Carving at the joints: distinguishing epistemic wrongs from epistemic harms in epistemic injustice contexts

Dunne, G. and Kotsonis, A. (2024) Carving at the joints: distinguishing epistemic wrongs from epistemic harms in epistemic injustice contexts. Episteme, (doi: 10.1017/epi.2023.62) (Early Online Publication)

Abstract

This paper examines the relatively underexplored relationship between epistemic wrongs and epistemic harms in the context of epistemic injustice. Does the presence of one always imply the presence of the other? Or, is it possible to have one without the other? Here we aim to establish a prima facie case that epistemic wrongs do not always produce epistemic harms. We argue that the epistemic wrongness of an action should never be evaluated solely based on the action's consequences, viz. the epistemic and practical harms suffered by the wronged party. Instead – as we shall show – epistemic harms necessarily follow from epistemic wrongs. To conclude, we suggest ways in which extant accounts of epistemic wrongs and epistemic harms as they cash out in epistemic injustice contexts might be refined in light of our argument.

• Item Type: Articles
• Keywords: Social epistemology, epistemic injustice, epistemic wrong, epistemic harm, primary and secondary harms.
• Status: Early Online Publication
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Kotsonis, Dr Alkis
• Authors: Dunne, G., and Kotsonis, A.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > School of Education
• Journal Name: Episteme
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• ISSN: 1742-3600
• ISSN (Online): 1750-0117
• Published Online: 25 January 2024
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2024 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Episteme 2024
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License