The political economy of immigration enforcement: conflict and cooperation under federalism

Ciancio, A. and García-Jimeno, C. (2022) The political economy of immigration enforcement: conflict and cooperation under federalism. Review of Economics and Statistics, (doi: 10.1162/rest_a_01266) (Early Online Publication)

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Selection forces often confound the effects of policy changes. In the immigration enforcement context, we tackle this challenge tracking arrested immigrants along the deportation pipeline, isolating local and federal efforts. 80% of counties exhibit strategic substitutabilities in responding to federal enforcement, while the federal level is very effective at directing its efforts toward cooperative counties. We estimate that changes in the profile of immigration cases, and not weakened federal efforts, drove the reduction in deportations following a 2011 shift in federal priorities. Reducing immigration-court discretion and removing their dependence from the executive would have a significant impact on deportations.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Early Online Publication
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Ciancio, Dr Alberto
Authors: Ciancio, A., and García-Jimeno, C.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Economics
Journal Name:Review of Economics and Statistics
Publisher:MIT Press
ISSN (Online):1530-9142
Published Online:15 November 2022
Copyright Holders:Copyright © by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
First Published:First published in Review of Economics and Statistics 2022
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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