On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions

Filos-Ratsikas, A., Giannakopoulos, Y. , Hollender, A., Lazos, P. and Poças, D. (2021) On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions. In: 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 18-23 Jul 2021, pp. 454-476. ISBN 9781450385541 (doi: 10.1145/3465456.3467627)

Abstract

We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when bidders have independent subjective prior beliefs about the value distributions of the other bidders, computing an e-equilibrium of the auction is PPAD-complete, and computing an exact equilibrium is FIXP-complete.

• Item Type: Conference Proceedings
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Giannakopoulos, Dr Yiannis
• Authors: Filos-Ratsikas, A., Giannakopoulos, Y., Hollender, A., Lazos, P., and Poças, D.
• College/School: College of Science and Engineering > School of Computing Science
• ISBN: 9781450385541