Sovereign debt crises and low interest rates

Bloise, G. and Vailakis, Y. (2024) Sovereign debt crises and low interest rates. Journal of International Economics, 150, 103893. (doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.103893)

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Abstract

We revisit the occurrence of self-fulfilling crises in sovereign debt markets under time-varying interest rates and growth in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981)’s model. We show that, when long-term interest rates exceed growth, insolvency is solely caused by the exhaustion of the sovereign’s debt repayment capacity subject to limited commitment. Indeed, high interest rates impose discipline on market sentiments, because creditors necessarily become more optimistic about solvency when the sovereign reduces debt exposure. Creditors’ beliefs respond instead ambiguously under low interest rates fluctuating around growth. As long as interest rates exceed growth, debt reduction alleviates the fiscal burden. However, the sovereign also benefits from the prospect of rolling over outstanding debt as long as interest rates remain below growth. Thus, creditors’ sentiments might adjust adversely to fiscal consolidation. When the default punishment is not disproportionately severe, this mechanism sustains belief-driven debt crises even when fundamentals would otherwise ensure solvency.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:Gaetano Bloise acknowledges the financial support of the Italian Ministry of Education (PRIN 2015). Yiannis Vailakis acknowledges the financial support of an ERC starting grant (FP7, Ideas specific program, Project 240983 DCFM) and of two ANR research grants (Projects Novo Tempus and FIRE).
Keywords:Sovereign default risk, self-fulfilling crises, low interest rates, limited commitment.
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Vailakis, Professor Yiannis
Authors: Bloise, G., and Vailakis, Y.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Journal of International Economics
Publisher:Elsevier
ISSN:0022-1996
ISSN (Online):1873-0353
Published Online:02 February 2024
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2024 The Authors
First Published:First published in Journal of International Economics 150: 103893
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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