Corporate Governance of the Largest Russian Banks. BOFIT Policy Brief 2019 No. 3

Sprenger, C. and Todorović, S. (2019) Corporate Governance of the Largest Russian Banks. BOFIT Policy Brief 2019 No. 3. Other. Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT).

Abstract

Corporate governance can play an important complementary role in banking regulation by limiting excessive risk-taking by managers and shareholders at the expense of creditors, including small depositors. This paper provides a detailed analysis of corporate governance in Russia’s 30 largest banks during the period from 2007 to 2017. We look at several governance features, including ownership structure, the size, composition and compensation of the boards of directors, as well as CEO characteristics. Based on our findings, we recommend policymakers focus on strengthening the role of independent directors in non-listed banks, address signs of managerial entrenchment in state-owned banks (long tenure and compensation above the level of private and foreign banks), and improve disclosure about board independence, board committees, and the backgrounds of board members.

• Item Type: Research Reports or Papers (Other)
• Status: Published
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Sprenger, Dr Carsten
• Authors: Sprenger, C., and Todorović, S.
• College/School: UNSPECIFIED
• Journal Name: SSRN
• Publisher: Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)
• ISSN: 15565068

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