Titus, L. M. and Carter, J. A. (2023) What the tortoise should do: a knowledge‐first virtue approach to the basing relation. Noûs, (doi: 10.1111/nous.12460) (Early Online Publication)
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Abstract
What is it to base a belief on reasons? Existing attempts to give an account of the basing relation encounter a dilemma: either one appeals to some kind of neutral process that does not adequately reflect the way basing is a content-sensitive first-personal activity, or one appeals to linking or bridge principles that over-intellectualize and threaten regress. We explain why this dilemma arises, and diagnose the commitments that are key obstacles to providing a satisfactory account. We explain why they should be rejected anyway, and then offer a new, knowledge-first virtue epistemological theory of the basing relation that shows how we can substantially theorize about mental processes without these commitments. The resulting view plausibly captures the way in which basing is an inherently mental and content-sensitive process.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Early Online Publication |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Carter, Professor J Adam |
| Authors: | Titus, L. M., and Carter, J. A. |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Noûs |
| Publisher: | Wiley |
| ISSN: | 0029-4624 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1468-0068 |
| Published Online: | 14 May 2023 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2023 Wiley Periodicals LLC |
| First Published: | First published in Noûs 2023 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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