You’re Fired! International courts, re‐contracting, and the WTO Appellate Body during the Trump presidency

Zaccaria, G. (2022) You’re Fired! International courts, re‐contracting, and the WTO Appellate Body during the Trump presidency. Global Policy, 13(3), pp. 322-333. (doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.13032)

Abstract

A long-standing debate amongst international relations scholars has surrounded the question of whether international institutions with judicial authority enjoy more autonomy and discretion than other global institutions. This is mainly because international courts are established as impartial third-party actors tasked with performing adjudicative functions for conflicting parties. As such, the delegation contracts of international institutions with judicial authority are expected to minimize control by states, even in cases where the members of a court engage in judicial overreach. This article contributes to that debate by examining the case of the crisis of the WTO Appellate Body. The article analyzes the Trump administration's successful efforts at rendering dysfunctional one of the most powerful courts in the international system. The findings showcase how powerful states are capable and willing to take advantage of the available control mechanisms and the institutional opportunity structures inherent in the design of international courts. The article speaks to the scholarship on the contestation of international institutions. The analysis relies on original data obtained through 22 interviews with WTO officials, state representatives, and experts.

• Item Type: Articles
• Additional Information: Funding information: This article is part of a project that has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement no. 802568).
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Zaccaria, Dr Giuseppe
• Authors: Zaccaria, G.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences > Politics
• Journal Name: Global Policy
• Publisher: Wiley
• ISSN: 1758-5880
• ISSN (Online): 1758-5899
• Published Online: 14 March 2022
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2021 The Author
• First Published: First published in Global Policy 13(3):322-333
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons license