Epistemic control without voluntarism

Kearl, T. R. (2023) Epistemic control without voluntarism. Philosophical Issues, 33(1), pp. 95-109. (doi: 10.1111/phis.12245)

Abstract

It is tempting to think (though many deny) that epistemic agents exercise a distinctive kind of control over their belief-like attitudes. My aim here is to sketch a “bottom-up” model of epistemic agency, one that draws on an analogous model of practical agency, according to which an agent's conditional beliefs are reasons-responsive planning states that initiate and sustain mental behavior so as to render controlled.

• Item Type: Articles
• Additional Information: This research was made possible with funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No 948356, KnowledgeLab: Knowledge-First Social Epistemology, PI: Mona Simion).
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Kearl, Dr Timothy
• Authors: Kearl, T. R.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Philosophical Issues
• Publisher: Wiley
• ISSN: 1533-6077
• ISSN (Online): 1758-2237
• Published Online: 19 August 2023
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2023 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Philosophical Issues 33(1):95-109
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

Project Code	Award No	Project Name	Principal Investigator	Funder's Name	Funder Ref	Lead Dept
309239		Knowledge-First Social Epistemology	Mona Simion	European Research Council (ERC)	948356	Arts - Philosophy