Epistemic control without voluntarism

Kearl, T. R. (2023) Epistemic control without voluntarism. Philosophical Issues, 33(1), pp. 95-109. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12245)

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It is tempting to think (though many deny) that epistemic agents exercise a distinctive kind of control over their belief-like attitudes. My aim here is to sketch a “bottom-up” model of epistemic agency, one that draws on an analogous model of practical agency, according to which an agent's conditional beliefs are reasons-responsive planning states that initiate and sustain mental behavior so as to render controlled.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:This research was made possible with funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No 948356, KnowledgeLab: Knowledge-First Social Epistemology, PI: Mona Simion).
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kearl, Dr Timothy
Authors: Kearl, T. R.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Issues
ISSN (Online):1758-2237
Published Online:19 August 2023
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2023 The Authors
First Published:First published in Philosophical Issues 33(1):95-109
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
309239Knowledge-First Social EpistemologyMona SimionEuropean Research Council (ERC)948356Arts - Philosophy