Maltsev, V. (2021) Lessons from the Japanese ninja: on achieving a higher trade equilibrium under anarchy and private constitutions. Constitutional Political Economy, 33(4), pp. 433-444. (doi: 10.1007/s10602-021-09354-6)
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Abstract
This paper investigates the possibility of anarchy achieving a high trade equilibrium via the example of ninja communities in Japan. Initially, ninjas in the mountainous regions of Iga and Kōka were stateless, constantly feuded, and had few opportunities for exchange. With the advent of civil war in the sixteenth century, ninjas’ economic conditions changed. The mercenary market significantly expanded and presented great profit opportunities for the ninjas. However, instead of creating a formal government to move to a higher trade equilibrium, the ninjas resorted to forming voluntary confederations held together by private constitutions. I argue that this development was possible because the institutional environment of the Sengoku period enabled a framework of self-governing institutions and principles. The ninjas were able to build on this framework with very low organizational costs. As a result, the ninjas were able to reap large economic gains on the mercenary market while remaining stateless—a seemingly paradoxical development that goes against the standard dichotomy of “states and thick markets” versus “anarchy and thin markets.”
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Maltsev, Dr Vladimir |
Authors: | Maltsev, V. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics |
Journal Name: | Constitutional Political Economy |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISSN: | 1043-4062 |
ISSN (Online): | 1572-9966 |
Published Online: | 16 December 2021 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © The Author(s) 2021 |
First Published: | First published in Constitutional Political Economy 33(4):433-444 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons license |
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