Lessons from the Japanese ninja: on achieving a higher trade equilibrium under anarchy and private constitutions

Maltsev, V. (2021) Lessons from the Japanese ninja: on achieving a higher trade equilibrium under anarchy and private constitutions. Constitutional Political Economy, 33(4), pp. 433-444. (doi: 10.1007/s10602-021-09354-6)

[img] Text
303601.pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.

626kB

Abstract

This paper investigates the possibility of anarchy achieving a high trade equilibrium via the example of ninja communities in Japan. Initially, ninjas in the mountainous regions of Iga and Kōka were stateless, constantly feuded, and had few opportunities for exchange. With the advent of civil war in the sixteenth century, ninjas’ economic conditions changed. The mercenary market significantly expanded and presented great profit opportunities for the ninjas. However, instead of creating a formal government to move to a higher trade equilibrium, the ninjas resorted to forming voluntary confederations held together by private constitutions. I argue that this development was possible because the institutional environment of the Sengoku period enabled a framework of self-governing institutions and principles. The ninjas were able to build on this framework with very low organizational costs. As a result, the ninjas were able to reap large economic gains on the mercenary market while remaining stateless—a seemingly paradoxical development that goes against the standard dichotomy of “states and thick markets” versus “anarchy and thin markets.”

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Maltsev, Dr Vladimir
Authors: Maltsev, V.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Constitutional Political Economy
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:1043-4062
ISSN (Online):1572-9966
Published Online:16 December 2021
Copyright Holders:Copyright © The Author(s) 2021
First Published:First published in Constitutional Political Economy 33(4):433-444
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons license

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record