Incentivizing responses in international organization elite surveys: evidence from the World Bank

Heinzel, M. , Weaver, C. and Briggs, R. (2024) Incentivizing responses in international organization elite surveys: evidence from the World Bank. Journal of Experimental Political Science, (doi: 10.1017/XPS.2023.39) (Early Online Publication)

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Abstract

Scholars of International Organizations (IOs) increasingly use elite surveys to study the preferences and decisions of policymakers. When designing these surveys, one central concern is low statistical power, because respondents are typically recruited from a small and inaccessible population. However, much of what we know about how to incentivize elites to participate in surveys is based on anecdotal reflections, rather than systematic evidence on which incentives work best. In this article, we study the efficacy of three incentives in a preregistered experiment with World Bank staff. These incentives were the chance to win an Amazon voucher, a donation made to a relevant charity, and a promise to provide a detailed report on the findings. We find that no incentive outperformed the control group, and the monetary incentive decreased the number of respondents on average by one-third compared to the control group (from around 8% to around 5%).

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:This work was supported by the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law, The University of Texas at Austin.
Status:Early Online Publication
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Heinzel, Dr Mirko
Authors: Heinzel, M., Weaver, C., and Briggs, R.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences
Journal Name:Journal of Experimental Political Science
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
ISSN:2052-2630
ISSN (Online):2052-2649
Published Online:26 January 2024
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2024 The Authors
First Published:First published in Journal of Experimental Political Science 2024
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
311169Earmarked funding and the effectiveness of international development organizations (EF-IO)Bernhard ReinsbergMedical Research Council (MRC)MR/V022148/1S&PS - Politics