Intentionalism and pain

Bain, D.T. (2003) Intentionalism and pain. Philosophical Quarterly, 53(213), pp. 502-523. (doi: 10.1111/1467-9213.00328)



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Pain may appear to undermine the radically intentionalist view that the phenomenal character of any experience is entirely constituted by its representational content. That appearance is illusory. After categorizing versions of pain intentionalism along two dimensions, I argue that an 'objectivist' and 'non-mentalist' version is the most promising, if it can withstand two objections concerning (a) what we say when in pain, and (b) the distinctiveness of pain. I rebut these objections, in a way available to both opponents of and adherents to the view that experiential content is entirely conceptual.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Bain, Dr David
Authors: Bain, D.T.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BD Speculative Philosophy
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Quarterly
Publisher:Blackwell Publishing
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2003 Blackwell Publishing
First Published:First published in Philosophical Quarterly 53(213):502-523
Publisher Policy:Reproduced with the permission of the publisher

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