Minority minds: mental disability and the presumption of value-neutrality

Carter, M. (2023) Minority minds: mental disability and the presumption of value-neutrality. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 40(2), pp. 358-375. (doi: 10.1111/japp.12636)

Abstract

Elizabeth Barnes has recently developed an account of disability that is sensitive to the role of self-evaluation. To have a physical disability is, according to Barnes, to have a body that is merely different from the norm. Yet, as Barnes notes, some disabilities will genuinely frustrate some life plans. It may be the case, therefore, that a disability is instrumentally bad for a person and that acquiring one may be a genuine loss. Equally, however, a person may genuinely value a disability such that it is instrumentally good for them and that they experience the acquiring of it as a gain. Notably, Barnes explicitly restricts this analysis to physical disabilities, leaving open the status of mental disabilities. Nevertheless, Barnes does not rule out the extension of her model to this category, and she expresses a desire to see future work on other disabilities built upon it. This article takes up this challenge, making the case that to possess a mental disability is merely to possess a minority mind.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Carter, Dr Matilda
• Authors: Carter, M.
• College/School: College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
• Journal Name: Journal of Applied Philosophy
• Publisher: Wiley
• ISSN: 0264-3758
• ISSN (Online): 1468-5930
• Published Online: 08 December 2022
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2022 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Journal of Applied Philosophy 40(2):358-375
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License