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The regulation of international migration in the Cold War: a synthesis and review of the literature

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ABSTRACT

For a long time, research on international migration during the Cold War maintained that a rigid distinction existed between political emigration, generated by the ideological conflict between liberalism and communism, and labour migration, which was determined by transformations in the capitalist world economy. This article challenges that assumption on several grounds. It starts from the premise that the Cold War was primarily a competition between the capitalist and communist projects of development. It ascribes to this rivalry the establishment of the international system regulating migration as a terrain of ideological confrontation in the early postwar period, and its evolution into one of convergence over development strategies since the 1970s. It reviews both the literature on labour migration to/in Western Europe and the recent studies exploring how socialist Europe also relied on foreign labour recruitment to achieve development. It brings these findings in conversation with research that examines the expansion of economic cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe during the long 1970s. It shows that, in this context, the distinction between economic migrant and political refugee continued to justify the erection of wired walls, this time between an enlarging European Union and the Global South.

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Introduction

This contribution is concerned with the ideological and institutional origins of the current regulation of international migration and in particular the legal distinction that it establishes between economic migrants and political refugees. It explores these questions by analysing them through the lens of the Cold War and the importance which the Cold War division of the world played for any aspect of international relations in the second half of the twentieth century. In doing so, its aim is twofold: to foster debate about the importance, on the one hand, of international migration for the Cold War rivalry between the superpowers, and, on the other hand, of the Cold War rivalry for the regulation of international migration. Its starting point is that the definition of economic migration as a voluntary choice, by contrast with political migration as a forced one, became a founding principle of the regulation of international migration in 1951 with the signing of the Refugee Convention.¹ But the role played by migration in development processes was and remained contested during the Cold War primarily because the meaning of, and paths to, development were disputed during the Cold War.² As Alessandro Landolo (2022) explains, 'Often understood as a geopolitical conflict, the Cold War was about development. Both capitalism and socialism had as their final goal the betterment of

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humanity, and both promised fast economic growth and better living conditions to those who adopted their principles' (p. 42).

Both liberal and socialist countries produced legislation on workers' rights that was embedded in different projects of modernity. Socialism advocated 'the right to stay', which was ensured through the policy of full employment. The recruitment of foreign labor was considered a form of exploitation of the working class used by capitalism to generate profit at the expense of labor migrants and to reproduce the economic dependency of their countries of origin. Capitalism by contrast sponsored the 'right of exit', which offered any individual the choice to decide their own fortune and, while doing so, to correct the imperfection the market economy. Labor migration, rather than reproducing dependency, optimized productivity, offered opportunity for social mobility, and reduced poverty.

However, over the last two decades, the assumption that there existed a Cold War divide over migration has been questioned on several grounds. New research has demonstrated that socialist societies were not immobile but were in fact fully included within the transnational system of migration (Borodziej & von Puttkamer, 2020). Most importantly, socialist countries conceptualized and developed a system of international labor migration that was intended as an instrument of socialist development.³ Studies supporting this claim have developed within a larger and rapidly expanding scholarship that, relying on newly available archival evidence and applying global, gender, and postcolonial approaches, has redefined the study of the Cold War.⁴ Their main merit has been to shed fresh light on the multiple polarities, agencies, and interactions that transformed the 'Iron Curtain' into a 'Nylon Curtain' (Péteri, 2004). Economic development and human rights figure prominently in this literature as the pillars around which both competition and cooperation were built across the ideological divide. The protagonists were political and economic actors from small-scale peripheral countries, navigating the waters of Cold War rivalry to find 'neutral' ground in international organizations such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the United Nations (UN) (Betts, 2022; Maul, 2012). European agency and the agency of socialist Europe, in particular, emerge prominently in these alternative histories of the Cold War (Calori et al., 2019; Christian et al., 2018; Mark & Betts, 2022a; Romano & Romero, 2020b).

Within this context, migration was both a top-down and a bottom-up strategy to adapt, resist, or embrace superpower competition. But when, how, and why the regulation of international migration became entangled with the above-described dynamics; if there was any socialist influence in the regulation of international migration in the West and vice-versa; and whether a socialist alternative to the regulation of international migration was possible, still remain open questions that will be discussed within this contribution. To do so, this contribution brings together the sizeable but scattered scholarship that has emerged on the various aspects of the relation between the Cold War and the regulation of international migration in the postwar period. It is an attempt to offer a synthesis and a review of the literature that covers the key debates and reveals the relevant gaps. It focuses primarily on Europe and on how Cold War division shaped the regulation of migration on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

This contribution is divided into four sections. The first section reassesses the relevance of the establishment of international refugee protection for the regulation of international labor migration as a terrain of Cold War rivalry. It shows that rather than there being a conflict over the absence of human rights protections for refugees in socialist countries, the management of postwar displacement was crucial in defining the relation between labor, development, and human rights that was adopted by the international community and that set the terms for the regulation of international migration in the subsequent decades. The second and third sections analyse the development of international labor migration in Western Europe and in Eastern Europe respectively, from the early 1950s to the late 1960s. These sections show how labor migration, initially an instrument of Cold War division and competition, gradually transformed into a crucial instrument of cooperation as both sides of the Iron Curtain became more interdependent. The fourth section analyses the final two decades of the Cold War. It examines the ways in which international migration, détente, and the new wave of economic globalization were intertwined. It shows how increasing East-West

cooperation led to the convergence of socialism and capitalism over the role of foreign trade and competitiveness in development processes. The distinction between economic migrant and refugee lost its relevance in shaping the dynamics of Cold War Europe, but it acquired a new function in relations with the Global South as new walls were constructed on the new European frontier.

Setting the debate: human rights, labor, and development from postwar displacement to international refugee protection

In the literature concerning the early postwar period, three factors tend to emerge as more dominant than others in defining the European postwar international order: a great expansion of governmental and non-governmental organization in the form of spaces and actors producing the normative framework for the internationalism of nation states (Mazower, 2011; Sluga, 2013); the unprecedented displacement caused by the war (Cohen, 2011; Gatrell, 2019); and the beginning of the Cold War. Research analysing the aftermath of World War Two from a Cold War perspective suggests that these three elements were strongly interconnected. Tension between the Soviet Union and the Western allies first developed in the international organizations that were set up to solve the problems of (post)war displacement. Between 1943 and 1945, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) repatriated war prisoners of Soviet citizenship as part of the agreements with the Soviet Union. But as soon as the war ended, frictions among the Allies rapidly escalated. UNRRA was dissolved, and a new international body, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was created. Under the IRO, which was largely controlled by the United States, the priority for relief aid switched from the repatriation of the displaced to the resettlement of Eastern European refugees far from Soviet reach (Gatrell, 2013, p. 86; Reinisch, 2011). In 1950, another international organization was created to solve the problems related to refugee relief aid, repatriation, and resettlement: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The adoption of the Refugee Convention came the following year. For the first time, a system of international refugee protection based on human rights was introduced. This was a major discontinuity from the interwar period when refugees were considered a subcategory of migrants and were essentially treated as economic migrants (Esch, 2020; Long, 2013). The pillar of the Convention was that it endorsed the right of exit and non-refoulement for any individuals who could provide strong evidence that before 1 January 1951 they were persecuted on grounds of race, religion, nationality, or political opinion. By doing so, the Refugee Convention established a clear, albeit implicit, reference to those escaping the establishment of communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

The scholarship on the establishment and early years of activity of the UNHCR explains that the Refugee Convention was an attempt to find a 'neutral' position between the socialist camp and Western bloc (Loescher, 2001). However studies examining the management of postwar displacement from a Cold War perspective generally agree that in transforming refugeedom from a socio-economic to a political status, the Refugee Convention legitimized the anticommunism of the Western powers.⁵ The Western media gave extensive coverage to defections in order to demonstrate to the western public the regime of terror that reined behind the Curtain (Bade, 2003, 267, pp. 266; Carruthers, 2009; Zahra, 2016, pp. 236, 237). Western governments recruited spies and country analysts among Eastern European refugees in the hope that they would destabilize their country of origin. The United States financially sustained émigré communities and their anti-Soviet activism, including the preparation of military units that could intervene in Eastern Europe (Quinney, 2018; Verovsek, 2019).⁶ Research has also explored how the system of human rights endorsed by the Refugee Convention did in fact empower those who left the Eastern bloc in different waves after 1945 because of anticommunism.⁷ For instance, Polish political émigrés embraced the Refugee Convention to petition for international support against Soviet repatriation programs in 1955 (Mazurkiewicz, 2022). The anticommunist drive of international refugee protection is further attested by research showing that, in the 1950s, professing anticommunism constituted sufficient grounds to receive refugee status, even for collaborators with Nazism, in countries such as the United States,

Argentina, and West Germany (Zahra, 2016, pp. 205–207; Tokic, 2020, pp. 26–32; Molnar, 2018, pp. 72–78). Even in the 1960s, when a milder form of anticommunism was professed by political leaderships in most Western countries those labor migrants recruited as guestworkers during the economic boom were discriminated against and even imprisoned in liberal Switzerland on the basis of alleged affiliation to communist organizations (Prieto, 2020).

