Knowledge-how and the limits of defeat

Kearl, T. (2023) Knowledge-how and the limits of defeat. Synthese, 202, 59. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-023-04280-6)

Abstract

How, if at all, is knowing how to do something defeasible? Some, the “intellectualists”, treat the defeasibility of knowledge-how as in some way derivative on the defeasibility of knowledge-that. According to a recent proposal by Carter and Navarro (Philos Phenomenol Res 3:662–685, 2017), knowledge-how defeat cannot be explained in terms of knowledge-that defeat; instead, knowledge-how defeat merits and entirely separate treatment. The thought behind “separatism” is easy to articulate. Assuming that knowledge of any kind is defeasible, since knowledge-that and knowledge-how are fundamentally different beasts, the best accounts of their defeasibility must reflect the underlying differences between them. I reject a separatist treatment of the defeasibility of knowledge-that and knowledge-how. One can acknowledge certain important differences between knowledge-that and knowledge-how without thereby needing two theories of defeasibility. Ultimately, though, I’ll argue that the defeasibility of basic knowledge-how, unlike non-basic knowledge-how, is a much more difficult issue than has been acknowledged.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Kearl, Dr Timothy
• Authors: Kearl, T.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Synthese
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 0039-7857
• ISSN (Online): 1573-0964
• Published Online: 11 August 2023
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © The Author(s) 2023
• First Published: First published in Synthese 202:59
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons license

Project Code	Award No	Project Name	Principal Investigator	Funder's Name	Funder Ref	Lead Dept
309239		Knowledge-First Social Epistemology	Mona Simion	European Research Council (ERC)	948356	Arts - Philosophy