What we know when we act

Kearl, T. (2023) What we know when we act. Philosophical Studies, (doi: 10.1007/s11098-023-01997-5) (Early Online Publication)

[img] Text
299966.pdf - Published Version
Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.



Two traditions in action theory offer different accounts of what distinguishes intentional action from mere behavior. According to the causalist tradition, intentional action has certain distinguished causal antecedents, and according to the Anscombian tradition, intentional action has certain distinguished epistemological features. I offer a way to reconcile these ostensibly conflicting accounts of intentional action by way of appealing to “ability-constituting knowledge”. After explaining what such knowledge is, and in particular its relationship to inadvertent virtue and knowledge-how, I suggest that, among other things, appealing to ability-constituting knowledge can help us flesh out what it is for an agent’s reasons to non-deviantly cause and sustain her purposive behavior.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:This research was made possible with funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No 948356, KnowledgeLab: Knowledge-First Social Epistemology, PI: Mona Simion).
Status:Early Online Publication
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Kearl, Dr Timothy
Authors: Kearl, T.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Studies
ISSN (Online):1573-0883
Published Online:24 June 2023
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2023 The Author
First Published:First published in Philosophical Studies 2023
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record

Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
309239Knowledge-First Social EpistemologyMona SimionEuropean Research Council (ERC)948356Arts - Philosophy