On the other hand, recent research on human rights in socialist countries shows that the establishment of refugee protections was neither solely a product of Cold War rivalry nor only the concern of liberal democracies. First of all, not all the political refugees of the early postwar period were escaping the socialist camp to flee to the West. Some went in the opposite direction: for example, socialist-leaning workers migrating from Italy to Yugoslavia (Abram, *in press*; Miletto, 2019), or refugees escaping the Greek Civil War (1946–1949) and finding shelter in the socialist camp (Bade, 2003, p. 270; Alamgir, 2022, pp. 294–296). Socialist countries also offered protection to political opponents of communist leaderships that did not align with Stalin, as in the case of Yugoslav Stalinists moving to the Soviet bloc following the Tito-Stalin Split (Vojtěchovský, 2016). Moreover, the arrival of refugees was not a new phenomenon in Eastern Europe. In the interwar period refugees escaping from the Russian revolution and from Hitler's takeover in Germany found refuge in Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest (Borodziej & Puttkamer, 2020; Čapková, 2020). The aid offered to refugees by socialist countries presented many similarities with that offered in Western Europe. In both socialist and capitalist countries, refugees were primarily seen as the manpower necessary for postwar reconstruction. On both sides of Europe, securing and improving the employability of refugees was one of the aims of humanitarian aid.⁸ Regarding the right to family reunion in cases of state-sponsored transfer of ethnic minorities or repatriation, the regulatory principles adopted by socialist countries were similar to those implemented in the West (on ethnic Germans see Panadiotidis, 2015). This was because human rights were as central to socialism as they were to liberalism (Betts, 2022; Przetacznik, 1971). Human rights discourses were embedded in developmental strategies in both the capitalist West and the socialist East.

Indeed, the Refugee Convention was not a confrontation regarding the management of postwar displacement but rather one that concerned the relation between labor, human rights, and development; and between the communist 'right to employment' and capitalist 'right to work'.⁹ In socialist countries, the nation state secured the fundamental human rights (access to free education and health) that were granted through employment. To secure employment to all, the nation state controlled and planned economic production in which workers participated as a collective. This would ultimately produce a communist, classless, and just society, it was proposed. In liberal Western countries, the right to work was not about securing employment but, instead, about obtaining fair conditions of work for everyone independently of their class, gender, and race, with equal application to employers and to employees. The state was still a key player. It regulated the conditions of economic competition between different actors with the aim of maximising profit and individual freedom rather than justice and equality. More precisely, the state was guarantor of the right to work. The right to vote and the freedom of worker association ensured that the process was fair and rewarding for the individual rather than for the collective.

The conflict concerning 'right to work' and 'right to employment' was not a novelty of the postwar period. In the interwar period, the definition of, and solution to, 'forced labour' – with respect to the unfree nature of worker association – was a major terrain of action of the ILO but also division within this organization (Maul, 2007). Since 1919, the ILO had assumed a leading role in establishing regulation of labor rights, based on the principle of democratic tripartism – according to which the state, the employers, and the free association of workers should take part in negotiations. As workers' freedom of association was the precondition for the democratic functioning of the negotiation process, associations of workers that were considered 'unfree' were denied recognition in the ILO. On these grounds, German trade unions were excluded in the 1930s. The Soviet Union became a member only in the second half of the 1930s when it joined the League of Nations as part of the popular front strategy; yet it was expelled in 1940 when it invaded Finland. During the 1930s,

however, the Soviet Union did not engage actively with the ILO, in large part because of the friction within the international movement of trade unions. Soviet trade unions were banned from the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) on the insistence of its major member the American Federation of Labor (AFL) (Jacobson, 1960).

Nevertheless, in 1945, the Soviet contribution to defeating fascism and liberating Europe from the Axis powers granted Moscow support from the international labor movement for the establishment of a new international trade union organisation that sided with Stalin: the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Initially this was a great victory for the Soviet Union, as the large majority of trade unions worldwide left the IFTU to join the WFTU. The Soviet Union also tried to seize the moment to obtain immediate recognition for the WFTU in the United Nations. In particular, the Soviet Union asked for members of the WFTU to be granted the right to participate and to propose motions in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN, which, unlike its predecessor – the League of Nations – was able to grant such prerogatives to nongovernmental organizations. According to contemporary observer Harold Jacobson (1957) these endeavours brought important results. As UN founding members, the Soviet Union along with Belarus, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia¹⁰ actively participated in the drafting of the Genocide Convention in Nuremberg and in the elaboration of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which occurred in San Francisco (Betts, 2022). They also proposed motions regarding labor rights to be discussed in the ECOSOC. Specifically, they used the Council to accuse the Western countries of discrimination against communist trade unions, of creating unemployment, and of failing to secure equal pay. These accusations, and the reaction to them, Jacobson (1957) explains, soon transformed the Council ‘into an arena of the cold war’ (p. 56).

Tensions escalated in 1948. The communist delegates at the UN refused to vote on the endorsement of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in protest of the document not being progressive enough: it was not inclusive in terms of social, economic, and cultural rights, while prioritising civil and political rights (Betts, 2022, pp. 182,183). On similar grounds, they opposed the establishment of the UNHCR in 1950. In 1948, the UN endorsed the AFL’s proposal to transfer responsibility for all questions related to trade union and labor rights to the ILO. This was a major defeat for the Soviet Union, which had hoped that the WFTU could compete with, and perhaps even replace, the ILO (Jacobson, 1958, 1960). The same year, most of the trade unions from non-socialist countries left the WFTU. The literature suggests that the Soviet Union’s request that its ‘allies’ reject the Marshall Plan, and the use of the WFTU as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, were the main grounds for this exodus. With the trade unions of non-socialist countries re-joining the IFTU, this was renamed the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) (Devinatz, 2013). The isolation of the WFTU, and of the trade unions of communist countries in the ILO and in the UN, greatly limited the ability of the Soviet Union to exert power over worker rights beyond the socialist bloc.¹¹ This was the principal reason why the Soviet Union re-joined the ILO in 1954 (Jacobson, 1960).

As the confrontation between the right to employment and the right to work dominated international organizations, the regulation of international migration that developed in the following decades became primarily a matter of the ‘western world’. Yet this is not to say that Cold War competition and the right to employment, as promoted by the Soviet Union, played no role. Rather, it was precisely in the field of ideas, rather than in its economic development, that the Soviet Union and the socialist project it represented challenged Western hegemony (Iandolo, 2022). Even under Stalin, the Soviet Union was visited by representatives of communist trade unions from Western countries who came back inspired and not disillusioned by what they had seen (American Trade Union Delegation, 1952; British Workers’ Delegation in Stalingrad, 1951). Although the Hungarian refugee crisis severely affected the stability of communist parties in Western Europe, the Soviet Union and its ‘satellites’ continued to inspire and be admired by various leftist movements. The trade unions affiliated to the WFTU had large memberships in Italy and France. Radical factions siding with Moscow were present within communist parties around the world (Harisch & Burton, 2023). But above all, the reformed communism that emerged in Eastern Europe from the mid-1950s created

transnational spaces in which exchanges and mutual influences were bidirectional (Christian et al., 2018). This was especially the case for Yugoslavia, whose system of workers' self-management was admired by many in the West and beyond (Zaccaria, 2018). The fear of communism's soft power transformed labor migration into a field of Cold War confrontation not only in East-West relations but also within Western Europe itself.

The Cold War of labor migration in Western Europe: from containment to offensive

If the Refugee Convention transformed migration into a field of competition between the two blocs, it was the Hungarian refugee crisis that revealed the full potential of migration as a Cold War battlefield. By the time of the Hungarian refugee crisis, the problem of surplus population in Western Europe was coming to an end, and a new phase characterized by shortages of labor was about to begin. The division of Europe in the late 1940s, and the economic boom of the mid-1950s, both sustained by the Marshall Plan, drove the change.

The Hungarian refugee crisis was different in many ways from the displacement of the first postwar decade. Involving approximately 200,000 Hungarians, it was the largest refugee crisis since World War Two and it was caused by the first major political crisis within the socialist system following the Tito-Stalin split. For the first time since 1946, international relief organizations did not exclude voluntary repatriation as an option for those who were considered economic migrants¹²; a change of approach that stemmed, at least in part, from the more constructive engagement adopted by the Soviet Union toward the UN from 1953 onward (Jacobson, 1958, p. 673). The Hungarians who fled in 1956 were different from the postwar displaced persons of the previous decade. While the latter were largely impoverished peasants in search of shelter and employment, the former group included young and educated individuals who left because of their active political opposition to Soviet rule. It seemed that the Refugee Convention was written for them. Indeed, the mandate of the UNHCR was extended to the Hungarian refugee crisis despite the Refugee Convention being limited to displacement occurring because of events taking place in Europe before 1 January 1951. The argument went that the Hungarian Revolution resulted from the communist takeover in 1949 (Gatrell, 2013, p. 113). The Western media were profuse in their presentation of Hungarians as especially deserving and valuable individuals. In doing so, the aim was twofold: to discredit socialism as a valid model of development, as it was being rejected by its most valuable subjects; and to facilitate the settlement process (via recruitment) of Hungarians by praising their high employability. The literature suggests that the latter was achieved successfully, and the settlement of Hungarian refugees was both smooth and quick (Comte, 2020; Papadopoulos & Kourachanis, 2015). The majority of Hungarian refugees left Europe for overseas countries under the supervision of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) (Ventura, 2015).

