Treaty withdrawal and recalcitrant states

Crampin, J. (2020) Treaty withdrawal and recalcitrant states. Cambridge International Law Journal, 9(2), pp. 225-240. (doi: 10.4337/cilj.2020.02.06)

Abstract

The recent prevalence of high-profile unilateral treaty withdrawals raises broader questions over trust in treaty-making. Given the foundational importance of trust in treaties to international law, these withdrawals present risks to the international legal order generally. The issue for international law is how it can regulate treaty withdrawal in a way that preserves trust in the international legal system. The problem of trust is twofold. If international law adopts too permissive a stance towards unilateral withdrawal, then this will undermine trust in the binding force of treaties: pacta sunt servanda. If it is too restrictive, it will undermine the authority of international law, since it will result in situations in which recalcitrant States (ie States which have decided no longer to comply with their obligations) disobey, and are seen to disobey, their obligations. The paper seeks to explore this tension that underlies the regulation of treaty withdrawal. First, it analyses historical approaches to the problem, and, second, how the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has sought to resolve it. It then examines how the principle is and can be used to achieve a balance between integrity and authority that can assist international law in regulating withdrawal and recalcitrance in a manner that preserves trust in treaty-making.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Crampin, Mr Joseph
• Authors: Crampin, J.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > School of Law
• Journal Name: Cambridge International Law Journal
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• ISSN: 2398-9173
• ISSN (Online): 2398-9181