Compulsory voting, economic conditions and turnout: explaining the outcome of constitutional referendums

Gherghina, S. and Qvortrup, M. (2024) Compulsory voting, economic conditions and turnout: explaining the outcome of constitutional referendums. West European Politics, (doi: 10.1080/01402382.2023.2293380) (Early Online Publication)

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Abstract

Referendums were historically and theoretically justified as a people’s veto. Do voters use them as such or are referendums merely second-order votes? This article aims to answer this question through a comparative study of all constitutional referendums around the world between 1980 and 2022 using a VP-Function model. The results indicate that the support for constitutional referendums follows a pattern in which compulsory voting, economic conditions and voter mobilisation are important. Contrary to findings in more generic studies of referendums, there is no indication of a ‘honeymoon’ period for constitutional referendums. Also, in contrast to other studies, the presence of emotive words and what may appear as ‘leading questions’ favour higher support, though this is not present in countries with compulsory voting. The results contribute to the study of referendums and to the wider debate about voters’ preferences by showing that political factors are more important than structural factors.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Early Online Publication
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Gherghina, Dr Sergiu
Authors: Gherghina, S., and Qvortrup, M.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences > Politics
Journal Name:West European Politics
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN:0140-2382
ISSN (Online):1743-9655
Published Online:12 January 2024
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2024 The Authors
First Published:First published in West European Politics 2024
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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