The Hungarian refugee crisis was a catalyst for the transformation of the provisional relief aid organizations, which were created to supervise the problem of postwar displacement, into permanent agencies for development (Parsanoglou & Papadopoulos, 2019, pp. 335–338). This was the case for ICEM¹³ and the UNHCR, which replaced the IRO, and for the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OECE). The UNHCR continued to supervise postwar refugee crises in Europe until the closure of the last refugee camps for displaced Europeans in the 1960s. However, from the Hungarian refugee crisis onward and until the end of the Cold War, the UNHCR was primarily involved in humanitarian actions in war-torn areas of Asia and Africa. The ILO, which had already been a permanent organization and a crucial player in the regulation of international migration since 1919, increasingly assumed operational and technical roles in programmes of development at the global level (Easton-Calabria, 2015, p. 423; Maul, 2012). From the 1940s, the ILO had also become active primarily outside of Europe where it exported the model of social welfare and labor protection legislation belonging to the advanced liberal democracies (Kott, 2018; Maul, 2012, pp. 31–58).

The reconfiguration of international organizations offering humanitarian help into permanent agencies for development was a response to the Cold War competition in the developing countries.

While supporting development was a common objective of humanitarian aid, each organization had its own political agenda that was defined by the priorities of their member states and by the respective contributions to the organization's budget. For instance, the universalistic vocation (meaning to expand membership as much as possible) embraced by the UN and ILO led to a majoritarian non-European membership in the 1960s in both organizations (Maul, 2012, pp. 227–258). One of the most tangible results of this geographical shift was the establishment of the forum of the developing countries, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 (Gardner, 1968). The OECD, which was the forum of the West, considered UNCTAD not so much a threat to the hegemony of the West as to the idea of development that it endorsed. Research by Patricia Hongler (2017) shows that, according to the OECD, developing countries had an 'emotional' approach to development, which compromised the rational use of resources and therefore the success of development processes at the global level. After the creation of UNCTAD, the OECD greatly reinforced the centrality of objectivity and rationality in supporting global development. In the area of migration policy, the central role of the OECD was in establishing a standardized system for monitoring migration as well as defining good practice for optimising the allocation of economic resources created by migration (Comte & Paoli, 2017; Bernard, 2019, pp. 69–75). As will be explained later, this role became crucial for the transformation of international migration in the second half of the 1970s.

The Hungarian refugee crisis helped to drive the establishment of the international system for the regulation of international labor migration in which economic development, peaceful relations, and anticommunism were strongly interconnected (Parsanoglou & Papadopoulos, 2019). Recent studies have examined how ICEM and OEEC played a major role in this process. Both organizations had clear anticommunist agendas and had no socialist countries among their members.¹⁴ ICEM and OEEC were intergovernmental organizations that were affiliated to the Marshall aid plan and tasked with finding a solution to the problem of surplus population in Europe. ICEM was established in 1952 and was mostly in charge of acting as a sponsor for the recruitment of European refugees and emigrants to South American countries. In the second half of the 1950s, when the problem of surplus population was seen as having been solved by degrees, there was some discussion of the future of ICEM; yet plans for its closure were abandoned following events in Hungary in 1956. ICEM proved its utility in using migration as an instrument for tying the development of overseas recruiting countries into Western strategic priorities (Ventura, 2015). From the late 1950s onward, ICEM operated principally in Latin America, where it became bastion of Western and US interests (Redondo Carrero, 2022). The trajectory of the OEEC was similar. Renamed the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) in 1961, it was established in 1948 to supervise the use of Marshall Plan. It also acted as an 'early embryo of European integration' until the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, after which it increasingly focused on the standardization of international economic statistics and became an important conduit for transatlantic norms in production and governance (Leimgruber & Schmelzer, 2017).

The expansion of the Western-led regulation of international labor migration outside of Europe was possible thanks to increasing levels of cooperation between the Western European countries in the area of migration policy, which was sustained by advances in the process of European integration. According to Emmanuel Comte, Western European responses to the Hungarian refugee crisis (including the opening of Western borders to refugees), were instrumental to the above. They transformed the problem of East-West migration from a policy of containing Soviet influence into an offensive anticommunist strategy (Comte, 2020).

German economic recovery, and its later economic expansion, played a prominent role in defining the ways in which labor migration shaped both the process of European integration and the Cold War strategies of Western European countries. After capitulation in 1945, Germany was occupied and partitioned by Allied forces. High unemployment was fuelled by war destruction, war reparations, and postwar displacement. Germany was, by far, the country most affected by postwar displacement. It received between 12 and 14 million East Germans from Eastern Europe during and

after the war, a large part of whom were excluded from resettlement aid.¹⁵ Fears that social unrest could lead to alliances between Soviet and Western controlled zones of Germany was a major concern of the United States. Especially prior to the split in 1949 between the WFTU and the ICFTU, a key objective of the American administration in Germany was to restrain and hinder cooperation between German trade unions under Western and Soviet control (Eisenberg, 1983). German recovery became the top priority of the Marshall Plan (Knapp et al., 1981). As West German recovery progressed and the economy began to experience shortages of labor, recruitment could not be pointed eastward as it had been in the past. Rather, it was Italy that signed the first recruitment agreement with West Germany in 1955. In Italy, persistent unemployment and regional underdevelopment constituted both a threat to political stability and fertile terrain for the spread of communism (Comte, 2018; Comte & Paoli, 2017, p. 262). In the 1960s, recruitment agreements were also signed with Portugal and Spain, which were both ruled by right-wing dictatorships that shared the anticommunist drive of Western European liberal democracies.

There is overall agreement in the literature that German economic needs were determinant in the establishment and development of the guestworker recruitment agreements. West Germany was by far the principal recruiter of guestworkers. Emmanuel Comte goes further and argues that, at the level of the European Economic Community, German economic needs (or rather the priorities of the German business sector) were prioritized at the expense of other national economies such as France or the north Mediterranean area. This derived from the importance of the division of Germany for the process of European integration and also from the Cold War division for West Germany's domestic and foreign policies (Comte, 2018). Yet the regulation of international migration in the postwar period was not only a response to Cold War competition and the division of Germany. It was also defined by the crisis of imperialism and the process of decolonization that had started in the interwar period. In fact, the state-run recruitment agreements adopted in Western Europe during the economic boom were modelled on the French interwar experience in which recruitment of labor converged from continental and transoceanic colonial systems. The ILO Convention 97 and Recommendation 86, which were adopted in 1949 and which became the model for bilateral labor agreements adopted in Western Europe during the economic boom, were shaped by the interwar regulation of international migration (Rass, 2012). Seven million European colonizers and their families returned to Western Europe in the period 1940–1975 (Bade, 2003, pp. 222, 223) and many other colonial subjects arrived in Western Europe as labor migrants. Western European countries were differently affected by both Cold War rivalry and decolonization, and these differences were noticeable in the variety of migration regimes adopted by Western European countries. These ranged from the guestworker regime based on rotation and temporary employment adopted by Germany and Switzerland; to the hybrid regime, which mixed guestworker recruitment and colonial migrant workers characterized France and the Netherlands; to the colonial regime adopted by Great Britain, in which most of the foreign labor force came from the Commonwealth and Ireland (Kofman, 2000, p. 48). This diversity was the main reason why, in the first two postwar decades, there was a vibrant debate among Western European countries concerning the relation between freedom of circulation and workers' rights; and, more broadly, regarding the role of international migration in defining relations among Western European countries and between the latter and their neighbouring countries in the 'South' (Barnard & Fraser Butlin, 2022; Patel, 2013). Yet whether and on what terms the colonial immigration of the first two postwar decades challenged or in fact reinforced the anticommunist drive of labor recruitment and what role was played by international migration in the process of European integration remain questions that only a few studies have started to address (Garavini, 2007; Laschi et al., 2021).

A further aspect that remains poorly investigated is if, and with what effect, a debate about labor migrant rights existed in the European labor movement. Two factors can explain this gap. Firstly, with regard to trade union positions on employment policy, it can be argued that regional and local labor market needs, and the different approaches to foreign labor recruitment adopted by different industrial branches at the local, regional, and national level, were equally if not more relevant than

were (trans)national strategies. Secondly, the bilateral nature of recruitment agreements also partly accounts for this gap. Trade unions were involved in negotiations for the recruitment of foreign labor forces in different ways in different countries: they were highly involved in Austria, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden; but they played a minor role in Switzerland, France, and Britain (Pennix & Roosblad, 2000). Pioneering research by Johan Svanberg (2021b) suggests that, due to the Cold War, trade union internationalism did intensify, but within the ideological divide rather than across the ideological divide. These dynamics have also been found in debates about labor migration. For instance, Western European trade unions affiliated to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) were in favour of both European integration and the free circulation of labor, on a temporary basis. Given that this policy agenda offered short term solutions to the imbalances between labor demand and supply and also optimized economic growth to the benefit of Western European workers, the temporary recruitment of foreign labor was considered beneficial to the process of European integration, and to the anticommunism that both the ICFTU and Western European governments shared (Svanberg, 2021a). This policy position was also that adopted by the ILO in the 1950s. Under the direction of the liberal David Morse (1948 to 1970), the ILO specialized in providing technical support to fair competition rather than to redistribution and social protection as the strategy for ensuring better living standards for waged workers (Kott, 2019, pp. 7, 8 ; Maul, 2010).

The relation between trade unions and migrant workers has also been overlooked in the scholarship. Research by Jennifer J. Miller (2013) and Simon Goeke (2014) demonstrates that migrant workers' labor activism was an important aspect of the wave of strikes and unrest that spread across West Germany and beyond in the late 1960s and 1970s. Their findings accord with sociological studies which suggest that, beginning in the second half of the 1970s, the struggle of migrant workers in the workplace became detached from trade union activism (cf. Goeke, 2014; M. J. Miller, 1981; Pennix & Roosblad, 2000). Unlike during the period of economic boom, there was an end to collective contracts for foreign labor recruitment of large numbers of workers, who had primarily worked in heavy industry sectors. This was replaced by small-scale recruitment of both high and low qualified workers to fill shortages in the high technology and service sectors that were both poorly unionized. In West Germany, where trade unions worked in close cooperation with the state and employers in the recruitment of migrant workers, the latest international assembly in which representatives from Turkey, Yugoslavia, and West Germany discussed the question of labor migration was held in 1976 (Haberl, 1985). This is not to say that trade unions ceased to be important actors in migration policies and labor migrant recruitment after 1976; nor that migrants were no longer an important part of the working force in Western Europe from the mid-1970s onward. Rather, it is argued that in the second half of the 1970s, and even more so in the 1980s, the presence of migrants in Western Europe was increasingly regulated as a question of cultural integration rather than of temporary employment and residence (Goeke, 2014, pp. 181–182; Pennix & Roosblad, 2000; Chin, 2017).

The parabola of labor migrants, from instruments to forge Western political and economic integration, into the object of integration policies themselves, was the result of developments that transcended Western Europe. These included, principally, the increase in economic cooperation between Eastern and Western Europe and the gradual convergence between the leaderships of Western and Eastern Europe over the role that migration was to play in development processes, as will be demonstrated in the following sections.

Between ideology and pragmatism: the programs for the exchange of labour in Eastern Europe

State-sponsored recruitment of foreign labor during the postwar economic boom has been generally considered to have featured specifically in Western Europe. But this picture is not fully accurate. Recent research has demonstrated how socialist countries also developed state-sponsored programs for the recruitment of labor. These programs were used to promote economic recovery and

cooperation within the Eastern bloc; and to offer fraternal aid to developing countries. In both cases, labor recruitment was sponsored under the umbrella of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the Soviet response to the Marshall Plan established in 1949 by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany (from 1950). COMECON was later joined by non-European countries such as Mongolia in 1960, Cuba in 1972, and Vietnam in 1978 (Fallenbuchl, 1987). Agreements for the exchange of labor could precede membership, as was the case with Vietnam. In other cases, agreements were signed with countries that were not part of COMECON, such as Cyprus, Angola, Mozambique, and some Western European countries (Alamgir, 2022, p. 315; Bortlová-Vondráková & Szente-Varga, 2021, p. 299; Levčík & Halsey Westphal, 1977).

Labor recruitment sponsored by state socialism was a marginal phenomenon that mobilized a small number of workers. According to some estimates, less than two hundred thousand workers were employed as part of COMECON-sponsored agreements in the 1970s.¹⁶ This was a meagre result if compared to the millions of guestworkers recruited in the capitalist West. However, as Alena Alamgir and Christina Schwenkel (2020) argue, the experience of socialist countries in respect of labor and student mobilities¹⁷ needs to be understood 'on their own social and historical terms' (p. 101). More precisely, it is not in the numbers that the socialist experience of labor recruitment should be assessed but in the ideological underpinnings that inspired it.

Indeed, research produced in the last decade and in the 1970s compared the recruitment of those foreign labor forces sponsored under state socialism with guestworker migration in Western Europe. Their findings show that differences and similarities coexisted. For example, training and the acquisition of new skills was the central aim of programs for the exchange of labor under state socialism, but not in guestworker recruitment in Western Europe. This was particularly the case in the exchange programs with developing countries, where, according to Alena Alamgir (2022), numbers of student scholarships were far more significant than those relating to the recruitment and training of workers. Yet, vocational training for workers, language courses, and transfer of knowledge were also present within guestworker recruitment in Western Europe; but in the latter region they were more of an instrument than a goal of development. In addition, unlike in most Western European countries, Eastern bloc countries allowed double citizenship, and migrant workers could apply for citizenship after a shorter period of residence than in Western Europe. However, with the exception of colonial migrants in France and Great Britain, labor recruitment was strictly regulated as temporary in both Eastern Europe and Western Europe.

Studies have also looked at conditions of work through a comparative framework. In socialist countries, workers moving within COMECON countries were equal to domestic workers in every respect and were not always employed in less privileged jobs (Levčík & Halsey Westphal, 1977, p. 30). The latter was usually the case in Western Europe partly because the majority of guest workers was recruited from countries that were not member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) (Laschi, 2021, p. 20). Indeed, the condition of recruitment and rights granted to citizens of EEC member states employed within the Common Market was very similar to those granted by socialist states to COMECON labor migrants. Scholars agree that in the second half of the 1970s socialist programs for the recruitment of labor increasingly resembled the guestworker regime in Western Europe. The logics of economic productivity and profit became more relevant by far than any orientation on training and solidarity (Alamgir, 2022; Apor, 2020). It is notable that this change took place while the liberalization of international mobility in Eastern Europe was experiencing its golden age (Stola, 2017, p. 160).

To understand this change, it is important to consider that there was nothing planned nor predetermined about the adoption of foreign labor recruitment as a strategy of development by the Soviet Union and its 'satellites'. International mobility of a socialist kind was not a direct outcome of the communist takeover. At the end of World War Two a strict policy of no exit was endorsed. International mobility within the socialist bloc was unthinkable, and this was partly because the position of Eastern Europe in the Cold War divide was not yet clear (Mazower, 2011). In the early 1950s, in Poland, which was the principal emigration country

of Eastern Europe, it was statistically easier to be a minister than an emigrant (Stola, 2017, p. 155). It was only after the death of Stalin that international mobility started to be conceptualized and experienced in state socialism. At the same time, it was only because of Stalin's decision not to transform Eastern Europe into Soviet republics that international migration was to be conceived as a policy to promote socialist development (Stola, 2021, pp. 1137, 1138). More precisely, labor migration within the Soviet Union was more extensive by far than international migration in Eastern Europe. If the geographic distance covered by labor migrants, the regulated nature of their movement, and in particular the sociocultural differences between labor migrants and domestic workers are considered, domestic migration in the Soviet Union was not very dissimilar from what are generally considered the political and social challenges posed by international migration. But legally and ideologically, because the Soviet Union was a multiethnic federation, this was considered as domestic relocation of the labor force (Siegelbaum & Moch, 2016)

World War Two and the division of Europe had a great and, in general, far more negative demographic impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe than on Western Europe (Case, 2011; Siefert, 2020, p. 7). Western Europe solved its problems of surplus population by exporting unemployment abroad. This was also an instrument to export capitalist development. Both were possible thanks to the Marshall Plan. Eastern Europe had its own 'German problem' which played a determining role in the economic reconstruction of the whole of Eastern Europe. But the Soviet Union could not support the reconstruction of Eastern Europe with a Soviet version of the Marshall Plan (Sanchez-Sibony, 2014). The loss of approximately 12 to 14 million ethnic Germans added to the dramatic death toll of World War Two, creating a depopulation problem of dramatic proportions (Mazower, 2011, p. 22). Demographic growth in Eastern Europe started later than in the West and was still inadequate for supporting economic growth, which started in the mid-1950s. East Germany and Czechoslovakia were the countries most affected by labor shortages and by population loss due to emigration. 'Illegal' East-West emigration continued in the 1950s along with state-sponsored repatriation of war prisoners and ethnic minorities. Khrushchev accepted the East German proposal to separate East and West Berlin in order to stop East Germans from leaving for West Germany (Engerman, 2010, p. 42). Escapes across the German border decreased greatly but did not stop. Yugoslavia, with its open border policy became a transit country through which Eastern European refugees went west (Vojtěchovský & Pelikán, 2019). In 1963, socialist Yugoslavia also legalized the employment of its surplus population in capitalist economies (Bernard, 2019, pp. 45–53). According to contemporary observer William Zimmerman (1987), temporary employment abroad was not only an instrument of economic development but also a safety valve against the rise of domestic discontent and dissent.

