Choice, deferral, and consistency

Costa-Gomes, M., Cueva, C., Gerasimou, G. and Tejiščák, M. (2022) Choice, deferral, and consistency. Quantitative Economics, 13(3), pp. 1297-1318. (doi: 10.3982/qe1806)

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We report on two novel choice experiments with real goods where subjects in one treatment are forced to choose, as is the norm in economic experiments, while in the other they are not but can instead incur a small cost to defer choice. Using a variety of measures, we find that the active choices (i.e., those that exclude the deferral outside option) of subjects in the nonforced‐choice treatment are generally more consistent. We also find that the combined deferral and active‐choice behavior of subjects in that treatment is explained better by a model of dominant choice with incomplete preferences than it is by rational choice. Our results suggest that nonforced‐choice experiments and models can be helpful in separating people's rational, hesitant/not‐yet‐rational and genuinely irrational behavior, and can potentially offer important new insights in revealed preference analysis.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:Gerasimou (the corresponding author) and Costa-Gomes gratefully acknowledge financial support from the British Academy (2012–13 SRG). Cueva acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (Grant PID2019-108193GB-I00) and the Generalitat Valenciana (Grant SEJI/2019/005).
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Gerasimou, Professor Georgios
Authors: Costa-Gomes, M., Cueva, C., Gerasimou, G., and Tejiščák, M.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Quantitative Economics
ISSN (Online):1759-7323
Published Online:01 November 2021
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2022 The Authors
First Published:First published in Quantitative Economics 13(3):1297-1318
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons license

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