Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice

Simion, M. (2024) Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice. Inquiry, 67(2), pp. 762-768. (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2167233) (PMID:38196841) (PMCID:PMC10773469)

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Alessandra Taniesini's ‘The Mismeasure of the Self’ develops an internalist account of epistemic vice. On this view, epistemic vices are grounded in attitudes towards the self: fatalism, self-satisfaction, narcissistic infatuation, and self-abasement. The account is internalist insofar as it claims to ground both the nature and the normativity of vice within the subject's skull. In this paper, I argue against vice internalism: epistemic vices, I show, need a normative hook outside the skull to explain their vicious nature. In other words, the ‘mis’ in the ‘mismeasure’ of the self demands externalist unpacking.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:This work was supported by HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council: [grant number 948356].
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Simion, M.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Inquiry
Publisher:Taylor & Francis
ISSN (Online):1502-3923
Published Online:09 February 2023
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2023 The Author
First Published:First published in Inquiry 67(2):762-768
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
309239Knowledge-First Social EpistemologyMona SimionEuropean Research Council (ERC)948356Arts - Philosophy