There is no such thing as expected moral choice-worthiness

Cote, N. (2023) There is no such thing as expected moral choice-worthiness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, (doi: 10.1017/can.2023.18) (Early Online Publication)

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Effective altruism (EA) requires that when we donate to charity, we maximize the beneficial impact of our donations. While we are in broad sympathy with EA, we raise a practical problem for EA, which is that there is a crucial empirical presupposition implicit in its charity assessment methods which is false in many contexts. This is the presupposition that the magnitude of the benefits (or harms) generated by some charity vary continuously in the scale of the intervention performed. We characterize a wide class of cases where this assumption fails, and then draw out the normative implications of this fact.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Early Online Publication
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Cote, Mr Nicolas
Authors: Cote, N.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
ISSN (Online):1911-0820
Published Online:28 September 2023

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