Kemp, G. (2024) Quine, evidence, and our science. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-024-02116-8) (Early Online Publication)
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Abstract
As is reasonably well-appreciated, Quine struggled with his definition of the all-important notion of an observation sentence; especially in order to make them bear out his commitment to language’s being a ‘social art’. In an earlier article (Mind 131(523):805–825, 2022), I proposed a certain repair, which here I will explain, justify and articulate further. But it also infects the definition of observation categoricals, and furthermore makes it a secondary matter, a seeming afterthought, that evidence, science and knowledge generally are shared—are joint, social and collaborative products. Without forsaking Quine’s strict naturalism, I try to make the necessary adjustments to Quine’s scheme.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Keywords: | Quine, knowledge, evidence, observation sentences, social dimension. |
Status: | Early Online Publication |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Kemp, Dr Gary |
Authors: | Kemp, G. |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Philosophical Studies |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISSN: | 0031-8116 |
ISSN (Online): | 1573-0883 |
Published Online: | 20 March 2024 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © The Author(s) 2024 |
First Published: | First published in Philosophical Studies 2024 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons license |
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