Trust, trustworthiness, and obligation

Simion, M. and Willard-Kyle, C. (2024) Trust, trustworthiness, and obligation. Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), pp. 87-101. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2223221)

Abstract

Where does entitlement to trust come from? When we trust someone to φ, do we need to have reason to trust them to φ or do we start out entitled to trust them to φ by default? Reductivists think that entitlement to trust always “reduces to” or is explained by the reasons that agents have to trust others. In contrast, anti-reductivists think that, in a broad range of circumstances, we just have entitlement to trust. even if we don’t have positive reasons to do so. In this paper, we argue for a version of anti-reductivism. Roughly, we argue that we have default entitlement to trust someone to φ so long as there is an operative norm that requires S to φ. At least in such circumstances (and absent defeaters), we don’t need any positive reasons to trust S to φ.

• Item Type: Articles
• Additional Information: The work was supported by the H2020 European Research Council [948356]; Leverhulme Trust [A Virtue Epistemology of Trust]
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Willard-Kyle, Dr Christopher and Simion, Professor Mona
• Authors: Simion, M., and Willard-Kyle, C.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Philosophical Psychology
• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• ISSN: 0951-5089
• ISSN (Online): 1465-394X
• Published Online: 13 June 2023
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2023 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Philosophical Psychology 37(1):87-101
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

Project Code	Award No	Project Name	Principal Investigator	Funder's Name	Funder Ref	Lead Dept
309239		Knowledge-First Social Epistemology	Mona Simion	European Research Council (ERC)	948356	Arts - Philosophy