Brady, M.S. (2010) Disappointment. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 84(1), pp. 179-198. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00191.x)

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00191.x


Miranda Fricker appeals to the idea of moral-epistemic disappointment in order to show how our practices of moral appraisal can be sensitive to cultural and historical contingency. In particular, she thinks that moral-epistemic disappointment allows us to avoid the extremes of crude moralism and a relativism of distance. In my response I want to investigate what disappointment is, and whether it can constitute a form of focused moral appraisal in the way that Fricker imagines. I will argue that Fricker is unable to appeal to disappointment as standardly understood, but that there is a more plausible way of understanding the notion that she can employ. There are, nevertheless, significant worries about the capacity of disappointment in this sense to function as a form of moral appraisal. I will argue, finally, that even if Fricker can address these worries, her position might end up closer to moralism than she would like.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Brady, Professor Michael
Authors: Brady, M.S.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
Publisher:John Wiley & Sons
ISSN (Online):1467-8349
Published Online:25 May 2010

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