Disappointment

Brady, M.S. (2010) Disappointment. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 84(1), pp. 179-198. (doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00191.x)

Abstract

Miranda Fricker appeals to the idea of moral-epistemic disappointment in order to show how our practices of moral appraisal can be sensitive to cultural and historical contingency. In particular, she thinks that moral-epistemic disappointment allows us to avoid the extremes of crude moralism and a relativism of distance. In my response I want to investigate what disappointment is, and whether it can constitute a form of focused moral appraisal in the way that Fricker imagines. I will argue that Fricker is unable to appeal to disappointment as standardly understood, but that there is a more plausible way of understanding the notion that she can employ. There are, nevertheless, significant worries about the capacity of disappointment in this sense to function as a form of moral appraisal. I will argue, finally, that even if Fricker can address these worries, her position might end up closer to moralism than she would like.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Brady, Professor Michael
• Authors: Brady, M.S.
• Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
• College/School: College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume
• Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
• ISSN: 0309-7013
• ISSN (Online): 1467-8349
• Published Online: 25 May 2010