What we know when we act

Kearl, T. (2023) What we know when we act. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-023-01997-5) (Early Online Publication)

Abstract

Two traditions in action theory offer different accounts of what distinguishes intentional action from mere behavior. According to the causalist tradition, intentional action has certain distinguished causal antecedents, and according to the Anscombian tradition, intentional action has certain distinguished epistemological features. I offer a way to reconcile these ostensibly conflicting accounts of intentional action by way of appealing to “ability-constituting knowledge”. After explaining what such knowledge is, and in particular its relationship to inadvertent virtue and knowledge-how, I suggest that, among other things, appealing to ability-constituting knowledge can help us flesh out what it is for an agent’s reasons to non-deviantly cause and sustain her purposive behavior.

• Item Type: Articles
• Additional Information: This research was made possible with funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No 948356, KnowledgeLab: Knowledge-First Social Epistemology, PI: Mona Simion).
• Status: Early Online Publication
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Kearl, Dr Timothy
• Authors: Kearl, T.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Philosophical Studies
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 0031-8116
• ISSN (Online): 1573-0883
• Published Online: 24 June 2023
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2023 The Author
• First Published: First published in Philosophical Studies 2023
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

Project Code	Award No	Project Name	Principal Investigator	Funder's Name	Funder Ref	Lead Dept
309239		Knowledge-First Social Epistemology	Mona Simion	European Research Council (ERC)	948356	Arts - Philosophy