Trust’s Meno problem: can the doxastic view account for the value of trust?

Patrizio, R. F. (2024) Trust’s Meno problem: can the doxastic view account for the value of trust? Philosophical Psychology, 37(1), pp. 18-37. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2206837)

Abstract

The doxastic view (DV) of trust maintains that trust essentially involves belief. In a recent paper, Arnon Keren (Citation2020) gestures toward a new objection to the view, labeled Trust’s Meno Problem (TMP), which calls into question the DV’s ability to explain the widely held intuition that trust has distinct and indispensable value. As of yet, there has been no attempt to take up TMP on behalf of DV. This paper aims to fill precisely this lacuna. I do so in three main stages. In §1 I contextualize and elucidate the problem, to which Keren gestures but does not address in detail. In §2 I disambiguate multiple possible interpretations of TMP, seeking to identify the most philosophically challenging. Finally, in §3, I argue that DV can solve even this interpretation. In order to do so, I make use ofthe highly plausible claim we find in the work of Katherine Hawley (Citation2012, 2019): that trust pays a compliment to the trustee. The payoffs of exploring the doxastic view in the context of Trust’s Meno Problem are twofold: we better understand the nature of the problem itself, and we see that the doxastic view can give a satisfying answer.

• Item Type: Articles
• Additional Information: The work was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and the Scottish Graduate School for Arts and Humanities (SGSAH).
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Patrizio, Ross
• Authors: Patrizio, R. F.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Philosophical Psychology
• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• ISSN: 0951-5089
• ISSN (Online): 1465-394X
• Published Online: 01 May 2023
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2023 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Philosophical Psychology 37(1):18-37
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License