Clearly, the division of Europe contributed to generating labor shortages that could not be filled by natural demographic growth. The employment of Greek, Korean, and Vietnamese refugees and the relocation of the labor force through the exchange of populations – endorsed to promote the ethnic homogenization of socialist state since the late 1940s – provided some limited solutions. New opportunities for foreign labor recruitment came with the partial and gradual liberalization of mobility endorsed across the Eastern bloc following the death of Stalin. The liberalization of movement began first in the Soviet Union, where Beria relaxed the regulation of domestic migration as well as international travel to Eastern Europe and to a lesser extent Western Europe. Eastern Europe followed suit. By 1956, Czechoslovakia and Poland had renewed an interwar convention that allowed private citizens of both countries to cross the border visa-free. In the 1960s, Hungary followed (Stola, 2017). Within this context, several agreements for the recruitment of labor were signed between COMECON countries: principally between Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and between Bulgaria and the USSR (Guha, 1978; Levčík & Halsey Westphal, 1977, p. 12). Recruitment agreements were also signed with Vietnam and North Korea. Yet, overall, the labor exchange programs mobilized a very modest number of workers. Workers recruited under state-sponsored exchange of labor

constituted only a fraction of the several million registered to have crossed border checkpoints between Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany in the 1970s (Stola, 2017).

But whether these small numbers were considered a failure by the political leaderships of the Eastern bloc is a matter of debate. Recent research on the transformations of Eastern Europe in the 1960s suggests this might have not been the case. In the mid-1960s the planned economy started to show signs of exhaustion. The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries opened to foreign trade and commercial relations with Western Europe in an attempt to rapidly acquire the technology necessary to increase productivity, to secure commodities, and thereby to improve living standards. Elites in Eastern Europe endorsed liberalization of international mobility among a set of policies to support consumption that were implemented to address increasing dissatisfaction among the working class. According to Stola (2017, pp. 159, 160), offering Eastern Europeans a surrogate of the freedom of choice offered by the capitalist system of Western Europe responded to the sense of inferiority developed by Eastern European elites and their attempt to relegitimize their leadership.

Indeed, in contradiction to traditional accounts, according to which every aspect of social interactions was strictly regulated by a top-down approach in state socialism, the literature on socialist international mobilities demonstrates how pressure from below played a major role in transforming international movement as a reality of life under socialism. A seminal study by Dariusz Stola (2016) on Polish international migration explains how, in the absence of a blueprint to follow, case by case episodes of unregulated mobilities, which he calls 'incidents', shaped the Polish leadership's policies in the field of international travel. While the regulation of international mobilities dealt primarily with short-term travel and tourism, it created fertile terrain for an expanding informal economy in which travel, tourism, and smuggling coexisted and often overlapped. Socialist authorities not only tolerated but even partook in this process that was in fact eroding the socialist ability to control its citizens (Kochanowski, 2020; Stola, 2016).

This is not to say that socialist principles did not inspire socialist mobilities nor that labor recruitment was a bottom-up initiative. Cooperation between the socialist state and the socialist public enterprise was at the core of socialist recruitment of the foreign labour force. It was socialist enterprise that requested to hire foreign workers and the state that established the basic conditions of employment. Welfare and social benefit were included in the negotiations and defined in consideration of principles of mutual benefit. Yet scholarship suggests that finding a balance between economic productivity and mutual benefit was a real challenge, not least because shortages and surpluses of labor were driven by the continuous restructuring of the economy that was, in turn, triggered by efforts to catch up with the West. This was an imperative of socialist modernization (Iandolo, 2022; Romero, 2020). At the same time, the literature suggests that cooperation coexisted with competition and that the latter prevailed towards the end of the 1960s. For instance, Jannis Panadiotidis (2015) explains how East Germany developed an interest in the recruitment of Polish workers of German ethnicity as a preferred source of manpower that would easily assimilate thanks to ethnic affinity. However, Poland preferred to grant its ethnic Germans exit permits to West Germany in exchange for credit and for West German recognition of the Oder Neisse Border. In some cases, the competition between socialist states could also promote the interest of migrant workers in an attempt to increase the benefits of labor emigration. For instance, this was the case in the late 1970s, when Poland abruptly withdrew or cancelled contracts for the recruitment of Polish workers to Czechoslovak enterprises, allegedly as a means for the Polish state to exert pressure on Czechoslovakia, the recruiting country, to improve work contracts (Alamgir, 2020).

The programs for the recruitment of labor remained primarily an instrument in bilateral relations between national states; however, the literature suggests that, at the turn of the 1960s, the exchange of labor was considered to be among the instruments for revitalising cooperation within COMECON at the multilateral level. The Prague Spring (1968) and the Soviet intervention that crushed it had showed that tolerance for reforms had limits. The Brezhnev doctrine made clear that change was acceptable only for moderate amelioration of the existing system. As part of the policies to sponsor specialization of national economies, programs for the exchange of labor were to be used, but with

careful consideration and in order to optimize rational use of natural resources for the mutual benefit of the countries involved (Guha, 1978, p. 53). According to Levčik and Halsey Westphal (1977, p. 13), the maximum limit for state-sponsored labor recruitment in COMECON was set at only 100,000 units. The actual number did exceed this limit by at least 50,000 but it was still very small and too small to have a meaningful impact on structural problems of labor shortage. In East Germany, which was the principal recruiter of foreign labour, the workforce employed on this territory under exchange programs in the early 1970s was below one percent (Levčik & Halsey Westphal, 1977, p. 16).

The main reasons why labor recruitment was not promoted on a larger scale was that it questioned the very core of Marxist ideology and, more precisely, the policy of full employment that granted the right to work to every citizen of working age and with it their economic security (Guha, 1978, p. 52). With the exception of socialist Yugoslavia, which never actively sustained a policy of full employment (Woodward, 1995), this was and remained the official policy of state socialism in Eastern Europe. Along with the problem of full employment there was that of the surplus created by foreign workers. In capitalist development, the exportation of the labor surplus, or, the recruitment of foreign labor to fill shortages, did not present any ideological problem. Rather they created conditions for the expansion of capitalism. The recruitment of foreign labor was used to exploit the differences in development between sending and recruiting countries to create a surplus of value for the profit of the owners and managers of enterprise. This could not be the case in state socialism, which needed to find a balance between economic productivity and mutual benefit for both countries involved (Guha, 1978). Exchange of labor was meant to reduce differences in development rather than reproduce them. Any surplus value was to be returned to society in the form of publicly financed investments or collective consumption goods (health, educational programs, etc). But how to measure the surplus product and how to divide it between the countries involved was both a practical and an ideological issue. Whether and how countries solved these issues is a topic that has scarcely been explored in the literature and that, hopefully, will become a major area of investigation in future years.

Détente in migration, migration in détente: globalization, decolonization, and the new migration-development nexus

Stemming from the late 1960s and continuing through to the early 1980s, 'the long 1970s' (Villaume et al., 2016) was as a decade of deep transformation in both the Cold War and the regulation of international migration. But there has been little dialogue between, on the one hand, the scholarship investigating developments in the international regulation of migration after the end of state-run recruitment of foreign labor in Western Europe, following the first oil price shock (1974); and, on the other hand, the literature exploring the process of détente in Europe that was characterized by increasing East-West economic cooperation and that culminated in the 1975 Helsinki Accords, covering cooperation in the three baskets of economy, security, and human contacts. Even though the regulation of international migration intersected with each of these three areas, the question of how détente transformed international migration and vice-versa remains unresearched. As recent research demonstrates détente and economic globalization were not separated but were part of the same process (Romero, 2020). The growth of economic East-West cooperation (Romano & Romero, 2020a) went hand in hand with the expansion of European cooperation with and in the Global South (Calori et al., 2019). Human rights were also a field of cooperation across the ideological divide (Betts, 2022). The regulation of international migration was one of the fields in which the socialist and capitalist models of development, and their respective conceptions of human rights, were negotiated in Europe and at the global level.

The beginning of the end of state-run recruitment agreements in Western Europe coincided with the beginning of détente. As Klaus Bade explains (2003, p. 231), '[t]he "oil price shock" of 1973 was less a trigger than a final chance to stop recruitment and immigration'. The need to reduce the recruitment and presence of immigrants had already been demanded, considered, and partially

implemented in the principal recruiting countries in the early 1970s (ibid, p. 228; Berlinghoff, 2013). But already in the late 1960s the need of cheap labor force was declining as a result of technological improvement in all branches of industrial production, the short recession of 1967, and the end of the Breton Woods System (1971). From the middle of the 1960s onward, racism and xenophobia framed political debates around migration in countries with a significant presence of non-European 'migrants', such as Great Britain and France (Freeman, 1979). In these countries, restrictions were introduced for the first time to reduce the right to citizenship and permanent residence for colonial migrants who, unlike guestworkers, were granted a semi-citizen status (Bade, 2003, pp. 223–225; Kofman, 2000; Castle, 2015). Yet guestworkers had not been exempted from different forms of social and racial discrimination (Castle, 1980). In 1968, and in the subsequent years, migrant workers joined strike action in the principal recruiting countries, West Germany in particular (Goeke, 2014; J. Miller, 2013; M. J. Miller, 1981; Paoli, 2021, p. 41). Despite this, in 1968, West Germany signed an important worker recruitment agreement with socialist Yugoslavia. Within three years, over 500,000 Yugoslavs were employed in the German economy, making them the largest group of guestworkers by nationality. Yugoslavs were still the second largest group of non-EEC nationality guestworkers – after Turkey – until the 1990s (Molnar, 2018, p. 134.). It could be said that the Yugoslav-German agreement pioneered a new role for labor migration in the relations between capitalist and socialist Europe. Under the leadership of German Chancellor Willy Brandt, and his Ostpolitik, cooperation rather than confrontation with socialist European countries was considered by Western powers the best strategy to win against Soviet-communism. Accordingly, labor migration transformed from an instrument to reinforce the Iron Curtain, to one that corroded it. This new role for international migration became more clearly defined during the last phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which led to the adoption of the Helsinki Accords (1975). Both the EEC and NATO considered that Warsaw Pact states had to prioritize the means of facilitating 'the free movement of persons, ideas and information' as part of the new European order (Eichwede, 2012, p. 259).

