Simion, M. (2024) Tanesini on truth and epistemic vice. Inquiry, 67(2), pp. 762-768. (doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2023.2167233) (PMID:38196841) (PMCID:PMC10773469)
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Abstract
Alessandra Taniesini's ‘The Mismeasure of the Self’ develops an internalist account of epistemic vice. On this view, epistemic vices are grounded in attitudes towards the self: fatalism, self-satisfaction, narcissistic infatuation, and self-abasement. The account is internalist insofar as it claims to ground both the nature and the normativity of vice within the subject's skull. In this paper, I argue against vice internalism: epistemic vices, I show, need a normative hook outside the skull to explain their vicious nature. In other words, the ‘mis’ in the ‘mismeasure’ of the self demands externalist unpacking.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Additional Information: | This work was supported by HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council: [grant number 948356]. |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Simion, Professor Mona |
Authors: | Simion, M. |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Inquiry |
Publisher: | Taylor & Francis |
ISSN: | 0020-174X |
ISSN (Online): | 1502-3923 |
Published Online: | 09 February 2023 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2023 The Author |
First Published: | First published in Inquiry 67(2):762-768 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons License |
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