Quine, evidence, and our science

Kemp, G. (2024) Quine, evidence, and our science. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-024-02116-8) (Early Online Publication)

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Abstract

As is reasonably well-appreciated, Quine struggled with his definition of the all-important notion of an observation sentence; especially in order to make them bear out his commitment to language’s being a ‘social art’. In an earlier article (Mind 131(523):805–825, 2022), I proposed a certain repair, which here I will explain, justify and articulate further. But it also infects the definition of observation categoricals, and furthermore makes it a secondary matter, a seeming afterthought, that evidence, science and knowledge generally are shared—are joint, social and collaborative products. Without forsaking Quine’s strict naturalism, I try to make the necessary adjustments to Quine’s scheme.

Item Type:Articles
Keywords:Quine, knowledge, evidence, observation sentences, social dimension.
Status:Early Online Publication
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kemp, Dr Gary
Authors: Kemp, G.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Studies
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0031-8116
ISSN (Online):1573-0883
Published Online:20 March 2024
Copyright Holders:Copyright © The Author(s) 2024
First Published:First published in Philosophical Studies 2024
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons license

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