Recruitment agreements, however, were not extended to Eastern European countries. In the 1970s, only a very limited number of workers from Eastern Europe were employed in Western Europe under schemes sponsored by COMECON (Levcik & Halsey Westphal, 1977, pp. 14, 15). Yet, the literature on labor exchange programs in socialist Europe explains that in the second half of the 1970s labor recruitment became more salient in the cooperation agreements with developing countries. As the recruitment of workers from developing countries became more relevant in East-South cooperation, the terms of foreign labor recruitment in Eastern Europe became gradually more similar to the guestworker recruitment agreements adopted in Western Europe in the previous two decades. Migrant workers filled labor shortages in specific industrial sectors and services that required poor or no training. Women were overrepresented among labor migrants. While it is difficult to assess the full extent of recruitment, existing studies suggest recruitment was in the range of 60,000 workers annually on contracts of employment ranging from one to several years in the early 1980s, with important increases in the late 1980s in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, being the principal recruiters after the Soviet Union. Labor migrants came in the largest numbers from Vietnam and Cuba. Smaller groups from Mozambique and Angola were also recruited (Alamgir, 2022, p. 315; Apor, 2020, pp. 123–125; Bortlová-Vondráková & Szente-Varga, 2021). Along with the growth in recruitment numbers, the goal of the rational use of resources to increase productivity replaced the goal of training. Alamgir (2020, p. 106) explains that, in the second half of the 1980s, workers from developing countries were explicitly employed to replace Polish labor migrants in Czechoslovak enterprises. The literature ascribes these changes to the effects of the two oil price shocks in 1973 and in 1979. With the first of these shocks, Eastern European economic growth became dependent on loans and credits from Western Europe, but with the second shock it became evident that Eastern European governments were unable to pay back what they owed to their creditors, leading to the explosion of a foreign debt crisis of dramatic proportions (Mark, 2019; Romano &

Romero, 2020a). The need to increase revenue in hard currency forced the prioritization of trade with Western Europe, while cooperation within COMECON dropped dramatically alongside a drastic decline in intra-state labor migration. Several authors consider the failure in support for intra-COMECON labor mobility to be one of the reasons for the failure of COMECON as a political project (Panadiotidis, 2015; Steiner, 2013).

The migration policies of Western European countries also went through a process of harmonization. Colonial migrants lost their 'privileged' access to citizenship and their entry was permitted and regulated in line with market needs. The standardization and harmonization of the international regulation of migration across Western and Eastern Europe was an important component of the new wave of economic globalization that centered around a push toward international trade, along with accelerated capital flows, as means to increase productivity and efficiency. If the emphasis on foreign trade was a novel development, the push for standardization of norms and for universalism had been key objectives of the regulation of international migration since 1919. The Great Depression of the 1930s, and the rise of fascism worldwide, had halted this process, which regained vigour in the 1940s. In the 1950s and 1960s, decolonization and Cold War rivalry had brought into question the neutrality of development as sponsored by international organizations, and opened space for experimentation not only in Europe and in the Soviet Union, but also in developing countries. Both socialism and capitalism as they developed in Europe were tested as suitable models of development (Iandolo, 2022). But in the second half of the 1970s, as decolonization was concluded, and as the political leaderships of European countries increasingly converged over development policy, standardization acquired new meanings and new force. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, the gradual embrace of neoliberal reforms led to the weakening of state control over development processes and to a greater role for NGOs, private organizations, and enterprises. These entities assumed a greater role in the regulation of migration and thereby contributed to making it less directly controllable by the state actor. In both Eastern and Western Europe, this change came alongside a redefinition of the relation with developing countries and, specifically, the terms of development aid.

In Eastern Europe, it was the socialist enterprise that acquired greater control over the recruitment of foreign labor. The socialist state acted on both the demand for foreign workers by the socialist enterprise and the demands from developing countries offering to send their labor force abroad. Labor exchange programs continued to relate to the nation state as the recipient of the surplus created by labor, and a small part of the agreed salary was not given to the migrant workers, but was transferred to the government of the country of origin as special funds for its use (Alamgir, 2017, 2022; Bortlová-Vondráková & Szente-Varga, 2021). This practice remained in place until 1989 when collective contracts were cancelled and foreign workers were (re)hired under individual agreements (Alamgir, 2022, p. 317). The socialist enterprise also led in terms of engagement in developing countries. Recent literature suggests that while the socialist state was failing economically, socialist enterprises operated successfully in the Global South, promoting a model that still claimed to be an alternative to capitalist development (Calori et al., 2019). Yugoslavia figures prominently in the literature as a case study of particular interest. Thanks to its independence from Moscow and its leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which it helped to establish in 1961, Yugoslavia had started to engage earlier and more extensively with non-European developing countries (Stubbs, 2023). The NAM's aim was to create a third way for development that, while inspired by socialist principles, would advocate the right to national independence in foreign policy and would refuse interference from either of the two superpowers. In the late 1970s and 1980s, Yugoslav export enterprises were a success story for innovation and competitiveness on the global stage (Spaskovska & Calori, 2021). Yet, how exactly the relation between low-skilled indigenous workers and highly qualified European foreign workers was conceptualized by the socialist state remains poorly researched. Research by Spaskovska (2018) does, however, show that the alliance of Yugoslavia with countries in the Global South was not spared from hierarchies (in particular between oil-producing and non-oil-producing countries). Yugoslavia did not aim to challenge the existing

capitalist world system (Wallerstein, 1979) but rather, Spaskovska (2018) explains, to empower 'newly independent and developing countries to partake in the international division of labor and economic exchange as equal partners' (p. 333). The same principles were adopted in labor relations within the enterprise, which replaced the state as the locus that dispensed socialist human rights.

Further research is needed to understand whether and how Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union or any socialist country in Eastern Europe ever considered the regulation of international migration to be a key battle in which socialism could challenge capitalism. Existing studies suggest this was not the case. Although fertile terrain for East-South cooperation was cultivated by the anti-imperialist orientation of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia and the position of (semi)coloniality that they shared with non-European developing countries (Kott & Schayegh, 2021; Mark & Betts, 2022b); and although the regulation of international migration was deeply shaped by coloniality; in the rapidly expanding literature on the international cooperation between the Eastern European countries and the developing countries, there has been no mention of international migration as an area of confrontation between the East and the West *in the South*. Surprisingly, not even UNCTAD seemed to have developed an interest in this crucial aspect of economic development. There was no reference to the international regulation of migration in the New International Economic Order (NIEO) adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974 (United Nations, 1974).

In the same year, Western Europe had started to close its borders to economic migrants. Recruitment policies were replaced by forms of support for the return and reintegration of workers in their countries of origin, principally Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Spain, Portugal, and Maghreb countries (King, 1986; Kubat, 1984). The policies promoting return migration were not unrelated to the expansion of Western economic and political integration of the European peripheries. These years saw the establishment of liberal democracies after the end of dictatorial regimes in Spain (1975), Portugal (1974), and Greece (1974), and the OECD played a major role in bringing political democratisation and economic reforms together. It supported the launch of programs to standardize mechanisms that would assist economic institutions and governments in monitoring and supporting the reintegration of labor migrants. The opening of small-scale businesses and the development of industries based on the utilization of locally available raw materials and skills was a major aim of the programs, in which the underlying objective was to secure institutional support for smooth transfers of capital and technology for outsourcing (Bernard, 2019, pp. 69–77). While there was a strong emphasis placed on how secure and improve the flow of hard currency, labor migrants were no longer considered as wage workers, but as entrepreneurs who might revamp the economies of their countries of origin thanks to the savings, skills, and technology acquired abroad. In doing so, returnees exported the model of development of capitalist countries.

Development aid to non-European developing countries changed accordingly. Since the late 1950s, the UNHCR and a variety of NGOs had been involved in humanitarian intervention in African countries. In the 1960s, along with short-term relief programs, humanitarian aid had focused on long-term economic development, with the recognition that displacement was both a cause and consequence of underdevelopment. The rational use of economic and social resources for development, including a new emphasis on refugee self-reliance, became leading principles regulating the distribution of aid (Gatrell, 2013, p. 244; Skran & Easton-Calabria, 2020). In recognition of the humanitarian dimension of underdevelopment, the New York Protocol on the Status of Refugees was signed in 1967. It lifted the geographic and time limitations of the 1951 Refugee Convention, but it left unchanged its principle according to which refugeedom was a political status (see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2010). Instead, the UNHCR endorsed a new emphasis on the temporary character of refugee protection and on repatriation as the preferred solution to displacement. Research by Peter Gatrell (2013, pp. 200, 201), and by Skran and Easton-Calabria (2020), shows how this was a response to budget constraints and pressure from member states – particularly the host countries. But the impact of this change beyond refugee protection has not been the object of academic scrutiny. It could be argued, though, that the temporariness of refugee status was also part of the process of standardizing norms that was required by the new

development doctrine. As Rosewarne (2010, p. 103) argues, temporariness became a fundamental direction of the migration-development nexus from the 1970s onward.

