Knowledge-how and the limits of defeat

Kearl, T. (2023) Knowledge-how and the limits of defeat. Synthese, 202, 59. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-023-04280-6)

[img] Text
304177.pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.



How, if at all, is knowing how to do something defeasible? Some, the “intellectualists”, treat the defeasibility of knowledge-how as in some way derivative on the defeasibility of knowledge-that. According to a recent proposal by Carter and Navarro (Philos Phenomenol Res 3:662–685, 2017), knowledge-how defeat cannot be explained in terms of knowledge-that defeat; instead, knowledge-how defeat merits and entirely separate treatment. The thought behind “separatism” is easy to articulate. Assuming that knowledge of any kind is defeasible, since knowledge-that and knowledge-how are fundamentally different beasts, the best accounts of their defeasibility must reflect the underlying differences between them. I reject a separatist treatment of the defeasibility of knowledge-that and knowledge-how. One can acknowledge certain important differences between knowledge-that and knowledge-how without thereby needing two theories of defeasibility. Ultimately, though, I’ll argue that the defeasibility of basic knowledge-how, unlike non-basic knowledge-how, is a much more difficult issue than has been acknowledged.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kearl, Dr Timothy
Authors: Kearl, T.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Synthese
ISSN (Online):1573-0964
Published Online:11 August 2023
Copyright Holders:Copyright © The Author(s) 2023
First Published:First published in Synthese 202:59
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons license

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record

Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
309239Knowledge-First Social EpistemologyMona SimionEuropean Research Council (ERC)948356Arts - Philosophy