Can epistemic paternalistic practice make us better epistemic agents?

Fratantonio, G. (2024) Can epistemic paternalistic practice make us better epistemic agents? Educational Theory, (doi: 10.1111/edth.12623) (Early Online Publication)

Abstract

Can epistemic paternalistic practices make us better epistemic agents? While a satisfying answer to this question will ultimately rest at least partly on empirical findings, considering the epistemological discussion on evidence, knowledge, and epistemic virtues can be insightful. In this paper, Giada Fratantonio argues that we have theoretical reasons to believe that strong epistemic paternalistic practices may be effective at mitigating some evidential mistakes, in fostering true belief, and even for allowing the subject of the intervention to gain knowledge. However, we have reasons to expect that these practices will not be able to make the subject of the intervention an overall better epistemic agent at the dispositional level. She then considers weak epistemic paternalistic practices, e.g., epistemic nudging, and provides some reasons for optimism. Finally, Fratantonio considers the implications that these theoretical considerations have for education.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Early Online Publication
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: FRATANTONIO, Dr GIADA
• Authors: Fratantonio, G.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Educational Theory
• Publisher: Wiley
• ISSN: 0013-2004
• ISSN (Online): 1741-5446
• Published Online: 04 March 2024
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2024 The Author
• First Published: First published in Educational Theory 2024
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons licence

Project Code	Award No	Project Name	Principal Investigator	Funder's Name	Funder Ref	Lead Dept
316175		Digital Knowledge: a new framework for digital epistemic virtues	Joseph Carter	Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC)	AH/W008424/1	Arts - Philosophy