The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 had a dramatic impact on the ability of developing countries to compete on the global market, which severely constrained humanitarian intervention in turn. The poor quality of developing countries' commodities and the low price of their raw materials engendered a spiralling of foreign debt, rising unemployment, and widespread poverty. In response, both domestic and international migration increased. The large majority of migrants remained in the region – moving within neighbouring countries. But larger numbers than before (although still marginal compared to total numbers of displacement) went overseas. Those who did so had various options. Arab Gulf countries started to sponsor temporary recruitment schemes that attracted workers from neighbouring countries first, and from Asian countries later.¹⁸ For would-be migrants in those developing countries that had looked to socialism as a model of development, opportunities to study or temporarily work in the socialist camp were also available. But in Middle Eastern and North African countries, geographical proximity and well-established migration networks made it possible, with relative ease, to cross the Mediterranean Sea and find employment in the dynamic and expanding informal economy of Southern Europe – particularly in Italy (King, 2001; Tapinos, 2000).

Although northwestern Europe had closed its borders to economic migration, it was in these former recruiting countries that the presence of foreigners (Europeans and non-Europeans) jumped from four million at the beginning of the 1960s to over 11 million in the early 1970s (Bade, 2003, pp. 217, 218). This was possible because of what James Hollifield (2004) calls the liberal paradox. Liberal states had (and still have) an obligation to comply with basic human rights and act upon their violation. Neither the Refugee Convention nor the New York Protocol oblige countries to open their orders to refugees, given the nation state holds the prerogative to decide who can enter and stay within its territorial borders and under which conditions. But the international system of human rights protection established in the 1940s had developed multiple agencies that could exert pressure on nation states to comply with human rights regulations. Human rights activists and international courts of law exerted pressure on nation states to create a legal space in which migrants and refugees could negotiate their rights (Hollifield, 2004, p. 891). In the 1970s, there were two options available to 'migrants' to access northwestern European countries: applying for the right to have a family (family reunion), if one of their family members, usually the spouse, had a residence permit in Western Europe; or applying for the right to asylum under proof of political persecution or discrimination.

Although natural demographic growth of foreign residents (mostly led by children born in migrant families) was by far the main factor in the increase in the foreign population in Western Europe in the 1970s, it was the jump in applications for asylum that caused alarm among the political leaderships of northwestern European countries. From the very low numbers received in the 1960s and first half of the 1970s, applications for asylum rapidly increased in the second half of the 1970s to reach 77,000 in 1979, and well over 100,000 in 1980. From the late 1970s to the late 1980s, the large majority of asylum seekers came from developing countries (Bade, 2003, pp. 264, 265), for the first time in the postwar period. These asylum seekers were above all escaping the economic and environmental crises that had followed the end of various wars; only a small fraction were political refugees. Yet, reversing the pattern of the previous two decades, the latter were predominantly members of left-wing oppositions escaping the far-right dictatorial regimes established in Latin America, including Chile in particular, and primarily heading to the Eastern Bloc (Bade, 2003, pp. 235–237; Graf, 2022).

The growing importance of human rights in the international regulation of migration was not separate from the process of economic globalization and its push toward universalism and standardization of norms. It was an equally global phenomenon which was defined by the increase in cooperation across the ideological divide. Recent research demonstrates that it was precisely in the field of human rights that the contribution of socialist countries was more

tangible (Betts, 2022). Eastern European countries and Yugoslavia were at the forefront of the battles against gender wage gaps and for recognition of women's economic rights, which were launched during the UN decade of women (1975–1984) (Bonfiglioli, 2014, 2021; Ghodsee, 2018). Human rights were also included in the Helsinki Accords (Bayefsky et al., 1990). Yet, while in international organizations such as the ILO and the UN cooperation across the ideological divide was reaching its apex, within the Eastern bloc the gap was widening between an emerging civil society and the socialist state. Research by Eichwede (2012) and Zahra (2016, pp. 255–267) shows how Helsinki gave a boost to dissident groups and civil society in Eastern Europe, who (re) claimed their right of exit and freedom of choice. The extent to which concern with the right of exit pervaded Eastern European society became clear in the second half the 1980s when the unstoppable increase in Eastern Europeans (and East Germans in particular) crossing borders to the West became a crucial factor in defining the timing and the nature of the end of the Cold War (Sarotte, 2009). But the pace and nature of this transformation were the result of choices taken by Eastern European elites and the different degrees of acceptance of these choices by Eastern European citizens since the 1960s. As James Mark and Paul Betts (2022b) argue, during the 1970s and 1980s, Eastern European political leaderships struggled 'to cope with the pressures of a globally integrating world in an era of imperial disintegration' (p. 17) and opted for a path of (de)globalisation characterised by 'an East – West reorientation, a slow cultural realignment towards a "common European home" and white western civilization' (p. 22).

In Europe, the spread of narratives according to which the recognition of liberal human rights was the pillar of a broad (Western) European identity went hand in hand with the idea that non-Europeans had the right to have their cultural differences recognized. According to research by Rita Chin (2017), this was also a development of multiculturalism that stemmed from the transformations of the long 1970s and was responsible for the rise of racism and xenophobia across Western Europe in the 1980s. Focusing on West Germany and France in particular, Chin suggests that the identity politics of the 1980s failed as a project of multicultural coexistence because both left and right political forces deemed incompatible with Western societies all those national groups, including Muslim groups in particular, that did not recognize the supremacy of individual rights of choice, in particular for women. Eastern Europe was affected by its own crisis of multiracial solidarity. Episodes of discrimination against students of colour were not absent in the previous decades (Alamgir, 2013; Wright, 2022), but the literature suggests that in the 1980s they increased as the tensions between socialist paternalism and the pressure to increase productivity (re)created hierarchies of socialist values in which gender and race intersected (Alamgir, 2013, 2014). Although racism in socialist states was 'softer' than that of Western Europe, largely because of the internationalist rhetoric that was to some extent embraced by socialist societies, xenophobic attitudes and episodes of physical violence against people of colour also occurred in the late 1980s in Eastern European countries such as Hungary (Apor, 2020, p. 125).

While policies towards labor migrants increasingly focused on problems of cultural integration, policies to reclassify refugees as economic migrants became the most effective way for Western European countries to escape the moral duty of humanitarian protection (Kofman, 2000, p. 72). Increases in the rejection of asylum applications were particularly pronounced in countries 'on the frontline of the Cold War' (Bade, 2003, p. 269). In 1977, violations of human rights that were considered to be fundamental, such as the use of torture and interrogation in dictatorial countries, were no longer sufficient grounds for being granted political asylum in West Germany (Bade, 2003, pp. 270, 271).

Despite détente, Eastern European refugees also found themselves no longer welcome. In the early 1980s, the establishment of military juntas in Poland and Turkey caused a large number of asylum applications from European countries (Bade, 2003, p. 265). The approximately 250,000 Poles who escaped martial law were not deemed as necessitating protection and visa entry requirements were reintroduced in West Germany and Austria (Zahra, pp. 266, 267; Graf, 2022). Applications for political asylum submitted by Eastern Europeans increased again in the second half of the 1980s,

reaching almost 430,000 by the turn of the 1990s, the highest number since the aftermath of World War Two (Bade, 2003, p. 268). Their numbers dropped significantly only in the second half of 1990. With the exception of those Eastern Europeans who crossed the border and applied for German citizenship on grounds of ethnicity, applications for asylum by other ethno-national groups were denied because they were considered economic migrants.

By late 1990, the Cold War was fading but geopolitical concerns were still defining migration patterns and policies across Europe. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland were declared safe zones and were brought within the new borders of an enlarging Western Europe. Migration had become the most important pillar of security, the third pillar of détente. Touristic visa-free entry was reintroduced for Hungarians, Poles, Czechs, and Slovak citizens, and coupled with foreign investment and technical expertise in their countries of origin. These measures were part of a broader set of economic and political reforms which led the process of transition from Soviet-style communism to liberal democracy first, and European integration eventually. In exchange, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic¹⁹ were to prevent uncontrolled immigration across their borders into Western Europe. Cooperation on migration control and harmonization of immigration rules, including the establishment of a special police unit to stop illegal immigration, became a pillar of cooperation among the Visegrad group established in February 1991 (Ardittis, 1994). Slovenia, which had become independent in 1991, joined agreements on migration control with the Visegrad group in 1993 while the other former Yugoslav republics remained trapped in a spiral of ethnic violence and wars through the 1990s and early 2000s. The former Yugoslav region, that during the Cold War had displayed the highest level of international mobility granted by any socialist country to its citizens and was the principal gate from Eastern Europe to enter Western Europe, regained only marginally and gradually visa-free access to its neighbouring countries in the east and west in the 2000s (Bonifazi & Mamolo, 2004).

