The case for cognitive penetrability

Schyns, P.G. (1999) The case for cognitive penetrability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22(3), p. 394.

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Pylyshyn acknowledges that cognition intervenes in determining the nature of perception when attention is allocated to locations or properties prior to the operation of early vision. I present evidence that scale perception (one function of early vision) is cognitively penetrable and argue that Pylyshyn's criterion covers not a few, but many situations of recognition. Cognitive penetrability could be their modus operandi.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Schyns, Professor Philippe
Authors: Schyns, P.G.
College/School:College of Science and Engineering > School of Psychology
College of Medical Veterinary and Life Sciences > School of Psychology & Neuroscience
Journal Name:Behavioral and Brain Sciences

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