Trust, trustworthiness, and obligation

Simion, M. and Willard-Kyle, C. (2024) Trust, trustworthiness, and obligation. Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), pp. 87-101. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2223221)

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Where does entitlement to trust come from? When we trust someone to φ, do we need to have reason to trust them to φ or do we start out entitled to trust them to φ by default? Reductivists think that entitlement to trust always “reduces to” or is explained by the reasons that agents have to trust others. In contrast, anti-reductivists think that, in a broad range of circumstances, we just have entitlement to trust. even if we don’t have positive reasons to do so. In this paper, we argue for a version of anti-reductivism. Roughly, we argue that we have default entitlement to trust someone to φ so long as there is an operative norm that requires S to φ. At least in such circumstances (and absent defeaters), we don’t need any positive reasons to trust S to φ.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:The work was supported by the H2020 European Research Council [948356]; Leverhulme Trust [A Virtue Epistemology of Trust]
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Willard-Kyle, Dr Christopher and Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Simion, M., and Willard-Kyle, C.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Psychology
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN (Online):1465-394X
Published Online:13 June 2023
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2023 The Authors
First Published:First published in Philosophical Psychology 37(1):87-101
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
309239Knowledge-First Social EpistemologyMona SimionEuropean Research Council (ERC)948356Arts - Philosophy