Cote, N. (2023) There is no such thing as expected moral choice-worthiness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, (doi: 10.1017/can.2023.18) (Early Online Publication)
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Abstract
Effective altruism (EA) requires that when we donate to charity, we maximize the beneficial impact of our donations. While we are in broad sympathy with EA, we raise a practical problem for EA, which is that there is a crucial empirical presupposition implicit in its charity assessment methods which is false in many contexts. This is the presupposition that the magnitude of the benefits (or harms) generated by some charity vary continuously in the scale of the intervention performed. We characterize a wide class of cases where this assumption fails, and then draw out the normative implications of this fact.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Early Online Publication |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Cote, Mr Nicolas |
| Authors: | Cote, N. |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Canadian Journal of Philosophy |
| Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
| ISSN: | 0045-5091 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1911-0820 |
| Published Online: | 28 September 2023 |
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