The Cold War had indeed ended but not the time of wired walls. This time Eastern Europe was behind them, while the former Yugoslav area was divided by them. By the end of the 1990s, Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslav region featured highly complex and diversified migration systems in which transit, economic immigration, refugee reception from the East and South, and also return migration from the West coexisted (Wallace & Stola, 2001; Zoppi, 2022, pp. 53–68). But this increased variety did not come with greater openness. The (limited and partial) freedom of mobility and choice of employment enjoyed by citizens of developing countries who, as students and workers, temporarily left the Global South to reside in the capitals of Eastern Europe, ended with the Cold War (Burton, 2019; Schenck, 2018, 2019; Schwenkel, 2014). In the post-1991 period, international migration was no more part of a project of development but a social and security problem which challenged the very nature of liberal development that international migration during the Cold War had helped to legitimise globally: individual freedom.

Conclusion

What was the relevance of the regulation of international migration for the Cold War rivalry and of the Cold War rivalry for the regulation of international migration? To answer these questions, this contribution offered a synthesis and review of literature that was guided by the assumption that the Cold War was primarily a competition between two alternative projects of development, the capitalist and the communist. Accordingly, the establishment and evolution of the international regulation of migration were examined as part of broader development processes, as they developed within the capitalist and communist worlds. Indeed, as demonstrated by recent research, not only the capitalist countries but also the socialist ones, relied on foreign labour recruitment to achieve development. This recent research also suggested that the long-held view that the Cold War produced primarily political refugees, and that the main contribution of the Cold War to the international regulation of migration was in the field of human rights protection for refugees, needs to be reassessed. Starting from these premises, and focusing on Cold War Europe, this contribution suggested that the international regulation of migration was a terrain of both confrontation and cooperation, not only between and within Eastern and Western Europe,

but also between Eastern and Western Europe on the one hand and the developing countries on the other.

Accordingly, the article showed that Cold War dynamics decisively affected the international regulation of migration but never resolved the underlying differences in development that were and remained the trigger and principal incentive for both migrants and nation-states to engage with international labour migration in the first place. The article started with an examination of how the international regulation of migration was shaped by Cold War competition when the international management of (post-)war displacement in Eastern Europe shifted from repatriation to settlement, as tensions grew between the Soviet Union and the United States. The adoption of the Refugee Convention in 1951 legitimised the defection of Eastern Europeans and simultaneously set the foundations of the international regulation of migration as a liberal project. The Soviet Union and its allies, by contrast, remained excluded from the international organizations defining the rules of international migration. In fact, far more than a dispute about what rights should be granted to refugees, the dispute of the early 1950s was about the role of workers—as a collective and as individuals—and of the nation state in securing equality (according to communism) or fair competition (according to liberalism) as the correct instruments to achieve development. The article then demonstrated that in the second half of the 1950s, as labour shortages accompanied the post-war economic boom in Western Europe, the recruitment of guestworkers from European peripheral countries, rather than the activism of refugees from the Soviet bloc, became the sharp end of an offensive against support for communist ideas of development. The Hungarian refugee crisis played a major role in that shift, as it boosted cooperation among Western countries in migration policies as the field bringing together liberal economic development, Western integration, and anticommunism. Meanwhile, Eastern Europe after Stalin went through a process of liberalisation of international mobility, which allowed, albeit with important ideological difficulties, for experimentation with foreign labor recruitment to foster economic cooperation within the Soviet bloc and as a form of fraternal aid to developing countries. Nevertheless, the article explains that, in the second half of the 1970s and in the 1980s, the patterns of international migration changed significantly as a response to the impact of the new wave of economic globalisation and the two oil price shocks of the 1970s. As cooperation across the Iron Curtain began to replace East-West competition in the developing countries, socialist recruitment of foreign labor force became more and more similar to the regulation of labor migration which had characterised Western Europe in the previous two decades.

This review thus suggested that an alternative system of international migration based on the communist 'right to employment' rather than the capitalist 'right to work' never went much further than partial experimentation and the wishful thinking of a few committed socialist thinkers. The experiments of socialist countries with foreign labour recruitment were not without effects and legacies, which deserve more academic attention. Nevertheless, the founding, liberal principles of the international regulation of migration as formed by the early Cold War have remained unchanged, even after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, although the distinction between political refugee and economic migrant has been an inadequate basis on which to regulate international migration since at least the 1970s, no international organization or nation state has in fact changed it. That has led to new attempts at challenging the international regulation of migration. In recent decades the development of migration crises along with refugee crises has created major problems for the humanitarian actions of NGOs (Council of Europe, 2020). There is a dynamic academic debate about the limits of the binary between voluntary and forced, or economic and political, migration, with implicit or explicit calls for a broader definition of refugeedom in order to extend humanitarian protection to 'economic refugees' (see for instance Bakewell, 2021; Bertram, 2019; Ottonelli & Torresi, 2013; Seiger et al, 2020). In this debate, there has been little space to questioning the absence of human rights protection for labor migrants or advocating for labor as a fundamental human right for migrants and refugees. The recent rebirth of cooperation between trade unions and labour migrants in different areas of the Global South (Schierup et al., 2015), though, suggests that there is a legacy of the socialist experiences with foreign labour recruitment during the Cold War which still needs to be examined.

List of Acronyms

AFL	American Federation of Labor
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (of the United Nations)
EEC	European Economic Community
ICEM	Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IFTU	International Federation of Trade Union
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IRO	International Refugee Organization
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Co-operation
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nation Conference on Trade and Development
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions

Notes

1. The United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines the difference between refugees and migrants as the following: ‘Migrants choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons. Unlike refugees who cannot safely return home, migrants face no such impediment to return. If they choose to return home, they will continue to receive the protection of their government’ (Edwards, 2016).
2. Development was and remained a contested political idea before and after the Cold War. For a useful guide to the history of development see (Peet & Hartwick, 2009).
3. Among the studies examining socialist labour migration see (Alamgir, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2018, 2020, 2022; Apor, 2020; Bortlová-Vondráková & Szente-Varga, 2021; Schwenkel 2014; Alamgir & Schwenkel, 2020; Gu, 2022).
4. See, for instance (Bonfiglioli, 2014, 2021; De Haan et al., 2016; Mark & Betts, 2022a; Mark et al., 2020).
5. The fact that the UNCHR’s mandate under the Refugee Convention was geographically limited to Europe and it excluded major refugee crises outside of Europe, such as the one caused by the partition of India (1947), corroborates this assumption.
6. The United States never signed the Refugee Convention as convincingly professing anticommunism was sufficient ground to be granted asylum (Zahra, 2016, p. 206).
7. The literature suggests that internal fight and the ambivalent support flight received from western countries were the main reasons why the political activism of eastern European refugees and émigrés did not represent a serious threat to the stability of Soviet Union and eastern European regimes (for an overview see Mazurkiewicz, 2019). A notable exception was that of the Croat extreme nationalist groups active in diaspora and aiming at destroying socialist Yugoslavia which were considered a top security risk not only by the Yugoslav government but also by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States (Nielsen, 2021; Tóćić, 2020, p. 2).
8. For the recruitment in refugee camps in Western Europe see (Gatrell, 2013, pp. 110–112; Kay & Miles, 1992).
9. For critical analyses of ‘right to employment’ and ‘right to work’ see (De George, 1984; Ellman, 1979; Kornai, 1992; Mahoney, 2008; Raffass, 2016).
10. The Soviet Union was represented by three seats in the United Nations: one for the Soviet Union and two for the Soviet Republics of Belarus and Ukraine.
11. Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland were ILO members in the aftermath of the war. Romania joined in 1956 (Jacobson, 1960, p. 406).
12. Only 11,000 of the approximately 200,000 Hungarian refugees returned to Hungary (Comte, 2020, p. 480).
13. ICEM was renamed International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 1989 and it became UN agency in 2016.
14. Yugoslavia had observer status from 1955 until 1991 when the country collapsed. See (Marković & Obadić, 2017).
15. Relief aid was offered to the population of countries affected by the war but it excluded citizens of the defeated countries. However, the allies made a distinction between the ethnic German refugees who arrived in Germany under allied occupation after the war from those who were displaced by Nazi Germany during the war. The former were not initially eligible for refugee aid. (Papadopoulos & Kourachanis, 2015, p 34; Panagiotidis, 2020).

16. Levčik and Halsey Westphal (1977) estimate that approximately 150,000 workers were recruited as foreign labour force between COMECON countries between 1973 and 1975, considered the peak of international mobility in socialist Europe. An additional number (between 15,000 and 20,000) of workers from COMECON countries were employed in Western Europe and in developing countries.
17. In theoretical terms, there is no clear distinction between the term ‘migration’, that is most commonly used in humanities, and ‘mobility’, that is preferred in social sciences. However, ‘mobility’ is preferred to ‘migration’ in current research on international movements of individuals (including labour migration) in the socialist camp. This is not the case in historical research on the guestworkers migration in Western Europe, that continues to prefer migration to mobility despite the temporary character of the guestworker recruitment. Mobility is usually adopted in studies of the movement of EEC citizens in the Schengen area since the 1990s.
18. By the late 2000s, labour migrants comprised up to ninety percent of the local population and ninety-eight percent of the workforce in several of the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Aarhi & Sahu, 2021).
19. Czechoslovakia dissolved on 31 December 1992.

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