Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences

Gerasimou, G. (2019) Dominance-solvable multicriteria games with incomplete preferences. Economic Theory Bulletin, 7, pp. 165-171. (doi: 10.1007/s40505-018-0159-2)

Abstract

This paper studies dominance solvability in games with multidimensional payoffs and incomplete preferences. The main result offers a generalization of Moulin’s (Econometrica 47:1337–1351, 1979) classic equilibrium-selection theorem in this more general environment. It is shown, in particular, that a natural extension of Moulin’s dominance solvability concept in this class of “multicriteria” games is an equilibrium refinement. It is further shown that dominance solvability based on the more permissive notion of partially dominated strategies generally fails to be an equilibrium refinement in such games.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Gerasimou, Professor Georgios
• Authors: Gerasimou, G.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
• Journal Name: Economic Theory Bulletin
• Publisher: Springer
• ISSN: 2196-1093
• ISSN (Online): 2196-1093
• Published Online: 08 November 2018
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © The Author(s) 2018
• First Published: First published in Economic Theory Bulletin 7:165-171
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons license