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We Need to Talk

Measuring intercultural dialogue
for peace and inclusion

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We need to talk!

As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, improved capacities to initiate and achieve effective dialogue are needed to address global challenges. **Currently, 1.5 billion people live in countries with low Intercultural Dialogue** where global challenges such as absolute poverty, terrorism and forced displacement are more prevalent. To forge effective cooperation and sustain peace, strengthening Intercultural Dialogue must be a priority.

For the first time, *We Need to Talk* presents **evidence of the link between intercultural dialogue and peace, conflict prevention and non-fragility, and human rights**. Building upon the groundbreaking data from the new *UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue*, this report **highlights key policy and intervention opportunities for intercultural dialogue as an instrument for inclusion and peace**.

Using **data covering over 160 countries in all regions**, the report presents a framework of the structures, processes and values needed to support intercultural dialogue, examining the dynamics and interlinkages between them to **reveal substantial policy opportunities with broad spanning benefits**.

Policy makers, development workers, peace and security actors, academics and more are invited to **leverage the analysis in this report and findings of the *Framework* to strengthen intercultural dialogue around the world**.

Together, let's get talking!



We Need to Talk

Measuring intercultural dialogue
for peace and inclusion

Foreword

The world is at a crossroads. At a time where global challenges like climate change, COVID-19, conflict, and economic precarity demand cooperative solutions, we are also seeing record levels of xenophobia, racism and divisive political discourses tearing societies apart. Digital transformations with the power to bring us closer together are instead pushing us further apart. Trust in institutions, in ‘others’, is falling as communities face increasing inequality.


If we want to deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals and address these challenges, we need to come together again. We need to build trust and understanding. We need to work together. We need to talk.

This is why UNESCO, with its mandate to promote peace and cultural understanding has developed the Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue. ICD is our path to collaboration. It is a means to understand each other, cooperate and develop trust. It is a means to celebrate and leverage diversity. It is a tool for peace and inclusion. It is a way forward to a better tomorrow. Today, 1.5 billion people live in countries with low intercultural dialogue where global challenges like absolute poverty, terrorism and forced displacement are more prevalent. To support sustainable change and leverage intercultural dialogue as a tool for peace, social cohesion and human rights, we must first understand what is necessary for effective ICD and how we can enable ICD. There is a need to expand our knowledge and develop data on what is required for successful intercultural dialogue.

UNESCO launched an initiative with the Institute for Economics and Peace to fill this knowledge gap and strengthen intercultural dialogue. Through this initiative, we have developed the groundbreaking UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue paired with this report to highlight the key policy and intervention opportunities for intercultural dialogue. For the first time, the connection between intercultural dialogue and sustainable peace, conflict prevention and strong human rights standards is backed by facts. The Framework has shown the significant difference that targeted efforts make, with countries with strong intercultural dialogue also showing stronger human rights protection, conflict prevention and non-fragility, and peacefulness. Through the Framework, we have been able to understand the enabling environment behind intercultural dialogue and have targeted data at national, regional and global levels that can be used by policymakers to inform policy and ultimately achieve greater impact for peace and development through intercultural dialogue.

This initiative is just the beginning. UNESCO will work with countries to develop policies and strategies for enabling intercultural dialogue using these findings and provide global leadership for data-based intercultural dialogue.

The UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue and “We Need to Talk” report can provide countries and organizations the guidance they need to transform dialogue. Let us take the first steps towards a more peaceful and inclusive tomorrow, using this report to harness the transformative power of dialogue.



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Executive Summary

Currently, 1.5 billion people live in countries with low Intercultural Dialogue (ICD), or states with a lower capacity to initiate and achieve effective dialogue, where global challenges such as poverty, terrorism and forced displacement are widespread. ICD, as defined by UNESCO, is: 'a process undertaken to realize transformative communication that requires space or opportunities for engagement and a diverse group of participants committed to values such as mutual respect, empathy and a willingness to consider different perspectives.' (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) & Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), 2020). Based on this definition, ICD has significance at both the macro and micro level, and works across a multitude of fields. For instance, a football team bringing together former combatants, a media network promoting indigenous voices, a school system fostering religious tolerance, are all examples of ICD in practice.

As the world is becoming increasingly interconnected, the challenges of responding to growing diversity have amply demonstrated the importance of ICD in achieving key development and security outcomes, including addressing the root causes of conflict and sustaining peaceful societies (Orton, 2009; United Nations; World Bank, -2018). For the first time, this global report, "We Need to Talk", quantitatively connects ICD with these outcomes to provide governments and decision-makers with actionable insights to implement effective dialogue processes and tackle pressing global issues.

"We Need to Talk" builds upon earlier work outlined in the [Conceptual and Technical Framework](#), published by UNESCO and IEP in 2020. This work recognised that the effectiveness of ICD as a tool for advancing peace and inclusion is hampered by the lack of knowledge and data-driven approaches to ICD, with limited evidence to inform practice and challenges for long-term political and financial support. The work also found that ICD does not occur in a vacuum; instead, it requires specific structures, skills and processes to support it. Consequently, this work served as an important foundation in developing the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue, an analytical tool that measures the enabling environment for effective ICD across 160 countries. Countries were selected in line with chosen secondary data sources. Using the data from the Framework, this report analyses key trends and provides deeper interrogation of insights, particularly the effect of ICD on broader development and security outcomes.

"We Need to Talk" also addresses the key objectives of the United Nations International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures, Sustainable Development

Goal (SDG) 16 on *Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions* and the United Nations Secretary General's prioritisation of conflict prevention as a crosscutting objective of development, humanitarian and peace initiatives. Consequently, the global report highlights how ICD can be a solution for advancing strategic priorities and seeks to serve as an essential step in strengthening the evidence-base on dialogue for peace and development and facilitating the enhanced use of evidence by stakeholders.

INTRODUCING AND MEASURING INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

Section One of the report highlights the complexity of defining ICD and the need for the Framework, outlining the key concepts and processes to measure it. The global report is grounded in research using expert consultations, a substantial literature review and a data scoping exercise. This process exposed some of the key challenges to constructing a technical framework to measure ICD, like the Framework, emphasising the project's ambitious goal. Given these challenges, one of the first priorities was developing an operational working definition of ICD as seen above.

These exercises also evaluated the conditions needed to foster ICD, finding that ICD is present on the macro-level, through institutions and policies that form the basis of societal structures, and on the micro-level, where skills and values are developed to ensure effective ICD. Hence, the report outlines the nine domains and 21 indicators selected to comprise the Framework and explains how these indicators capture the elements in society which promote effective ICD. The nine identified domains comprise of four supporting domains, *Leadership and Organisation, Inclusion and Representation, Linkages and Coherency, and Skills and Values*, and five structural domains, *Horizontal Equality, Stability and Non-Violence, Social Cohesion, Governance and Citizenship, and Freedom of Expression*.

THE DYNAMICS, BENEFITS AND TRENDS OF THE FRAMEWORK

Section Two identifies the relationships between the domains of the Framework, identifying strong positive correlations across most domains. The findings highlight the systemic nature of the Framework, meaning that higher levels in one domain are typically associated with higher levels in another domain – and that high scores in these domains combined lead to even greater outcomes such as positively managing diversity, actively preventing conflict and creating the conditions for sustainable peace.

Importantly, analysis on the relationship between ICD and economic development finds that while having a strong economy is helpful, it is not necessary to succeed in strengthening ICD. For instance, lower-income countries score 17.6 per cent higher, on average, on the *Leadership and Organisation* domain than higher-income countries, demonstrating that strong leadership and institutions that champion ICD can counterbalance challenges faced by countries with weaker economies.¹ This indicates that effective ICD is an achievable goal for all countries.

The section also explores the additional benefits of high ICD, with a strong statistical correlation established between a high Framework score and conflict prevention and non-fragility (-0.941), peacefulness (-0.842), and protection of human rights (-0.775). These close relationships between the Framework and other peace and security outcomes mean that governments, decision-makers, and members of civil society have a wide variety of areas in which improvements can be made. In particular, three Framework domains - *Skills and Values*, *Inclusion and Representation*, and *Social Cohesion* - show strong correlations with state fragility, meaning improvements in these ICD domains may be a key first step in the stabilisation process.

The global report is innovative in its analysis of ICD at the global, regional, and national levels. By calculating regional averages, it becomes evident which areas of the Framework the global regions perform well in, and which areas would benefit from further development. Analysis at the regional level also exposes the differences and similarities between regions. The results find that all regions perform better in the structural domains than the supporting domains on average. Nevertheless, the differences between average regional scores are greater for the structural domains than the supporting domains. While the Framework can be thought of as systemic, with strong correlations between different domains, there is a large variety in the different combinations of strengths and challenges states face, particularly in the supporting domains. The regional analysis is important for policymaking, indicating that recommendations to improve ICD will vary greatly between regions since each region has different strengths and faces different challenges when it comes to ICD.

INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AT WORK

Section Three closely examines five case studies - one high-performing state from each of the regions. The five selected countries are New Zealand from Asia and the Pacific, Finland from Europe and North America, Ghana from Africa, Jamaica from Latin America and the Caribbean and Oman from the Arab States. Each case study provides a historical background and detailed analysis of each state's strengths in the ICD domains as well as areas for further improvement, and outlines examples of successful institutions, policy initiatives and good practices which

support effective ICD in practice. All five countries perform higher in the structural domains compared to the supporting domains. The five also score above the global average on two structural domains - Governance and Citizenship and Social Cohesion - illustrating the importance of strong institutions, legal frameworks and initiatives across different countries in facilitating effective and inclusive ICD.

INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE IN PRACTICE

Section Four presents five think pieces examining the implications of the findings from the Framework for policy and practice to support ICD through Education, Media and ICT, Culture and the Arts, Local Governance and Urban Planning, and Political Negotiation. Contributed by experts from these various fields, each piece examines what the data means for how policy and practice support ICD. The pieces also offer a series of examples and recommendations, providing further insight into the new data from the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue. The pieces shine a light on the diversity of actions possible for enabling ICD and the potential for impact of these actions.

LOOKING FORWARD

Through the analysis of the Framework data, case studies and think pieces, the core purpose of the global report is to help governments, civil society stakeholders and other practitioners see the value of ICD, understand it conceptually, and know how to support it in practice. Fundamentally, the report seeks to operationalise the use of data-driven insights in order to identify areas to improve the enabling environment for ICD and collaborate with governments, decision makers and practitioners on initiatives to achieve effective ICD in practice.

This report, however, is just one step of a process. The data the Framework has provided, and will continue to provide, will serve as a foundation for a reinforced operational offering by UNESCO and its partners to better support capacity building, technical assistance and coordination efforts to enhance the effectiveness of dialogue processes on the ground. Going forward, the data will be used to organise pilot policy dialogues, establishing roadmaps to more effectively mobilise ICD around specific issues and testing approaches to building capacities to interpret, use and respond to the data. Ultimately, it is our hope that a Dialogue Support Facility can be established, providing capacity building, funding and coordination for ICD.

¹ Refers to the average Leadership and Organisation domain score of 30 lower-income countries included in the framework, compared to the average for 43 higher-income countries.

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Section 1

Introducing and measuring intercultural dialogue



1.1 Introduction

In the face of persistent global challenges — such as inequality, divisive political discourses, discrimination and intolerance, internal displacement and violent extremism — innovative approaches are necessary to harness to the power of our diversity. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, the importance of reinforcing the values, institutions and skills that promote dialogue as a means of building the trust and respect needed to peacefully resolve inter-community conflict and prevent victimisation has become more apparent. The success of government systems, schools and economies depend heavily on harnessing and maximising the benefit of the growing diversity of backgrounds and perspectives in societies by improving communication (Deloitte & Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), 2019). Therefore, there is growing recognition of the importance of ICD as a vital instrument in achieving key development and peace-related outcomes, including addressing the root causes of conflict and sustaining peaceful societies (Orton, 2009; United Nations; World Bank., 2018).

UNESCO Member States have acknowledged the need for better data on ICD to effectively tackle pressing global issues. The adoption of Decision 202 EX/12 at the 202nd session of UNESCO's Executive Board in autumn 2017 reflects this promise to supply more evidence-driven and responsive information to support the Member States. This initiative is supported under the directive of the UNESCO-led International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures (2013-2022). One of the main challenges for policymakers is the lack of relevant or timely data which directly measures ICD. Without specific data to identify or measure progress towards ICD, it is difficult to develop evidence-based policies to address ICD's shortfalls.

In response to these challenges, the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue has been developed to measure the conditions that enable ICD. This framework ensures ICD is mobilised effectively, as well as measuring its impact on achieving key development and peace-related objectives. The Framework is grounded on an operational definition of ICD that was established through expert consultations and an extensive literature review.

BOX 1.1

Intercultural dialogue operational definition

'A process undertaken to realize transformative communication that requires space or opportunities for engagement and a diverse group of participants committed to values such as mutual respect, empathy and a willingness to consider different perspectives.' (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) & Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), 2020).

The Framework includes data and insights to help prioritise interventions to support effective ICD processes. The tool can help Member States better manage key development outcomes,

such as conflict prevention and reduced fragility, peacefulness and human rights protection — three key outcomes that Member States have identified as particularly important (UNESCO, 2018).

BOX 1.2

What is the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue?

The UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue is an analytical tool for Member States that measures the enabling environment that supports effective ICD in 160 countries. It contains 9 domains consisting of 21 indicators, which cover key macro- and micro-level societal factors that create the space and opportunity for successful ICD.

Using the Framework's data, Member States can identify barriers to ICD and prioritise investments that can enhance its effectiveness. The report can assist national and/or local actors to better manage diversity by clarifying ICD data. The Framework can be used by Member States, policymakers and practitioners to prioritise interventions to achieve social cohesion, prevent conflict and sustain peace, ultimately contributing to Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16. SDG 16 – *Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions* - aims to *'promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels'* (United Nations Statistics Division, 2021).

BOX 1.3

Connecting global agendas

This project responds to the UN International Decade for the Rapprochement of Cultures, SDG 16, and the UN Secretary General's prioritisation of conflict prevention as a crosscutting objective of the UN's development, humanitarian, and peace activities. It highlights how ICD can be a solution for advancing strategic priorities.

1.1.1 Report structure

Section 1 presents the core framework and the key concepts used, including ICD, and the structural and supporting domains comprising the Framework. The report section outlines expert consultations, the literature review and the data scoping exercise as tools for evaluating conditions to foster successful ICD. The section also highlights why ICD is important to broader goals and how it contributes to the pursuit of peace.

Section 2 investigates how the Framework domains work together to support effective ICD. The section analyses which domains are particularly important to ensure key outcomes, such as conflict prevention and reduced fragility, peacefulness and human rights protection. Regional trends are also investigated in this section.

Section 3 closely examines five case studies featuring a state from each global region. These case studies have been chosen based on their exceptional performance within their respective region. Each case study provides an analysis of each state's strengths and weaknesses in the ICD domains, and outlines examples of successful institutions, policy initiatives and practices which support effective ICD in practice.

Section 4 contains five Think Pieces contributed by Education, Media and ICT, Culture and the Arts, Local Governance and Urban Planning, and Political Negotiation experts. The pieces examine the implications of the findings from the Framework for policy and practice to support ICD through these various fields.

Finally, a comprehensive explanation of the framework's methodology can be found in Annex.

1.2 Framework development

To better understand the value of ICD, UNESCO-UIS surveyed Member States' views on the meaning and purpose of ICD in 2017 (UNESCO-UIS, 2018). The 17 qualitative and quantitative questions were divided into three main sections: Definition, State of Affairs and Operational Directions. The findings from the Survey underscored that Member States place a high value on ICD, but do not have a shared understanding of how to support it, hampered by insufficient data to nourish a strong evidence base. This further helped to establish the need for this initiative.

Building on this initial direction, an extensive research and consultation process was launched to design the conceptual and technical framework for the initiative. This included the preparation of a scoping study, an expert meeting and expert consultations.

1.2.1 Scoping study

As a first step in the process, UNESCO engaged the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), a leading global research institute working on peace and conflict data, to undertake a scoping study, examining the conceptual and technical feasibility of generating new data on ICD. The scoping study incorporated two key components: a literature review and a data scoping exercise.

1.2.2 Literature review

IEP conducted a literature review to evaluate approaches to measuring ICD. The Council of Europe's *White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue: Living Together as Equals in Dignity* (2008) was an initial reference point. The Council of Europe defines ICD as "an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals, groups, with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds and heritage" (Council of Europe, 2008: 10-11). It suggests that ICD operates at all levels (i.e. within and amongst societies, and globally), and stipulates that mutual understanding and respect must be foundational for effective ICD (Council of Europe, 2008).

Based on this definition, the literature review sought to answer

the following questions:

- How is ICD defined across different research fields?
- What does the existing literature point to as effective?
- What frameworks exist in the literature for measuring ICD?

The key findings revealed:

- 1) The most common definition is that ICD is defined by its purpose or goal. One example is to measure the effectiveness of ICD as the ability to influence a change in perception or to reach an agreement between culturally distinct actors (Froude & Zanchelli, 2017; Orton, 2009). Research within this area frequently uses a qualitative methodology based on surveying perceptions before and after ICD engagement. The literature also points to a dual characteristic of ICD: principles and as a tool for change. This distinction has been critical in developing the framework for this report, which emphasises ICD as both a necessary environment and an instrumental practice.
- 2) ICD is effective when the environment surrounding it is supportive of inclusion, interaction and engagement of an entire society. This is dependent on the abilities and willingness of individuals to communicate effectively and openly. An enabling environment can present itself as the absence of violence and discrimination (Zachariassen et al. 2016, Phipps, 2014, Nimer & Smith 2016), and the presence of civil freedoms, such as press freedom and the freedom to express one's culture and religious identity (Zachariassen et al 2016, Orton 2009). In addition, openness, connectedness and an understanding of others' cultures are critical to achieving ICD (Orton 2009). Educational institutions are also relevant; they provide students with a setting to actively engage with others but can also support the development of skills and values needed for inclusive practices (Dervin 2015, Kagitcibasi et al 2017).
3. The literature review revealed two methods to approaching ICD: the co-existence model (also known as the *harmony* model), and the confrontation model.
 - a. The co-existence model focuses on interpersonal contact, aimed at promoting understanding and tolerance, as well as reducing prejudices. It emphasises similarities and shared experiences (Abu-Nimer et al., 2007; Mor et al., 2016).
 - b. The confrontational model² emphasises the conflict and asymmetric power relations between groups and individuals in society (Hammack & Pilecki, 2015; Mor et al., 2016). It ultimately argues that historical-constructed identity markers are essential to understand power dynamics and inequalities.

The Framework is positioned between these two models, with an emphasis on the confrontational model. For example, the Framework captures opportunities for diverse groups to share their experiences with others through a *Freedom of Expression* measure. Yet, the Framework also investigates *Horizontal Equality* and *Inclusion and Representation* to understand

² This confrontational model is sometimes referred to as a liberation theology model by scholars such as Abu-Niber et al. (2007).

asymmetric power relations.

1.2.3 Data scoping exercise

IEP conducted a data scoping exercise based on the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence in the literature. The exercise highlighted challenges in capturing ICD through quantitative data sources, but also supported the idea that the technical framework would benefit from focusing on macro- as well as micro-level elements to better capture ICD.

While there is sufficient data to measure the broader structural environment for ICD, there is a conceptual overlap with measures of development and stability. Therefore, a framework approach was chosen to capture the diverse aspects of the environment that enables effective ICD. Different from constructing an index, which combines various areas of a concept into a combined score, the framework approach allows for UNESCO Member States, policymakers and practitioners to better understand the architecture for effective ICD relevant to their State. This is because the Framework does not provide an ‘overall score,’ but instead identifies one score for each of the areas – referred to as *domains* – included in the Framework. An analysis of the relationship between the Framework domains can be found in Section 2.1.

1.2.4 Designing the architecture to measure intercultural dialogue

This scoping study served as the basis for discussions at an expert meeting in December 2018 which brought together representatives from organisations working on related issues, including the World Bank, UNDP, the OECD, the Council of Europe, the Nordic Cultural Fund, Global Affairs Canada and various academic institutions (including Deakin University (Australia); Pontificia Universidade Catolica de Sao Paulo (Brazil); Durham University (UK) and City University (UK)), as well as UNESCO staff working across different programme sectors. Over the course of the discussion, the experts offered insights and reflections to refine the conceptual and technical architecture preliminarily suggested within the scoping study. These were consolidated and further elaborated in subsequent inputs received from experts (from both within the UNESCO Secretariat and beyond), gathered through in-depth discussions and open-ended questionnaires. On the basis of this comprehensive process of expert design, a consolidated conceptual and technical framework was written up, explaining the concepts, measurements and indicators planned to be used to collect and analyse the data. This was published, following comprehensive peer-review, in April 2020.

1.2.5 Member State engagement

Member States provided useful direction to the process of developing the direction of the initiative was presented to Member States at an Information Meeting, held in April 2018, where there was an opportunity to interact with experts from the Secretariat and IEP to understand both the results of the Member State Survey and the planned direction for this new initiative. A number of informal consultations were held across the process of design and implementation with Member States who expressed an interest in the initiative during the Information Meeting.

1.3 Measuring ICD – The UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue

The concept of ICD is multi-faceted, and various definitions are used depending on the context, field and purpose. The complexity of understanding ICD follows the complexity of understanding cultural differences. Culture was recognized at the 1982 UNESCO World Conference - Mondiacult as the ‘*set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs*’ (UNESCO, 2001). More simply put, culture can be understood as the multiple identities that people assume in different settings. Existing ICD literature often focuses on ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity, but such a narrow scope diminishes the importance of understanding social and cultural dividers’ impact on ICD. Examples of these dividers include age, income level, gender and marital status, which all form part of an individual’s identity and culture.

ICD is understood as a process undertaken to realise transformative communication across cultures and identities. It is a value-driven process, as it requires participants’ commitment to values such as mutual respect, empathy and a willingness to change perspectives (Woodin et al., 2011, p. 122). Knowledge of historical legacies is essential to understand and overcome current power disparities and establish dialogue (Kent & Taylor, 2002).

These criteria align with the findings in the literature review, which revealed that ICD is present on the macro-level through institutions and policies that form the basis of societal structures, and on the micro-level where skills and values are formed to ensure effective ICD. Therefore, ICD must be “*an objective of holistic public policies. It should be defined as a transversal objective across education, social, immigration, labour and cultural policies*” (Ratzmann, 2019, p. 53), as well as by the day-to-day interaction between individuals with differing identities and cultures.

The Framework provides UNESCO Member States with enhanced, data-directed support that will improve capacity to design and implement effective dialogue processes on an international, national, and local level. By measuring macro- and micro-level enabling conditions, Member States can better understand (a) what is required to adequately support ICD, (b) begin to identify potential blockages to effective ICD processes, and (c) prioritise investments.

1.3.1 Two-level approach

The Framework architecture consists of two levels that are crucial in establishing effective ICD:

- a) Structural domains (macro-level): Reflect the systemic elements of society at the social and institutional levels, defined by policies and legal frameworks
- b) Supporting domains (micro-level): The principles, values and competencies that impact actions, policies and activities of

ICD based on individuals' interaction and engagement, as well as ICD working 'on the ground'

Both structural and supporting domains possess systemic qualities. They impact each other and work together – within and across each layer – to enable effective ICD. There is a continuous process of interaction and reinforcement between the domains, ultimately impacting society's ability to realise effective ICD. In addition, these same domains have a strong relationship with states' ability to reconcile and prevent conflicts, as detailed in Section 2.

Establishing the Framework requires questioning the systems and routines that shape and define our societies, on both a macro- and micro-level: Are our young people being taught the skills and competencies necessary to engage with people from diverse backgrounds and with different identities in schools? Are our media and digital platforms providing inclusive and diverse spaces for critical thinking and discussions on matters affecting minorities as well as the majority? Are our cities being designed so communities can unite to support each other?

The Framework answers these questions. It lays the foundation for ICD to be woven into individuals', groups' and institutions' daily interactions and policymaking activities. Governments, ICD advocates and the public can enable the ICD environment by strengthening the structural domains and/or developing the supporting domains. These two layers are at the core of this report's analysis.

1.3.2 The UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domains

Based on the input from UNESCO's Member States, ICD expert consultations, literature review and data scoping exercise, the indicators presented in Table 2.1 were selected to capture the Framework domains. Data limitations made it difficult to capture

all domains equally, but of the 21 indicators selected, 20 had data for more than 150 countries, providing a strong representation of countries.

Stability and Non-violence, Governance and Citizenship, Freedom of Expression, Horizontal Equality and Social Cohesion are the five domains selected to capture structural domains in the Framework.

Four additional domains were selected to capture the supporting domains. These are *Inclusion and Representation, Leadership and Organisation, Linkages and Coherency, and Skills and Values*.


The Framework architecture (Figure 1.1) details five examples of pathways to effective ICD. The fields of education, media and ICT, culture and the arts, local governance, urban planning, and political negotiation are areas that can work as pathways to successful ICD. States should direct their intervention towards the challenges within these areas, through policies and other strategic initiatives.

While the architecture outlines the Framework's domains and key pathways, other important themes are captured within and across domains. For instance, promoting gender and racial equality is a pertinent step to ensuring ICD is effective and inclusive with avenues for dialogue between all segments of society. Progress towards these goals similarly helps to strengthen the Framework's structural and supporting domains. Hence, the Framework highlights the need for an intersectional approach to strengthen ICD in order to achieve key development and security outcomes towards greater inclusion.

In-depth arguments for the domain and indicator selection can be found in *Measuring intercultural dialogue: a conceptual and technical framework* (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) & Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), 2020).

FIGURE 1.1

Architecture for the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue



Source: UNESCO; IEP

BOX 1.4

Why a Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue?

Throughout the development of the Framework, it was widely acknowledged that supporting effective ICD requires attention in multiple areas and across the two layers. It is more than the sum of a set of domains, but rather it is how these domains interact with each other.

Other measurement approaches, such as composite indices, rank countries on aggregate scores. This approach

would give the impression that ICD is a linear process when the path to developing effective ICD is non-linear. This means, there is no calculated 'overall score' for the Framework. Instead, the Framework is intended as a tool for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers to assess the strengths of the elements that are required to achieve effective ICD, as well as clarity on where to prioritise interventions.



Section 2

The dynamics, benefits and trends of intercultural dialogue



Key Takeaways:

- The domains of the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue show strong statistical correlations with each other, with the exception of *Leadership and Organisation*. This highlights that higher levels in one domain are typically associated with higher levels in another domain – and that high scores in the domains combined lead to even greater outcomes.
- The close relationship between the domains means that policy-makers, advocates and members of civil society have a wide variety of areas in which improvements can be made and that improving one domain could lead to substantial improvement of other areas of the Framework, thereby increasing the broader societal benefits.
- A strong Framework score is strongly linked with conflict prevention and reduced fragility, peacefulness and human rights protection. The strong negative correlation between measures of conflict prevention and non-fragility and the Framework combined score, in particular, highlights that strength across all domains provides a greater outcome than strength in any individual domain alone.
- Three Framework domains - *Skills and Values*, *Inclusion and Representation* and *Social Cohesion* - show strong correlations with conflict prevention and reduced fragility, meaning improvements in these ICD domains may be a key first step in the stabilisation process.
- On average, all regions perform better on the structural domains than on the supporting domains. However, the variation between average regional scores is greater for the structural domains than the supporting domains.
- *Social Cohesion* is the highest-performing domain across all regions, while the greatest regional variation is on the Skills and Values domain.

2.1 The dynamics of the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue

As mentioned in Section 1 of this report, the structural and supporting domains in the Framework work together to support effective ICD. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the domains and indicator included in the Framework.

To better understand how the different parts of the Framework function and interact, a statistical analysis in the form of a correlation matrix has been constructed. Correlation indicates how closely two parts of the Framework are linked. A high correlation reflects that, on average, countries scoring high in one domain also tend to score high on the other domain. These correlations are referred to as positive correlations because results globally tend to fall in the same direction. Positive correlations are marked with a green colour in Table 2.2. Negative correlations, on the other hand, are correlations where countries tend to score highly on one domain but low on the other. These

are marked as blue in the table. The darker the colour, the stronger the correlation, hence, a white or pale colour indicates that the link between the two domains is non-existent or weak.

The Framework domains show strong positive correlations to each other suggesting systemic patterns of the framework: that higher levels in one domain are typically associated with higher levels in another domain – and that the domains combined lead to even greater outcomes. Lower and higher levels of the domains also tell us about a state's capacity for dialogue. As the domains work as a system, a country's focus on improving weaker domains through specific programmes or policy-changes can have a positive effect on others, thereby, increasing the broader societal benefits. While most domains show strong positive relationships across all countries, the *Leadership and Organisation* and *Freedom of Expression* domains, however, show more regional nuances in their relationships to the other domains.

The strong positive correlations across most domains point to systemic patterns in the Framework: that higher levels in one

TABLE 2.1

Table of UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domains and indicators

Domains	Indicators	Definition
Structural Domains		
Freedom of Expression	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Press freedom • Religious restrictions 	Free press is regarded as an enabling factor for peacebuilding, offering an avenue for open dialogue and knowledge-dissemination (Orton, 2009; Zachariassen et al., 2016). Media can raise awareness of minority groups' stories – for journalists as well as the audience – and can broadcast in minority languages (Prina et al., 2013, p. 7). In addition, legislative rights and structural policy conditions are essential to protect and enhance societal tolerance and respect free speech, human rights and pluralism, so minority groups have equal opportunities to express their identity.
Governance and Citizenship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Factionalised elites • Control of corruption • Government effectiveness • Political stability and absence of violence • Regulatory quality • Rule of law • Voice and accountability 	Efforts to address power imbalances between groups also include those aimed at coalition-building, governance-decentralisation, strengthening political leadership, the rule of law, voting and quota arrangements and education (UN/WB, 2018; Stewart, 2010; Zachariassen et al., 2016). Effective governance and institutions lay the foundation to engender public trust and participation in society, ensure that everyone has a voice, and create avenues for dialogue between governments and citizens and likewise between citizens.
Horizontal Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GINI • Group grievances • Horizontal accountability 	Addressing, confronting and challenging socio-economic inequality across groups of differing identities forms the bedrock of successful ICD. Without equality, the playing field for the groups involved is uneven or tilted, reducing avenues for dialogue between diverse groups and hindering opportunities for representation at all levels. Direct approaches aim to create change through a distribution of assets and representational quotas etc., whereas indirect approaches can be anti-discrimination policies, efforts to decentralise governance structures etc. (Stewart, 2010).
Social Cohesion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intergroup cohesion 	<i>Social cohesion</i> , or the sense of belonging, provides strength and resilience in society and the foundation for transformative exchange, that is ICD. Social cohesion also denotes the process of building trust between communities which in turn supports collective action and cooperation, among diverse groups and individuals, in pursuit of shared objectives (Foa, 2011; Mansouri & Elias, 2021).
Stability and Non-violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Internal conflict • Political instability • Feeling safe • Likelihood of violent demonstrations 	Violence affects the structures and space of civil society and populations, shutting down avenues for ICD. In addition, coalitions and associations, such as neighbourhood or community organisations, contribute to the cohesion that helps ' <i>buffer against risk of violence</i> ' especially when these associations build relationships across groups of diverging identities and establish new avenues for inclusive dialogue which allow for differences to be considered respectfully (WB/UN, 2018, 89; Orton, 2009).
Supporting Domains		
Inclusion and Representation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inclusion of minorities 	The involvement of a wide range of groups and individuals in decision-making processes, public institutions and the private sector is key to establishing new avenues for social and economic inclusion in society. It is also key to ensure effective ICD to achieve peacebuilding goals (Yousuf, 2017). The term inclusivity is frequently used by professionals in the peacebuilding and mediation space to denote broad participation in dialogues. For example, the inclusion and active participation of women in ICD is found to be particularly important for conflict prevention (Paffenholz et al., 2017; Zachariassen et al., 2016).
Leadership and Organisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leadership approval 	<i>Leadership and Organisation</i> relates to the management of ICD and includes factors concerning consistency in funding and support, developing the skills required for educators and facilitators and utilising the theory of change logic. It also extends to the credibility and legitimacy of organisers which impacts the ability to build trust between government and citizens, communicate effectively, reach political agreements and achieve desired policy outcomes.
Linkages and Coherency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Group acceptance 	Partnerships across different circles and domains in society and international partnerships help spread and widen knowledge-sharing and lessons learned in ICD processes (Froude & Zanchelli, 2017). This is also referred to as 'transfer and linking strategies' (Zachariassen et al., 2016). ICD involving participants with wider connections and networks with respect to their identities promotes a willingness to consider different perspectives, and is understood to be more effective in establishing beneficial engagement and building longer-term peace (Orton, 2016).
Skills and Values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education 	<i>Skills and Values</i> relates to the ability to acknowledge cultural differences and change viewpoints towards others, and to activate democratic structures and forces to confront horizontal inequalities between diverse groups within societies. This can be taught through different pathways, such as education, media and culture and the arts, and help to promote democratic values and citizenship based on equal rights, especially if it takes place across multiple levels and wider networks in society.

TABLE 2.2

Intra-correlations between the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domains

Domains	Freedom of Expression	Governance and Citizenship	Horizontal Equality	Social Cohesion	Stability and Non-violence	Inclusion and Rep.	Leadership and Org.	Linkages and Coher.	Skills and Values
Freedom of Expression	1	0.51	0.36	0.35	0.283	0.374	-0.261	0.279	0.167
Governance and Citizenship		1	0.876	0.624	0.835	0.75	0.033	0.532	0.777
Horizontal Equality			1	0.44	0.713	0.702	0.033	0.484	0.792
Social Cohesion				1	0.652	0.602	0.035	0.265	0.461
Stability and Non-violence					1	0.67	0.166	0.435	0.686
Inclusion and Representation						1	0.028	0.477	0.641
Leadership and Organisation							1	0.217	-0.096
Linkages and Coherency								1	0.453
Skills and Values									1

Source: UNESCO; IEP

domain are typically associated with higher levels in another domain – and that the domains combined lead to even greater outcomes. This indicates a close relationship between its parts – within each level as well as across the micro-macro-layers – which supports and contributes to ICD literature by offering an empirical evidence base to highlight the close link between the domains and ICD.

One exception to this result is *Leadership and Organisation*, as measured by percentage of population who approve of their governments and measured by Gallup World Poll. This measure correlates weakly with the other domains and records a negative correlation with the *Freedom of Expression* domain. This relationship shows that, on average, as the *Freedom of Expression* domain score increases, the *Leadership and Organisation* domain score declines. This relationship, however, is intuitive and consistent with previous studies: as *Freedom of Expression* increases with a society, so too does the ability for individuals to express disapproval of governments without fear of retribution (Møller & Skaaning, 2013). These relationships are explored in more detail in the following sections.

2.1.1 Interlinkages between the Framework domains

Of the five structural domains, *Governance and Citizenship* and *Stability and Non-violence* correlate particularly strongly with each other (0.835) as well as with most other domains – both structural and supporting. A strong correlation between these two domains is consistent with previous empirical findings that have shown well-functioning governments to be associated with lower levels of violence (Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), 2019). ICD for conflict prevention works by addressing root causes and structural drivers of violent conflict through inclusive political procedures etc. (Paffenholz et al., 2017; Zachariassen et al., 2016). In addition, the correlation matrix also shows how strength in these two domains has a strong relation to higher levels of *Horizontal Equality* and *Social Cohesion*³. This is

important as long-term cohesion across and between culturally distinct groups comes about through the exposure to ‘the other’ in an environment which enables for inclusive, respectful interactions.

These relationships are likely to be similar at the city or community level, where local government is concerned with the creation of more inclusive public spaces to address the challenges of growing urbanization and migration flows. In other words, actors involved in local governance (as one of the pathways to effective ICD) create opportunities to enhance intercultural understanding through interventions, such as urban planning and political processes. These interventions have a high potential to positively influence the structural domains, hence, facilitating progress towards greater social cohesion between groups and a reduction of city and community violence. See an example in Box 2.1.

Skills and Values and *Inclusion and Representation* are the supporting domains that correlate particularly highly with other domains in the Framework. A positive *Skills and Values* score is strongly associated with good *Governance and Citizenship* as well as higher levels of *Horizontal Equality*, correlating at 0.777 and 0.792 respectively. Correlations between *Linkages and Coherency* and the other Framework domains are slightly lower - though, still correlating at 0.532 with the *Governance and Citizenship* domain.

This confirms findings from the literature review that showed *Skills and Values* to be important for effective ICD. On an individual and group level, the ability to acknowledge cultural differences and change viewpoints towards others can stimulate democratic structures and forces to confront horizontal inequalities between groups in societies, which are essential for effective ICD. These skills and values can be taught through different pathways, such as education, media and culture & the arts, and help to promote democratic values and citizenship based on equal rights, especially if it takes place across multiple

³ NB: The intergroup cohesion indicator, which constitutes the Social Cohesion domain, contains data from the EIU on the likelihood of violent demonstrations. This data is already included in the Stability and Non-violence domain, as one of its indicators. A small part of the correlation between these two domains is, therefore, driven by this data overlap.

BOX 2.1

Use of ICD pathways to address violence and exclusion at the city level

City mayors in Cali, Bogotá and Medellín in Colombia have been inspired by data-based, research-driven methods that treated violence as a public health problem. Medellín, Colombia's second-largest city, had one of the highest violent crime rates in the world during the early 1990s. Over the last 15 years, a string of city mayors used available data on crime rates and social exclusion to pioneer a so-called "urban acupuncture" tactic using urban design to solve social problems. Today, Medellín is renowned as a socially cohesive, business-friendly and people-centric city with a high quality of life.

To tackle social inequality, violence and crime, the City Mayor's administration developed a series of multi-neighbourhood projects. These were small-scale urban projects but with high-impact - designed to decrease illegal activities, strengthen government legitimacy and rebuild social and economic institutions. Medellín's civic leadership realised early on that sustainable urban development could only be achieved by ensuring all the city's stakeholders became active participants in discussions on violence and social urbanism (Maclean K. (2015)). Hence, the projects were successful because the city facilitated a constant multilevel dialogue between many parties that brought leftist community leaders, social organisations and activists together with the city's elites (Maclean K. (2015) p.78)

These coalitions were made possible by long-term inclusive political processes and by checks and balances to attenuate the potential for populism. Innovative strategies encouraged the creation of co-operatives, community-business alliances and platforms so that the perspectives of everyone in this astonishingly diverse city could be understood, including radical and minority groups, emphasising the key role of ICD in the political processes and the more technical parts of urban planning.

In addition to participatory planning and budgeting to define development priorities and the use of educational campaigns and mass media messaging, Medellín also focused on public transportation infrastructure as a multifaceted means of addressing crime, inequality, unemployment and public and societal disengagement. A metro-cable played an important role in encouraging social inclusion and integration, connecting underprivileged neighbourhoods – literally and figuratively – to the lifeline of the city and all of its opportunities: economic, educational and cultural.

This case study shows how a city applied several of the ICD pathways, i.e. political processes, education, media and urban planning to influence levels of crime, social exclusion and inequality and ultimately achieved higher levels of trust and stability, economic growth and prosperity for its citizens.

levels and wider networks in society. The case of transboundary groundwater cooperation at the Dinaric Karst aquifer system provides an excellent example of this – See Box 2.2.

2.1.2 Exploring the link between economic development and ICD

By investigating the average domain scores by states' income level⁴, it is possible to understand the role of economic development in enabling effective ICD. A linear relationship across all domains indicates that a strong economic foundation supports the strength of the domains. On the other hand, however, a non-linear relationship indicates that economic development is not necessarily a condition for developing a strong enabling environment for effective ICD – hence, low- and middle-income groups are still able to achieve effective ICD. The trend for most ICD domains is that higher income levels are associated with stronger domain scores, but this linear relationship is not present for the *Leadership and Organisation* domain, as seen in Figure 2.1. In fact, states across all income groups score relatively low on the *Leadership and Organisation* domain.

The proportion of the population who approves of the state's political leadership, which is the measure capturing *Leadership and Organisation* in the Framework, is on average highest for low-income states. It declines for lower middle and upper middle-income states, recovering slightly for high-income states. Similarly, it is interesting that low-income states, on average, score better on the *Freedom of Expression* domain than middle-income states. This highlights that the path to effective ICD is non-linear, which is consistent with other theories on economic development and conflict (Rioux & Redekop, 2013).

In conclusion, the correlation findings confirm that the Framework domains work together systemically to support effective ICD. Except for the *Leadership and Organisation* and the *Freedom of Expression* domains, all domains are correlated, indicating that strength in one area is often associated with strength in another. To strengthen the Framework system, states can, therefore, focus on the opportunities and challenges of different pathways and prioritise investments accordingly. The close relationship between the domains means that policy-makers, advocates and members of civil society have a wide variety of areas in which improvements can be made and that improving one domain, could lead to substantial improvement of other areas of the Framework, thereby increasing the broader societal benefits.

Yet, analysing the average domain scores for each income group exposes that strength in the Framework is not simply a reflection of income level. Both *Leadership and Organisation* and *Freedom of Expression* are not following the linear trajectory between economic development and strength in the Framework domain as one would assume. This gives hope to lower- and middle-income states as their capacity to initiate and achieve effective dialogue, and strengthen their domains, is not necessarily limited by lower levels of economic development.

⁴ Income level categories as specified by the World Bank.

BOX 2.2

Transboundary groundwater cooperation as a pathway to strengthen ICD: the case of the Dinaric Karst aquifer system.

Groundwater is the world's largest distributed store of freshwater. It provides almost half of all drinking water worldwide, about 40 per cent of water for irrigated agriculture and about 1/3 of water supply required for industry. It sustains ecosystems and maintains the base flow of rivers (International Groundwater Resources Assessment Centre (IGRAC), 2018). Groundwater is contained in underground rocks called aquifers. Some of the aquifers cross international borders and are shared by different countries. The sustainable management of these shared underground water systems depends on the level of cooperation established between countries. Cooperation for the use of these shared water resources can generate opportunities to promote dialogues among countries and enable peace, regional stability and sustainable development. Fostering transboundary water cooperation is one of the items of the Agenda 2030 that has developed a Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) indicator 6.5.2 dedicated to monitoring transboundary water cooperation.

The UNESCO project for the study and the management of the Dinaric Karst Transboundary Aquifer System (DIKTAS) financed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) is a successful example of transboundary water cooperation. It was initiated in 2010 by the request on national institutions of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Montenegro.

The Dinaric Karst Aquifers is one of the world's largest karst aquifer system spanning from Italy to Greece, across nearly ten countries. Karst aquifers are a special type of geologic environment able to store large amounts of groundwater. Drinking water supply in the region heavily depends on this karst

aquifers, e.g. from up to 70 per cent in Albania to 90 per cent in Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina.


The DIKTAS project attracted various local groups for a constructive dialogue on sustainable management of the shared karst aquifers. These groups performed the analysis of opinions, power balances and perceptions of all interested parties, as stakeholders, regarding the management of the water resources at all levels, local, national and regional. Through the consulting efforts all the interested parties agreed to establish new multilateral mechanism for cooperation - the Regional Consultation and Information Exchange Body.

Due to activities under the DIKTAS project, it became possible to assess and share scientific knowledge through a "Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis" (TDA) which generated structured data-driven dialogue at technical level. Accordingly, it resulted in political commitment between stakeholders to adopt a "Strategic Action Programme" (SAP). The SAP currently constitutes a framework for the commitment of countries on specific commonly-agreed evidence-based policy, legal, institutional and investment actions within a multi-country context.

The DIKTAS project is an opportunity for individuals and groups of many countries to learn from each other. Its activities, regular meetings and trainings, contributed to trust building; dialogues were made possible between countries but also between actors of each country that did not usually meet. Furthermore, all stakeholders, as defined earlier, are currently engaged in the second phase of the DIKTAS project (2022-2026) that will intensify transboundary cooperation, mutual understanding and peace.

FIGURE 2.1

Average domain scores by income level



Source: UNESCO; IEP; World Bank

Note: Of the states covered in this report, 30 are classified by the World Bank as low income, 45 and 42 as lower and upper middle income, respectively, and 43 as high income.

2.2 How enabling intercultural dialogue provides additional peace, security and development outcomes

While the Framework measures the enabling environment for ICD, there is empirical evidence that strength in the Framework domains also supports a range of outcomes related to peace, security and development. Based on the 2017 survey, UNESCO’s Member States highlighted three key outcomes as particularly important: conflict prevention and reduced fragility, human rights protection and peacefulness (UNESCO, 2018).

To understand the relationship between the Framework and each of these outcomes, correlations were conducted with three prominent measures of these outcomes: the Fragile States Index (looking at fragility and risk of conflict), the Political Terror Scale (looking at political terror and violations of human rights) and the Global Peace Index’s internal peace score (looking at domestic peacefulness) were used as proxies for these outcomes. Table 2.3 provides an overview of the correlation results for each Framework domain as well as an average combined score. Evidenced by the combined score, a strong Framework is closely linked with conflict prevention and reduced fragility (-0.941), human rights protection (-0.775) and peacefulness (-0.842). In addition, the strong negative correlation between the Fragile States Index score and the Framework combined score highlights that strength across all domains provides greater outcome than strength in any individual domain alone.

To better understand the dynamics of the Framework domains in relation to the three outcomes, an analysis of the Framework

BOX 2.3

What are quantiles and why are they useful?

- Quantiles are a division of a data-set into equal groups according to the distribution of the results. The number of quantiles determines the number of groupings.
- Quartiles, as used for the Framework analysis, divide the data-set into four equal-sized parts. The four groups are:
 - Quartile 1: The lowest 25% of numbers (lowest performing).
 - Quartile 2: The next lowest 25% of numbers (up to the median).
 - Quartile 3: The second highest 25% of numbers (above the median).
 - Quartile 4: The highest 25% of numbers (highest performing).
- Quantiles are beneficial to compare groups who score similarly on a scale, such as the Framework domains, with other groups to understand the dynamics of their performance on a third dimension, such as fragility.

quantiles has been conducted. By dividing all domain scores into four equal-sized groups from lowest performing to highest performing, so-called quartiles, and calculating each group’s average score on the proxy-outcomes, it becomes apparent how the domains relate to the outcomes.

TABLE 2.3

UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domains and measures of conflict prevention and reduced fragility, human rights protection and peacefulness

Domains	Conflict prevention and reduced fragility (Fragile States Index score ^a)	Human rights protection (Political Terror Scale score ^b)	Peacefulness (GPI – Internal Peace score ^c)
Freedom of Expression	-0.416	-0.572	-0.338
Governance and Citizenship	-	-0.793	-0.847
Horizontal Equality	-	-0.672	-0.722
Inclusion and Representation	-0.782	-0.645	-0.666
Leadership and Organisation	0.015	0.051	-0.126
Linkages and Coherency	-0.534	-0.362	-0.371
Skills and Values	-0.872	-0.595	-0.657
Social Cohesion	-0.666	-0.591	-0.708
Stability and Non-violence	-0.836	-0.742	-0.919
Combined Framework score	-0.941	-0.775	-0.842

Source: "UNESCO; Fund for Peace (2020); Gibney et al. (2020); IEP (2020)

Notes: "a) A higher score in the Fragile States Index indicates higher levels of fragility.

NB: The Fragile States Index has not been correlated with the Governance and Citizenship and the Horizontal Equality domains, as these domains entails indicators already within the Fragile States index.

b) A higher score on the Political Terror Scale indicates higher levels of political terror.

c) A higher GPI Internal Peace score indicates lower levels of peace.

2.2.1 Conflict prevention and reduced fragility

The Fragile States Index was used as a proxy for conflict prevention and reduced fragility in the outcomes analysis. The Fragile States Index is constructed by the Fund for Peace and captures states' ability to prevent conflict. The Index measures risks and vulnerability in 178 states across the globe and the most recent data from 2019 was used.

Unsurprisingly, the correlation matrix in Table 2.3 shows that conflict prevention and reduced fragility are strongly correlated with the *Stability and Non-violence* domain (-0.836). State fragility, however, also correlates particularly strongly with three other Framework domains: *Skills and Values* (-0.872), *Inclusion and Representation* (-0.782) and *Social Cohesion* (-0.666). As a high score in the Fragile States Index denotes high levels of state fragility and greater risk of conflict, the negative correlations in the matrix indicate that a strong Framework is associated with lower levels of state fragility. In conflict-affected and fragile contexts, inclusive community or inter-group dialogue is often considered a first step in the stabilisation processes that are initiated and facilitated by multidimensional interventions to reduce tensions, eliminate armed conflict and to develop social cohesion.

It would be misleading to correlate the *Horizontal Equality* domain with the Fragile States Index score, as the domain contains indicators directly from the Index. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the literature strongly emphasises inequality as a driver in uprising and conflict. While the link between vertical inequality and violent conflict is disputed in the

literature, a strong link has been confirmed between inequalities between groups and violent conflicts' uprising (Balkwell, 1990; Østby, 2013).

Leadership and Organisation stands out as the only domain which is not strongly correlated with state fragility. As mentioned previously, *Leadership and Organisation* is captured by the leadership approval indicator. Hence, there is no clear association between the proportion of citizens who approve of the state's leadership and the states' level of fragility. As seen in Figure 2.2, there is almost no difference between the average Fragile States Index score for the four quartiles on the *Leadership and Organisation* domain. Similarly, the *Linkages and Coherency* domain does not follow the same trajectory as most domains in relation to state fragility. Nevertheless, there is a strong tendency for countries with the strongest domain scores to experience less state fragility, indicating that a strong enabling environment supporting ICD also brings people together and prevents division and conflict.


2.2.2 Human rights protection

Combining annual country reports from Amnesty International, the U.S. State Department and Human Rights Watch, the Political Terror Scale captures human rights protection by measuring 'levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a particular year based on a 5-level "terror scale"' (Gibney et al., 2020). The most recent data from 2019 was used for the correlations.

As seen in Table 2.3, all structural and supporting ICD domains

FIGURE 2.2

Average Fragile State Index score by ICD quartiles



Source: UNESCO; IEP; Fund for Peace (2020)

Note: Quartile 1 is the group of countries with the lowest Framework score. Hence, the countries in quartile 4 scores the highest in the Framework. A higher score on the Fragile States Index denotes higher fragility.

are strongly correlated with the Political Terror Scale – except the *Leadership and Organisation* domain. A lower score on the Political Terror Scale indicates high levels of human rights protection, meaning negative correlation results are expected, as they reflect that stronger Framework domains are associated with the human rights protection.

Governance and Citizenship and *Stability and Non-violence* correlate particularly strongly with political terror, at -0.793 and -0.742 respectively. These high correlations are not surprising, as political terror includes extra-judicial killings, disappearances and other forms of constraints. These protests can cause instability and, if escalated, turn to violent clashes.

Similarly, *Horizontal Equality* and *Inclusion and Representation* are closely related to levels of human rights protection. Equality between groups is captured by the *Horizontal Equality* domain in the Framework, while the *Inclusion and Representation* domain includes a measure of discrimination against minority groups in society. Hence, the strong correlation between the Political Terror Scale score and these domains confirms Balkwell’s (1990) and Østby’s (2013) findings which argue that there is a link between horizontal inequalities and violence.

Investigating the performance of the quartile groups’ performances on the Political Terror Scale shows that quartile 4, the highest scoring group in each of the Framework domains records, on average, lower levels of political terror. Hence, an environment that enables effective ICD also increases the capacity, and perhaps willingness, to protect human rights. Yet, this trend is not present for the quartiles of the *Leadership and*

Organisation and Linkages and Coherency domains. In fact, the third quartile in the *Linkages and Coherency* domain scores slightly worse on the Political Terror Scale than the second quartile. This implies that some states performing well on group acceptance, the indicator comprising the *Linkages and Coherency* domain, are still challenged in protecting human rights. However, it should be noted that the difference between the average Political Terror Scale score for quartile 2 and 3 is relatively small.


2.2.3 Peacefulness

Finally, the internal peace score in the Global Peace Index (GPI), by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), is used to evaluate which parts of the Framework in particular promote peacefulness. While the Political Terror Scale is part of the GPI’s internal peace score, the GPI score also includes numerous other negative peace indicators, such as homicide rates, likelihood of violent demonstrations, terrorism impact and weapons imports (Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), 2020).

The correlation analysis highlights that higher levels of internal peace, in general, are associated with stronger levels in the Framework domains. The strong association with Internal Peace is present for both levels of the Framework, that is both for the supporting domains as well as the structural ones. Calculating a combined Framework score confirms further the notion that an environment enabling effective ICD also promotes peacefulness (correlating at -0.842).

As seen from Table 2.3, good *Governance and Citizenship* is particularly important in sustaining peace, with a correlation of

FIGURE 2.3
Average Political Terror Scale score by ICD quartiles



Source: UNESCO; IEP; Fund for Peace (2020)
 Note: Quartile 1 is the group of countries with the lowest Framework score. Hence, the countries in quartile 4 scores the highest in the Framework. A higher score on the Fragile States Index denotes higher fragility.

-0.847. Though, it should be noted that the *Governance and Citizenship* domain contains a political stability and absence of violence indicator. As the domain captures elements of negative peace that are also captured by the GPI internal peace score, a part of this high domain correlation can be accredited to the overlap in data (correlating at -0.936). Nevertheless, the correlation between the remaining indicators within the *Governance and Citizenship* domain and the Internal Peace score is still significantly high, at -0.813. This confirms the strong relationship between good governance and peacefulness. Similarly, higher levels of *Horizontal Equality* and *Social Cohesion* are associated with a greater ability to sustain peace, correlating at -0.722 and -0.708 respectively.

Freedom of Expression is the domain with the lowest direct association to peacefulness. With a correlation of -0.338, there are signs that higher levels of *Freedom of Expression* are associated with higher levels of peacefulness, though the relationship is more complex. Investigating the data in greater detail exposes that numerous states have high levels of *Freedom of Expression*, despite pressing issues with violent conflicts and instability. Conversely, the data shows a few countries that are very peaceful but with some restrictions on *Freedom of Expression*.

Freedom of Expression includes the freedom to express dissatisfaction with rulers, organisations and other groups and individuals in society. This means that higher levels of *Freedom of Expression*, potentially, exposes greater differences of opinions within society. Although these conflicting opinions may be expressed through demonstrations and other peaceful means of


communication, they can turn violent when polarised sides meet and confront each other.

Classical functionalist approaches to conflict theory point to conflicts as a positive transition-point (Rioux & Redekop, 2013, p. 14). According to Coser (1964), non-violent conflict can serve social functions: Conflict is about group-formation and, therefore, conflicts have the potential to bring people closer together and move societies forward. Hence, these states, with high levels of *Freedom of Expression* but lower levels of peacefulness, have potentially not crossed the transformation-point yet, and are yet to achieve peacefulness. Conversely, the opposite cases imply that expressing conflictual views is not necessarily a pre-cursor for violent actions.

The quartile analysis highlights that states who perform well in the Framework (quartile 4 and 3) also experience higher levels of peacefulness, indicated by lower average GPI internal peace scores. Yet, the opposite is not always the case, with quartile 1 in the *Freedom of Expression* domain (the lowest performing group) achieving a better average GPI score than quartile 2. In addition, quartile 3, the second-highest performing group of states in the *Linkages and Coherency* domain, experience the highest average GPI internal peace score, that is these states record the lowest peacefulness, on average, compared to the three other quartile groups. It should be noted, however, that the difference in average peacefulness between quartile 1, 2 and 3 are small, and that quartile 4 continuously out-perform the other quartiles. This means that strength in the Framework domains is still associated with higher levels of peacefulness.

FIGURE 2.4

Average GPI Internal Peace score by ICD quartiles



Source: UNESCO; IEP (2020)


Note: Quartile 1 is the group of countries with the lowest Framework score. Hence, the countries in quartile 4 scores the highest in the Framework. A GPI Internal Peace score of 1 indicates a higher level of peacefulness, while a score of 5 indicates a lower level of peacefulness.

2.3 Regional Trends

By calculating regional averages, it becomes evident which areas of the Framework the world regions perform well in, and which areas would benefit from further development. It also exposes any global trends that may exist across all regions⁵.

Figure 2.5 shows the regional average scores in the structural and supporting domains of the Framework. It appears that all regions perform better in the structural domains, on average, compared to the supporting domains. Nevertheless, the differences between average regional scores are greater for the structural domains than the supporting domains. While the Framework can be thought of as a system, there is a great variety in the different combinations of strengths and challenges states face, particularly in the supporting domains.

FIGURE 2.5
Average structural and supporting domain scores by region




Source: UNESCO; IEP

2.3.1 The trends in five world regions

In the African region, two of the structural domains in the Framework - *Social Cohesion* and *Freedom of Expression* – perform higher compared to the region’s performance in the seven other domains. Of the supporting domains, Africa records its highest score on the *Leadership and Organisation* domain. Areas in need of extra attention in the African region are *Governance and Citizenship* of the structural domains and *Skills and Values* of the supporting domains. On average, the region would benefit from investing further in these areas to advance ICD and other outcomes. Ghana provides a good example of a country with strong *Social Cohesion* and *Freedom of Expression*, facing challenges in the Skills and values domain in the region. Read more about how Ghana has achieved strong *Social Cohesion* despite linguistic and ethnic diversity in the country and how the government is working to address unequal socio-economic development in order to improve ICD in Section 3.3 of this report.

Based on the average domain scores for the region, the *Inclusion and Representation*, *Governance and Citizenship* and *Freedom of*


FIGURE 2.6
Average domain scores: Africa



Source: UNESCO; IEP

Expression domains require attention across the Arab states. ‘Across the region, citizens — regardless of ethnicity, faith, wealth, education or status— continue to demand basic elements of governance that states are often unable or unwilling to provide’ (Fakir & Yerkes, 2018). Yet, the Arab states perform strongly in *Social Cohesion* and *Skills and Values*, which, in part, explains the economic development many countries in the region have experienced over the last decades. Oman exemplifies this well and the inclusion of women in education and the labour market has supported its progress towards ICD. Reflecting the regional average, however, Oman is challenged in supporting *Freedom of Expression* as well as *Linkages and Coherency*. Read more about Oman’s strengths and challenges in supporting effective ICD in Section 3.6.

FIGURE 2.7
Average domain scores: Arab states




Source: UNESCO; IEP

⁵ An overview of which states are included in each of the world regions can be found in the methodology section of this report.

Asia and the Pacific achieves its highest scores in the *Social Cohesion* and *Stability and Non-violence* domains. Despite substantial economic, cultural and social differences to Europe and North America, the Asia and the Pacific region faces similar challenges according to the Framework with *Inclusion and Representation* and *Linkages and Coherency* being the lowest scoring domains. Section 3.5 takes a closer look at how ICD is supported in multicultural New Zealand. Political institutions, legal frameworks and allocated funding to media celebrating and supporting the indigenous Māori language and culture have supported *Inclusion and Representation* and *Social Cohesion* in the country. Yet, the Christchurch attack in 2019 highlighted the challenges with racism and discrimination that New Zealand continues to face.

FIGURE 2.8

Average domain scores: Asia and the Pacific




Source: UNESCO; IEP

In contrast, Europe and North America is doing particularly well in developing citizens' *Skills and Values* to support effective ICD on the ground. In fact, on average, this is the highest performing supporting domain in the region, but, overall, the region tends to perform better in the structural domains compared to its average supporting domain scores. *Social Cohesion* and *Skills and Values* are the two highest-performing domains in Europe and North America, while the region would benefit from initiatives aiming to improve its *Linkages and Coherency* and *Leadership and Organisation* scores. As an exemplary case, Finland provides insights into how even one of the highest-performing countries in the Framework faces challenges – particularly in the *Leadership and Organisation* domain - in ensuring public mistrust does not hinder the efficacy of institutions or avenues which facilitate ICD in practice. Read more on the case of Finland in Section 3.2.

Latin America and the Caribbean also performs well in *Social Cohesion* but unlike the Arab states, the *Freedom of Expression* domain is among the highest scoring domains in the region. On the other hand, the region faces particular challenges in the *Leadership and Organisation* domain, as well as *Governance and Citizenship* and *Inclusion and Representation*. The average leadership approval in the region (the indicator comprising the *Leadership and Organisation* domain) is particularly low, confirming 'a clear rise in anti-incumbency sentiment ... and

FIGURE 2.9

Average domain scores: Europe and North America




Source: UNESCO; IEP

increasing preference for populist policy solutions among a growing proportion of the population' (The Economist, 2021). This regional trend of low levels of leadership approval is also present in Jamaica, which has been chosen as the region's case-study for its relatively high performance in the Framework. The historical legacies of multiculturalism in Jamaica continues to play a key role in ICD in the country, with celebrations of its diverse range of colourful African heritage. Hence, reflecting the regional average, Jamaica performs particularly well in *Freedom of Expression*. Nevertheless, challenges in *Horizontal Equality* and *Inclusion and Representation* prevails. Section 3.3 highlights how Jamaica is circumventing these challenges.

FIGURE 2.10

Average domain scores: Latin America and the Caribbean



Source: UNESCO; IEP



Section 3

Case studies: intercultural dialogue at work



3.1 Introduction

The following section provides five case studies featuring one high performing state from each of the global regions. The five selected countries are Finland from Europe and North America, Ghana from Africa, Jamaica from Latin America and the Caribbean, New Zealand from Asia and the Pacific and Oman from the Arab States. Each case study provides a detailed analysis of each state's strengths and weaknesses in the ICD domains, and outlines examples of successful institutions, policy initiatives and practices which support effective ICD in practice.

The selection of case studies highlights a great variety in the different strengths and challenges states face. All five states perform higher in the structural domains compared to the supporting domains. In particular, all five countries score above the global average on two structural domains - *Governance and Citizenship* and *Social Cohesion* - illustrating the importance of strong institutions, legal frameworks and initiatives across different countries in facilitating effective and inclusive ICD. In contrast, the greatest variation between the five countries is seen in the *Linkages and Coherency* and *Skills and Values* domains, indicating areas for further development in some states.

In order to select the five countries for the case studies, a principal component analysis (PCA) of the nine domains was conducted. The countries with the largest value in their region for the first principal component were selected. Future iterations of the Framework will seek to include case studies of different countries as part of a dynamic and evolving process.

The compilation of case studies is intended to provide exemplary examples of how different states, in different regions of the world, can develop high capacity for ICD through many diverse avenues, despite different histories, cultural landscapes and identities.

The first case study looks at Finland where changes in its cultural landscape due to recent immigration have necessitated progress towards the integration of minority ethnic and religious groups. Finland's strengths in *Social Cohesion* and *Skills and Values* are reflective of its strong institutions to support cultural diversity, particularly its universal education system, which has created avenues for ICD for students with different linguistic, religious and ethnic backgrounds. Section 3.2 also assesses some of the challenges facing Finland, such as negative attitudes to diversification, and how these issues can undermine the effectiveness of current institutions to facilitate ICD.

Ghana provides a good example of a country with strong *Social Cohesion* and *Freedom of Expression*, facing challenges in the *Skills and Values*. Ghana has achieved strong *Social Cohesion* despite linguistic and ethnic diversity in the country. Section 3.3 discusses the country's extensive framework for the protection and promotion of national culture and cultural diversity, while also assessing various initiatives to address unequal socio-economic development in order to further improve capacity for ICD.

The case of Jamaica illustrates how historical legacies of multiculturalism continue to play a key role in ICD in the country, with celebrations of the country's diverse range of colourful

African heritage a key feature. As with many other states in Latin America and the Caribbean, Jamaica performs particularly well in *Freedom of Expression*. However, the country faces challenges in *Horizontal Equality* and *Inclusion and Representation*, and current efforts to strengthen these aspects of ICD are outlined in Section 3.4.

The New Zealand case study explores the history of European and Maori legacies which continue to influence the cultural landscape of the country today. The country's high capacity for ICD is facilitated by institutions and practices which are inclusive of minority communities and indigenous Māori. Section 3.5 discusses the importance of addressing xenophobia and racism in the country, in the wake of the Christchurch attack in 2019, and initiatives to address these issues which pose challenges to the existing foundation of effective ICD in the country.

Finally, the case study of Oman discusses the significance of recent modernisation in the country and specifically female empowerment in education and the labour market which has supported the country's development of *Skills and Values*. Like many other Arab States, however, Oman is challenged in supporting *Freedom of Expression* as well as *Linkages and Coherency*. Section 3.6 also provides a discussion on how Oman might build upon its current strengths to further develop and navigate future challenges.

3.2 Finland - Suomi

Key takeaways

- Finland has experienced cultural changes due to recent immigration, which has necessitated the adaptation of social policy towards the integration and protection of minority ethnic and religious groups.
- Finland's strong public institutions, namely its universal education system, have facilitated effective ICD in broadening the avenues for immigrants and minorities to participate in society.
- The development of *Social Cohesion* and *Skills and Values* primarily through education has sought to instil a sense of belonging for all students, in particular for students with different linguistic, religious and ethnic backgrounds.
- Finland's strong performance in *Governance and Citizenship* is evidenced by high levels of institutional trust which serve as a foundation for societal resilience and facilitation for effective ICD between diverse groups and communities.
- While Finland achieves high scores across structural and supportive domains in the Framework, cultural diversification has put pressure on existing legal frameworks, demonstrating that further protection mechanisms and avenues for ICD are required to fill emerging gaps.

Background

Located in north-eastern Europe, Finland shares its border with Russia, Sweden and Norway. Finland has long been regarded as one of the most peaceful and stable countries in the world

(Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), 2021; The Fund for Peace, 2021). Equality and fairness are important values in Finnish society, and high levels of trust in democratic institutions are viewed as a clear strength in building resilience to address societal transformations and as an important foundation for ICD (OECD, 2021; Prime Minister's Office, 2020). Within Europe and North America, Finland is a high performer, scoring above average across all nine domains as shown in Figure 3.1.


Finland has a population of 5.5 million (2021) (Statistics Finland, 2021) with Finnish and Swedish as the two official languages. More than 86% of the population speak Finnish as a first language, while a smaller proportion speak Swedish at 5.2% (see Box 3.2). Although Finland is renowned as a relatively homogenous society, Finland's recent history illustrates how the country has adapted to increasing cultural diversity and viewed multiculturalism as '*a strength and resource*' (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2017). Finland's multicultural policies, and particularly its education system, aim to foster the cultural identity of people coming to Finland with different ethnic and religious backgrounds, while also supporting traditional minorities with different linguistic backgrounds (Ubani et al., 2019).

3.2.1 A history of Finland's evolving cultural landscape

Finland formed part of the Swedish empire until 1809, leading to significant cultural, political and economic ties which persist today (Raento & Husso, 2001). After the Finnish War of 1809, Finland was ceded to the Russian Empire and became the Grand Duchy of Finland (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2021). During this period, Lutheranism was the only nationwide institution and hence '*became an important stabilising factor encouraged as a trust-building element by the ruling power*' (Sinnemäki, et al., 2019). Under Russian rule, the Swedish language also held a

FIGURE 3.1

Finland's UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domain scores compared to the regional average



Source: UNESCO; IEP

BOX 3.1

Ethnicities, languages and religious diversity in Finland**Ethnicities***

- Finn, Swede, Russian, Estonian, Romani, Sámi

Languages*

- Finnish (official) 86.9%, Swedish (official) 5.2%, Russian 1.5%, other 6.4% (2020 est.)
- Religious diversity*
- Lutheran 67.8%, Greek Orthodox 1.1%, other 1.7%, unspecified 29.4% (2020 est.)

Urbanization

- Urban population: 85.6% of total population (2021)
- Rate of urbanization: 0.42% annual rate of change (2020-25 est.)

Source: CIA World Factbook (2020)

dominant position in society, as one of the main languages of administration and education (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2021).

In 1917, Finland declared independence from Russia and all population groups became Finnish citizens (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2004). The 1919 Constitution and 1922 Language Act provided constitutional equality to Finnish and Swedish, which were deemed the country's 'national languages' (Raento & Husso, 2001; Saukkonen, 2012). The key principles of the legislation determined that public authorities would 'provide for the cultural societal needs of both language groups on an equal basis', guaranteeing the cultural and linguistic rights of the Swedish speaking minority (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2004; Saukkonen, 2012). Industrialization and urbanization after World War II led to an increasing number of Finnish-speakers moving into primarily Swedish-speaking areas, challenging the existing linguistic structure (Raento & Husso, 2001). These changes led to local tensions as residents of rural, and predominantly Swedish-speaking, coastal areas found their language and traditional forms of livelihood threatened, and consequently led to Swedish emigration in the latter half of the 20th century (Raento & Husso, 2001).

Meanwhile, Finland sought to improve the position of previously marginalised minorities such as the Sámi and the Roma. The Sámi people are internationally recognised as the 'first people' (Lavery, 2006), inhabiting the Sámi territory, which spans the northern parts of Norway, Sweden and Finland, and the Russian Kola Peninsula (Árnadóttir, 2017). From as early as the 17th century, the Sámi people had been discouraged from speaking their native languages, in favour of Finnish (Minority Rights Group, 2021). In 1973, the Sámi parliament was established in Finland, marking the first elected body of Sámi people in the Nordic Region (Minority Rights Group, 2021). Later, in 1995, the Finnish constitution was amended to acknowledge the status of the Sámi as indigenous people and their right, as well as the Roma and other groups, 'to maintain and develop their own language and culture' (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2021). The Sámi Language Act of 2003 reified this, setting forth the linguistic rights of the Sámi people, and the status of Sámi languages as

regional minority languages (Minority Rights Group, 2021).

Furthermore, the Roma people also benefitted from improvements in minority rights. The Roma people are a linguistic and cultural minority who first arrived in Finland from Central Europe sometime during the 16th and 17th centuries (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2004; Raento & Husso, 2001). The initial policy of assimilation was abandoned in the 1970s, and instead the policy shifted to focus on the integration of Roma people into Finnish society, while respecting their desire to maintain a distinct identity (Minority Rights Group, 2015). In 1989, the National Advisory Board on Romani Affairs was founded in conjunction with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, and four regional advisory boards were also established to work with local authorities in order to improve the participation of the Roma in decision-making (Arrhenius & Friman-Korpela, 2009). Despite their equal legal status, the Finnish Roma continue to encounter problems in employment, education and access to public services, and face discrimination in their everyday lives (Granqvist, 2021; Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2004).

Following World War II and up until the early 1970s, Finnish society was characterised by high rates of emigration, primarily to North America and neighbouring Sweden, and strict immigration laws which attracted few immigrants (Koivukangas, 2003; Lavery, 2006). The first refugees to arrive in Finland at the request of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees arrived from Chile and Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s (Kanerva & Mitchell, 2017). In 1988, a quota system for refugees was adopted, and the first Somali refugees arrived in Finland in 1992 (Kanerva & Mitchell, 2017). Immigration expanded in the 1990s as Finnish policy became more receptive, with refugees from Southeast Europe, Eastern Europe, Iraq and Turkey as well as migrants from Asia. The expansion of immigration coincided with several changes in the international political and economic environment, including the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland's membership of the European Union (1995) and increasing globalisation (Kanerva & Mitchell, 2017; Koivukangas, 2003). In response to increasing immigration and cultural diversity, the Office of the Ombudsman for Minorities was founded in 2002 'to promote good ethnic relations and monitor the situation and rights of foreigners and ethnic minorities' (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, 2004).

The cultural geography of Finland has shifted considerably in recent decades, and the increasing cultural and demographic exchange has led to a recognition of Finland's cultural heterogeneity (Ubani et al., 2019). There has been a marked increase in new policies towards both old and new minorities at the national, regional and local levels. In particular, efforts have focused on the cultural and linguistic rights of previously neglected minority groups, immigration and refugee policy as well as housing, education, employment and cultural accommodations that apply to all minorities (Ubani et al., 2019). As Ubani et. al (2019) determine:

'...there has been a need to come to terms with growing social, cultural and religious diversity in Finland and to develop social policies addressing issues arising from this diversity.'

3.2.2 Finland's high capacity for successful ICD

Finland records high scores across all nine Framework domains. In particular, the country's highest performing domains are *Social Cohesion, Skills and Values* and *Governance and Citizenship*.

Finland's high performance on the *Social Cohesion* domain is reflective of its strong institutions to support cultural diversity. In the Strategy for Cultural Policy for 2020 (published in 2009), the Ministry of Education outlined the central role of the nation's strategy:

'...to promote the preservation and development of cultural heritage and cultural environments; to enhance equal access to, accessibility of and diverse use of culture... and to reinforce the cultural foundation of society.' (Ministry of Education, 2009)

Given the country's recent history of migration and advancement of minority rights, the 2025 Cultural Policy recognises the value of multiculturalism in Finland and acknowledges the benefits of building trust among increasingly diverse groups. Initiatives to enhance the rights of immigrants, refugees and minority groups have led to progress toward economic and social integration into Finnish society (Kanerva & Mitchell, 2017). For instance, the Act on the Promotion of Immigrant Integration (2011) aims to support immigrations by providing basic information on Finnish society, the labour market and services which promote integration (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of Finland, 2011).

One of the key avenues to facilitate *Social Cohesion* is through education and the development of *Skills and Values*, which seek to instil a sense of belonging and contribute to greater trust in institutions and between communities (Martela et al., 2020). In the 1970s, the Finnish government implemented a comprehensive school system, offering free education for all citizens (Ubani et al., 2019). One of the main principles of Finnish education is that *'the same educational opportunities should be available to all citizens irrespective of their ethnic origin, age, wealth or where they live'* (Ministry of Education and Culture & Finnish National Agency of Education, 2018). As such, the model for religious education evidences this belief in allowing students the right to study the student's own religion or ethics in basic and upper secondary education. According to Zilliacus and Holm (2013) the *'system aims at promoting equality and integration with respect to religion and one's worldview'* by acknowledging the pupil's background as a basis for instruction. This model is also exemplified in Helsinki's local curriculum, which aims to integrate student's religious traditions and rituals in the school, where possible, and consider these aspects in music and sports education as well as integrate them within school festivities (Zilliacus & Holm, 2013).

Developments in *Social Cohesion* and *Skills and Values* have been the result of efforts to enhance linguistic diversity, with investments in developing language proficiency seen as an asset for the individual and society as a whole (Ministry of Education and Culture, 2017). As Finland has witnessed increasing multiculturalism, policies have been aimed at fostering the cultural identity of immigrants with different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds (Ubani et al., 2019). These have expanded the opportunities for linguistic diversity, with students from different

linguistic backgrounds able to learn their native tongue as part of the curriculum, in addition to Finnish and Swedish languages (Ubani et al., 2019). Other initiatives which have focused on developing *Social Cohesion, Skills and Values* and many of the other Framework domains, include:

- The establishment of teacher training programs by the Ministry of Education and Culture aimed at immigrants in order to train better-qualified immigrant teachers (Nishimura-Sahi et al., 2017), expanding the potential for knowledge-sharing and thereby enhancing *Linkages and Coherency* and *Inclusion and Representation*.
- The Sámi Language Act of 2003 permits the right to use Sámi as an official language in the Sámi homeland area and receive primary and lower secondary education in their native language (Kanerva & Mitchell, 2017; Sámi Language Act, 2003), acknowledging the linguistic rights of the Sámi people and hence contributing to *intergroup cohesion* and reducing *group grievances*.
- The implementation of a *'gender sensitive approach to teaching'* to promote gender equality and an *'understanding of gender diversity'* (Zilliacus & Holm, 2013), hence promoting *Horizontal Equality*.
- The expansion of religious education to include different religious denominations, or a choice to study ethics, seeks to encourage students to *'build their own identity and worldview'* and facilitates *Inclusion and Representation* of diverse religious communities (Zilliacus & Holm, 2013).
- The establishment of a Roma Education Unit in 1994 to develop education for Roma people and promote the Romani language illustrates initiatives to ensure inclusivity in education and the preservation of cultural heritage, thereby facilitating progress towards *Inclusion and Representation* in the national curriculum (Granqvist, 2021).

Governance and Citizenship is another domain where Finland performs particularly well on the Framework. Finland's strong performance in *Governance and Citizenship* is underpinned by high levels of institutional trust which serve as a foundation for societal resilience. High levels of public trust in institutions can also influence trust between diverse groups and communities and establish broader avenues for dialogue which is essential for facilitating effective ICD. Trust in government and public institutions also ensures that everyone has a voice, the government is held accountable and institutions are transparent.

Two of Finland's highest scoring indicators (see Table 3.2) come from the *Governance and Citizenship* domain: *control of corruption* and *rule of law*. Finland's high score on the *control of corruption* indicator illustrate that instances of corruption in Finland are rare, and the policies and processes in place ensure transparency and provide avenues for reporting corruption. A survey carried out by Transparency International (2021) revealed that the majority of Finns believed they could report corruption without fear of retaliation and thought the government does a *'good job'* at fighting corruption (Transparency International, 2021).

Likewise, the high score in the *rule of law* indicator reflects high

confidence in public institutions and the low likelihood of crime and violence. Public trust in government is linked to the transparency and openness of public institutions, the capacity of the government to innovate and initiatives taken by the government towards equality and non-discrimination (OECD, 2021). Examples include the ability to submit a citizen’s initiative to be considered by Parliament if it amasses enough support. In 2014, the Finnish Parliament approved a bill legalising same-sex marriage after the initiative received 170,000 online signatures (*Good Governance - Finnish Society Is Based on Trust*, 2020).

3.2.3 Opportunities for further development and challenges ahead

Finland’s high capacity for successful ICD is evidenced by its strong performance across the nine domains on the Framework. Finland scores above the global average on all indicators; however, its three lowest indicators point to areas for improvement. The country faces challenges in ensuring institutions to protect minorities and enhance rights facilitate successful ICD in practice.

The lowest scoring indicator – *approval of country’s leadership* - is from the *Leadership and Organisation* domain. The indicator captures the level of trust in the country’s leader and the capacity to communicate effectively. Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the leadership of Finland’s current Prime Minister, Sanna Marin, was praised and she was deemed largely popular in guiding the country’s response to the crisis (*Yle Poll*, 2020). However, government polling illustrates lower levels of trust for rural residents, lower income households and people with lower levels of education, meaning Finland faces challenges in ensuring ‘pockets of distrust’ do not fracture the efficacy of national-level dialogue, and therefore hinder progress for ICD (OECD, 2021). Institutional trust in government has served as a foundation for building resilience to collectively address societal transformations in Finland, including an ageing population, climate change and increasing cultural diversity (OECD, 2021).

The government *restrictions index* score is higher than the global average and freedom of religion is enshrined in Finland’s

TABLE 3.1

Finland’s highest and lowest performing indicators in the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue

Indicator	Domain	Score*	World Average
GCI 4.0: Freedom of the press	Freedom of Expression	1	0.63
Control of Corruption: Estimate	Governance and Citizenship	1	0.41
Rule of Law: Estimate	Governance and Citizenship	1	0.5
Group Grievance	Horizontal Equality	1	0.48
Internal Conflicts Fought Banded	Stability and Non-violence	1	0.85
Political Instability Banded	Stability and Non-violence	1	0.62
Violent Demonstrations Banded	Stability and Non-violence	0.75	0.52
Government Restrictions Index	Freedom of Expression	0.74	0.61
Approval of Country’s Leadership - Approve	Leadership and Organisation	0.56	0.46

Source: UNESCO; IEP

Notes: *1 is the highest possible score and 0 the lowest possible score.

FIGURE 3.2

Finland’s UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domain scores



Source: UNESCO; IEP

constitution which stipulates the right to profess and practice a religion and be a member, or decline to be a member, of a religious community (The Constitution of Finland, 2000). However, there is clearly progress to be made to ensure minority religious groups are able to express their identity and preference is not given to any one religion. The vast majority of the population follow the Lutheran Church of Finland (see Box 3.1) and the church has historically held a different legal and economic position to other churches and religious communities in Finland (Kotiranta, 2010; Laverty, 2006). This is also evident in education with the model for religious education stemming from ‘a strong tradition of Lutheran instruction’, and most students taking the Lutheran instruction (Zilliacus & Holm, 2013). As the religious landscape of Finland has evolved, schools must provide religious instructions in religions other than the Lutheran faith

given there is a minimum of three pupils registering that faith in the municipal region, the religious community in question is registered and the students' family belong to the religious community (United States Department of State, 2021). However, despite these provisions to expand religious education, the introduction of newer instructions might pose challenges for the treatment of students and individuals from minority religious denominations who encounter prejudice or discrimination (Zilliacus & Holm, 2013).

As the country has witnessed numerous social changes in recent decades, signs of negative attitudes towards diversification have emerged and discrimination remains a common occurrence, posing challenges for effective ICD (Raento & Husso, 2001). In recent years, Finland has recorded an increase in hate crimes and racist and intolerant speech in public discourse against immigrants, refugees and members of religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Jews (United States Department of State, 2021). Certain extremist groups, including the Finnish branch of the Nordic Resistance Movement (PVL), a Pan-Nordic neo-Nazi movement, have engaged in the 'systemic use of hate speech' and used demonstrations to protest against 'ongoing demographic change' (Council of Europe, 2019). The group has organised demonstrations and engaged in acts of violence, including a deadly assault during a demonstration in Helsinki in 2016 (Council of Europe, 2019). The threat posed by such groups engaging in violent activities is reflected in Finland's score on the *violent demonstrations* indicator, which captures the likelihood of violent civil or labour unrest. While the Finnish Supreme Court ordered the shutdown of the PVL in September 2020 (Vanttinen, 2020), the prevalence of discrimination in Finland remains concerning for future violence and demonstrations. Addressing the gaps between the protections offered by institutions and ICD on the ground are necessary to open avenues for dialogue and develop cohesion to act as a 'buffer against risk of violence' and strengthen the *Stability and Non-violence* domain (Orton, 2009; United Nations; World Bank., 2018).

Conclusion

Finnish society has experienced rapid cultural changes in recent decades following an increase in immigration which has necessitated the adaptation of social policy towards the integration and protection of minorities. Finland's strong public institutions, namely its universal education system, have facilitated effective ICD in broadening the avenues for immigrants and traditional minorities to participate in society. The development of *Social Cohesion* and *Skills and Values* primarily through education has sought to instil a sense of belong for all students, in particular for students with different linguistic, religious and ethnic backgrounds. Finland's strong performance in *Governance and Citizenship* is evidenced by high levels of institutional trust which serve as a foundation for social resilience. Finland's strengths in these domains highlight just some examples of the country's success in broadening avenues for open dialogue between diverse groups, building trust and promoting opportunities for ICD.

However, negative attitudes to diversification can undermine the effectiveness of legal frameworks in practice and looking to the future, Finnish society will likely become more diverse, meaning further protection mechanisms and avenues for ICD will be required to fill emerging gaps. Greater attention should also be

paid to strengthening the role of institutional and interpersonal trust to support Finland's success in collectively addressing future challenges. Finland's strong performance across structural and supportive domains in the Framework highlight the country's resilience to adapt to social and cultural changes and ensure progress towards effective ICD to the benefit of society as a whole.

3.3 Ghana

Key takeaways

- Ghana performs well across most of the structural domains on the Framework, illustrating the strong institutions and initiatives in place to foster *Stability and Non-violence*, *Social Cohesion* and *Freedom of Expression*.
- The establishment of a peace infrastructure in Ghana supports many of the Framework elements by facilitating dialogue between different religious and ethnic groups, including and empowering minorities in decision-making frameworks and promoting a culture of peace and tolerance.
- During Ghana's history of European settlement and colonization, demarcations of regional territories created inequalities which persist today and contribute to political and social exclusion, hindering effective ICD in practice.
- Regional differences are reflected in unequal access to education and resources and illustrate the limited opportunities to build cohesion through relationships between groups with different identities.
- The success of existing institutions to promote ICD depend upon the values, skills and capabilities of communities and individuals to establish avenues for ICD through strengthening *Linkages and Coherency*, *Skills and Values*, and *Horizontal Equality* and building trust across diverse groups.

Background

Formally known as the Gold Coast, the Republic of Ghana is renowned for its multicultural heritage. Ghana was the first sub-Saharan nation to achieve independence from a colonial power, gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1957 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020). Ghana's colonial history had a profound influence on the country, particularly in regards to linguistic diversity and education policy, with English inherited as the official language (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2021b). Although many differences exist between Ghana's ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, Ghana's commitment to '*unity through diversity*' has been a key tenet of its success in enabling successful ICD, as outlined in the nation's Cultural Policy:

'Since independence, the emerging civil society of Ghana has recognized the need to promote Unity within this cultural diversity and Ghana has since enjoyed relative unity, stability and peace.' (National Commission on Culture, 2004).

Ghana is home to a variety of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups, as seen in Box 3.3. While English is the official language, Ghana has a long history of linguistic diversity and, according to the Bureau of Ghana Languages (BGL), approximately 81 different languages are spoken (Appiah & Ardila, 2020; Bergen, 2019). The BGL actively promotes the development of local Ghanaian languages and publishes resources in 11 Ghanaian languages, including Asante, Ewe and Ga (BGL - *The Bureau of Ghana Languages*, 2021).

Ghana’s population was estimated to be 31.1 million as of 2020 (*World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition*, 2019). Ghana has more than eight major ethnic groups, each with their own distinct language (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2021b). The largest of these ethnic groups are the Akan, which comprise approximately 50% of the population. The majority of Ghana’s population follow a denomination of Christianity, at 71.2%, while 17.6% follow Islam. A smaller percentage of the population adheres to traditional indigenous religions, at 5.2%.

3.3.1 A history of colonial legacy in Ghana

Ghana’s history of European settlement and colonization changed the socio-economic development of the country and had important implications for education, and consequently for ICD. Prior to European settlement, and the introduction of formal education in Ghana, traditional education was conducted in the native Ghanaian languages⁶ (Ansah, 2014). The first European explorers to arrive in the territory now known as Ghana were the Portuguese in 1471, soon followed by other European powers who established posts to trade gold and engage in the slave trade (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2021b; “Ghana Profile - Timeline,” 2018).

The first instances of formal education in Ghana were believed to have begun in the late 15th Century with the establishment of

BOX 3.2

Ethnicities, languages and religious diversity in Ghana

Ethnicities*

- Ethnic groups: Akan 47.5%, Mole-Dagbani 16.6%, Ewe 13.9%, Ga-Dangme 7.4%, Gurma 5.7%, Guan 3.7%, Grusi 2.5%, Mande 1.1%, Other 1.4% (2010 est.)

Languages*

- English (official), Asante 16%, Ewe 14%, Fante 11.6%, Boron (Brong) 4.9%, Dagomba 4.4%, Dangme 4.2%, Dagarte (Dagaba) 3.9%, Kokomba 3.5%, Akyem 3.2%, Ga 3.1%, other 31.2% (2010 est.)

Religious diversity*

- Christian 71.2% (Pentecostal/Charismatic 28.3%, Protestant 18.4%, Catholic 3.1%, Other 11.4%), Muslim 17.6%, Traditional/Spiritualist 5.2%, Other 0.8%, None 5.2% (2010 est.)


Urbanization

- Urban population: 58% of total population (2021)
- Rate of urbanization: 3.06% annual rate of change (2020-25 est.)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2021); (Ghana Statistical Service - GSS, Ghana Health Service - GHS, and ICF International, 2015)

FIGURE 3.3

Ghana’s UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domain scores compared to the regional average



Source: UNESCO; IEP

⁶ In this context, a Ghanaian language refers to a language of the locality which includes one of the following: Akan (Fante and Twi), Nzema, Ga, Ga-Adangbe, Ewe, Gonja, Kasem, Dagbani, and Dagaare (Owu-Ewie, 2006).

Castle Schools (Agbedor, 1994). These schools were established by European settlers in order to educate the children and relatives of African merchants and important chiefs (Ansah, 2014). Throughout this era there was no official language of instruction for education in the Castle Schools and the medium of instruction evolved from one European language to another, including Portuguese, Dutch, Danish and English, depending on which group was in control at the time (Ansah, 2014).

In 1874, the British declared the Gold Coast (the territory comprising present-day Ghana) a crown colony (*BBC News*, 2018). Colonisation had a profound impact on the social fabric of Ghana, with the introduction of a European model of organisation replacing the indigenous nature of statehood (Edu-Buandoh, 2016). The British demarcated the country into the three territories of the Gold Coast – the Colony (the coastal regions), Asante and the Northern Territories. While the colonial administrators invested heavily in the Coastal and Ashanti territories, the Northern territories were neglected due to the lack of exploitable and exportable resources (Osei-Assibey, 2014). As Osei-Assibey (2014) claims, these demarcations ‘reflected the necessity to maintain major ethnic or tribal groups as homogenous and unified entities for the administration and effective governance of the country’.

Throughout the colonial era, underinvestment in the Northern regions was reflected in the large inequalities in access to education. The Northern regions had fewer schools than the Southern regions, and total enrolment and educational attainment was lower (Aboagye, 2021). There were also significant gender gaps in education, and girls were initially exempt from attending school while the Colonial administrators chose to train males, as opposed to females, in order to provide labour required to support newly established institutions (Abass, 2017; Aboagye, 2021). By the time girls were allowed to enrol in education, the educational gender gap was pronounced; different subjects were offered according to gender and girls typically studied subjects related to domestic duties (Abass, 2017). This had repercussions for the role of women in the labour market, with the majority of top professional and administrative posts being held by men (Abass, 2017). As such, these cultural changes during the colonial period served to undermine the traditional gender dynamics, and resulted in the marginalisation and subordination of women within education and the labour force (Abass, 2017).

After Ghana gained independence from the British in 1957, education was a high priority on the government’s agenda, albeit subject to intermittent changes in the search for an appropriate model ‘which would fit the needs of the country and the expectations of its citizens’ (MacBeath, 2010). The post-independence period saw the gradual inclusion of Ghanaian languages in education (Owu-Ewie, 2006). The government declared in 2002 that a Ghanaian language could be studied as a compulsory subject until the senior grades of Secondary School, while English was the main medium of instruction (Owu-Ewie, 2006). While many were critical of this new approach, others viewed this bilingual approach as transitional, with education in Ghanaian languages ‘used as a bridge to English literacy’ and serving to promote the use of local languages as a valuable component of Ghanaian culture (Berson et al., 2020)

Today, English is the official language of Ghana, while a further

eleven languages have the status of government-sponsored languages: four Akan languages (Asante Twi, Akuapem Twi, Fante and Nzema), two Mole-Dagbani ethnic languages (Dagaare and Dagbanli), Ga, Ewe, Dangme, Guan and Kasem (*BGL - The Bureau of Ghana Languages*, 2021). English is a consistent feature in Ghanaian media, in television, radio broadcasts, newspapers and magazines, and in the majority of legal documents published within the country (Guerini, 2008). Because of this, and due to its importance within the education system, English is viewed as central to social mobility in Ghana (Dako & Quarcoo, 2017). Hence, in the post-colonial era, the role of language in education has had important implications for *Social Cohesion* and ICD in Ghana:

‘Ghanaians who have had formal education and thus can read and write in English mostly see themselves as belonging to a positive social group with positive social identity and are entitled to positive social representation.’ (Edu-Buandoh, 2016).


3.3.2 Ghana’s High Capacity for Successful ICD

Ghana performs higher than the regional average across all nine Framework domains. The country performs particularly well in *Social Cohesion*, *Stability and Non-violence* and *Freedom of Expression*.

In Ghana, the positive trend in *Social Cohesion* is measured by one of Ghana’s highest performing indicators, *intergroup cohesion* (see Table 3.2). Ghana has developed an extensive framework for the protection and promotion of national culture and cultural diversity, which contributes to successful ICD. In 1990, the National Commission on Culture was established under the Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture with the aim ‘to respect, preserve, harness and use cultural heritage and resources to develop a united, vibrant and a prosperous national community with a distinctive African identity and personality’ (National Commission on Culture, 2004). The establishment of

FIGURE 3.4

Ghana’s UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domain scores



Source: UNESCO; IEP

the National Commission on Culture facilitated the establishment of a number of other initiatives promoting culture and development. These included the Cultural Policy of Ghana (2004), the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (2010-2013) and the National Tourism Development Plan (2013-2027).

In particular, the 2004 Cultural Policy was a critical step to acknowledging the necessity of linguistic diversity in Ghana. The Cultural Policy emphasises the State's responsibility in fostering the development of Ghanaian languages by promoting Ghanaian languages as a medium of instruction in the educational system (National Commission on Culture, 2004). The policy also highlights collaboration between relevant bodies, including the Ministry of Education, the Ghana Association of Writers and the Bureau of Ghana Languages, to promote the publication of books in Ghanaian languages and use of such languages in educational institutions and at official and public functions. As such, the Cultural Policy is just one example of actions taken by the Government to achieve cultural interaction and inter-ethnic understanding through the prism of linguistic diversity.

Furthermore, the continuous efforts to support peacebuilding have been an essential part of Ghana's high capacity for ICD and have contributed to developing an enabling environment for *Stability and Non-violence*. Throughout Ghana's history, the country has experienced numerous communal conflicts, some of which have resulted in violent confrontations, including the Konkomba-Nanumba conflict in 1994 (Tsikata & Seini, 2004). However, Ghana has enjoyed a period of relative stability and a key contributor to this success has been the establishment of a comprehensive infrastructure for peace. This includes the National Peace Council, regional and district peace councils and a Peacebuilding Support Unit within the Ministry of the Interior (Giessmann et al., 2017). In particular, the National Peace Council seeks to promote national cohesion through peacebuilding, and to provide mechanisms 'through which Ghanaians can seek peaceful, non-violent resolution of conflicts' (Kotia & Aubyn, 2013). This peace infrastructure in Ghana creates an enabling environment which supports many of the Framework elements, namely:

- The incorporation of various religious and tribal leaders in the National Peace Council ensures *Freedom of Expression* and *Inclusion and Representation* by facilitating dialogue between different religious and minority groups (United States Department of State, 2019).
- The reduction of tensions and mitigation of potential conflict, particularly around elections, reinforces *political stability and absence of violence* (Hopp-Nishanka, 2012; United Nations; World Bank., 2018b).
- The inclusion and empowerment of minority and marginalised ethnic groups within local decision-making structures contributes to greater *intergroup cohesion, inclusion of minorities and group acceptance* (United Nations; World Bank., 2018b).
- The promotion of a culture of peace, tolerance, dialogue, reconciliation, and the rule of law among Ghanaians contributes to *Social Cohesion* (Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014).
- The strengthening of inter-institutional collaboration between

civil society organizations and government in the area of peacebuilding supports *government effectiveness and horizontal accountability* (Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014).

Freedom of Expression is another domain where Ghana performs particularly well on the Framework. The domain is measured by two indicators – *press freedom* and *religious restrictions*. In particular, *press freedom* is enshrined in Chapter 12 of the 1992 Constitution which guarantees '*freedom of the press and other media*' (*The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Act, 1996, 1996*). Ghana enjoys a high degree of media freedom (BBC News, 2020) and the presence of a private media, especially radio, has become a key medium for democratic participation for large parts of the population (Asante, 2020). According to Reporters Without Borders, journalists are free to demand accountability from leadership without fear of reprisals, hence contributing to Ghana's high score on the *horizontal accountability* indicator (Asante, 2020).

The constitution also protects the individual's right to profess religious affiliation, prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion and does not designate a state religion (*The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Act, 1996, 1996*; United States Department of State, 2019). Christianity is the main religion practiced in Ghana, with approximately 80.2% of the population adhering to Christian denominations (as shown in Box 3.2), though Islam and African Traditional Religions are also practiced. Ghana recorded one of the lowest levels of government restrictions on religion in the world, with a score of 1.6 out of 10 on Pew Research Centre's 2018 Government Restrictions Index (GRI) (Majumdar & Virginia, 2020). While interreligious tensions have occurred historically, in general, religious diversity is embraced and adherents of different religions, including religious leaders, regularly partake in religious ceremonies and festivities to encourage interfaith engagement (United States Department of State, 2019). For instance, during public meetings, religious leaders offer prayers in their respective ways; followers of Islam perform du'a, while followers of Traditional religions pour libation and Christians offer prayers in their own way (Konadu, 2018). Religious diversity is also exemplified at the highest levels in politics, with Ghana's President, Nana Akufo-Addo, a Christian, and Vice-President, Alhaji Dr Mahamudu Bawumia, a Muslim, publicly emphasising the importance of religious coexistence and acceptance of different religious beliefs (Office of the President, Republic of Ghana, 2019).

3.3.3 Opportunities for further development and challenges ahead

Ghana performs well across most of the structural domains, illustrating the strong institutions in place to ensure *Stability and Non-violence* and *Social Cohesion*. However, Ghana's lowest scoring indicators come from the *Horizontal Equality, Skills and Values and Linkages and Coherency* domains, as seen in Table 3.2. Despite the strong institutions and frameworks in place to support an enabling environment for ICD, in practice, this is not always inclusive of all groups within society. There are several challenges which currently hinder successful ICD in practice such as unequal socio-economic development, gender inequality and discriminatory attitudes towards LGBTQI+ people. Notably, Ghana scored 135th out of 162 countries on the gender inequality index (GII)⁷, facing challenges in gender gaps in political

⁷ Based on data from the 2020 GII

participation, education and the labour force (United Nations Development Programme, 2020).

The lowest scoring indicator, *group grievance*, comes from the Fragile States Index. The indicator measures the divisions and schisms between different groups in society, particularly those based on social or political characteristics, and their role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process. While Ghana's Constitution designates equal access to opportunities and resources, in practice, large inequalities persist between ethnic and religious groups, as well as between men and women. In particular, the politicisation of ethnic loyalties remains a concerning feature of Ghanaian politics (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). Discrimination can sometimes occur within state institutions, despite frameworks in place which prohibit discrimination (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020).

Poverty also remains a significant challenge in Ghana and has been a key driver of social or political exclusion since the colonial era. Poverty is more concentrated in the country's Northern three regions (Northern, Upper East and Upper West) and the Volta Region, where most people are employed in the agricultural sector, while the Southern regions record relatively lower poverty rates (World Bank, 2020). These divisions largely coincide with geographic separation of religious groups which has persisted since the colonial era (Langer & Stewart, 2015). While much of Ghana's Muslim population resides in the three northern regions, the majority of inhabitants in the South are Christian. The Ghanaian government has proposed steps to address these inequalities and adopted a 40-year development plan with the aim to achieve a '*just, free and prosperous society by 2057*' (Abubakari et al., 2018). Central to the Plan is the structural economic and social transformation of Ghana, with specific objectives to create an inclusive and equitable economy and society which would facilitate ICD inclusive of all groups (Graham, 2016).

Regional differences are also reflected in unequal access to education, which remains a challenge to effective ICD in Ghana. Ghana scores below the global average on the *education index* indicator, which measures the average adult years of schooling and expected years of schooling for students under the age of 25. Urban areas have a 74% primary school attendance ratio, compared to 66% for rural areas (Ghana Statistical Service - GSS et al., 2015). Attendance is much lower for secondary education,

and the World Bank estimates that students from rural areas were 5 to 6 times less likely to access secondary education (World Bank, 2021b). Ghana's low score in *Skills and Values* reflects the lack of opportunities for transformative dialogue between diverse groups and poses challenges for the development of intercultural skills, religious tolerance and acknowledgement of cultural differences. The government of Ghana has sought to improve access by offering universal free secondary education, in addition to technical and vocational training (World Bank, 2021b). Progress in expanding education access and quality will be essential to facilitating increased opportunities for youth in Ghana, and foster capabilities to promote *Horizontal Equality*.

The low score in the *group acceptance* indicator reflects discriminatory attitudes towards certain groups in Ghanaian society, namely women and LGBTQI+ people. While attitudes towards women in Ghana have evolved in recent decades, women still face social and political exclusion. Females account for just 14.5% of seats in national parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2021). The lack of political participation for women in Ghana is attributed to the patriarchal structure of society, which determines unequal power, social values, entitlements and roles for women (Sikweyiya et al., 2020). As such, these cultural attitudes, and especially the perception that men are the primary decision-makers, mean women face discrimination if they do become involved in politics (Bukari et al., 2017; Sikweyiya et al., 2020). Ghana's constitution guarantees equal rights for men and women, however, in practice, inequalities persist in terms of access to education, employment and health, while gender-based violence also remains a serious issue and is linked to the subordination of women within society (Freedom House, 2021; Sikweyiya et al., 2020).

In addition, LGBTQI+ people also face legal and societal discrimination. Ghana does not recognize same-sex marriage or same-sex civil unions, and same-sex relationships between males are criminalized in the Ghanaian Criminal Code of 1960. Although many cases are not prosecuted, persecution is widespread (Human Dignity Trust, 2015). High-profile statements against homosexuality have also increased tensions for LGBTQI+ people and led to calls to further criminalize same-sex activity (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

TABLE 3.2

Ghana's highest and lowest performing indicators in the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue

Indicator	Domain	Score*	World Average
Internal Conflicts Fought Banded	Stability and Non-violence	1	0.85
Political Instability Banded	Stability and Non-violence	0.94	0.62
Intergroup Cohesion	Social Cohesion	0.89	0.8
Group Acceptance	Linkages and Coherency	0.39	0.46
Education Index	Skills and Values	0.38	0.57
Group Grievance	Horizontal Equality	0.37	0.48

Source: UNESCO; IEP

Notes: *1 is the highest possible score and 0 the lowest possible score.

Conclusion

Ghana’s colonial history has had a significant impact on socio-economic development, designating inequalities which persist today. Ghana’s strong institutional frameworks, namely infrastructure aimed at preserving cultural diversity and mitigating conflict, demonstrate the country’s high capacity for ICD and underpin its position as a high peace country (Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), 2021). However, the success of these institutions to promote ICD depend upon the values, skills and capabilities of communities and individuals to establish avenues for ICD and build trust across diverse groups. As such, efforts to develop *Linkages and Coherency*, *Skills and Values* and *Horizontal Equality* are crucial to developing Ghana’s capacity for ICD and ensuring sustainable peace.

3.4 Jamaica - Xaymaca

Key takeaways

- Jamaica’s colonial history has shaped the country greatly with political institutions resembling the British system and the diverse cultural heritage originating, in particular, from Africa. After the emancipation of African slaves, celebrating African culture became essential to Jamaica’s national identity.
- The historical legacy of multiculturalism in Jamaica continues to play a key role in ICD in the country, with Jamaica’s high performance in *Social Cohesion* reflective of the public institutions and vibrant civil society which embrace the country’s diverse cultural heritage.

- The development of *Freedom of Expression* has created an enabling environment for ICD by providing avenues to raise awareness of minority issues, allowing diverse religious groups to engage and facilitating easy access to information to bridge knowledge gaps between different communities.
- Jamaica faces challenges with high levels of organised crime and corruption remaining barriers to successful ICD, particularly for minority groups and lower socio-economic groups, who continue to be excluded from decision-making processes.
- While Jamaica’s strong political institutions and legal frameworks supports political and civic rights, a greater focus on addressing *Horizontal Equality* and *Inclusion and Representation* is necessary to provide opportunities for all to engage in fruitful ICD interactions in the future.

Background

An island nation situated in the Caribbean Sea, Jamaica is known for its Reggae music, Rastafarianism and pride in African heritage. The national motto, represented on the Coat of Arms, highlights the country’s aim to unify its people and celebrate diversity:

“Out of Many, One People” (The Office of the Prime Minister, Jamaica, 2021).


This need for national pride has been particularly important since Jamaica’s independence from the United Kingdom in 1962.

Within Latin America and the Caribbean, Jamaica scores above average on 8 of the 9 domains (Figure 3.5), with the exception of *Leadership and Organisation*.

Jamaica’s colonial history has shaped the country greatly with political institutions resembling the British system and the

FIGURE 3.5

Jamaica’s UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domain scores compared to the regional average



Source: UNESCO; IEP

BOX 3.3

Ethnicities, languages and religious diversity in Jamaica**Ethnicities***

- Black 92.1 %, mixed 6.1 %, East Indian 0.8 %, other 0.4 %, unspecified (2011 est.)

Languages*

- English, English patois

Religious diversity*

- Protestant 64.8 %, Roman Catholic 2.2 %, Jehovah's Witness 1.9 %, Rastafarian 1.1 %, other 6.5 %, none 21.3 %, unspecified 2.3 % (2011 est.)

Urbanization

- Urban population: 88.7% of total population (2020)
- Rate of urbanization: 0.82% annual rate of change (2015-20 est.)

Source: : Central Intelligence Agency (2020)

diverse cultural heritage originating, in particular, from Africa. After the emancipation of African slaves, celebrating African culture became essential to Jamaica's national identity and according to the 2011 census, 92.1% of Jamaicans today self-identify as black (see Box 3.3).

'African continuities are present in religious life, Jamaican Creole language, cuisine, proverbs, drumming, the rhythms of Jamaican music and dance, traditional medicine (linked to herbal and spiritual healing), and tales of Anansi, the spider-trickster' (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2020).

Therefore, it is essential to bring together its different communities to celebrate the country's diverse heritage and support ICD processes in Jamaica, now and in the future.

3.4.1 A History of diverse and proud African heritage

The Tainos, part of the Arawak tribes, arrived from South America approximately 2,500 years ago and named the island Xaymaca, meaning 'the land of wood and water' (Jamaica Information Service, n.d.). The Tainos are considered the original inhabitants of the island and some of their words have been incorporated into Spanish and English and are still used today, e.g. barbacoa (barbecue), tabaco (tobacco) and hamaca (hammock) (BIM Editorial Team, 2020).

When the European explorer Christopher Columbus first sighted the island in 1494, he referred to it as Santiago (St. James) but the indigenous name, Jamaica or Xaymaca, persists (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2020). Yet, the colonial history is still present in the diverse place-names in Spanish, French and English found across the island. Particularly Spanish Town, near the South coast, is a lasting reminder that the Spanish settlers built this town to administer the colony (Bryan, 1992).


By the time the British invaded the island in 1655, the native Taino population had been exterminated through overwork from enslavement or by diseases brought over by the Spanish colonisers (Poole, 2011). The Spanish colonisers, therefore, traded and brought over African slaves – a practice the British colonisers continued when conquering the island. As the British took over the rulership of the land, the Spanish fled the island and to ensure the growth of the sugar estates, the number of African slaves increased (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2020). Therefore, 70 per cent of Jamaica's population today is of African descent and a small proportion of mixed ethnicity, that is African and European (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2020).

Some of the original Spanish slaves managed to escape the British coastal plantations and established independent communities farther inland. These communities were referred to as maroons, derived from the Spanish *cimarron* meaning 'wild' or 'untamed' (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2020). The Maroon's resistance against the British settlers led to the Maroon Wars and the Baptist War, which are accredited to have accelerated the process of emancipation of Black people in the country (BIM Editorial Team, 2020). Despite the abolition of slave trade in 1808 and slavery in 1834⁸, political rights remained a point of conflict between the plantocracy and parts of the Colonial Office (BIM Editorial Team, 2020). While the Black community achieved political and economic rights, such as voting, suppression and societal exclusion persisted. Jamaica was also unsuccessful in converting ex-slaves into a sharecropping tenant class, making many ex-slaves economically vulnerable and excluded from the economy. At the same time, demands for labour were high, leading to higher rates of immigrants, particularly from India, China and Sierra Leone (BIM Editorial Team, 2020).

Almost 100 years later, following the coronation of Ras Tafari as Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie I in 1930, Rastafarianism took root in Jamaica (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2020). The coronation was predicted by the spiritual leader and activist

FIGURE 3.6

Jamaica's UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domain scores



Source: UNESCO; IEP

⁸ Emancipation came into effect in 1834 but full freedom was not granted until 1838 (Jamaica Information Service, n.d.).

Marcus Garvey to be a sign and call to African slaves to return to Sion, the promised land. Selassie was considered the embodiment of God and African pride was, and is, at the heart of the movement (Art Network TV, 2018). As a plea to a society unjust and violent, Bob Marley and the Wailers' reggae music became famous internationally, for preaching unity and redemption – a core message for Rastafarians.

Independence from the United Kingdom (UK) was established in 1962 with the Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council, but the country remained a member of the Commonwealth (Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council, 1962). Emigration, particularly from the United States and Canada, increased at the end of the 20th century and early 21st century and the country experienced substantial development, primarily in metropolitan areas.

The historical legacy of colonization can still be seen today from political institutions to dominant cultures, with Christianity being the dominant religion in the country (see Box 3.3) and the political institutions mirroring those in the UK – bicameralism and a Governor-General representing the British Crown. Given Jamaica's history of diverse and proud African heritage, it has also been necessary for the state to establish institutions and practices which embrace cultural diversity and enable individuals and groups with differing identities to engage in ICD on equal foot.

3.4.2 Jamaica's high capacity for successful ICD

Jamaica performs higher than the regional average in seven of the nine Framework domains – *Skills and Values* and *Inclusion and Representation* being the exceptions. The scores for *Freedom of Expression*, *Social Cohesion* and *Stability and Non-violence* are particularly high.

Freedom of expression and 'the right to freedom from discrimination on the ground of (i) being male or female (ii) race, place of origin, class, colour, religion [and] political opinions' were confirmed by the Constitutional Amendment Act in 2011 (The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Constitutional Amendment) Act, 2011, 2011). With this, Jamaica has a relatively low level of government restrictions on religion, with a score in 2018 of 1.4 out of 10 on Pew Research Centre's Government Restrictions Index (GRI) (Christ Baronavski et al., 2020). The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms not only manifests the individual's right to express convictions and personal identity, but also protects Jamaicans against any form of discrimination, ultimately providing a solid political framework supporting *Social Cohesion* in the country.

In addition, Jamaica continues to rank as one of the world's safest and most supportive environments for press freedom. Reporters Without Borders (2020) ranks Jamaica as having the 7th best environment for press freedom in the world. The Press Association of Jamaica, formed in 1943, continues to uphold the high standards of journalism through scholarships for education and awards recognising meritorious work in the industry (Press Association of Jamaica, 2010). The association's motto 'A Free Press Oxygen of Democracy' further underpins the association's goal to support the media in delivering not only information to the general public, but what it considers 'public welfare' (Press Association of Jamaica, 2010).

Jamaica's strong performance in *Freedom of Expression* creates an enabling environment in support of many of the Framework domains, in a variety of ways including the following:

- Numerous free-to-air TV stations and radio stations have shaped the Jamaican electronic media landscape and the easy access to information has the potential to bridge knowledge gaps between different communities as well as develop and shape Jamaican's *Skills and Values*, even outside the traditional education channels (Broadcasting Commission, 2017).
- Free press provides a space for diverse views to be heard from different civil society organizations and therefore contributes to *horizontal accountability*. For instance, the Women's Media Watch, a not-for-profit organization, works with journalists to develop 'gender-aware media practices', influence broadcast policy and legislation, and improve the images of men and women in the media as a means to reduce violence (*Women's Media Watch – Do Good Jamaica*, 2018).
- The Jamaica Council for Interfaith Fellowship coordinates regular events with representatives from many different religious organizations to promote religious tolerance and diversity, which underpin legal frameworks to guarantee freedom of religion and work to develop *Social Cohesion*, *Inclusion and Representation* and *Linkages and Coherency* (United States Department of State, 2020).
- Local media outlets provide extensive coverage and open dialogue on religious matters, including topics such as interfaith harmony, LGBTQI+ rights and religion, and religion's role in government. Local media outlets provide avenues to raise awareness of minority groups' stories and a forum for discussion, allowing diverse groups to engage in ICD and therefore contributing to *Inclusion and Representation* (United States Department of State, 2020).

Furthermore, Jamaica's strong performance in *Social Cohesion* is reflective of the public institutions in place to embrace national identity and the country's diverse cultural heritage. The government is currently in the process of revising the National Cultural Policy of Jamaica, to be called the National Policy on Culture and Creative Economy 2020-2030. Integral to the policy, which was first established in 2003, is the acknowledgement of 'the historical realities' Jamaica has faced and the measures needed to advance cultural and economic development (Ministry of Education, Youth and Culture, 2003). In particular, the policy seeks to provide a framework which recognises, promotes and protects 'all cultural expressions and products developed by the Jamaican people in the course of our history' including African retentions, European based traditions and Rastafarianism (Ministry of Education, Youth and Culture, 2003). This includes promoting cultural and linguistic diversity within education, namely encouraging programmes to increase foreign language education in the school system and strengthening *Skills and Values* and *Linkages and Coherency* also (Ministry of Education, Youth and Culture, 2003).

Social Cohesion is also developed at the community level in Jamaica, through collaboration between groups to address particular community challenges and issues. Jamaica has a large

number of civil society organisations and their work ranges from poverty alleviation to acting as anti-corruption watchdogs (Watson and Less, 2015). In particular, collaboration between different interest groups tends to occur around specific issues such as the environment, corruption and violence against women and children (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). While some organisations face financial constraints, their work has been impactful in holding public institutions and the government accountable and providing critical services, such as sports activities, homework centres and health care (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). Cooperation between various organisations contributes to building trust at the local level, thereby creating societal resilience and strengthening *Social Cohesion*.

Jamaica also achieves relatively high scores in *Stability and Non-violence* – above-average levels for the Latin America and the Caribbean region. Similarly to *Freedom of Expression*, this is supported by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, enshrined by ‘the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in the execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal offence of which the person has been convicted’; (The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Constitutional Amendment) Act, 2011, 2011, p. 3). By this, capital punishment is, therefore, a legal penalty in Jamaica. Though, it has not been carried out since 1988 (Sangiorgio, 2018).

The positive trend in the *Stability and Non-violence* domain is driven by two of Jamaica’s three highest performing indicators, *political instability* and *internal conflicts* (see Table 3.3). While social, ethnic and class divisions exist in Jamaica, widespread internal conflicts are rare, extremist actors have had little success in mobilising these tensions and the political system is considered to be stable (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). However, non-political violence remains an issue in Jamaica and the domain does not directly capture the high levels of organized crime, and its related violence, present in the country (due to limited data availability in developing the Framework). The challenges of organized crime are closely related to historical political divisions and socio-economic challenges in the country and will be discussed further in Section 3.4.3.

3.4.3 Opportunities for further development and challenges ahead

Despite Jamaica’s high performance in most of the structural

domains, with strong political institutions and a legal framework that supports political and civic rights, the country faces challenges ensuring ICD on the ground. The two lowest performing domains are on the micro supporting level (*Leadership and Organisation* and *Inclusion and Representation*), and the implementation of effective ICD is further challenged by the country’s high levels of organised crime. These challenges are evident in Jamaica’s Framework scores, particularly in *control of corruption* and high levels of economic inequality (*GINI*), as seen in Table 3.3.

Jamaica’s score in *leadership approval* is much lower than the global average and voters appear discouraged to take part in political processes, with a voter turnout of only 37% at the 2020 general election⁹ (Electoral Commission of Jamaica, 2020). The two main parties in the 63-member House of Representatives (lower house) are the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP), with long-standing tensions between the two main political parties. Voter turnout has declined in recent decades in both local and national elections, signalling low trust in politicians and the bipartisan political system (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). As such, weaknesses in *Leadership and Organisation* can be linked to weaknesses in the *Governance and Citizenship* domain, particularly *control of corruption*.

Corruption continues to be a core challenge to inclusive practises in Jamaica’s political institutions as well as socio-economic equality in the country. The two main political parties are well-established and clientelism, corruption and political patronage are ingrained in the political culture, meaning other political parties have been unable to gain widespread support (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). The exchange of services and cash from corruption is historically linked to the ‘garrison communities’ in the country. Garrison community is a term used to describe geographically homogenous voting, or an area where at least 90% of the eligible votes are cast for either the PNP or JLP (King, 2008).

Today, numerous low-income communities continue to be led by dons, whose organisations act like miniature states; they allocate benefits, defend borders and extract taxes (Schwartz, 2011). Though, in contrast to the typical citizen-state contract, the garrison communities benefit from the extensive economic inequality the country faces. The lack of employment

TABLE 3.3

Jamaica's highest and lowest performing indicators in the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue

Indicator	Domain	Score*	World Average
Internal conflicts	Stability and Non-violence	1	0.85
Press freedom	Freedom of Expression	0.95	0.63
Political instability	Stability and Non-violence	0.94	0.62
GINI	Horizontal Equality	0.45	0.65
Control of corruption	Governance and Citizenship	0.44	0.41
Leadership approval	Leadership and Organisation	0.33	0.46

Source: UNESCO; IEP

Notes: *1 is the highest possible score and 0 the lowest possible score.

⁹ It should be noted that the last September 2020 election happened during the COVID-19 pandemic, hence, some voters may have refrained from voting for health reasons. Nevertheless, voter turnout in 2016 was almost 50 %, so it is assumed that at least parts of the decline are accredited to other factors.

opportunities and, in some instances, education opportunities make individuals from the lower socio-economic classes more prone to joining the gangs and/or turning to criminal actions (*Extraditing Coke | Latin America News*, 2010).

The latest numbers from the World Bank confirm Jamaica's challenges with economic inequality, with a GINI coefficient of 45.50 in 2004¹⁰ (World Bank, 2021), compared to the world average of 35.45. As seen in Table 3.3, the GINI indicator is Jamaica's third lowest-performing indicator and scores substantially lower than the global average. In Jamaica, organised crime is concentrated in known areas and typically occurs in areas that are vulnerable to criminogenic risk factors such as drugs, guns, gangs and high rates of youth unemployment (Harriot & Jones, 2016). Recent violence is characterised by clashes between gangs for control over turf or domestic conflict reasons, rather than for ethnic, religious or political reasons as it was in the 1970s and 1980s (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). The presence of organised crime networks has profound implications for ICD as violence undermines traditional community leaders and structures and damages social trust which underpins community leadership and civil society traditions (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020).

Certain groups in Jamaica are at higher risk of facing hardship than others. Women, the LGBTQI+ community and Rastafarians are examples of such groups. In particular, Rastafarians have faced social and political exclusion, because of their '*radical critique of Euro-American imperialism*' and many refusing to cooperate with the established political parties (Art Network TV, 2018). Discrimination against women and gender-based violence remains a critical issue in the country and, while some progress has been made, women are still underrepresented in most aspects of society with conservative gender stereotypes remaining a barrier to social inclusion (UN General Assembly, 2006). *Inclusion and Representation*, therefore, needs greater attention in Jamaica to ensure the equal participation of all groups in public matters as well as ICD.

Horizontal Equality should also be promoted to increase security and provide opportunities to engage in fruitful ICD interactions in the future. In 2009, the government of Jamaica announced '*Vision 2030 Jamaica*', the country's first long-term development plan which was developed in collaboration with the private sector and civil society groups (*Vision 2030 Jamaica: National Development Plan*, 2009). The plan acknowledges the role of crime and violence in hindering prospects for development, but also recognises the key drivers of such violence, including socio-economic inequality. The plan also promotes the role of effective governance in ensuring Jamaican society is secure and cohesive. While Jamaica faces many challenges in reducing crime and addressing corruption and socio-economic inequality, frameworks such as *Vision 2030* provide a framework for steps that can be taken towards better outcomes for the community and hold the government accountable for this progress.

Conclusion

Jamaica's colonial history has shaped the country greatly with political institutions resembling the British system and the diverse cultural heritage originating, in particular, from Africa. The country's history of diverse and proud African heritage has necessitated institutions and practices which enable individuals

and groups with differing identities to engage in ICD on equal footing. Jamaica has shown high capacity in developing an enabling environment for ICD through *Freedom of Expression*, which provide spaces for open dialogue between diverse groups. The country's cultural frameworks and vibrant civil society organizations also work to strengthen *Social Cohesion* and build community trust. Despite the strong political institutions and legal frameworks, Jamaica faces challenges in ensuring ICD in practice. High levels of organised crime are underpinned by corruption and socio-economic inequality, and historical discrimination against minority groups also remains a barrier to effective ICD. Looking to the future, approaches to development should focus on addressing key drivers of crime and violence and enable diverse social groups to meaningfully participate in a dialogue, in order to facilitate inclusive and sustainable development to the benefit of all in society.

3.5 New Zealand - Aotearoa

Key takeaways

- Despite a history of colonisation and segregation against the native Māori, New Zealand has developed a societal sense of belonging by fostering a national culture that embraces and celebrates diversity.
- While New Zealand's cultural influences are predominantly European and Māori due to historical multicultural legacies, more recent immigration from Asia, Africa and neighbouring Pacific States is reflected in the diverse makeup of the country. The continuous efforts to support inclusive practices of Māori are an essential part of New Zealand's success in ICD. In particular, political institutions, legal frameworks and allocated funding to media celebrating and supporting the indigenous Māori language and culture have fostered *Inclusion and Representation* and *Social Cohesion*.
- The country's multicultural makeup necessitates that structures, as well as practices, are inclusive of immigrant minority communities and indigenous Māori, and initiatives continue to address weaknesses in *Horizontal Equality* and *Stability and Non-violence*.

Background

New Zealand is known for its biodiversity and its ethnically and culturally diverse communities, who live together across its two islands – the North Island (Te Ika-a-Māui) and the South Island (Te Waipounamu). As seen in Box 3.4, New Zealand is home to multicultural communities and peoples, including its indigenous Polynesian Māori population. ICD is, therefore, of particular importance to New Zealand.

¹⁰ A GINI coefficient of 0 indicates that the distribution of income is perfectly equal between all households, whereas a GINI coefficient of 100 implies perfect inequality, that is that all income is in the hands of one household. A higher value, therefore, indicates that Jamaica is facing higher levels of inequality.

BOX 3.4

Ethnicities, languages and religious diversity in New Zealand**Ethnicities***

- European 70.17 %, Māori 16.51 %, Asian 15.06 %, Pacific Peoples 8.12 %, Middle Eastern/Latin American/African 1.5 %, Other 1.24 %.

Languages*

- English (de facto official) 95.4%, Māori (de jure official) 4%, Samoan 2.2%, Northern Chinese 2%, Hindi 1.5%, French 1.2%, Yue 1.1%, New Zealand Sign Language (de jure official) .5%, other or not stated 17.2% (2018 est.)

Religious diversity*

- Christian 37.3%, Hindu 2.7%, Maori 1.3%, Muslim, 1.3%, Buddhist 1.1%, other religion 1.6%, no religion 48.6%, objected to answering 6.7% (2018 est.)

Urbanization

- Urban population: 86.7% of total population (2020)
- Rate of urbanization: 1.01% annual rate of change (2015-20 est.)

*based on the 2018 census of the usually resident population; percentages add up to more than 100%, as respondents are allowed to identify with more than one group.

Source: Statistics New Zealand - Tatauranga Aotearoa (2019), Central Intelligence Agency (2021).

New Zealand performs higher than the regional average across all nine Framework domains, as seen in Figure 3.7. Spoonley et al. (2005) highlight that behind New Zealand's success in developing an enabling environment for dialogue between diverse communities is its ability to provide an experience where people feel a sense of belonging and that their contribution is recognised, celebrated and valued:

'A sense of belonging derives from being part of the wider community, trusting in other people and having a common respect for the rule of law and for civil and human rights – New Zealand is home to many peoples, and is built on the bicultural foundation of the Treaty of Waitangi.' (Spoonley et al., 2005, p. 103)


Despite a history of colonization and segregation against the native Māori, New Zealand has developed a sense of belonging by fostering a national culture that embraces and celebrates diversity. New Zealand, therefore, provides numerous examples on policies other states may consider replicating to be inclusive of diversity and build trust between communities, despite historical legacies of tensions and conflict.

3.5.1 A history with multicultural legacies

Eastern Polynesians began to settle in the islands of New Zealand between approximately 1280 and 1350. At the time, the islands of New Zealand were the last sizeable habitable landmass to be settled by humans, and the Polynesians developed a distinctive culture here – known as Māori today (New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage - Manatú Taonga, 2019).

According to traditional Māori story-telling, Kupe was the first Polynesian explorer to discover the islands of New Zealand. Limited fishing opportunities in his homeland Hawaiki led him to

FIGURE 3.7

New Zealand's UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domain scores compared to the regional average

Source: UNESCO; IEP

travel the Pacific ocean in his canoe, ultimately discovering New Zealand (New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage - Manatú Taonga, 2019). Today, many Māori iwi (tribes) assign great importance to Kupe, and his wife Kuramārōtini is said to have named the north island of New Zealand – Ao-tearoa (Land of the Long White Cloud) (Te Ahukaramú Charles Royal, 2005). Aotearoa is still the Māori name for New Zealand today.

The Dutch explorer Abel Tasman was the first European to discover New Zealand in 1642. On this first encounter, tensions between the Dutch and the Māori quickly turned violent and 127 years passed before the next meeting between Europeans and Māori was recorded – with English James Cook arriving in 1769 (New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage - Manatú Taonga, 2020b). Soon after, European whalers, sealers and eventually traders began to arrive with greater frequency and the Māori population, who had no name for themselves at the time, adopted their ‘Māori’ name - meaning normal or ordinary - to distinguish themselves from the Europeans (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, n.d.-a). To this day, ‘Māori’ is in contrast to ‘Pākehā’, which refers to a person of European descent or a non-Māori New Zealander.

With the arrival of European settlers, newly acquired firearms led to intertribal warfare, warfare between settlers and Māori and the introduction of an array of new diseases - to which the Māori had no resistance. These events led to a rapid decline in the Māori population (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, n.d.-a). Nevertheless, some Māori iwi (tribes) were open to interactions with the Pākehā and developed strong trade networks, assisting in bridging the cultural gap. Literacy, introduced by Christian missionaries, also became an increasingly important feature of Māori culture from the 1830s (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, n.d.-a).


With pressure from the Christian missionaries to ‘reduce lawlessness in the country’, the British Colonial Office sent William Hobson to New Zealand with ‘the instructions to obtain sovereignty over all or part of the country with the consent of chiefs’ (New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage - Manatú Taonga, 2020a; New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment - Híkina Whakatutuki, 2020a). Hobson engaged Māori chiefs from across the North Island to sign the Treaty of Waitangi on February 6 1840 – a treaty between the Māori and the British Crown, which, in European eyes, gave British immigrants legal rights as citizens (Jock Phillips, 2015). However, while the English version guaranteed ‘undisturbed possession’ of Māori properties, the Māori version guaranteed ‘tino rangatiratanga’ over ‘taonga’, i.e. full authority over treasures (New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage - Manatú Taonga, 2017). This highlights an essential challenge in ICD: the translation of meaning.

Today, it is common to refer to the spirit or principles of the treaty, instead of its original wording, which is still subject to debate. According to the present government, the treaty is:

- accepting that Māori iwi (tribes) have the right to organise themselves, protect their way of life and to control the resources they own;
- requiring the Government to act reasonably and in good faith towards Māori;

FIGURE 3.8

New Zealand’s UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domain scores



Source: UNESCO; IEP

- making the Government responsible for helping to address grievances;
- establishing equality and the principle that all New Zealanders are equal under the law (New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment - Híkina Whakatutuki, 2020b).

Following the signing of the treaty, Britain annexed New Zealand in May 1840. The treaty contained a vital land-selling article to protect Māori from disruptive large-scale private land purchase. However, in practice, the article fell short. Struggling to afford much land-purchase from the Māori, the colonial government still re-sold the land to Europeans at a substantial profit. This angered both Māori and immigrants and ultimately led to warfare in the late 1840s.

By the late 1850s, settlers had outnumbered Māori, and it is estimated that in 1900, New Zealand was home to 772,000 Europeans, with most of them New Zealand-born (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, n.d.-a). Along with an increasing population, the settlers demanded more land, but many Māori became reluctant to sell more. Resistance movements grew and so did the pressure on land-sellers. Tensions escalated and over a decade of violent conflicts began (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, n.d.-b). Following the New Zealand Wars, the government supported the settlement of thousands of British people in New Zealand. Infrastructure was in progression and the export-economy developed (New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment - Híkina Whakatutuki, 2020a).

In support of inclusive governance and citizenship practices, New Zealand became the first country in the world to grant all women the right to vote in 1893 (New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment - Híkina Whakatutuki, 2020a). Concerned about the low fertility rates and population growth, the government re-introduced assisted immigration schemes, with most arriving from Britain and Europe (New Zealand

Ministry for Culture and Heritage - Manatú Taonga, 2014). This has led to New Zealand's cultural influences being predominantly European and Māori today. Furthermore, immigration policies were changed in the mid-1970s to focus more on labour-demands and less on ethnicity, which led to an increase in Asian and African immigrants. Free access was also granted to people born in the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau, ultimately a historical legacy of diverse ethnicities, languages and cultures residing in New Zealand, as seen in Box 3.4 (New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment - Híkina Whakatutuki, 2020a).

3.5.2 New Zealand's high capacity for successful ICD

New Zealand records high scores across all nine Framework domains. However, the country performs particularly well in *Social Cohesion*, *Freedom of Expression* and *Governance and Citizenship*.

Spoonley et al. (2005) explore how *Social Cohesion* as a social policy goal operates in New Zealand. Through their policies, the government aims to reinforce trust and confidence that the country is a 'diverse, tolerant and supportive place to live' for all citizens (Spoonley et al., 2005). For instance, the National Immigration Settlement Strategy aims to accommodate migrants, refugees and their families and recognise their contributions to society. An essential part of ensuring opportunities for migrants to contribute is the requirement of a basic understanding of the English language - one of the three official languages (New Zealand Human Right Commission, n.d.). Education, therefore, works as an essential pathway for the inclusion of minorities and immigrants in New Zealand.

While New Zealand has three official languages – English, te reo (Māori) and NZ Sign Language - English is the de facto dominant language in society. Te reo and NZ Sign Language are not universally available in schools – in part because of a low supply of teachers who are able to teach the languages. Evidently, the historical legacy of the British annexation still plays a vital role in the way its education system and school curricula are structured. However, the government has acknowledged the value of learning te reo and has expressed a wish to make it a "core subject" in primary schools by 2025:

'I have an aspiration that my generation will be the last generation to regret not having the chance to learn te reo Māori in our learning and education journey,' - Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern (SBSNews, 2019).

The continuous efforts to support inclusive practices of Māori, their language, culture and arts are, therefore, an essential part of New Zealand's success in ICD, and in particular explain the country's high performance on the *Social Cohesion* domain. Initiatives span across multiple pathways, such as political negotiation, education, media and ICT, and culture and arts. Examples of initiatives New Zealand has carried out to support the Framework domains include:

- The Waitangi Tribunal, which researches and makes legal decisions on cases where Māori land and other resources were seized illegally or unfairly in the past, promotes *Horizontal Equality*. The Tribunal has exclusive rights to determine the meaning of the Treaty of Waitangi (New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage - Manatú Taonga, 2017).
- Legally recognising the Māori te reo language as well as New Zealand Sign Language as official languages alongside English, thereby embracing linguistic diversity and contributing to *Skills and Values* and *Linkages and Coherency*.
- Te Māngai Pāho, which promotes Māori language and culture through the provision of funding for Māori initiatives in music, radio, TV and news media initiatives, underpinning minority platforms and contributing to *Linkages and Coherency* and *Inclusion and Representation* (Te Māngai Pāho, n.d.).
- The famous haka performances by New Zealand rugby-teams, the All Blacks and the Black Ferns, before each match. The Haka is a traditional ceremonial Māori dance or challenge showing the opponent(s) the tribe's pride, strength and unity (New Zealand Tourism, n.d.; Tamaki Māori Village, 2017) and is an example of knowledge sharing and intercultural awareness, which are crucial for supporting *Linkages and Coherency*.

Freedom of Expression, which is measured through indicators covering religious restrictions and press freedom, is another domain where New Zealand performs particularly well in the Framework. These freedoms are typically guaranteed in a country's constitution, but New Zealand is one of the few countries in the world without a singular codified constitutional document. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, however, enshrines '*Freedom of expression*', '*Rights of minorities*' and '*Manifestation of religion and belief*' as tenets of society (Parliamentary Counsel Office - Te Tari Tohutohu Pāremata, n.d.). '[E]veryone has the right of freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and opinions of any kind' (Buchanan, 2019).

Furthermore, New Zealand has some of the world's lowest levels of government restrictions on religion, with a score in 2016 of just 0.48 out of 10 on Pew Research Centre's Government Restrictions Index (GRI) (Kishi et al., 2019). Its legal framework, protecting the individual's right to express religious affiliation, is further underpinned by liberal inclusive values. Data from the World Values Survey confirms the general public's openness to 'the other', with less than five per cent indicating that they do not want immigrants or foreign workers as their neighbour and less than 2 per cent indicating that they do not want people with a different religion as neighbours (Haerpfer et al., 2020). New Zealand also has one of the lowest levels of social hostilities involving religion in the world (Kishi et al., 2019).

In addition, Reporters Without Borders (2020) ranks New Zealand as having the 9th best environment for press freedom in the world. This is partly driven by the Media Freedom Committee, which is considered the national watchdog to the

government and a body essential in the protection of the plural media industry. The Official Information Act (OIA) also provides essential checks on the government, by granting the general public and journalists the right to request the release of official information from the government (Parliamentary Counsel Office - Te Tari Tohutohu Pāremata, 2021).

Such policies limit the avenues for corruption within government and between public institutions and private entities, ultimately supporting political stability and economic prosperity. Also, New Zealand criminalises bribery and corruption in the private sector as well as the public sector, with offences applying to both individuals and legal persons (NZ Ministry of Justice, n.d.). These are essential laws that contribute to New Zealand’s ranking as number one in the world in controlling corruption (Transparency International, 2020). This explains why New Zealand’s fourth highest scoring indicator is the *control of corruption* indicator from the *Governance and Citizenship* domain, which contributes substantially to the high performance in *Governance and Citizenship*.

3.5.3 Opportunities for further development and challenges ahead

Despite New Zealand’s high capacity for successful ICD, the country also faces challenges. New Zealand’s three highest scoring indicators are all within the *Stability and Non-violence* domain. Yet, the lowest scoring indicator is also from the *Stability and Non-violence* domain - the *feeling safe* indicator, which is used to measure people’s perceptions of safety as a proxy for the level of violence or perceived threat in society. This explains why the domain is not one of the top-performing domains, despite having three top-scoring indicators. While the *Stability and Non-violence* score is still higher than the global average, there is clearly room for improvement in making people feel safe to support ICD further.

The *feeling safe* indicator is captured by Gallup World Poll’s question on whether respondents feel safe walking alone at night and represents perceptions of criminality, as opposed to rather than actual instances of criminality. This fear applies to immigrants as well as natives. In a recent report, published by the New Zealand Human Rights Commission (2021), immigrants expressed how institutional discrimination and experiences of racism have resulted in fear, disengagement from society and loss of culture and identity. Many respondents even said they were

changing how they dressed, looked, spoke or acted to fit into what they considered Eurocentric expectations in society.

‘Our migrant communities should not have to change themselves to fit into white society. Migrants must feel safe in expressing their language, culture and identity’ – Meng Foon, New Zealand’s Race Relations Commission (Asia Pacific Forum, 2021)

Xenophobia and racism continue to be core challenges to ensure effective ICD. The Christchurch mass shooting in March 2019 was a reminder to many New Zealanders of the challenges the country continues to face. A man in his late 20s entered two mosques and shot dead 51 people and injured over 40 people (the Guardian, 2019). Targeting Muslim worshippers specifically, experts called the massacre a clear example of the increasing xenophobia present in the country (Menon, 2020). The Christchurch attack prompted a number of ongoing measures and initiatives to address xenophobia and racism in New Zealand, namely the decision to hold community hui (meaning large social or ceremonial gatherings) with Muslim communities and broader faith and ethnic communities (New Zealand Government, 2021). These hui were held to seek input from diverse ethnic and faith communities on the issues faced, and use this community feedback to inform and guide the Government’s response (New Zealand Government, 2021).

New Zealand also faces challenges with structural discrimination against its indigenous population. Many Māori still feel the colonial legacy. A recent study of GPs revealed a staggering pay-gap and under-representation of Māori GPs (Hannah Martin, 2021) and Māori unemployment rates are still substantially higher than the national average (at 9 per cent compared to the national 4.9 in December 2020) (New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment - Hīkina Whakatutuki, 2020c). This also points to the challenges New Zealand faces in advancing *Horizontal Equality* – two of the five lowest scoring indicators are recorded here. The Māori Economic Development panel, within the New Zealand government, has taken steps to address these inequalities, outlining the Strategy and Action Plan for Māori economic development in 2012. The approach includes educational objectives, such as improving educational participation and performance, as well as financial objectives, such as aims to bring Māori median wage and unemployment in line with the national average by 2040 (*He Kai Kei Aku Ringa The Crown-Māori Economic Growth Partnership*, 2012).

TABLE 3.4

New Zealand's highest and lowest performing indicators in the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue

Indicator	Domain	Score*	World Average
Likelihood of violent demonstrations	Stability and Non-violence	1	0.52
Political instability	Stability and Non-violence	1	0.62
Internal conflict	Stability and Non-violence	1	0.85
Control of corruption	Governance and Citizenship	1	0.41
Leadership approval	Leadership and Organisation	0.71	0.46
Inclusion of minorities	Inclusion and Representation	0.7	0.48
Feeling safe	Stability and Non-violence	0.69	0.6

Source: UNESCO; IEP

Notes: *1 is the highest possible score and 0 the lowest possible score.

Conclusion

In conclusion, like many other countries, New Zealand's challenges arise because of the country's history and subsequent development of institutions around these experiences. Its multicultural makeup necessitates that structures, as well as practices, are inclusive of its indigenous Māori population and immigrant minority communities. Initiatives such as the guaranteed parliamentary representation of Māori, the adoption of te reo as an official language and the establishment of freedom to express one's individual culture exemplifies how the government is actively promoting inclusive practises, seeking to further *Social Cohesion* in the country. Furthermore, the allocated funding through Te Māngai Pāho provides platforms for ICD across the media landscape.

Other states can learn from these initiatives, but should also recognise that essential to successful ICD are the values, principles and competencies that underpin the implementation of legal frameworks on the ground. New Zealand achieves high scores across structural as well as supportive domains in the Framework, but increasing xenophobia challenges the existing foundation for effective ICD. To ensure New Zealand keeps its high ranking in peacefulness – the second-highest in the world in 2020 (Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), 2020) - these issues should be addressed, so ICD can be effective in developing *Social Cohesion* between all communities and individuals. As the recent anti-racism campaign from New Zealand's Human Rights Commission states, it is not simply a matter of political will but the will of the people to stop xenophobia, create a sense of belonging and build trust among diverse communities:

'We live in one of the most ethnically diverse as well as one of the most peaceful places on earth: whether it stays that way is up to us. ... How we treat other people will define what kind of country we become and what kind of person a New Zealander is. Give Nothing To Racism: That's Us.' (NZ Human Rights Commission - Te Kāhui Tika Tangata, n.d.)


3.6 Oman

Key takeaways

- Oman's high capacity in ICD follows decades of development which have modernised the country and created a sense of belonging based on intercultural understanding, religious tolerance and mutual respect.
- In the last five decades, state-building initiatives to improve infrastructure, healthcare and the educational system have created an enabling environment which supports many of the Framework domains, namely *Linkages and Coherency*, *Inclusion and Representation*, and *Skills and Values*.
- Education has been at the forefront of Oman's progress and has been one of the primary pathways facilitating the empowerment of Omani women, a previously marginalised group, by establishing new avenues for social and economic inclusion in society.

FIGURE 3.9

Oman's UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domain scores compared to the regional average



Source: UNESCO; IEP

BOX 3.5

Ethnicities, languages and religious diversity in Oman

Ethnicities*

- Ethnic groups: Arab, Baluchi, South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi), African

Languages*

- Arabic (official), English, Baluchi, Swahili, Urdu, Indian dialects

Religious diversity*

- Muslim 85.9%, Christian 6.5%, Hindu 5.5%, Buddhist 0.8%, Jewish <0.1%, other 1%, unaffiliated 0.2% (2010 est.)

Urbanization

- Urban population: 87% of total population (2021)
- Rate of urbanization: 2.32% annual rate of change (2020-25 est.)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2021).

- Future demographic challenges have the potential to create barriers for open dialogue and pose issues for public trust for young people, while discrimination against minorities excludes their participation in ICD.
- Oman’s continued success in ICD will depend upon expanding opportunities for knowledge-sharing, partnerships and transformative dialogue between diverse groups and ensuring the collective efforts of society to navigate the challenges of the future.

Background

The Sultanate of Oman is the oldest independent state in the Arab World and shares borders with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen. Compared to neighbouring Arab States, Oman scores highly across all Framework domains, with the exception of *Linkages and Coherency*, as seen in Figure 3.9. As a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council States (GCC), Oman shares a number of common features like language, religion and culture with these countries (Al Barwani & Albeely, 2007). Oman stands out for its success in fostering ICD in many ways:

‘Oman’s strategic location, combined with a sustained history of interaction with peoples of distant lands, robust trade relations, and extensive imperial exploits, contributed significantly to its rich cultural mosaic, including the relative ease with which its citizens interact with people from distant lands and various cultures.’ (Funsch, 2015)

Oman has a population of 4.5 million (2021), with foreign expatriates accounting for nearly 39% of the population (Times of Oman, 2021). As seen in Box 3.5, the majority of Oman’s population is Arab. However, Oman’s history of multiculturalism is reflected in its ethnic composition, with Indian, Pakistani, Sri

Lankan and Bengali and African ethnic groups. Arabic is the official language in Oman, although several other languages such as English, Baluchi, Swahili, Urdu and Indian dialects are also spoken (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2021c).

Islam is the state religion of Oman and Sharia forms the basis for legislation (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). Ibadhi Islam is the predominant religion in Oman, and although the government does not publish statistics on religious affiliation, estimates suggest that 75% of Omanis are Ibadhi Muslims, while the remaining Muslim population is divided between Shia and Sunni denominations (Oxford Business Group, 2017). Although the Ibadhi sect has fewer followers than Sunni or Shia Islam, it is generally considered to be the third Islamic tradition and followers of Ibadism place an emphasis on moderation and dialogue, often referring to themselves as *‘the people of consultation’* (Funsch, 2015). In contrast to both Sunni and Shia Muslims, Ibadhis believe that the leader of the Muslim community (*Imam*) is selected by tribal leaders and religious scholars and then elected by the people in the community (Funsch, 2015). The majority of non-Muslims in Oman are migrants, primarily from South Asia, who practice a variety of faiths, including Buddhism, Sikhism, Christianity and Hinduism (Oxford Business Group, 2017).

3.6.1 A History of female empowerment


Following the ascension of a new ruler in 1970, Sultan Qaboos bin Said, Oman embarked on a process of economic liberalisation and modernisation (Funsch, 2015). Upon his ascension to the throne, Sultan Qaboos inherited an *‘impoverished country’* which was isolated from much of the world and devoid of modern infrastructure (Abouzzohour, 2020; Funsch, 2020). Sultan Qaboos’ national development strategy was largely funded by the discovery of oil and led to investment in the country’s infrastructure, healthcare, educational and social protection systems, with the construction of public schools and establishment of adult literacy programs and vocational training programs (Funsch, 2015).

This period of modernisation has played a crucial role in strengthening ICD in Oman and leading to greater inclusion, particularly for Omani women (Das & Gokhale, 2010). The inclusion of women, particularly women from different ethnic and religious groups, in education, the workforce and in the political sphere has challenged existing socio-economic inequalities and been vital to building inclusive environments and establishing new avenues for dialogue, participation and cooperation, thereby facilitating effective ICD.

Education has been one of the primary pathways towards greater social and economic inclusion for women in Oman. Prior to the reforms made by Sultan Qaboos, there were only three formal schools in Oman, which educated 900 boys and primarily focused on reciting the Quran and elementary math and writing skills (Al-Lamki, 2002). In 1970, Sultan Qaboos introduced a universal education policy, granting women access to education for the first time (Al Riyami et al., 2004). Female enrolment in secondary education has increased rapidly from 68.1% in 2000 to 93.1% in 2018 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2020). As a result, many women in Oman have received an education and been able to pursue professional goals despite traditional cultural and social barriers (Al-Wahaibi, 2020).

FIGURE 3.10

Oman's UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue domain scores



Source: UNESCO; IEP

Since the initial period of nation-building, during the 1970s, women have held jobs in most professions and have been actively engaged in the armed forces, the police force, civil service and education (Chatty, 2000). The inclusion of Omani women in the workforce was also facilitated by the policy of 'Omanisation', first introduced in the 1980s (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2021c). The policy sought to reduce dependence on foreign labour and tackle unemployment through the nationalisation of the labour force (al-Talei, 2010). A key characteristic of the strategy was to encourage women to join the labour force and work alongside male colleagues to 'efficiently contribute to social and economic welfare' (Goveas and Aslam, 2011). In particular, this had a positive impact on women from poorer backgrounds, who were better able to attain employment as cleaners, hospital and kitchen staff (al-Talei, 2010). In terms of ICD, gaining employment allowed women who were previously marginalised to support themselves and provide a new role within their communities, ensuring inclusivity in dialogue (al-Talei, 2010).

The advancement of Omani women is not only reflected in the increase of participation in the workforce, but also in the variety of fields of employment, including in the political sphere. In recent decades, women have served in both houses of Oman's parliament as cabinet ministers, and within the foreign service as diplomats (Funsch, 2015). At the highest level in politics, two women currently serve on the Consultative Council (*Majlis al-Shura*), while 15 women were appointed to the Council of the State (*Majlis ad-Dawla*) in November 2019 (Freedom House, 2020). These appointments reflect progress towards strengthening *Leadership and Organisation*, *Horizontal Equality*, and *Inclusion and Representation* in expanding access to the political process for women and offering an avenue for more inclusive decision-making.

Legislative changes have also led to greater social inclusion and representation for women. In 2003, universal suffrage was granted, allowing all Omani women over the age of 21 the right

to vote and stand for election to the Consultative Council (*Majlis al-Shura*) (UNICEF, 2011). Legislative changes stipulating that women's legal testimonies would be considered equal to men's, and giving women the equal right to own land as held by their male counterparts, signified important changes in female representation in the legal system (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020; Funsch, 2015). As new legislation was passed, more women began to advocate for greater awareness of laws and policies that women could use to empower themselves (Freedom House, 2010).

Over the past five decades, modernisation has led to a shift in attitudes towards women in Omani society. As Funsch (2015) acknowledges, most changes in attitudes towards women have been 'accommodated and absorbed into existing traditional social patterns' and gained acceptance through their grounding in religious doctrine. The inclusion of women, a group that was previously marginalised, has brought greater benefits for society, by establishing avenues for ICD and knowledge-dissemination. In particular, women are now at the forefront of educating and training younger generations, with around 39.7% of the female workforce employed in education (Funsch, 2015; Padmaraj, 2020). In 2004, Sultan Qaboos appointed the first female Minister of Higher Education, Rawya bint Sa'ud al-Busaidia, highlighting the crucial role of women in developing *Skills and Values* in Oman (Funsch, 2015). The national recognition of women in Oman was formalized in 2009, when Sultan Qaboos declared that each year on October 17 the nation would celebrate Omani Women's Day (Oman News Agency, 2021). The day celebrates the crucial contribution of women in society, with representatives across the country coming together to honour women for their achievements and role in Oman's recent development (Funsch, 2015).

3.6.2 Oman's high capacity for successful ICD

Oman performs particularly well in the *Social Cohesion*, *Skills and Values*, and *Horizontal Equality* domains.

The positive trend in *Social Cohesion* is measured by one of Oman's highest performing indicators, *intergroup cohesion* (see Table 3.5). One such example is the inclusion of the traditional tribal structure in modern Oman. Historically, the tribal structure was central to the state of Oman, with the country divided into various tribes of different sizes and cohesiveness, which 'regulated social, territorial, economic and political relationships' (Al Barwani & Albeely, 2007). According to Plekhanov (2004), respect for Oman's tribal structure and tradition was incorporated into Sultan Qaboos' strategy for modernisation because:

'It was his opinion that everything valuable from the past ought to be brought forward into the future.'

Instead of excluding tribal leaders, the Sultan invited them to participate in the evolving political discourse, reflecting the enduring respect for Oman's traditions throughout the modernisation period (Funsch, 2015).

Within the region, Oman stands out as a 'bastion of coexistence' due to the tolerance of different sects of Islam (France 24, 2017). Oman is the only country with a majority Ibadhi Muslim population and the Ibadhi faith has a long history in Oman dating

back thirteen centuries. Ibadhi beliefs have evolved over time to embrace modernisation and inclusivity, especially in regards to other Muslim sects (Funsch, 2015; Singhal, 2012). Funsch (2015) explains how this has fostered an environment in Modern Oman where Ibadhi Muslims, Sunnis and Shias pray together and focus more on their similarities than differences. Conciliation and peaceful resolution of disputes are central to the Ibadhi narrative and the Ibadhi-based method of mediation has long been applied to disputes between tribes, domestic grievances and even external diplomacy (Leonard, 2017). This religious pluralism is also evidenced in Oman’s government with representatives from each Muslim sect holding positions of power and authority, including in the country’s parliament (Funsch, 2015).

In addition, Oman has been described as a ‘polyglot nation’ (Funsch, 2015); a nation home to many different languages and ethnicities. Arabic is the official language in Oman, and modern standard Arabic is taught in schools (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2021c); however, a number of other languages are spoken throughout Oman, as seen in Box 3.5. This diversity is a product of centuries of migration to Oman, which have contributed to the foundation of the Omani state (Al-Ismaili, 2018). The languages of South Asia are common in Oman with dedicated pages included in national newspapers on current events, popular culture and sporting fixtures in India and Pakistan (Funsch, 2015).

Skills and Values, measured by UNDP’s *education index*, is another domain where Oman performs particularly well in the Framework. The role of education is enshrined in Article 13 of Oman’s Basic Law – The Cultural Principles - which posits education as ‘a cornerstone for the progress of the Society which the State fosters and endeavours to disseminate and make accessible to all’ (Ministry of Technology and Communications, 2019). In the last five decades, initiatives to improve education prospects have created an enabling environment which supports many of the Framework elements, namely:

- The first public university, Sultan Qaboos University, was founded in 1986, vastly expanding the opportunities for students who previously travelled to neighbouring countries for higher education (Chatty, 2000), thereby developing *Skills and Values* in Oman.

- The expansion of education has been a crucial pathway towards the greater inclusion of women in Oman (Chatty, 2000), particularly in higher education, and contributed to promoting *Horizontal Equality* and providing greater opportunities for improved *Inclusion and Representation*.
- The establishment of international schools has attracted expatriates from many countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, India and Pakistan, thereby fostering *Linkages and Coherency*, *Inclusion and Representation*, and *Social Cohesion* by establishing new avenues for transformative communication with diverse groups and willingness to consider different perspectives.
- Likewise, government-funded scholarships have encouraged students to study abroad (Funsch, 2015) and contributed to strengthening *Linkages and Coherency* through the formation of international partnerships and engagement with wider connections and networks (Funsch, 2015).
- Linguistic diversity is embraced in Omani schools to help students ‘develop a more outward-looking stance’ by making the study of foreign languages compulsory for all students beginning in Grade 1 (Al-Maamari, 2016), hence contributing to *Skills and Values* and *Linkages and Coherency*.

Horizontal Equality, is another domain where Oman performs particularly well in the Framework. This positive trend is largely driven by relatively high scores in two indicators within the domain: *GINI and group grievance*. Oman’s success in reducing income inequality and ensuring access to services and resources can be linked to sustainable development initiatives, such as ‘*Oman 2020*’ which was first announced in 1995 and sought to use oil revenues to fund investments in health, education and social services in order to improve living standards (*Wrapping up Vision 2020, Solidifying Vision 2040*, 2019). Consequently, Oman’s rapid economic development has significantly reduced the number of people suffering from extreme hunger and diversification has improved opportunities for education and employment, especially in rural areas (Cavins, 2017).

TABLE 3.5

Oman's highest and lowest performing indicators in the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue

Indicator	Domain	Score*	World Average
Internal conflicts	Stability and Non-violence	1	0.85
Intergroup cohesion	Social Cohesion	0.95	0.8
GINI	Horizontal Equality	0.91	0.65
Factionalized elites	Governance and Citizenship	0.38	0.38
Horizontal accountability	Horizontal Equality	0.38	0.57
Voice and accountability	Governance and Citizenship	0.27	0.52
Group acceptance	Linkages and Coherency	0.26	0.46

Source: UNESCO; IEP

Notes: *1 is the highest possible score and 0 the lowest possible score.

3.6.3 Opportunities for further development and challenges ahead

Oman has high capacity for ICD; however, challenges remain, particularly in the lowest scoring indicators which come from two structural domains - *Governance and Citizenship* and *Horizontal Equality* - and one supporting domain - *Linkages and Coherency*. Notably, Oman scores below the world average on the horizontal accountability indicator which poses challenges to its overall strong performance in the *Horizontal Equality* domain.

As shown in Table 3.5, the lowest scoring indicator is from the *Linkages and Coherency* domain: the group acceptance indicator. Group acceptance is measured by Gallup World Poll's question on whether respondents feel their area is a good place for Gay or Lesbian people, immigrants, and religious or ethnic minorities. In particular, discrimination against LGBTQI+ people continues to be a challenge to inclusive dialogue in Omani society and is underpinned by legislation which denies the social and economic rights of LGBTQI+ people. Some of this legislation has become increasingly discriminatory in recent years and same-sex relations can be punished by up to three years in prison under the new penal code (The Penal Law Promulgated by Royal Decree 7/2018, 2018).

Similarly, migrant workers have faced discrimination in the workforce and legal system. Through the '*kafala*' system, private citizens and companies maintain control over migrant workers' employment and immigration status (Robinson, 2021). In recent years, calls for reform have increased due to reports of widespread exploitation, inadequate living and working conditions, inequitable access to medical care and health insurance, and abuse, especially for female migrant workers (Amnesty International, 2021; McQue, 2021; Robinson, 2021). In 2020, the state announced amendments to the existing provisions of the '*kafala*' system that would come into effect in 2021, allowing expatriate workers to change sponsors without permission after completing a two-year contract (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2020). These amendments aim to enhance the competitiveness of the labour market and address current issues (Arabian Daily, 2021). Although there has been some recent progress, Oman's ability to improve *Linkages and Coherency* and strengthen ICD depends upon the implementation of frameworks and legislation to ensure the protection of and equal treatment of diverse groups in society, including LGBTQI+ people and migrant workers.

Furthermore, gender-based violence remains a significant issue in Oman and specific legislation criminalising gender-based violence is lacking. For instance, Omani law does not specifically address domestic violence or sexual harassment, and spousal rape is not criminalised (Freedom House 2020). Various female-led civil society organisations in Oman have raised concerns about gender-based violence, however, due to restrictions on freedom of speech, many have been silenced (Padmaraj, 2020). One of Oman's lowest scoring indicators is horizontal accountability, from the *Horizontal Equality* domain, which is below the global average and captures the extent to which the ideal of government accountability is achieved. This also captures the extent to which the government's power is held accountable by civil society organisations. In Oman, weaknesses in *group acceptance* and *horizontal accountability* interact and this demonstrates how restriction of freedoms, and the silencing of

civil society organisations, can exacerbate gender discrimination and, therefore, exclude women from engaging in ICD.

The *voice and accountability* indicator measures citizens' perceptions of the extent to which they are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free media. The 1996 Basic Law guarantees freedom of the press and opinion provided that it does not 'lead to public discord or harm the security of the state' (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). However, in practice, the media face many restrictions and authorities began to crackdown on media organisations in the wake of the Arab Spring (BBC News, 2013). Journalists have also reported harassment for publishing stories that are perceived as critical of government ministries (United States Department of State, 2020). The lack of free media in Oman hinders ICD by prohibiting the delivery of essential information to the general public, thereby reducing opportunities for *horizontal accountability*. Looking to the future, Oman faces a demographic challenge, with nearly half of its citizens aged under 19 (Valeri, 2020). According to the World Bank, Oman's youth unemployment rate was 11.5% in 2019 (International Labour Organization, n.d.). In 2018 and 2019, the government faced protests with unemployed youths and recent graduates taking to the streets to protest against high unemployment rates and austerity measures, and to demand economic reform, including more public sector jobs (Abouzzohour, 2021). This example highlights the challenges Oman may face in the future in ensuring its high capacity for ICD is sustainable and inclusive of the growing youth population. Hence, finding ways to engage the country's youthful population will be an enduring challenge in Oman to ensure that future development challenges do not lead to increased social and political tensions.

Conclusion

Oman is diverse in terms of linguistics, ethnicity and religion and the country has been successful in facilitating ICD largely by '*imposing the idea of an Omani nation as the collective framework of belonging*' (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020). Oman's high capacity in ICD follows decades of development which have modernised the country and created a sense of belonging based on intercultural understanding, religious tolerance and mutual respect. In particular, the development of *Skills and Values* has been at the forefront of Oman's progress, facilitating the empowerment of women and establishing new avenues for ICD. However, Oman faces several challenges in ensuring the participation of all communities and individuals in ICD. Discrimination against certain groups in society excludes their participation in ICD, denying the potential for knowledge-sharing, partnerships or transformative dialogue between diverse groups. Future demographic challenges have the potential to establish barriers to ICD for young people, and lead to increased tensions, while limited avenues to ensure *government accountability* hinder open dialogue and pose issues for public trust. These aspects should be addressed in order benefit from Oman's high capacity for ICD and ensure the collective efforts of society to navigate the challenges of the future.



Section 4

Think Pieces



4.1 Introduction

The following section provides five think pieces examining the implications of the findings from the Framework for policy and practice to support ICD through five pathways (areas where ICD is often supported or practices) - Education, Media and ICT, Culture and the Arts, Local Governance and Urban Planning, and Political Negotiation. Contributed by experts from these various fields, each piece examines what the data means for how policy and practice to support ICD, as well as offering a series of examples and recommendations, providing further insight into the new data from the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue. The pieces shine a light on the diversity of actions possible for enabling ICD and the potential for impact of these actions.

Contributed by Dr. Veronica Boix Mansilla of the Harvard Graduate School of Education, the Education think piece looks to the education implications for the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue. Boix Mansilla examines how the Framework can be used to rethink two foundational pillars of educational practice, *the idea of the child* and *the kind of learning environments* we seek, and, ultimately, to prepare all our young people for a world of increasing complexity, diversity and mobility. She proposes a move to a situated ecological view of the child as well as a learning environment that nurtures ICD dispositions providing illustrations of successful pedagogical practice to highlight the opportunities.

The Media and ICT think piece explores the potential of Media and ICT to positively contribute to ICD, looking at what needs to be done in practice and how to avoid negative effects. Contributed by Dr. Iffat Idris of the University of Birmingham, the piece focuses on the aspects of portrayal, access and participation as well as sensitisation and training and regulatory and monitoring mechanisms.

Written by Professor Alison Phipps of the University of Glasgow, the Culture and the Arts think piece focuses on the anomalies within the Framework when it comes to certain correlations. Phipps offers considerations of why these anomalies may be occurring and gives examples of what this means in practice for arts and cultural work in humanitarian situations and for peace building. Delving into the domains of *Leadership and Organisation* and *Freedom of Expression*, Phipps provides analysis into key characteristics of these domains in relation to Culture and the Arts as well as illustrates how they can be leveraged for ICD with real world examples.

Providing analysis on the Framework results from the perspective of Local Governance and Urban Planning, Dr. Bob W. White of the University of Montreal highlights key

policy lessons within his think piece. The Local Governance and Urban Planning think piece provides a window into current intercultural practices and policies in cities with a particular focus on inclusion networks. Looking at the findings of the Framework, White analyses how trends and correlations could impact local governance and urban planning as well as how promotion of ICD is already being leveraged within the pathway. Ultimately, White details the lessons for municipal policy and practice as well as presents tips for future research and policy design.

Contributed by Dr. Tim Murithi of the University of Cape Town, the Political Negotiation think piece analyses the benefits of integrating ICD into political negotiation processes. Using the case studies of South Africa and Northern Ireland, the piece underlines how ICD can contribute towards enhancing political negotiations and provides key insights for policymakers.

4.2 The Pathway of Education: Nurturing Foundations for Sustainable Peace

Contributed by Dr. Veronica Boix Mansilla
Project Zero Principal Investigator
Harvard Graduate School of Education
United States

We live in remarkable times. For over three decades the world has witnessed a rapid and uneven process of globalisation, able to connect societies as never before and giving rise to new forms of global interaction, intercultural understanding, cooperation, movement and innovation. Global mobility, digital connectivity and trade have accelerated cultural encounters and mutual influences (Suarez-Orozco 2019). Today's 281 million international migrants are at once transforming and being transformed by societies the world over (United Nations, 2019). They enrich cultural repertoires, languages and resources in their new land, while contributing to the development of the societies they left behind. They are crafting dynamic forms of transnational identity, weaving our humanity together in their daily interactions with others (Bokova 2019).

At the same time, we are witnessing the rise of global inequities, political polarisation and environmental disruptions. From cyberbullying to fake news, we see the misuse of the very digital networks meant to connect us. Ethno-cultural conflicts have become the most common source of political violence in the world since the end of the Cold War (Kymlicka 1995, Sen 2007). Feeble institutions, conflict and violence, continue to lead women,

men and children to leave their homes, stepping into the largest humanitarian crisis we have seen since World War II. Xenophobic nationalisms and nativist platforms are on the rise, rooted in the rejection of diversity as a value, and disregard for the human dignity of those construed as “other.” These forms of “othering” militate against the healthy development of individual human potential and societal wellbeing. They place children -- especially those of immigrant-origin and ethnic minorities -- in particularly vulnerable situations, calling upon states as well as educational institutions to fulfil their obligation to protect and nurture all children respectively (Bhabha, 2014 2016).

Whether we succeed in leveraging our global interconnectedness to construct more just, inclusive and sustainable societies, or we fail to do so, opening room for hatred, violence and dehumanisation depends, in great measure, on our capacity to engage in transformative intercultural dialogue. In turn, whether intercultural dialogue is sustained in the future, depends on our determination to nurture such capacity among rising generations. Education cannot bear the sole responsibility for challenging ethnocentrism and xenophobia, but it can teach our young to recognise cultural biases, challenge stereotypes and seek connections across difference. Indeed, schools and cultural institutions are uniquely positioned to advance this work. They are the gathering places for diverse children and families. They are tasked with selecting the content and skills that matter most for children to master as well as with crafting the environments and experiences that will support such learning.

Against this backdrop, I here examine the educational implications of the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue and study [herein referred to as UNESCO Framework], advanced by UNESCO and the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). Specifically, I posit that, to prepare all our young for a world of increasing complexity, diversity and mobility, the conceptualization of ICD and empirical results presented here invite professionals in education to re-think two foundational pillars of educational practice: (1) *the idea of the child*, (2) *the kind of learning environments we seek*. In describing each pillar, I revisit the UNESCO Framework findings and illustrate key points with promising ICD pedagogies. I conclude with recommendations for policy and practice.

4.2.1 Intercultural Dialogue in education today

In the world of educational policy, interest in fostering intercultural dialogue [ICD] is fast-growing. Governments and international organisations are focusing on ICD’s potential value to prepare learners to live together harmoniously in diverse societies, build more equitable

and inclusive communities, participate in the protection of democratic values, cooperate with others in the advancement of sustainable development goals, and ultimately, to ensure personal and collective wellbeing (Barrett et al. 2014, Council of Europe 2018, Deardorff 2020, Elias and Mansouri 2020, OECD 2018, UNESCO 2020). For example, the Council of Europe articulated competencies that learners need to acquire to participate effectively in a culture of democracy and live peacefully together in diverse democratic societies, signalling ICD’s relevance for policy and practice. The model features ICD as dialogue that takes place between individuals or groups who perceive themselves as having different cultural affiliations from each other. Similarly, the 2018 cycle of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), which looks at 15-year-old students, gathered data from 66 countries and economies regarding the global competences needed to live in our interconnected and changing world. This framework considered the capacity to “engage in open, appropriate and effective interactions across cultures” as one of four dimensions of global competence. Across frameworks and assessments, reports highlight the importance *and challenge* such dialogues present.

Practitioners in schools and cultural institutions recognize the importance and urgency of nurturing ICD capacities among children and youth, too. About 26% of the school-aged population across post-industrial societies consists of children who have at least one parent born in a country other than the one in which they live. Changing classroom demographics are making diversity, multilingualism, hybrid identities and cultural straddling a new normal. They are also making exclusion, bullying and discrimination a more pervasive threat. Many practitioners find themselves unprepared to respond to this new scenario. The 2018 OECD global competence assessment shows that only a modest percentage of students attended schools where teachers reported having received training in culturally responsive teaching (37%), intercultural communication (34%) or teaching in multicultural contexts (30%). Confronted with changing demographics in their classrooms, educators wish that they too could count on a modicum of intercultural competence to facilitate difficult conversations and understand the children in their care.

Against this backdrop, how might we translate broader policy aspirations into actionable principles for practice and viable pedagogical designs? Furthermore, how might we do so in ways that are informed by the UNESCO Framework and results?

The UNESCO Framework captures forces that create enabling environments for effective ICD within a society and have the potential to contribute to positive outcomes such as conflict prevention, peace promotion and human

rights protection. Forces include macro social and/or institutional elements that either enable or hinder ICD, i.e., *Stability and Non-violence, Governance and Citizenship, Freedom of Expression, Horizontal Equality and Social Cohesion*, as well as supporting domains such as *Inclusion and Representation, Leadership and Organisation, Linkages and Coherency and Skills and Values*. Peered through the lens of education, the data and analysis from the framework proposes two timely invitations to re-think educational practice: recasting our *idea of the child and that of learning environments*.

4.2.2 Invitation 1: Re-casting our idea of the child: toward a situated ecological view

In their analysis, UNESCO and IEP demonstrate that factors enabling ICD show system-like qualities. That is, taken as a whole, the macro societal structural domains such as a country's *Stability and Non-violence, Governance and Citizenship, Freedom of Expression and Horizontal Equality*, at once impact and are impacted by micro-level domains such as dialogue participants' *Skills and Values, Inclusion and Representation, Leadership and Organisation, and Linkages and Coherency*. The significant role attributed to context and institutions in which ICD education takes place is of special significance in the context of schooling practices that centre on curriculum, pedagogy, assessment and teacher education and all too often sees the world surrounding classrooms and schools as an epiphenomenon, or as graduates' future labour markets and civic participation destinations. Instead, the system-like quality of conditions documented by the UNESCO Framework invites us to reframe the relationship between world and educational practice as mutually constitutive — the world walks into our classrooms with our students (and ourselves). Of special interest to educational practices in increasingly dynamic, multi- and intercultural societies is that we come to *understand children and youth through an ecological lens*—i.e., *understanding that children's formative experiences and sense of self are shaped by their ongoing reciprocal interactions with their microenvironments such as the ones we create in schools and macro environments of cultural, political, economic and historical forces amidst which they live*.

A situated and ecological view (Bronfenbrenner 1994 2006, Lave, 1991) invites us to re-cast the idea of the child that drives daily practice in Education. It involves moving beyond seeing children solely as “this second-grade student” or “that student in my maths class” — that is, beyond descriptors that foreground their role and knowledge acquisition expectations in our current educational institutions. Instead, peered through a situated and ecological lens, children become social and cultural agents, whose learning and development is informed by and informs the contexts in which they grow. Through this

ecological view, educators continue to attend to *individual characteristics* of the child, i.e. age, gender, nationality and identities as they design instruction. They also attend to children's *micro-worlds*: family cultural traditions, peers and communities, school, and neighbourhood climate. Yet they further consider external *influences* such as the messages the child receives through the media, local politics and policies, legal status and rights, and *macro contexts* including factors such as social cohesion, governance, historical context, geopolitical location, and or cultural/political climate vis a vis diversity and the possibility of dialogue across difference. *In sum, a situated and ecological approach to our educational practice sheds light on the fact that micro and macro dynamics with system-like properties sets the conditions of possibility for ICD and child development simultaneously*.

Consider the micro-level contexts learners inhabit. Educators working in increasingly diverse classrooms, recognize that engaging children whose cultures, languages and beliefs differ from their own demands seeking to understand these children and their contexts more fully and create space for children's home languages, cultural practices and beliefs in the classroom. Yet, too many schools around the world exhibit a *monocultural* and *monolingual* habitus that interrupts the possibility of ICD exhibiting *Inclusion and Representation*. Such a worldview privileges linguistic and cultural uniformity and views diversity as a problem (Gogolin, 2002; Ruiz, 1984). At school, many students are assessed as “deficient” in the dominant language and cultural norms of society (English in the U.S.). Meanwhile, their multilingual and multicultural assets are rendered invisible, and their personal stories and journeys find no place in classroom conversations. Conversely, when educators value children's home cultures and languages, and when they honour children's capacity to straddle across cultures and discursive communities, they are more likely to create fertile learning environments for intercultural understanding and dialogue. When such interactions are made visible and become part of the fabric or ethos of a classroom and are sustained over time, educators create real opportunities to transform youngsters' disposition to ICD in and out of school. The UNESCO Framework results suggest that creating such conditions might benefit from skilful leadership, proactive inclusion and representation of diverse cultural groups in schools and classrooms and from proactive linkage with diverse cultural groups to enrich the child's experience.

Macro level forces matter. They involve issues of power and influence. Children are not immune to the dominant exclusionary narratives that permeate our societies. They internalise these messages, often with devastating mental health consequences. Awareness of such influences can prepare educators to mitigate their impact on children

(Rogers, 2019). Educators can nurture values of human dignity and an appreciation for diversity from early in life. They can invite young people to address exclusionary forces critically across the curriculum, through their teaching of literacies, history, literature, science or the arts. They might prepare students to value and protect *Freedom of Expression*. Furthermore, considering the child in macro societal contexts, might invite educators to respond proactively to power differentials among student populations. Inequities take multiple forms. They come into play in the micro interactions of a classroom when, for example, language barriers impede equal expression of ideas. Yet, they also play out in geopolitical dynamics inherited from colonialisms or differential impact of climate change, for example. If nurturing ICD capacities among the young is to deliver more just, inclusive and sustainable societies, educators may need to take broad structural power differences into account, helping children understand their own place along multiple axes of inequality along with helping them recognize and act in their spheres of influence (Boix Mansilla 2020).

Here, too, the UNESCO Framework results enable educators to intervene at various levels in the child's ecosystem with informed precision. For instance, analyses point to the high correlation of structural domains


enabling ICD and peace-related outcomes. Children benefit from growing up in contexts of *Stability and Non-violence*, where trusted governing institutions are able to ensure citizens' right, including for example quality education for all children amidst changing demographics and intercultural teacher professional development services to meet the demand. Children and their families are likely to benefit from a broader culture of *Freedom of Expression* and open knowledge dissemination that fosters respect for human rights and pluralism. Attention to structural and supporting domains for ICD is especially relevant when missing or weakened. For example, when violence, instability, lack of freedom of speech and exclusion become institutional they impede healthy ICD among adults and directly impacting youth. Figure 1 below outlines the proposed ecological view of the child and the leveraging forces that might foster or impede the development of ICD among individual, micro and macro systems in which a child's life unfolds.

Turning to practice

What might pedagogies rooted in an ecological view of the child and the shift in mind-sets here proposed look like? Consider the following pictures of practice:

FIGURE 4.1

An ecological view of the child and the structural and supporting factors enabling (or impeding) the nurturing of ICD dispositions.



From English grammar to children's portraits.

Hamdi is in second grade. The child of a Somali refugee family in a public school in the northern United States, he writes about settling into the long winters and his grandmother's desperate insistence to go back home to bring those left behind. Feeling unprepared for a conversation about Hamdi's experience back home, his well-meaning teacher limits her feedback to English spelling and punctuation. After all, she explains visibly conflictedly, she is primarily responsible for Hamdi's English mastery. The truth is, she adds, she worries about not knowing enough about Somalia and saying something that would offend Hamdi or re-trigger a family trauma.

Hamdi's story marked the beginning of a signature pedagogy centred on portraiture. His teacher took on the challenge of seeking to understand this child's life in context and through multiple points of view. She took time to converse with him, talk with his family, hear about the beautiful oral traditions and poetry that binds people together and the tragic family departure. This gave this teacher, Hamdi and, eventually, the classroom community the opportunity to begin to build intercultural bridges that would ultimately transform the teachers' pedagogy. The bridge they created was not one rooted in the efficient exchange of fixed information about Somalia and the US. The point was not to create a cultural brief about Somalia. Rather, they established a process in which trust and mutual discovery grew through the back and forth of genuine interactions. This process took place in the context of an educational institution seeking to embrace pluralistic mind-sets, where teachers had an opportunity to learn about culturally responsive teaching methods and learned to remain open to interactions whether the personal and intimate life of a child stood in dialogue with the macro forces shaping his life even is still invisible to him. Hamdi, his family and his teacher created opportunities for ICD as a form of engagement with a commitment to mutual respect, empathy and willingness to understand each other's perspectives and experiences. Her interactions with Hamdi stood in this teacher's mind as an ongoing reminder of the transformative power of dialogue. It resulted in her commitment to prioritise relationships, empathic perspective-taking and intercultural competence in her increasingly diverse classroom ever since.

Preparing for ICD in geo-political terrains

A popular English language learning programme for children ages 8 to 11 in Brazil a few decades ago illustrates the importance of a globally situated preparation for ICD. Anthropologists involved in creating it, understood Brazil as part of the developing Global South and appreciated the country's marked historical racial, cultural and religious syncretism. Mindful of context and the global power relations surrounding it, the programme's stated purpose became that children learn to appreciate the richness of

their country's natural and cultural diversity and learned to use the English language to share their stories with the world and collaborate with others to preserve it. In this programme children and educators alike prepared for ICD by developing an appreciation of the human dignity of their people and the diversity of culture in Brazil – from traditional practices of the inhabitants of the Amazons to Afro-Brazilian rituals honouring the Goddess of the seas to mixed-race skateboarding of urban youth in megacities. Preparing to voice stories that are all too often invisible, exoticized or essentialised in the global sphere, the children's understanding of Brazil's natural and cultural diversity was essential to advance *Horizontal Equality* and Representation and Inclusion in ICD. The programme interrupted established power narratives in North-South dynamics (Appiah 2006, Andreotti, 2006). It created a novel set of conditions for engagement between Brazilian English learners and their native peers in the North to interact on a basis of mutual respect and desire to consider multiple perspectives in equally high regard.

The example illustrates how interventions at the level of institutional and in this case curricular leadership able to situate the practice of schooling in the Southern Hemisphere prompted the preparation of generations of English language learners disposed to view the world in more horizontally equal terms against general trend by which higher income countries show stronger scores among conditions for ICD. Further, informed by the UNESCO Framework outcomes policy initiatives can be

An ecological view: A moment to reflect

Select a child in your institution and explore how an ecological view of such child might contribute to the development of his or her ICD capacities and dispositions.

1. What do you know or would need to learn about the qualities of this child bring to learning to participate in ICD?
2. What Micro level influences in this child's life might foster or impede her capacity to engage in dialogue across cultures? What are a few actions you might take to respond to such influences given the leveraging forces outlined by the UNESCO Framework?
3. What Exo, Macro and Chrono-system level seem to enable or impede this child's development as an agent of ICD. What are two or three opportunities for intervention you now see?

designed to strengthen conditions for ICD in Brazil. Examples include promoting *Stability and Non-violence* in multicultural communities while creating spaces for dialogue and exchange.

4.2.3 Invitation 2: Re-casting our idea of learning: from teaching skills to nurturing ICD dispositions

In the analysis of UNESCO and IEP, the ICD supporting domain of *Skills and Values* relates to the “ability to acknowledge *cultural differences*, change viewpoints towards others and to activate democratic structures and forces to confront horizontal inequalities between diverse groups within societies”. The importance of teaching *Skills and Values* for ICD is underscored by its high correlation with macro structural domains such as *Horizontal Equality, Governance and Citizenship, Stability, and Non-violence* (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch 2011). Greater efforts to teach *Skills and Values* also seem necessary in light of the significant differences in average “scores” between high- and low-income countries, where *Skills and Values* are the most unequally distributed ICD associated domain.

Teaching content, skills and values is what schools do the world over, rendering *Skills and Values* a particularly permeable entry point for educators approaching the UNESCO Framework architecture. However, developing the skills and values for ICD, in order to participate in increasingly heterogeneous societies, calls for deliberate attention to the specific capacities to be targeted (e.g., acknowledging cultural differences, changing viewpoints towards others, confronting inequalities, activating democratic processes) and the kinds of pedagogies that will deliver them. In recent years governments and international organisations have proposed a series of frameworks mapping the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes associated with intercultural competence, dialogue and democratic values (Council of Europe 2016.). These range from values such as human dignity and rights, to attitudes of openness to cultural otherness, skills like autonomous learning and empathy, and knowledge and critical understanding of world politics and human rights, to name a few.

Results from the OECD PISA 2018 assessment of Global Competence suggest that students are generally aware of skills needed to communicate across cultural and linguistic difference. These include listening attentively, speaking slowly and clearly, checking for understanding and explaining themselves with simple language. Yet, intercultural dialogue is more than verbal exchange. Much like the ICD Framework results, the OECD report suggests that dialogue builds on genuine interest, respect, curiosity and is typically enhanced by contact with people of other cultures, and multilingualism stands as a window to the world and to others.

But what constitutes quality learning of skills and values of this kind? How can learning to engage in ICD be cultivated in ways that increase the likelihood that its effects will live beyond the confines of a test, a classroom or a school? Most importantly, how might nurturing ICD capacities among our youth enable them to contribute to advancing a culture of ICD in their communities and society at large?

The second invitation the ICD framework and study proposes involves re-casting the kind of learning we seek and, concomitantly, the learning environments that will nurture it. To fulfil the promise of promoting peace, democratic values and citizenship based on equal rights, our educational institutions will need to focus on learning that is far-reaching. Conceptions of learning rooted in the mastery of isolated skills, memorisation of knowledge and occasional lessons on values and attitudes will most likely not suffice, nor will activities designed with the sole purpose of meeting schooling requirements. ICD calls upon us to bring our diverse world into the classroom and learning into the world. Needed are new qualities of learning: learning that is **relevant** — vis a vis the world of the child and our increasingly heterogeneous societies, **deep** — inviting young people to develop critical inquiry capacities across the disciplines, and fundamentally, **long-lasting** — that is, the kind of learning that will remain with youth after they leave their classrooms and schools, as they go about their lives, grow and participate to create more peaceful, inclusive and sustainable societies. It is this last characteristic of learning to which we turn next (Boix Mansilla & Chua 2017).

Enter a view or learning centred in “**dispositions**”. From this standpoint, when learning to engage in ICD, students may develop the ability to take perspective empathically, and do so upon request in a school assignment or class discussion. However, not uncommonly, these same students fail to apply such ability in the world outside school when unprompted. Needed is the development of a **sensitivity** to opportunities to put their ability into play, and an **inclination** to doing so over time (Perkins et al., 2000, Boix Mansilla, 2018). Seen through the lens of dispositions, learning is not only about mastering a skill such as perspective taking or holding a value such as human dignity. It is about *becoming the kind of person who takes perspective and embodies these values in multiple contexts, unprompted and habitually*. When educators focus their attention in nurturing ICD dispositions, they seek learning that is transformative and *long-lasting*.

Pedagogically speaking, dispositions develop through **enculturation** (Lave, 1991). That is, students do not develop ICD dispositions through occasional lessons on perspective-taking, a unit on migration or an annual school event, but through ongoing participation in classroom cultures in which ICD is visibly valued and extensively

practiced. In other words, to cultivate such ICD dispositions educators must make ICD a routine and integral part of everyday life in the classroom—i.e., “the way we engage with each other in this classroom/school.” In fact, creating a culture of ICD in a classroom or school involves attending to the multiple messages explicit and tacit that children receive when entering educational institutions. For example: What does the space of a school say about whose work and ideas matter (e.g. children’s) and how diverse cultures are to be viewed? Considering time, how much time is allocated for ICD through a students’ day? What are formal and informal opportunities for students to participate in ICD across their curriculum, in and out of school to become better at identifying opportunities to apply what they learned? Is the language used in class one that models ICD for students setting expectations and the habit for students to do the same? It is through ongoing participation in a whole classroom or school culture where ICD is routine, that students internalise target ICD capacities in long-lasting ways? Eventually and over time, they come to view such capacities as part of who they are (Ritchhart, 2015).

Turning to practice

What might pedagogies and programs rooted in nurturing ICD dispositions the shift in mind-sets here proposed look like? Consider the following pictures of practice:

Creating a whole school culture of ICD

Over the last few years, a local public primary school in a city settling refugee families from Northern Africa, Asia and the Middle East has been running “Rise and Shine.” Every morning, the programme brings children and adults together for an early arrival in school. Teachers, parents and community members teach beadwork, yoga, cooking, art, writing, knitting, international dances and math games. Multiple languages are spoken, and friendships made across these 40-minute morning classes, which the children take by choice and across grades. The programme strengthens the sense of community and prepares students for learning with joy. A room in the school is reserved for immigrant-origin mothers, mostly from Somalia and South Sudan, to gather and sew together over coffee and conversation. Programmes like “Rise and Shine” contribute to creating a whole school culture in which celebrating diversity in the larger community, perspective-taking and human dignity is part of the air children and adults breathe.

Making ICD part of the fabric of learning every day

For years, teachers around the world have utilized “thinking routines” as pedagogical tools to develop “thinking dispositions” across ages and disciplines. Thinking routines contribute to the creation of a culture of

ICD by offering micro instructional interventions that include the systematic and ubiquitous use of carefully crafted open-ended questions or series of questions designed to nurture specific habits of mind. For example, when questions like “What makes you say so?” or “How else might you say this, and why?” are asked routinely in a child’s educational journey, they become internalised expectations and capacities for reasoning with evidence and meta communicative awareness (Boix Mansilla 2016, Ritchhart, 2011). Thinking routines designed to cultivate perspective taking, for example, include “circle of view-points” where children are invited to see an issue under study taking on various perspectives and then reflect about the insights gained through the exchange. A “step-in, step-out, step-back” routine invites children to imagine the perspective of another person, ponder what else they would need to know to understand this perspective better, and reflect on what they learn about themselves, their preferences and their biases as they observe their own effort toward perspective taking. Perhaps most illustrative in terms of conflict prevention, dignity affirmation and peace is a routine called “seek to see” whereby young people are invited to examine a photograph or painting depicting a person, who is likely to remain invisible or the target of discrimination in their societies, and after a moment of close observation learn to orient their gaze toward recognising this persons’ dignity through a four step invitation:

1. “I seek to see the many emotions this person might be feeling in this context”
2. “I seek to see his/her strengths, cultural assets and powers”
3. “I seek to see human connections between this person and myself”
4. “I seek to see the words that describe this person’s human dignity”

Through the use of this particular routine — employed frequently with portraits or provocations in literature, history, art, the news or scenes from the school’s playground, young people have an opportunity to create a disposition toward perspective taking, egalitarianism and value of human dignity that are essential conditions for ICD. (Boix Mansilla, Suarez Orozco, Wilson 2021). If successful, children will have internalised a disposition to “seek to see”, finding multiple opportunities to orient their gaze deliberately toward dignity, toward a justice of recognition. If successful, they will “seek to see” unprompted and over time, becoming “the kind of person” that interrupts dominant discriminatory narratives.

4.2.4 Moving forward

In sum, if the education of rising generations is to fulfil its promise of contributing to more peaceful and sustainable societies, educating for ICD is not a luxury but a necessity, indeed an urgent necessity. The UNESCO Framework architecture sheds a useful light on the promise of educating for ICD and its relationship with peace outcomes. The accompanying empirical findings foreground the opportunity of a systemic approach to doing so. By identifying structural and supporting domains such as *Social Cohesion*, *Freedom of Expression*, and *Leadership and Organisation*, among others, as conditions able to enhance ICD, and by showing their mutual interrelation, the UNESCO Framework offers productive entry points for action. The framework and results help us anticipate, for example, that broader policies of inclusive growth veering toward horizontal equality can create better conditions for ICD, as can local institutional arrangements fostering ICD-oriented micro interpersonal dynamics of leadership and skill development.

I have proposed that in the field of education the ICD Framework invites us to reconsider our image of the child, to favour an ecological view that situates her and his developing ICD capacities in broader context. I have claimed that it also invites us to re-consider the nature of learning, to favour “transformative dispositions” over “isolated skills” and opt for “enculturation into habits of ICD” over “transmission-based pedagogies” or “stand alone skills-based curricula” as approaches for relevant, deep and long-lasting learning. The implication of these mind-set shifts for practitioners, policy makers and leaders are noticeable.

Parents and teachers need to realize that children and youth are highly permeable to macro conditions that enable or impede ICD and that they have choices regarding how to manage such influences - from shielding the very young from toxic public messages, to creating safe and courageous spaces at home and at school for youth to examine such messages critically and contesting discriminatory or exclusionary language openly. Children and youth will benefit from growing up in spaces where they themselves are respected as participants in intercultural dialogue, able to consider different perspectives and express and calibrate their own. Curriculum experts are invited to bring greater understanding of diverse cultures, local and global issues, contemporary dilemmas, and perspectives into the classroom and infuse the curriculum with examples of intercultural dialogue, past, present and future. Examples of successful and failed ICDs will help children consider the multiple conditions, supporting factors and personal dispositions that make success possible, as well as the human and environmental costs of when dialogues collapse.

Relatedly, Educators can opt for transformative pedagogies such as those described above, which make ICD, and the cognitive and emotional capacities it demands, part of the fabric of the daily experience in classrooms, schools or museums. School communities can collaborate to create spaces that embody a culture of respect for diverse life trajectories fostering cooperation, collective problem-solving and conflict resolution. Educators and communities can welcome demographic changes in their classrooms that enhance the opportunities youth have of connecting with, understanding, and deliberating with people from other cultures. Here, too, attention to free speech and cultural expression in educational institutions, together with forms of leadership that model ICD and the values of empathy, respect and democracy it embodies are of the essence. Policy makers can support ICD in education directly through legislation that advocates for relevant and systemic professional development and school-community interactions.

To be successful, efforts to nurture ICD dispositions among our young will need to puncture our deeply engrained human proclivity to construct (and polarise) binary dynamics of “us and them,” as well as the profoundly unequal conditions in which global ICDs unfold. We know that when discrimination becomes part of an institution’s culture, students may develop discriminatory attitudes towards those who are different from them. Yet, we also know that the opposite is true. The promise of quality ICD education lies exactly in its deliberate commitment to open minds and creating more just and equitable conditions for learning and dialogue for all.

4.3 The Pathway of Media and ICT

*Contributed by Dr. Iffat Idris
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4.3.1 Introduction

Importance of media and ICT in promoting ICD

The recent furore over allegations of racism experienced by former Yorkshire cricketer Azeem Rafiq, and the vast attention this has received in the news and on social media, is already bringing about a sea change in attitudes and practices in cricket.¹¹ Clubs at all levels, and the sport’s governing bodies, are being forced to acknowledge and address the problem. Other players of colour have been enabled to come forward and share their experiences. The England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB) has set up a hotline for people to contact. Rafiq himself believes he lost his

¹¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/nov/17/azeem-rafiq-cricket-racism-revelations>

promising cricket career because of racism but is hopeful that his speaking out will lead to reform and make it easier for those of minority heritage coming after him to do well in the sport.

This example shows the positive impact media and information and communications technology (ICT) can have on promoting intercultural dialogue (ICD). Underlying this is the power of the media and ICT to influence thinking and behaviour. The argument that ‘racism is not innate but learnt through discourse and communication’ (Council of Europe, n.d.: 11) applies to all forms of intolerance towards other groups (whether based on race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, etc.). The media and ICT are especially relevant in this regard. A recent report by McKinsey & Company (Dunn et al, 2021: 2) notes that movies and television ‘can play an outsize role in shaping and reinforcing cultural beliefs and attitudes about race, both in the United States and internationally’ – a comment that, again, applies to all forms of ‘the other’.

This disproportionate influence stems in large part from the significant amount of time people spend on different forms of media and ICT. In 2015 the average US resident consumed traditional and digital media for an average of approximately 15.5 hours per day; children (8-12 year olds) consumed an average of six hours per day and teens nine hours (Yuen, 2015). Yuen (2015) stresses that, ‘This mindboggling amount of media consumption shapes how we see the world which we live in. Though they are largely fictional, on-screen images can shape our views of reality’.

The media and ICT are especially influential in the context of diverse, multicultural societies in which direct engagement between different groups is limited.

(A) lack of contact between racial groups can lead to greater reliance on media stereotypes when formulating ideas about people outside of one’s race. Studies show that audiences substitute stereotypes they see on screen for reality when they have not had any direct interactions with particular social groups.

The Council of Europe formally recognised as far back as 1997 that ‘the media can make a positive contribution to the fight against intolerance, especially where they foster a culture of understanding between different ethnic, cultural and religious groups in society’ (Council of Europe, n.d.: 9). However, the media can also play a negative role and undermine intercultural understanding and tolerance, and it is important to ensure this does not happen.

Outline

The UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue points to two key ways in which the media and

ICT can contribute to intercultural dialogue (UNESCO, 2021: 14):

- Through the representation of cultures and groups in their content;
- As platforms for public debate and engagement across different peoples, cultures and groups.

As explained earlier in this report, the framework focuses on the enabling environment for ICD, and identifies two layers of this:

- a) Structural domains - *Stability and Non-violence; Governance and Citizenship; Freedom of Expression; Horizontal Equality; and Social Cohesion;*
- b) Supporting domains - *Organisation and Leadership; Inclusion and Representation; Linkages and Coherency; and Skills and Values.*

This article takes these as the starting point and describes the different mechanisms through which these domains can be promoted with regard to the media and ICT. The aim is to show how the potential of the media and ICT to positively contribute to ICD can be realised – i.e. what needs to be done in practice – and how to avoid negative effects.

While there are many other measures that can be implemented in relation to the media and ICT to promote the structural and supporting domains needed for ICD, this article focuses on the following:

- Ensuring portrayal of all groups, and avoiding negative stereotypes;
- Ensuring access of all groups to media and ICT, including through use of multiple broadcast languages and support for digital literacy;
- Ensuring participation of all groups in media and ICT, and ensuring this happens in all roles (on-screen and off-screen, executive and lower levels);
- Training/sensitising journalists and others working in media and ICT to ensure they promote, and do not undermine, tolerance, intercultural dialogue and understanding;
- Establishing regulatory and monitoring mechanisms to see what role the media and ICT are playing, what impact they are having on ICD, and to enforce compliance with codes of conduct.

Finally, the article illustrates the different mechanisms with examples drawn from across the world.

4.3.2 Portrayal of minorities/others in media

Importance and approach

The UNESCO framework identifies *Horizontal Equality* and *Social Cohesion* as two important structural domains. 'Without equality, the playing field for the groups involved is uneven or tilted, affecting their ability to communicate openly' (UNESCO, 2021: 21). The framework also identifies *Inclusion and Representation* as an important supporting domain for ICD. 'For genuine ICD...it is imperative to involve individuals and groups who represent 'the other' both inside and outside of the represented cultures' (UNESCO, 2021: 22).

In the context of the media, this means ensuring portrayal of minorities/other groups such that:

- one, the full range of societal (population) diversity is reflected in media content, so minorities/other groups are actually seen;
- two, negative stereotypes are avoided.

With regard to the former, people of colour and other minorities are often missing altogether (*Horizontal (in) Equality*). And when they are seen, unfortunately, negative portrayals are highly prevalent. According to Washington (2019), 'Media depicts stereotypical representations for people of colour and women, whether through Hollywood or on the news, as violent criminals, the help, terrorists, submissive characters, highly sexualised beings, unintelligent people and more'. Castaneda (2018: 7) echoes this, noting that while racial minority stereotypes in the media vary across ethnic/racial groups, at their core there are similarities that cut across all of them: 'Meaning, these racial/ethnic groups are consistently represented in the media as hypersexual, violent, unintelligent, dishonest and consistently poor'.

Positive portrayal of minorities and excluded groups is important for the promotion of *Horizontal Equality*, and *Inclusion and Representation* for a number of reasons:

- Inclusion of such groups reflects societies which are multicultural and multi-ethnic; exclusion sends the signal that they are unimportant or not valued. Thomas (2018, cited in Washington, 2019) asserts, 'the lack of inclusion sends a hostile message, whether intended or not, that other voices are not valued or welcome to join the conversation'. Washington (2019) stresses that, 'Seeing oneself on screen is crucial... people feel validated and a sense of worth by seeing themselves reflected on screen'.
- Negative stereotypes in the media and ICT are taken

up by people in society, and influence how they perceive and interact with members of those groups, and how such groups are treated. Writing in the context of the United States, Castaneda (2018: 7-8) explains that by representing racial minorities through negative stereotypes 'it raises the question as to whether "these people" have a right to the societal resources available to those who have part of a productive populace...these populations are then granted limited privileges in civil society'. She adds that the negative impact is not only experienced by individuals 'but also in the kinds of biased policies and practices that are instituted by educational, economic or political institutions'. Such portrayals thus lead to inequality and lack of representation as well as undermine social cohesion.

- Negative stereotypes undermine the confidence of members of those groups. Conversely, inclusion of such groups in positive images builds confidence and empowers members of these groups. According to Yuen (2019), 'the erasure and negative portrayals of people of colour can adversely affect how people of colour see themselves. Prolonged television exposure predicts a decrease in self-esteem for all girls and for black boys, and an increase in self-esteem for white boys. These differences correlate with the racial and gender biases in Hollywood, which casts only white men as heroes, while erasing or subordinating other groups as villains, sidekicks and sexual objects'. Horton, Price and Brown (cited in Washington, 2019) explain the long-term effects: 'when images and ideas presented at a young age take hold, and are reinforced over years of viewing, these images become reality and once these stereotypes and misconceptions become ingrained in the psyche of...children, they become self-perpetuating'.

Horizontal Equality and *Inclusion and Representation*, in turn promote *Social Cohesion*: 'the sense of belonging, trust and community' (UNESCO, 2021: 22). Whether and the ways in which the media portray diverse groups in society directly impacts intercultural tolerance and understanding in society. Castaneda (2018: 9) notes in relation to the US: 'Media images create meaning, and as the demographics in the US and across the Americas, continue to shift towards more people of colour, those images will mean the difference between intersectional inclusion and violent exclusion'. *Social Cohesion* is promoted as different groups develop greater familiarity and understanding of each other – by seeing societal diversity in the media – and this helps change perceptions of 'us vs. them' and 'the other' into feelings of 'we', i.e. belonging to a single community.

Examples

The 2018 film *Black Panther* was a global hit – indeed, a global phenomenon – netting over US\$ 900 million (Washington, 2019). The film’s significance lay in its portrayal of black people: as well as the superhero and the vast majority of the cast being black, the fictional African nation featured in the movie was portrayed as technologically far superior to the West. In addition, the film’s director was black, as were many of the off-screen staff (costume designers, hairstylists, musicians, etc.) (Washington, 2019). Johnson (2018) describes it as a ‘cultural phenomenon’:

It [Black Panther] acknowledges and celebrates everything from traditional African society to African-American political debates, from the power and beauty of black women to the preservation of identity...The film is a crucial stamp of validation for black people hungry for the opportunity to celebrate everything from Afrofuturism to the natural hair movement that’s often been derided in mainstream spaces.

These features of the film – the highly positive portrayal of black people, the fact that the majority of cast and off-screen personnel were people of colour – massively helped promote *Horizontal Equality* and *Inclusion and Representation*. By breaking out of the ‘traditional’ ways in which black people are shown on screen, the film not only empowered them, but also showed white people a different – far more positive – image of black people, thereby helping promote understanding, acceptance and social cohesion.

Another example is *Noughts and Crosses* on the BBC, a dramatization of the novel of the same name by Malorie Blackman. This series reversed the typical power relationship by placing black people at the top of the social hierarchy, and whites at the bottom. It showed black people in positions of power and wealth, making decisions, leading, being subservient to no one. As with *Black Panther*, for audiences more accustomed to seeing black people in lowly, subservient or criminal roles, this portrayal was an eye-opener. Critically, it ‘makes the lasting impact of daily, subtle racism glaringly obvious’ for all viewers (Pometsey, 2020):

By putting the shoes on the other feet, Noughts + Crosses elegantly gives people from all backgrounds the opportunity to empathise with those who are too often accused of playing the race card, forging a much-needed bridge of understanding between the polarised fractions of our society.

As with *Black Panther*, this series helped promote *Horizontal Equality* and *Inclusion and Representation*.

Moreover, because it not only showed black people in positions of power, but also highlighted the negative impact of racism on those affected, it helped generate empathy and understanding among white viewers for black people who are subjected to racism in their everyday lives. These are critical to building *Social Cohesion* – the sense of belonging to one community.

4.3.3 Access: languages and media and information literacy

Importance and approach

There are other aspects to *Horizontal Equality* in relation to media and ICT. Lack of access by some groups to the media and ICT because of language barriers and/or because of lack of digital literacy represents a form of inequality and keeps them out of ‘mainstream’ media content, limiting their opportunities and participation. *Horizontal Equality* is promoted when all citizens and all groups have access to and can make full use of media and ICT. This also promotes *Inclusion and Representation*. By giving different groups in society a shared experience of programming (as in the ability to watch the same programmes/see the same online content), media access/digital literacy help promote *Social Cohesion*.

To successfully leverage media and ICT as a pathway for ICD, access is key. An important mechanism for media access is multilingualism, identified in the UNESCO framework as important within the *Skills and Values* domain. The framework also calls for *Freedom of Expression*. Digital literacy enables people to share their views/interact with others online, and thus supports *Freedom of Expression* for such otherwise excluded groups.

This article focuses on two aspects of access: one, multilingual programming and two, digital literacy.

Multilingual programming

In multicultural societies it is important that media programmes be in minority languages as well/subtitled so that they are readily accessible to all people.

There are two possible scenarios for mono-lingual programming in such societies: one, majority and minority languages are mutually intelligible so programmes can be followed by different linguistic groups; and two, there is a language barrier (either the language(s) of minorities are not generally understood by the majority, or when some people in minority groups do not know the state/majority language) (Prina et al, 2013: 8). While the former scenario can support intercultural understanding and dialogue, the latter can undermine it.

A further risk is that minority groups – unable to access mainstream media programming – turn to foreign

channels, e.g. Russian minorities in Eastern European countries following Russian language programmes broadcast in Russia, rather than programmes in their own countries. This clearly will not advance ICD. Ensuring access to national news rather than that of foreign media outlets 'is all the more important during periods of tension and conflict, when news takes on a particular importance and can play a role in maintaining and promoting of social cohesion' (Prina et al, 2013: 9).

However, the solution is not to create parallel minority language media broadcasting systems, as these can cement rather than overcome divisions in society. With separate programmes, members of different groups can remain unaware of issues relating to other groups, or their interests and concerns, and ICD can be very limited or non-existent (Prina et al, 2013).

By contrast, a common media space can facilitate interaction. One key measure to create such a common space is through provision of subtitles. The big advantage of these is that different groups can follow the same programme simultaneously, and they facilitate learning of other groups' languages. Prina et al (2013: 8) note that 'translations can be important in preventing minority groups from becoming excessively insular, and in facilitating interaction with other groups'. Another useful measure could be to re-broadcast programmes in another language at a different time. Media in minority languages can have the additional benefit of facilitating preservation and development of such languages, e.g. it was found that Romani-language media in the Slovak Republic served the dual purpose of facilitating the integration of Roma into the wider society, and of promoting Romani language (Prina et al, 2013: 9).

It is worth noting that multilingualism in the media should form part of a wider drive to promote multilingualism in society. In a past report, UNESCO (2009: 80 & 85) stresses that 'social cohesion and citizenship require shared forms of communication and comprehension, not monolingualism' and describes multilingualism as 'a fundamental means of receptiveness to others and a constituent of intercultural skills'. The report calls for language policies to promote multilingualism, e.g. through translation provision, in education, administration, the media, cyberspace, as well as for efforts to 'preserve and enrich global linguistic diversity as a prerequisite for cultural diversity' (UNESCO, 2009: 81).

Digital literacy

In an increasingly digital world, media and information literacy (MIL) – which encompasses both access to tools such as smartphones and the internet, and the capacity to make effective use of these – is vital. Key elements of MIL include the ability to: define and articulate information

needs; locate and access information; assess information; critically analyse and evaluate media content; and produce user-generated content.

Just as digital technology (e.g. social media) is a key transmitter of ideas, so MIL for all is essential for ICD. Digital media can be especially useful in offering a chance for otherwise unheard voices to find an outlet (Anna Lindh Foundation, 2021: 6). 'The digital world has brought some equilibrium with the participation and representation of diverse groups and people, showing that not just one type of people exists' (French journalist cited in *ibid.*). Pathak-Shelat (2014: 58) echoes this, noting that 'Internet and social media are immensely valuable in their civic partnership and that intercultural dialogue online has great potential, albeit with some challenges, in furthering the experience of global citizenship'. Hence, she asserts that MIL programmes can play a significant role in facilitating ICD online (Pathak-Shelat, 2014).

However, not everyone has equal access to digital technologies: women, for example, have less access to media and communication technology, and this invariably constrains their participation in cultural exchange (Grizzle, 2014: 19). MIL could thus be a potent tool to foster gender equality, including in intercultural dialogue. Other digital literacy gaps are seen between rich and poor, and between old and young people. There is a need to ensure access to digital equipment and build the environment required to cultivate digital literacy (Anna Lindh Foundation, 2021: 7).

Pathak-Shelat (2014: 67) stresses the need to ensure not just physical access to technology and capacity to use it, but also the requisite 'soft skills' to avoid negative effects. She suggests three distinct areas in which MIL programmes could play a significant role: a) in developing reflective and critical thinking skills; b) in developing communication competencies, civility and open-mindedness to other cultures; and c) ensuring that managed spaces remain safe and democratic.

Related to this is the need to ensure *Freedom of Expression*. UNESCO (cited in Grizzle, 2014: 20) stresses: 'Cultural diversity...dictates a balanced representation of the different communities living together in a particular country, in accordance with the principles of the freedom of expression and the free flow of ideas'. This point is explored further in the section below on regulation of media and ICT.

Examples

Sakamoto (2015) describes the experience of using MIL (exchanging video letters) to overcome mutual negative perceptions between Chinese and Japanese students. He argues that MIL is a powerful tool to enable ICD, tolerance

and cultural understanding. Hate speech directed at Chinese in Japan is an especially big problem, fuelled by right-wing groups holding demonstrations with hate speech, and spreading this through the internet. A 2014 survey of public opinion in Japan and China found that 93.0% of Japanese respondents had an unfavourable impression of China, and 86.8% of Chinese respondents had an unfavourable impression of Japan (Genron NPO, cited in Sakamoto, 2015: 240). Moreover, the survey found that only 3.5% of Japanese got information about China from direct communication with Chinese people: 96.5% got it from Japanese media (TV, newspapers, internet). Similarly, only 1.0% of Chinese got information about Japan from direct communications: 91.4% got it from Chinese news media.

Sakamoto's approach to tackling this involved working with school children in both countries. They were taught MIL skills and encouraged to prepare video messages – comprising of images and videos, as well as narration and subtitles so that students didn't need foreign language skills - about their country and their lives, to send to their counterparts in China (and vice versa). Over the course of a three-day workshop, students were first asked to think of topics on which their video letter should focus (Sakamoto, 2015: 242). Most of the themes were an introduction to their city or school, or other cultural aspects of their lives. They were then taught to create a storyboard, how to use an iPad mini and how to shoot images. On day two, the students began shooting, recording narration and editing their footage. On the last day, they edited and presented their video messages.

The video messages from the Japanese students were then sent to be shown to students in the Chinese school, and vice versa. The Chinese students involved in the workshop were already taking Japanese classes in their school, so Sakamoto acknowledges that they might have already been positively predisposed to Japan. Nonetheless, they made positive comments after watching the Japanese video messages: the Japanese school was clean, school life seemed interesting, Japanese students seemed to be courteous (Sakamoto, 2015: 243). But the biggest change was seen among the Japanese students: they commended the fact that the Chinese students spoke good Japanese, and the high quality of the Chinese video messages; they said Chinese culture looked appealing; and commented that the Chinese seemed to have fun at karaoke, or the night food stalls (Sakamoto, 2015: 243). The overall impact on the Japanese students was summed up by Sakamoto (2015: 244):

There are no negative comments on China or Chinese culture. The following comments represent the voice of the Japanese students, "I want to visit China", "The image that I had before has changed". Just one exchange of video letters changed the Japanese students' attitudes.

The example of using video messages to promote ICD between Japanese and Chinese students illustrates the impact of building *Skills and Values*, as called for in the UNESCO framework. They also show how MIL can promote *Social Cohesion*.

4.3.4 Participation of minorities/others Importance and approach

Horizontal Equality, and *Inclusion and Representation*, are also important in relation to those working in the media. The diversity seen in society needs to be reflected in the media profession. By putting otherwise excluded/marginalised groups in positions (on-screen and off-screen, high to low levels) throughout the sector, they can contribute to content, ensure positive portrayal of minorities, and fully engage in mainstream content – in turn, helping promote *Social Cohesion*. The UNESCO framework identifies a number of skills and values (e.g. tolerance, empathy, effective communication) as necessary for ICD. Since equal participation in media jobs entails people from different groups collaborating on media content, programming, etc. it helps build those skills and values. Participation and representation of all in media and ICT can also be seen as supporting *Freedom of Expression*, in that this helps everyone to have their voice heard. It is also relevant to the supporting domain in the UNESCO framework, *Organisation and Leadership*, in that media/ICT managers, editors, etc. have to take steps to promote diversity.

Prina et al (2013: 11) identify a number of forms of participation of minorities in the media: consultation in decision-making on the media; involvement in producing programmes (both ad hoc through commissioning, and actual recruitment of people with minority backgrounds in media outlets); and feature of minorities themselves in programmes, e.g. television debates. Positive portrayal of all groups in society depends on having people of all backgrounds in decision-making roles, as well as in the plethora of off-screen positions – directors, producers, journalists, editors, writers, artists and so on. Washington (2019) stresses: 'If there are not more diverse individuals who are included in the structures of power that disseminate the ideals through television and movies to the world, then nothing can change'.

The report by McKinsey & Co. (Dunn et al, 2021: 2) identifies some of the problems facing black people trying to work in film and TV: fewer black-led stories get told, and are consistently underfunded and undervalued; the handful of black people who are in prominent off-screen positions (i.e. creator, producer, writer or director) tend to be responsible for providing off-screen opportunities for other black people; emerging black actors have far fewer chances early in their careers compared with white actors;

and both film and TV have very little minority representation among top management and boards. It concludes that, while a certain amount of progress has been made with on-screen talent in recent years, 'inequity persists and is deeply entrenched across the film and TV ecosystem' (Dunn et al, 2021: 2). It makes the following recommendations to improve diversity in the industry (Dunn et al, 2021: 21):

- Ensure diverse representation, especially among off-screen talent and executives;
- Increase transparency and accountability;
- Seek and financially support a wide range of Black stories;
- Create an independent organization to promote diversity.

However, the report warns that the unique characteristics of the film and TV industry, with tight-knit, interdependent networks dominating the landscape, mean that a single company's efforts to change 'can do only so much for the entire ecosystem...real and lasting change in film and TV will require concerted action and the joint commitment of stakeholders across the industry ecosystem' (Dunn et al, 2021: 3).

A Council of Europe (n.d.: 22-23) report on media and diversity makes a number of recommendations for media organisations to actively combat discrimination in employment:

- Publish all job vacancies online, make appointments on a fair and non-discriminatory basis and have the results publicly available, as a very first step for providing fair and equal access to jobs within the sector for candidates from every background;
- Explore how to widen the recruitment base;
- Publish employment and recruitment policies openly;
- Establish and communicate clear and quantifiable goals, such as minimum targets in diversity recruitment, minimum annual training hours for the workforce, and concrete targets for representation. These targets for recruitment should mirror the make-up of the population;
- Enable journalists from minority communities to report on all aspects of the news agenda and not simply community issues;
- Modernise the casting and portrayal of minorities and minority issues in mainstream broadcast programming.

It is also important to ensure minority participation in 'mainstream' programming – to not restrict them to minority issues (Council of Europe, n.d. 11). A report by the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, a legally binding instrument in force in 39 European states, found that representatives of linguistic minorities in the UK (including Welsh, Gaelic and Irish speakers) were only invited to participate in programmes in the national media to discuss issues specifically related to their own communities, and were excluded from programmes treating mainstream news (Prina et al, 2013: 11). Related to this is the need to provide training for journalists from minority backgrounds to increase their participation in the production of media outputs (Prina et al, 2013: 23).

Examples

Steve McQueen is a black British director, writer and artist whose film *Twelve Years a Slave*, an adaptation of a slave memoir, won international recognition (including an Oscar for Best Picture). McQueen has been able to use his high profile to push for other programmes in which black stories and/or people are at the forefront. In November 2020, the BBC released *Small Axe*, a series of made-for-TV movies directed by McQueen. Set in Britain between the 1960s and 1980s, the five films tell distinct stories about the West Indian community in London and cover the topic of race from different angles: a young black man joining the police force and experiencing racism at the hands of his colleagues; a black female activist living in 1970s Notting Hill; a teenage girl experiencing her first all-night West Indian house party in London, and so on. *The Guardian* writes, 'Moving between the political and the personal, the dramatic and the ordinary, they are undercut by a desire to illuminate a part of recent British history and experience that remains relatively untold and thus undervalued' (Sean O'Hagan, 2020). McQueen was also able to use his position to have a cast of both established (e.g. John Boyega, Letitia Wright) and up-and-coming black British actors (e.g. Amarah-Jae St. Aubyn, Michael Ward).

Also in 2020, Tate Modern hosted a major retrospective of Steve McQueen's work, while Tate Britain simultaneously exhibited his project, *Year 3*, in which he invited every Year 3 class in London to have a photo taken. *The Guardian* notes, 'Filling the walls of the Duveen Galleries, the class portraits reflected the extraordinary diversity of multicultural London' (Sean O'Hagan, 2020). In January 2021, it was announced that McQueen would be working on two documentaries for the BBC: one on the rise of the black power movement in Britain, and the second on the scandal of racism in Britain's education system – reflected in disproportionate numbers of black children being sent to 'educationally sub-normal' schools (ESNs) (Bakare, 2021).

The career of Steve McQueen shows the difference that can be made through *Horizontal Equality* and *Inclusion and Representation* – in this case of black people at the highest levels in the media profession. McQueen has been able to use his position not just to give opportunities to other black creatives, but also to shine a light on issues of race that have previously been neglected.

4.3.5 Sensitisation and training

Importance and approach

The UNESCO framework lists *Governance and Citizenship* as a structural domain; this includes local, community-based efforts feeding into governmental policy-making and practice. In relation to the media and ICT, training and sensitisation at the level of media outlets/social media companies, etc. can feed into higher level government policy-making to build capacity for ICD and to promote inclusion. *Horizontal Equality* is promoted as those trained will include people from often marginalised/excluded groups. Interaction between different groups, as well as sensitisation to promote understanding of other groups, will help promote *Social Cohesion*. The UNESCO framework includes *Skills and Values*. Capacity building by definition builds *Skills and Values*: those especially relevant for ICD include awareness of the impact of words/stories (esp. negative stereotypes), empathy and better knowledge about others.

Training and sensitisation of those working in the media (journalists, editors, programme makers, etc.) on minority and diversity issues are a further important element alongside those discussed in previous sections (portraying all groups in society in the media, avoiding negative stereotypes, ensuring participation by all groups and access to media and ICT).

It is of paramount importance that journalists display sensitivity in their reporting of matters concerning minorities: there can be particular sensitivities in relation to specific past events, such as instances of sustained discrimination or violence affecting particular groups. In extreme cases, they can relate to full-blown inter-ethnic conflicts...Such cases often result in different narratives and interpretation of events. Journalists need to use special care in handling these subjects, so as to avoid an escalation of societal tensions (Prina et al, 2013: 11).

As noted above, negative stereotypes are especially prevalent – and potentially most damaging – in reporting of the news. One measure that could help in this regard is integrating courses on minority and diversity issues in basic journalist training programmes. The Council of Europe (n.d.: 9) urges schools of journalism and media training institutes to ‘introduce specialist courses in their core curricula with a view to developing a sense of

professionalism which is attentive to the involvement of the media in multi-ethnic and multicultural societies; and the contribution which the media can make to a better understanding between different ethnic, cultural and religious communities’.

The goal should be to ensure that reporting is based on principles of journalistic ethics, which require journalists to provide objective information to the public (Prina et al, 2013: 11-12). The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) elaborates these principles (Council of Europe, n.d.: 19):

- Truth Telling - an addiction to factual accuracy, checking and rechecking; the skill of anticipating the possibility of error; establishing authenticity through questioning; being ready to admit and correct mistakes; recognising that underlying truths can only be revealed by rigorous research, in-depth interviews and good understanding of the issues.
- Independent and Fair – stories that are complete, without suppression of significant facts; strive to avoid bias; reject pejorative terms; allow space for valid and reasonable disagreement; give those attacked space to have their say; do not surrender to the seductive influence of commercial or political interests.
- Humanity and Solidarity – doing no direct, intentional damage to others; minimising harm; being open-minded and thoughtful; having due regard for the rights of the public and the moral quality of journalism itself.

The Council of Europe (n.d.: 24) makes further recommendations for journalists:

- Widen their range of contacts and sources to include people from a diverse range of backgrounds who are asked to comment on every aspect of life in society and not just ethnic or minority issues;
- Take personal responsibility to challenge racist attitudes and assumptions within the newsroom and take care in what and how they report in the light of the guidelines mentioned above;
- Secure balanced and accurate representation of Europe’s diversity with a view to supporting greater social cohesion and building greater public trust in the media.

Prina et al (2013: 12) highlight a common practice of the media of disclosing the ethnic background of suspects or offenders in the coverage of crime, noting that ‘this information is often added gratuitously when suspects or offenders belong to minorities, and contributes to

reinforcing stereotypes'. They call for media outlets to be encouraged to make it policy not to disclose the ethnic origin of crime suspects or offenders; this could be realised through training, and 'the sensitisation of journalists as to the need to avoid the reinforcement of stereotypes through the media' (Prina et al, 2013: 12).

Similar recommendations are made for media enterprises (Council of Europe, n.d.: 10):

- Reporting factually and accurately on acts of racism and intolerance;
- Reporting in a sensitive manner on situations of tension between communities;
- Avoiding derogatory or stereotypical depiction of members of cultural, ethnic or religious communities in publications and programme services;
- Challenging the assumptions underlying intolerant remarks made by speakers in the course of interviews, reports, discussion programmes, etc.

Adebayo (2015) goes further in advocating for the media to not only 'do no harm', but to 'channel the immense influence wielded by the media' to make a positive contribution to social cohesion in society. He describes the concept of peace journalism as manifesting 'when journalists deliberately make choices regarding the stories they report and the prominence they accord such stories, in ways that create opportunities for members of society to take the route of non-violence when responding to conflict – such as electoral tensions'. He cites the positive impact of peace journalism training on the 2015 general election in Nigeria and claims that peace journalism training could be a catalyst for non-violent elections in Africa.

Examples

The Roma form a minority in Hungary, as well as a number of other European countries. In Hungary they have long faced discrimination and intimidation, with political leaders either complicit or silent. 'Prime Minister Victor Orbán has invoked anti-Roma rhetoric time and again as part of his arsenal of racist hate speech' and described a 2020 court decision to award damages to Roma children illegally segregated in special schools as 'money for nothing' (Bhabha & Matache, 2020). A 2019 Pew Research Centre poll found that 61% of Hungarians expressed negative sentiments towards the Roma (Bhabha & Matache, 2020).

The Independent Media Centre in Hungary seeks to strengthen the voice of minorities, notably the Roma, in the news media. The centre runs a number of programmes

to promote dialogue between Roma and non-Roma and to portray the Roma without prejudice. These include¹²:

- Europe: A Homeland for Roma – For this project Roma, non-Roma and American journalists worked together to make a series of video documentaries about Roma communities in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. The films aimed to highlight the problems facing Roma communities in Europe and contribute to conditions conducive to the elimination of discrimination and promotion of social inclusion. Five 15-18 minute films were made in 2013, and a further ten were made in 2014.
- Roma journalism internship programme – Running for 11 years (1998-2010), this programme was completed by a total of 110 interns. The aim was to prepare talented young Roma people for a career in journalism, and in the longer term, to help them find jobs as journalists in the Hungarian news media. The training entailed interns taking part in full-day theory lessons and practice-focused workshops, followed by internships in editorial offices for several months, returning to the Independent Media Centre for thematic sessions. Launched in Hungary, the programme then spread to Slovakia, Romania and Macedonia and was found to have 'contributed in a very innovative and positive way to changing the living conditions of the Roma community'. The programme received international recognition and in 2009 it was selected as one of the top 30 European anti-discrimination media programmes by an international panel of experts examining more than 150 initiatives.
- Online portal about Roma community – The Independent Media Centre operated an online portal (www.sosinet.hu) from 2009-2015, which provided over 1,000 original multimedia content about the life of the Roma community. The portal was initiated by Roma journalists, who produced news, interviews, reports, portraits, blogs, radio and video materials, and was supported by the Open Society Foundation. The aim was to give more space to multimedia content produced by Roma journalists, and thereby ease tensions between Roma communities and the majority society in Hungary.

The initiatives by the Independent Media Centre in Hungary contribute to a number of structural and supporting domains in the UNESCO framework: *Horizontal Equality, Social Cohesion, Inclusion and Representation, Organisation and Leadership, Linkages and Coherency, and Skills and Values*.

¹² Centre for Independent Journalism: <https://cij.hu/hu/programok/romak-a-mediaban/>

4.3.6 Regulation and monitoring

Importance and approach

The UNESCO framework lists *Freedom of Expression* as a structural domain, ‘offering an avenue for open dialogue and knowledge dissemination, and with a capacity to spread positive images and messaging’ (UNESCO, 2021: 21). *Freedom of Expression* gives different groups the right to convey their views in an environment of tolerance and mutual respect. Hence the right to free speech has to be balanced with the need to prevent hate speech. In the context of the media and ICT, this means ensuring effective regulation and monitoring. *Freedom of Expression* in turn helps build *Social Cohesion*, as well as *Inclusion and Representation*, as ALL groups are given this right. Regulation and monitoring can also be seen as promoting *Skills and Values* for ICD, as at their core they are about allowing for effective and transformative communication with others.

Media outlets

Training and sensitisation of journalists, media agencies and others working in media and ICT are an important step towards removing negative stereotyping and promoting fair, unbiased news coverage and other programming, that can support ICD. However, training tends to be a voluntary activity, which those working in the media and ICT can choose whether or not to undertake. In order to effectively promote ICD, legislation and regulations which prohibit intolerance and hate speech in the media are needed, backed up by effective monitoring mechanisms and strict enforcement of sanctions.

Codes of conduct can guide journalists and others ‘towards a more culturally-sensitive approach to their coverage of minority issues’ (Prina et al, 2013: 12). This can promote *Social Cohesion*. The Irish code of practice for the media, for example, requires that, ‘Newspapers and periodicals shall not publish material intended or likely to cause grave offence or stir up hatred against an individual or group on the basis of their race, religion, nationality, colour, ethnic origin, membership of the travelling community, gender, sexual orientation, marital status, disability, illness or age’ (Principle 8, cited in Council of Europe, n.d.: 14). Guidance on programming in the UK calls on broadcasters ‘to ensure that material which may cause offence is justified by the context. Such material may include, but is not limited to, offensive language, violence, sex, sexual violence, humiliation, distress, violation of human dignity, discriminatory treatment or language (for example on the grounds of age, disability, gender, race, religion, beliefs and sexual orientation)’ (Council of Europe, n.d.: 17).

Legislation can go further by requiring media outlets and others to comply with key principles such as banning hate

speech and avoiding negative stereotyping. Sanctions, in the event of non-compliance, could include revoking licenses of media organizations, fines and – in more serious cases – prison sentences.

Legislation and regulations will only have clout if sanctions are enforced, and this in turn requires well-functioning monitoring mechanisms (Prina et al, 2013: 13). These should be tasked with monitoring media content ‘with a view to identifying unduly negative reporting or hate speech against persons belonging to minorities’ (Prina et al, 2013: 13). They should also assess wider compliance of media outlets with relevant legislation and codes of conduct and should include mechanisms for members of the public to file complaints. Implicit in this is that monitoring agencies and complaint systems are fully operational, known to the public and easily accessible (Prina et al, 2013: 14).

ICT/social media

Regulation and monitoring of social media and online content is equally critical for promoting social cohesion. Much of current hate speech, negative stereotyping and intolerance is found on social media and online. Social media has been blamed for spreading misinformation and contributing to violence around the world (Siripurapu & Merrow, 2021). Specifically, it has contributed to religious and ethnic violence, for example against the Rohingyas in Myanmar, and against Muslims in India.

Regulating and monitoring social media and online content is far more challenging than monitoring media outlets. One reason is the massive scale of the problem. Some idea of this can be gauged from figures for action taken by social media companies just in the first half of 2020: 32 million pieces of content on Facebook relating to hate speech removed/covered with a warning/subject to other action; 1.2 million videos promoting violence or violent extremism removed from YouTube; and just under 1 million pieces of content categorised as hateful conduct removed from Twitter (Siripurapu & Merrow, 2021). A related problem is that much content (especially offensive comments) is often posted anonymously, making it difficult to identify and take action against individual perpetrators (e.g. imposing social media bans).

A further challenge is that social media companies use advertisement-driven business models, which rely on keeping users engaged. This therefore disincentivises them from regulating hateful or violent speech. Regulation has to be balanced against freedom of expression. It can be difficult to define content that should be removed – how to distinguish between hateful speech and satire, for example? Many countries rely on social media companies themselves to decide the rules for use of their platforms. However, when social media companies do take action to restrict users or remove content, they can be criticised for

restricting freedom of expression. This has been seen in the United States, for example, following the removal of former President Donald Trump from Twitter and Facebook.

Some of the major social media companies, e.g. Facebook, YouTube, have been taking steps to regulate content on their platforms. Measures include:

They bar posts that glorify or encourage violence; posts that are sexually explicit; and posts that contain hate speech, which they define as attacking a person for their race, gender, or sexual orientation, among other characteristics. The major platforms have also taken steps to limit disinformation, including by fact-checking posts, labelling accounts of state-run media and banning political ads (Siripurapu & Merrow, 2021).

Examples

On 6 January 2020, supporters of President Donald Trump attacked the Capitol Building in Washington, in an attempt to stop the formal certification of the Electoral College votes, which would declare Jo Biden the next President of the United States. The violence led to five people being killed, including one policeman, and caused widespread damage to property. For a number of years, social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter had wrestled with how to balance Donald Trump's right to free speech – his right to communicate directly with his supporters, who number in the tens of millions – against the need to curb hate speech, and messages that could incite violence. The January 6 riots brought this clash to a head.

Prior to the riots in early 2020, Facebook and Twitter had begun adding 'fact checks' and warnings to posts by the President which contained misinformation. But his posts in the run-up to the riots were seen by many as having incited the violence. On that day, while Trump did eventually post a video calling on his supporters in the Capitol Building to go home, he also told them, 'We love you. You're very special'. This was the final straw for Facebook: it responded by barring Trump indefinitely from both Facebook and Instagram. The company's Oversight Board later criticised the open-ended ban, and this was modified to two years, starting from the date of the initial suspension (7 January 2020). However, the company warned: 'If we determine that there is still a serious risk to public safety, we will extend the restriction for a set period of time and continue to re-evaluate until that risk has receded'.¹³

Donald Trump was also banned from Twitter, Snapchat, YouTube, Twitch and other social media platforms, and Google removed Parler (a pro-Trump platform) from its online store. Twitter initially (on Wednesday 7 January 2020) suspended Trump's account for 12 hours, in

response to a number of his tweets, including one in which he described the people who stormed the US Capitol as 'patriots'. On Thursday it was restored after the President took down the posts, but with the warning that he would be permanently banned if he breached the rules again. Following two further tweets by Donald Trump, which Twitter interpreted as indicating that he would not facilitate an orderly transfer of power and that he did not consider the election legitimate, it carried out its threat and permanently banned him. Twitter subsequently also ruled out a return to the platform for Donald Trump, even if he is re-elected in 2024. The company's chief financial officer, Ned Segal, told reporters, 'Remember, our policies are designed to make sure that people are not inciting violence, and if anybody does that, we have to remove them from the service and our policies don't allow people to come back'.¹⁴

The social media ban imposed on Donald Trump supports the *Social Cohesion* identified as a structural domain for ICD in the UNESCO framework. The framework includes *Freedom of Expression* as a supporting domain, but, as seen, this freedom has to be balanced against the harm it can cause. Facebook, Twitter and other platforms allowed the former President freedom of expression, but eventually were forced to ban him to prevent him inciting further violence – and thereby undermining *Social Cohesion*.

4.3.7 Conclusion

The UNESCO framework for measuring intercultural dialogue identifies a number of structural and supporting domains that can create an environment conducive for ICD. This article shows how the media and ICT can promote many of those domains, in particular, *Horizontal Equality, Social Cohesion, Inclusion and Representation, Freedom of Expression, and Skills and Values*. The media and ICT have massive power to influence thinking and behaviour, and this article shows the different mechanisms through which this can be done to have positive impact on ICD. The various interventions described – ensuring all groups in society are portrayed in the media, giving all groups access to media and ICT, ensuring job opportunities for all groups in all aspects of the media and ICT, training and sensitising those working in the media and ICT to ensure they promote rather than undermine *Social Cohesion*, and regulating and monitoring the media and ICT to remove harmful content – all require planning, resources and capacity. They will not come about automatically. It is hoped that all the stakeholders involved – government, media/social media companies, individuals in the field, regulators – will work to implement these measures, so that the media and ICT can fulfil their potential to promote ICD.


¹³ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-57365628>

¹⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/feb/10/trump-twitter-ban-permanent-social-media>

4.4 The Pathway of Culture and Arts

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Picture the scene. Centuries ago, when trade in people for slavery was a present threat, the leaders of an ethnic group arrive in a village at a time of great tension and danger for people. The leaders can be seen approaching and wearing a cloth with a striking design. The patterns are zigzags, and they offer an insight into the intentions of the leaders. The way the cloth is worn shows the patterns pointing downwards, in the manner of a sheathed sword. It means the people come in peace. Seeing this pattern and style of wear, the community knows what protocols to follow and how to prepare for hospitality not for conflict.



- KENTE Cloth from Bonwire, Ghana: Niata, meaning double edged sword. Sheathed to bring peace, drawn to bring war. How the cloth is worn and seen is its own ICD between leaders and communities.¹⁵ (A. S. Phipps, Tawona, 2018)

In this opening example, Kente cloth with the Niata pattern is used as a form of intercultural dialogue between leaders and communities. The cloth can be the difference between war and peace. Tracing the designs of cloth from West Africa back into the roots of the slave trade, this example offers a symbol for the focus of this think piece.

This 'Think Piece' will outline some of the important issues emerging from the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue. It will focus in particular on some of the anomalies where correlations are not in evidence and consider why this might be the case, and offer examples of what this means in practice for arts and cultural work in humanitarian situations and for peace-building. The anomalies which form the focus of the piece are:

- i) *Leadership and Organisation* for ICD
- ii) *Freedom of Expression*

The examples offered are taken from the work of the UNESCO Chair in Refugee Integration through Languages and the Arts and represent peer-reviewed examples of work funded for the purpose of understanding and enhancing arts and cultural work for peace building and intercultural dialogue. Some of the examples selected come from situations of enduring conflict; others represent the work of women in peace building and intercultural dialogue world-wide; some represent an enduring history through many different conflicts. Included also are examples which represent different approaches to leadership in arts and culture, through collective work under situations of duress, and as part of what Hyab Yohannes, UNESCO RILA scholar, has termed '*Restorative Integration*'. Each example is indicative of an aspect of arts and cultural work in intercultural dialogue (ICD) coming from around the world. A taxonomy of such work can be found in *Why Cultural Work with Refugees?* (A. Phipps, 2017).

First, the think piece examines the context of structural and enabling support for ICD in measuring sustainable peace, focusing on the specific role of creativity and inventiveness in the processes of fostership. Fostership refers here to the process of deepening relationships of care for artistic processes and those caught in conflict, over the medium to long term. Second, it reflects on methodological issues which are raised by the data and also on the practice-led approaches to peace building and intercultural dialogue through arts and cultural work. Third, it considers the aspect of leadership and organisation for ICD; fourth, it considers *Freedom of Expression*; and fifth, it offers reflection on Thinking with Ancient Practices and ICD in Arts and Cultural Work before drawing conclusions. Throughout it offers tangible examples from around the world and clearly articulate the characteristics present which are important and of note for the work of ICD and sustainable peace.

4.4.1 Measuring intercultural dialogue: processes of fostership in arts and culture

Peace work is both process and practice. In this respect it parallels the work of artistic and cultural work. Both sticking with the process of peace and with the practice of making something new to speak into a context of ICD is fostership. Fostership refers to the day to day work of nurture and the opening up of often entirely new vistas. To think peace, we need to be imaginative and consequential in a certain pursuit of freedom, and liberation. To encounter and sustain living with difference, peculiarity, change and transformation such as is required for intercultural dialogue to foster peacefulness, we need structural and enabling supports, or the structural and supporting the UNESCO Framework domains mentioned in this report. These domains can only flourish and combine to enable ICD if member states, institutions, communities

¹⁵ I am indebted to the work of Gameli Tordzro and Naa Densua Tordzro for their introduction to and research the patterns and symbols of West Africa and especially for this insight and the image of the Kente Cloth.

and leaders offer them hospitality and foster their practice through a variety of processes and pathways, as mentioned in this report. To do so requires inventiveness and creativity; in short, it is the work for arts and culture, as process and practice as well as product.

It's easy to understand the pathways that produce the domains of the enabling environment for ICD in terms of political negotiation, local governance, education and media, but the arts and culture are often overlooked in the discourse surrounding peacebuilding and conflict transformation. Over the last decade, however, there has been renewed scholarly attention paid to the role of arts and culture in peacebuilding and with those suffering in situations of post or protracted conflict (J. P. Lederach, 2005). In particular, there has been a focus on the ways in which indigenous peoples work to make peace using cultural forms of speech and language, artefacts and living cultural traditions.

The indicators and correlations presented in this report demonstrate a clear consistency between the nine enabling domains and the systemic qualities at play in ICD. In countries with high income all domains show strength. The point of interest for this *Think Piece* comes where the domains do not correlate: the negative correlation of leadership between the intra-correlations of the nine enabling domains – a gap in the normal pattern and assumptions which needs interpretation. The two areas where this is apparent relate to *Leadership and Organisation* and *Freedom of Expression*. In the domains of arts and culture enabling structures are often overlooked or even absent but artists still come into leadership positions, organise and take up their cultural rights, regardless of the presence of the enabling domains. Here again we see parallels between the fostering of the arts and the fostering of ICD where leaderships, organisation and freedom of expression are concerned.

The data for the outliers suggests a non-linear approach to ICD is potentially desirable and effective, within a whole, dynamic systems approach and in line with literature in ICD and communication theory. As outliers *Leadership and Organisation* and *Freedom of Expression* are themselves not dependent on the non-adverse economic contexts that other domains can correlate. In other words, the different constituent elements identified as making up ICD are entangled, made of different threads and fibres, using different patterns and when used in tandem within a strong, sustained structural framework, ensure that ICD fosters peace. This means that certain contexts, even where economic environmental factors may be weak, are able to sustain strong ICD, if leadership, organisation, and freedom of expression permit. In other words, non-linear approaches to leadership, organisation and freedom of expression in ICD may even be desirable in adverse

economic circumstances as the data suggests that these domains can have strong, potentially overriding influence even when economic environmental factors are weak.

Whilst this underscores the vital importance of SDG 16 (*Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions*), and in particular whole of system approaches to implementing SDG 16 at macro, meso and micro levels of human encounter and intercultural dialogue, it raises questions relating to *Leadership and Organisation* and *Freedom of Expression*, the two domains with strength where economic conditions are not favourable. What is it about good leadership and organisation in arts and culture through ICD that can change structural and systemic conditions in such a way as to strengthen conditions for peace? How might this be sustained beyond a single individual, artist or cultural worker? What is it about freedom of expression as a liberatory cultural, imaginative and political practice and process, that fosters ICD such that its contribution to peacefulness and conflict reduction is measurable and correlates world-wide, even where material and economic scarcity may be considerable?

In arts and cultural work leadership, organisation and freedom of expression are critical dimensions of daily, routine practice, and in the process of creation. These can be generated by a single individual leading innovations in technique or form, or can be fostered through a company or school's discipline, vision and distinctive mode of working. It has long been the case that aesthetic work has been seen in the Western Academy and popular consciousness in the west as the product on display or for purchase: the film in the cinema; the artwork in the gallery; the play on stage. What scholars focusing on cultural work have identified in recent years, however, is the fundamental importance of practice and process, of work in progress, as part of the flow of cultural work. (Mignolo, 2021; Thompson, 2009). That these domains buck the trend and expectations is perhaps not surprising. The mode in which this occurs also relates to methodological considerations in arts and cultural work. Artistic freedom may operate to frustrate or block ICD and may also infringe the rights of other despite its freedoms. It is itself a field often in flux and easily adopted by powerful agencies which do not have ICD as an aim. What is distinctive in arts and cultural work which operates successfully to foster – as practice and ongoing process – the work of ICD, and the imagination of ICD – is attention to how this is undertaken by leaders, organisations and under freedom of expression which respects cultural rights.

4.4.2 Methodological considerations

Artistic, ceremonial and cultural approaches to peace-making are not easily measured and evaluated, they do not

lend themselves to random control trials given the inherent peculiarities and singularity of many of the forms. It is only through careful intercultural dialogue as a constituent part of anthropological and ethically grounded, critical methods that the focus on case studies, exemplars and comparison across the records of participant observation, improvisation and ethnography, begin to reveal the important contribution of the arts and culture to peace building.

As the scholar Achille Mbembe has pointed out, it is especially difficult for the scholarly systems of measurement in the West, which have been predicated upon transactional and extractivist thinking in the formative times of scholarship during the colonial and imperial eras, to see what they are not trained to see.

We should first remind ourselves that, as a general rule, the experience of the Other, or the problem of the "I" of others and of human beings we perceive as foreign to us, has almost always posed virtually insurmountable difficulties to the Western philosophical and political tradition. (Mbembé, 2000)

Just as weaving the Kente cloth described earlier in this piece takes time and practice, understanding the pathways to and domains behind ICD takes thought and research. This means isolating discrete strands, methodologically, and then understanding their interrelationship and interdisciplinary through comparison of exemplars not measurements. These discrete strands are those with which analysts and researchers, leaders and elders, peace and cultural workers separate out the issues and factors according to different needs, untangling the often-knotty problems and then weaving the strands into new, useful, maybe even beautiful patterns. Just like weavers will privilege certain colours, ICD actors will privilege certain domains, taking extra care of weaker areas.

That said, there is clearly a case for interdisciplinary scholarship, such as that currently underway in, for instance, MIDEQ (Migration for Development and Equality) with a large, internationally significant household survey which is, for the first time, including questions which will elicit data on intercultural dialogue in migration in the global south. By enumerating the answers to questions on the movements of and choice of cultural artefacts by migrations in the global south, there is new potential for seeing how chosen artefacts of tangible heritage and the accompanying living culture operate statistically and at scale for the first time.

When such data is offered for interpretation and qualitative analysis, the pathways taken by arts and culture in the work for peace and ICD can be better understood across a number of domains, including the structural and supporting domains in question here. What is difficult,

however, is that questions pertaining to arts and culture have not traditionally been included in large statistical surveys of global standing and proportions. To include such questions means also changing the baselines for variabilities and statistical comparators and it requires consistent inclusion of appropriate survey questions regarding arts and culture to be formulated, resourced and enumerated for such data to begin to have traction in the way statistical work can. Even then, the reductions as applied to the variations of arts and culture may exceed what statistical methods can produce.

ICD in relation to peacefulness and through the pathway of arts and culture operates across different repertoires and idioms, from proverbs passed down to global surveys and measures which may be normative, using the traditional methodologies or they may be innovative and demonstrate approaches not tested before in certain domains. When expressed numerically there is an instant *lingua franca* of mathematics for those initiated, when expressed poetically or artistically the figures shimmer and change and offer ways into the structures and supporting domains which need interpreters, and dialogue themselves to be understood.

There is no one, single approach but rather an often beautiful, discomfiting symbiotic dance sustained and enabled by and importantly as intercultural dialogue in myriad forms. It is clear, however, from both the methodological considerations and the development of artistic and cultural work that how the work is lead and organised is of critical importance for fostering ICD and tolerance.

4.4.3 Leadership and organisation for ICD

In leadership and organisational studies, scholars have identified the need for holistic models, horizontal structures and a dynamic systems approach to producing the kinds of conditions which will enable organisations to flourish in the Twenty First Century (Laloux, 2014). This organisational literature in leadership accords with work in intercultural dialogue focusing on diversity of communication styles and linguistic repertoires as vital for a whole culture approach to ICD (Guilherme, Glaser, & Mendez-Garcia, 2010).

For intercultural dialogue to be effective, the ways in which it is organised and the ability of leaders to communicate interculturally has been of interest to scholars. As globalisation has advanced as a phenomenon, reaching deep into the lives of people around the world, the need to enable understanding and dialogue across languages and cultures, especially in leaders, has been especially significant. For many global concerns, however, the effects of globalisation have not been addressed interculturally but through the production of

standardisation of branding or service. These monocultural solutions to intercultural challenges are insufficient to the task of peace building and tolerance in particular, and can only operate functionally, or for transaction, but not for understanding or the construction of the defences of peace. For this reason, the outliers in the data on leadership and organisation for ICD are especially interesting as these address what is imaginative, quirky and non-standard in ICD.

In the context of SDG 16 leadership for and of strong institutions for peace can make the difference at each level of society, for good and ill. It is a much more capricious indicator, according to the data presented, than other measures showing that an individual leader can make a very significant difference both in terms of peace and in terms of conflict. Why is it that one theatre might be flourishing and distinctive, communicating different messages which attract attention, whilst others are performing repertoires which are familiar and do not introduce new ideas or ways of approach subjects? What is it that produces an exceptional response to threat or

danger from which the conditions for peace and intercultural dialogue can be fostered and organised in the long term? Or why might leaders retreat from ICD, preferring to adopt monocultural, monolingual retrenchments in face of danger? Why might those in leadership roles, or responsible for organising, close avenues for others to form more adversarial communication into dialogic modes? In other words, who is served by the presence of conflict and perpetuation of adversarial positions? In answering these questions, we can discern certain important patterns in leadership for ICD in arts and cultural work from exemplars. Discernible characteristics of leadership and organisation for ICD are introduced below.

What institutions built around such individual leaders can do is begin to discern what are the enabling structures in terms of supporting domains: *Inclusion and Representation, Leadership and Organisation, Linkages and Coherency, and Skills and Values*. Including those who are most often marginalized, ensuring their representation, enabling others to lead with scaffolding, support and

BOX 4.4.1

Ten characteristics of leadership and organisation for ICD

1. Leaders are imaginative, artistic pioneers.
2. Leaders are courageous, risk takers and innovators, experimenting and improvising in many diverse circumstances. They are open and often also stubborn.
3. Leaders understand and sustain the creation of a different presence within societies to that of mainstream, normative 'entertainment' or cultural work.
4. Leaders build communities of artists around them who learn within their spaces which are safe enough to produce bravery – courage to improvise, to create, to show and perform work. And to become leaders, often along collaborative lines themselves.
5. Leaders encourage critique and dissent. Paradoxically, they may be confident to the point of arrogance in their approach and craft, but they hold within this the humility of being open to correction and recognition of different opinions. This is a difficult balance, but it is critical to the sustaining arts and cultural work for peace.
6. Leaders' contributions are often not recognised until late in life, or until there is particular danger, and they may be dismissed both by the academy and by cultural institutions.
7. Leaders regularly pioneer and produce their own spaces, raising resource to have the freedom to create and follow their emergent understanding and protect their artistic communities rather than overly compromising with the need for stifling reproduction.
8. Conflict transformation is practiced at all levels of the cultural organizations. Such leaders do not create easy lives for their artists and may often be difficult to follow or understand or satisfy. There may well be moments of frustration and failure and it is how leaders lead through these into conflict transformation and an ease with bravery that is critical to whether this can serve intercultural dialogue and openness or whether it becomes autocratic and domineering in style.
9. Leaders practice hospitality but this is not uncritical and 'come all ye' but rather discerns who will bring difference such as can work within the precious ethos of a troupe, company, ensemble, arts space.
10. Such leaders often foster love and loyalty and stories and legends may grow around them, together with signature moves, artefacts, cultural objects, phrases, speech.

coworking also accords with the principles laid down by Freire (Freire, 1998). Below, two examples seek to make tangible the abstract concepts of *Leadership and Organisation*:

BOX 4.4.2

Naturtheater Hayingen

Founded after the Second World War in a tiny village in Upper Swabia, southern Germany, as an open-air community theatre, Hayingen's annual summer productions are now both ritual and institution. People travel from across the region to attend and audiences are packed, with up to 2,000 at a time watching the dialect performances of politically inspired theatre. At the heart of the foundation of the open-air theatre was a family of playwrights and actors, Martin Schleker senior and Martin Schleker junior. The latter came to be known affectionately as 'Brecht' of the Alb, of the region, for his very different brand of theatre, that looked at issues of justice and peace through the medium of dialect theatre and song performed by villagers from a range of families which have come together into the institution. Many other villages and small towns across south-west Germany have theatres themselves performing dialect theatre and musicals from the mainstream of theatrical repertoires in the western entertainment canon: *My Fair Lady*, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, *The Three Musketeers* etc. Each has leadership which follows the standard templates for theatre management in a charitable context and a vivid community of interest gathers annually around the creation of these performances. The theatres have their differences, but do not stand out in the way that the Hayingen theatre has done, with the performances and creativity creating hallmark styles and innovations, under the direction first of Martin Schleker senior, then junior and then the community of players formed under his leadership and training. The performances, in breaking with the mainstream offered something very different and yet popular as their own form of intercultural dialogue. A way of seeing the world that was different and needed time, discussion, both comedy and tragedy, were offered for enjoyment. And audiences continue to visit in great numbers as the leadership is now shared into the third and fourth generations.

BOX 4.4.3

The Noyam Institute for African Dance

In Ghana the Noyam Institute for African Dance, was founded by the late Prof Nii Yartey to offer young people in a township an opportunity to develop the skills of dance to a high level and grow as artists. To do this he did not, however, stay within the mould of traditional African dance, but rather set out with an intercultural vision and a way of developing dance from everyday actions which build a home and sustain an environment.

"'Noyam' means, Development or Moving-on, in the *Ga-Dangbe* language of Ghana. The Institute's main focus is the training of dancers and the continuing development of Traditional and Contemporary African dance in Ghana. Our educational approach is based on the philosophy that dance as a social phenomenon should not be limited only to its artistic and cultural offerings but also must be embraced for its ability to engender change and cut across cultural and other barriers." (Noyam African Dance Institute: <https://noyam.weebly.com/about.html>)

The Noyam Dance style stands out and is the subject of research into cultural change, dance and performance. It has worked as a communication and story-telling medium internationally, with productions to UN designations at conferences and on international platforms. Connecting with work on the African Continent and with other innovative youth theatre leaders, including the late Stephen Chifunyiso, former Culture Minister and UNESCO delegate for Zimbabwe, it has been an important dimension to ICD in African performance. Stephen Chifunyiso was the founder of a sister theatre for young people, CHIPAWO, now under the leadership of Chipso Basopo, the first woman to take up the leadership and development.

Unlike the mainstream theatres, and those funded to offer work within the National Theatre of Ghana where the repertoire is focused, as in the German example above, on what can attract steady audiences of fee-paying strangers, according to norms and business management, these theatres are shaped in the image of the leaders' distinctive vision, especially linked to intercultural dialogue

through dance and theatre, and to peacebuilding.

The UNESCO Chair for Refugee Integration through Languages and Arts conducted an experiment with both Noyam and Chipawo to see if intercultural dialogue was sustainable, by working in all of the mother languages of an international dance-piece, rather than adopting English as a Lingua Franca. The results are shown in these [documentaries](#) (Tordzro, 2017) and [productions](#). The experiment demonstrated that if leadership from within a dance organisation is already distinctive and ground-breaking, it might be transferred to young people through workshops and activities which sustain their love of dance, and also enable them to become leaders themselves over time. Dialogue through languages and through dance, through sharing and taking time to enable leaders to emerge amongst young people meant that the kinds of results seen for the role intercultural dialogue can play in peace building and conflict transformation could be embedded and made sustainable, with new leaders. (A. S. Phipps, Tawona; Tordzro, Gameli; Tordzro, Naa Densua, 2020)

When a new cultural direction is taken in the arts both these, and other examples, demonstrate that they need strong, bold and innovative leaders, who are steeped in their art, such that they can also critique it in act through new approaches.

The untimely deaths of both these cultural leaders also highlights that for such innovations to live beyond the leaders' own lifetime or resourcing governance structures, administrative acumen, international networks and new leaders, formed within the learning environment of the cultural work itself, is required. Leadership often needs to be sustained indigenously, from within the ecological and cultural context, for it to set the new direction and then meet in intercultural dialogue. Otherwise, the work becomes a one off, or a festival or a single performance, rather than allow a new institution to take shape and be strengthened. To this end the leadership capacity is also critical to consideration of the role of ICD and cultural pathways in SDG16. What the example of Hayingen shows is that when institutional structures and new leadership can grow organically, and allow for the repetition of cycles of performance, leadership can be sustained for ICD over 70 years, without ossifying.

It is clear that as new leaders who are skilled in intercultural dialogue emerge in their communities, it is important that they are sustained and encouraged to rehearse and repeat rather than always expecting further innovation. This runs contrary to much of the funding and resource opportunities available to cultural institutions, which continually prioritise the "new". What can produce steadiness in innovative leadership is the opportunity for that emergent leadership to solidify and grow in confidence. Where there is an ever-present fear for the very survival of nascent work, it is important to support institutions as they form new appropriate structures and not to impose template governance or accountability structures. In short, what serves a monocultural mainstream will not serve ICD leadership formation or nascent innovations in institutionalisation, in arts and cultural work.

Such leadership can take communities in new directions, can be agile and nimble, later reporting that governance and institutions cannot do this easily or quickly. Such leadership and organisation is also critically connected to freedom of expression, upon which arts and cultural work both rely for their audience and resonance, but also may need to respond to inventively where censorship is imposed in varying degrees. We now turn to the question of *Freedom of Expression* in measuring ICD.

4.4.4 Freedom of expression

Artistic and cultural freedom, within human rights norms, is a further area where the correlations in the data are inconclusive or do not provide strong correlations between the presence of freedom of expression and the production of ICD. This again is interesting for ICD and for peace building as it suggests *Freedom of Expression* can both influence ICD negatively and positively. It is also worth further examination as *Freedom of Expression* in contexts which are economically favourable or adverse does not bring strong correlations to ICD. As with the domain of *Leadership and Organisation* this is an interesting outlier and a focus on this outlier allows us to consider what might be done across all contexts to ensure *Freedom of Expression* fosters ICD and initiatives which might sustain and strengthen peace, not promote violence or conflict. In high income, favourable conditions or in low income, unfavourable conditions, *Freedom of Expression* may or may not produce ICD. The whole system cannot be seen as a determining factor for freedom of expression.

Again, we might consider the literary and cultural record on *Freedom of Expression* and work of many organisations including International PEN, who document and advocate for those whose freedom of expression is curtailed, world-wide, but who are compelled – through political conviction, ideological persuasion, religious belief or artistic drive – to pursue *Freedom of Expression* despite

dangers. This may pertain to cultural organisations, or it may pertain to individuals.

Here too, we can discern certain important patterns where *Freedom of Expression* sustains ICD in arts and cultural work from exemplars. There are parallels here with the ten characteristics discerned for leadership and organisation.

BOX 4.4.4

Ten characteristics of freedom of expression for ICD

1. Expression is outward looking and may be international in orientation
2. Expression uses many artistic devices to attract attention
3. Expression produces a multiplicity of often divergent responses
4. Expression may attract conflict and be tested, often harshly
5. Expression may be subject to violent or administrative repression
6. Those seeking freedom to express may be marginalized or excluded and may need to 'turn up the volume' of their work to be heard or use devices which draw attention to their silencing.
7. Where freedom of artistic expression is curtailed its value for ICD in human rights may be increased through inter-artistic dialogue, through connection and sharing and through visual manifestations in new forms e.g. the growth of Pride marches when freedom of expression was curtailed for Gay rights, led to the use of costume and carnival as ways of expressing what this domain of human right meant in ways which did not rely on speech but made use of theatricality.
8. Expression may use tragedy or comedy to gain attention, seeking certain human affective responses.
9. Expression may use traditional cultural forms in new or incongruent ways.
10. Expression may draw attention to silencing devices in society by using 'silent' arts which can be seen or by availing themselves of intercultural connections which might speak for/on behalf of – with permission and understanding.

What these dimensions to arts and cultural pathways in ICD demonstrate is that there is an awareness of pressure, need or threat that prompts new forms of expression, where expression is curtailed. Where expression is not curtailed other means exist for producing the kinds of pressure which produce artistic and cultural work – the discipline of rehearsal, technique and critical revision, as well as the opportunity to perform or exhibit work, even in competition, for example – which may be denied in spaces where expression is curtailed, but which nonetheless produce a certain energy which can result in ICD, not least in dialogue in the public square about the work. Two additional examples considering leadership and organisation in cultural work in contexts of the curtailment of *Freedom of Expression* illustrate this concept further.

BOX 4.4.5

Chauka, Please Tell Us the Time: Behrouz Boochani (2017)

Arguably the most important global leadership of the Twenty First century has been shown by an artist and cultural worker in the field of refugee rights, Behrouz Boochani, an Iranian writer and journalist. Boochani was imprisoned on Manus Island under the Australian policy of detention of those seeking asylum arriving in Australia by boat. A thought leader and artistic innovator, Boochani sent illicit text messages documenting life in the camp to the translator Omid Torfighian during his time in detention on Manus Island, before being granted asylum by Aotearoa New Zealand. Published under the title *No Friend But the Mountains: Writing from Manus Prison*, the work is a highly acclaimed literary genre in and of itself, blending highly astute intellectual and critical observations about life in the prison, alongside often lyrical elegiac passages of poetic prose. In addition, Boochani recorded and co-directed a documentary, with Arash Kamali Sarvestani, also using illicit camera work from a phone, of life in the Manus Island prison, finding ways of blending the visuals with the agony of waiting, violence and boredom, alongside care and conflict. *Chauka, Please Tell us the Time* is structured around the Manusian bird, Chauka, a symbol of freedom and beauty to the Manusians, but it is also the name of the solitary confinement cells where torture occurred in the detention camp and the double meaning of the bird's name is held in exquisite tension throughout the film.

Boochani continues to work through translators and the medium of film and poetry to consider and to advocate for the rights and dignity of those seeking asylum and to expose the violence. His work falls outside the mainstream of genres of advocacy used by International Non-Governmental and Intergovernmental Organisations.

The acclaim and literary sensation accompanying Boochani's book *No Friend but the Mountains*, (2018) and his many public speaking engagements are examples of both thought-leadership and freedom of expression wrought under extreme circumstances. From his escape as a journalist threatened for his work to the use of his intellect and training, Boochani has changed the nature of intercultural dialogue in the public space, and with advocacy and governmental organisations, adding greatly to the pressure to close outsourced detention centres worldwide. It is notable that it is when the literary and documentary film was given freedom of expression through publication and film distribution that intercultural dialogue could centre on Manus Island and change direction.

BOX 4.4.6

ArtLords of Afghanistan

The ArtLords of Afghanistan began their work of painting public murals as a grassroots movement of freedom of expression in 2014. Their aim was to “transform the aggressive face of Kabul, spoiled by blast walls, into a pleasant visual experience”. As a group of volunteers, they worked with the ‘soft power’ of art to turn Kabul, Afghanistan into the street art capital of the world. By joining with ordinary people over the years to paint issues which affect the lives of ordinary Afghans, issues of love, education, loss and expressiveness, the ArtLords promoted messages of peace in both Afghanistan and across the world. They were commissioned to produce a mural for the UN in 2021. The Painting – “The Unseen Afghanistan” is the first gift presented by Afghanistan to the United Nations since 1963 and is the only one on display.

The ArtLords see public art and its co-creation opening up dialogue, including ICD, around issues such as corruption, violence, loss, and representation. For example, this image was painted by the ArtLords team and passers-by as a tribute to the 90 female students killed in a bomb blast in their school in Kabul. It says: “I see you and I will not forget”.



The work under the leadership of ArtLords director Omaid Sharifi is both an example of leadership for ICD but also one which sits on the knife-edge of *Freedom of Expression*. Using art for ICD intentionally, and with leadership focused on transformation change for peace, ArtLords succeeded in enabling an environment in Kabul where, despite dangers, *Freedom of Expression* was possible for many artists and ordinary citizens together. The Fall of Kabul to the Taliban in August 2021 saw the ArtLords painting murals as the city fell. The work of the ArtLords is now continuing from exile, with a focus on ensuring *Freedom of Expression* in refugee camps, and on the trauma healing potential of *Freedom of Expression*.

“But some space like ArtLords was a blessing for the city. It provided that shelter from hatred, anger and rumours, it provided the place to heal, relax and take a moment for yourself and enjoy. Despite all of this, we loved our work. We never-ever dreamed of giving up. We had consciously decided to do this work. We knew that we have to do our part. It was our country and our responsibility. We felt the pain and suffering our people and we aimed to help where we can with our art gallery, art therapy sessions, music concerts and our joint public murals. But with Taliban in control in Kabul, they have taken away my freedom of expression. They are taking away my voice.

I can go through anything, but I will not surrender my voice.” Omaid Sharifi September 1st 2021



[<https://twitter.com/OmaidSharifi/status/1426412215658291201?s=20>]

On September 3rd 2021 the new regime began painting over the murals produced by the ArtLords in Afghanistan. This offers a stark example of the ways in which Freedom of Expression producing ICD is contested and other forms of expression which seek to lead away from *Freedom of Expression* through violent means will also produce the converse.

It is clear from the preceding four examples and the consideration of the characteristics, that the ways in which arts and cultural work articulate ICD for sustainable peace pre-dates industrialisation, automation and the generation of numerical data. Art and cultural practices are as ancient as humanity itself, and still evade numerical conceptualisation and quantification.

Arts and cultural work have powerful and often emotive resonance, connecting strongly to ancient and indigenous practices which hold lessons for contextualising ICD in the current day. It is to these that I now turn.

4.4.5 Thinking with ancient practices and ICD in arts and cultural work

In contexts which do not possess the resources to conduct large-scale quantitative surveys or programmes of dialogic and economic measures, communities rely on forms of knowledge and dialogic practices which belong within the domains of intangible cultural heritage and living culture. In such contexts ICD is accompanied by understanding not as a three-letter acronym but as practices, which are, as

this report states, ancient human practices, which are practiced universally.

1. Hospitality – the giving and receiving of shelter, food, drink, entertainment, a safe place for a while; this requires protocols and leadership in households, communities, institutions and states. Those practicing hospitality well, communicating safety and conviviality with confidence and resonance are those leaders and institutions where ICD flourishes.

2. Fostership – the enabling of a more permanent stay amongst people who are not of your kith and kin but may be strangers, dialogue in ways which are strange, even opaque, possibly frightening or seemingly hostile but which can, piece by piece, strand by strand, become part of a new way of going on and living life, amongst people who live differently. Those who ensure legacy and accountability in the way in which hospitality becomes a whole societal praxis, malleable to the breaking of some fibres, or relationships but with a strong enough twist in the threads for the vessel to be sustained.

The first is the focus on what, in ICD, occurs in the times of intercultural encounter and mitigates culture shock, xenophobia; creates enabling environments for what is hard to encounter, difficult to digest or painful to hear to be encountered in peace, digested slowly and heard amongst witnesses.

The work of such adaptation over the short term focuses in the literature on what happens in new encounters between people who do not speak the same language. It focuses on health care interactions (Lu & Corbett, 2012; T. Piacentini, 2014; T. O. D. Piacentini, Catherine; Phipps, Alison’ Jackson, Ima; Stack, Niamh 2019) education (Arizpe, Bagelman, Devlin, Farrell, & McAdam, 2014; Byram, 2008; Ladegaard & Cheng, 2014) language learning in international and humanitarian settings (Footitt, 2017) and ICD in the workplace (Guilherme et al., 2010).

The second is what occurs when time is taken to ensure living heritage is sustained and passed on despite conflict or political threat; when a cultural institution is developed to house artefacts, when mother languages are taught in schools, when leaders are able to enact visions for peace, and are not threatened by freedom of cultural expression.


3. Weaving

Finally, the ‘warp’ and the ‘weft’ – the vertical and horizontal threads in weaving - are ways many cultures conceptualise the structural and supporting domains which have been found to enable measures of intercultural dialogue for peace.

In culture, arts and indigenous philosophies the use of indirect metaphorical language is sustaining and unremarkable of work for peace. In the domains of international non-governmental organisations and framework documents for upscaling good practice in ICD measures are required for comparability and accuracy. There is a tension present throughout evaluative interdisciplinary discussions of arts and culture, which often sets statistical measures as a gold standard, rather than as a way of weaving a dialogue.

Lederach & Lederach (J. P. L. Lederach, Angela Jill, 2010) have shown the extent to which peacebuilding practices and ICD, together with work for conflict transformation depend on the arts and culture, but also tends to produce circular forms as structures which contain the difficult work, work which needs to hold tension, much as weaving practices do to produce cloth or basketry. Their conclusions also point to ancient, shared practices of hospitality and fostership within ICD settings: “As a family we have hosted and been hosted by people from all those locations, sat together around tables, listened to people, shared experiences, felt the trauma and seen resilient hope.” (J. P. L. Lederach, Angela Jill, 2010) (p.2). This element of sharing in, passing round, holding taught, finding the warp and the weave with the right tension for sustaining dialogue points to the inconclusive role of leadership and organisation, but not of leaders with certain key characteristics and ways of organising. It also points to the importance of settings where tensions can be held such that freedom of expression is possible, healing and safe. These inconclusive dimensions of the quantitative data come together in arts and culture pathways for ICD to suggest also that there may be a strong relationship when *Freedom of Expression*, *Leadership and Organisation* can combine with a sustained focus on ICD and peacebuilding.

Commonly in the past, and practiced still today in some indigenous cultures, a weaver would be present in ceremonies where elders or leaders met to discuss serious matters of concern, peace and conflict in a community. The weaver would be there to hold the sonic space, to listen and to produce a cloth from the tension. In particular, it was common for women to weave textiles or vessels which represented in abstract or design terms what was deliberated in society and where hope was expressed for peace. This is because weaving as a practice, mirrors the report’s working definition of intercultural dialogue. It, too, is a process undertaken to realize **transformative communication** that requires **space or opportunities for engagement**. A new cloth, design or vessel can only be fashioned from a **diverse group of participants committed to values** such as *mutual respect, empathy and a willingness to consider different perspectives*.



The activity of weaving – for clothing, shelter, cooking, storing, gathering – is an activity which supports the day-to-day practices of peace. In cultures world-wide we find tangible signs of woven heritage and intangible cultural practices, such as song and dance, accompanying these peaceful arts, and arts often, though not always, undertaken traditionally by women. ICD in practice across continents, languages and experiences of indigeneity, oppression and exile, can be illustrated by the example of the women’s Arpilleras group in Wellington, Aotearoa New Zealand. This is an indicative example of many other such women’s artistic collections connecting ancient practices, with both *Leadership and Organisation* and *Freedom of Expression* in contexts of curtailment of cultural rights.

BOX 4.4.7

Arpilleras Wellington

Originating in Chile, Arpilleras are appliquéd hessian or jute sack cloth, often used for potato storage, which were used by women to sew designs from rural, peaceful and domestic life in Isla Negra. (Kindon, 2021). Over time the craft spread to urban areas, including Santiago under the violence of the Pinochet dictatorship. It was during this period of the 1970s that women began to use Arpilleras to document what they were witnessing, the rural idyll gave way to violent scenes and the craft became a means of *Freedom of Expression*, including state brutality, popular protest, and a way of providing women with a means of grieving the ‘disappeared.’ As Kindon et al 2021 note, women’s activities often go unnoticed, and the practice did not come to wider attention until church groups began to smuggle out examples of the political protest sewn into the Arpilleras. Women became Arpilleraists and church organisations began supplying materials to support the freedom of

expression of the women. As a practice at this time the work was not focused on ICD, but the work has gained international audiences over the last four decades, inspiring the use of the craft of Arpillera making for collectives of women in different settings world-wide.

One such example is the Wellington Arpilleras Collective in Aotearoa New Zealand. This group was founded out of an initiative to bring 24 historic Arpilleras, through curator Roberta Bacic, to the church of St Andrew's at The Terrace, Wellington, to be exhibited. This was the first exhibition of Arpilleras in New Zealand in 2013. Academics at Victoria University, Wellington researched the effects of bringing the Arpilleras to the city, and on those involved, not least the creation of a group of residents, including those in the Latin American community, many of refugee-background, in Wellington.



"I had my home here, but I think the arpilleras ... made me feel ... there is a space here for my history, now a space we carved together."



A group of Wellington based Arpilleras was created that held its own exhibition of their work. The often fraught experiences and personal stories involved in creating such

expressions which could join the historic Arpilleras as a continuing thread of resistance, and memory connecting women around the world, from Northern Ireland, to Chile, to Tibet and Wellington in a collective, crafted *Freedom of Expression*. This again presents an asynchronous, non-linear example of *Freedom of Expression* being enabled interculturally by enabling institutions wishing to foster intercultural dialogue for peace, but also individual leaders and curators, or academics prepared to support such endeavours as part of working with arts and culture for ICD.

4.4.6 Conclusions

The non-linear relationship between the domains within a whole systems approach to measuring intercultural dialogue for sustainable peace stand out and are particularly interesting and worthy of extended thought for arts and culture.

Freedom of Expression and Leadership and Organisation have a bearing on forms of governance worldwide, not least democracy, as well as liberalism. That both of these domains do not produce ICD in liberal, favourably resourced, democratic contexts alone indicates that there are vessels for human social and cultural organisation which may foster ICD without being only dependent on democratic values. In a world where the pursuit of democracy and liberalisation sits uneasily with the pursuit of peace and conflict transformation this finding alone may shine a light on how to navigate the limits of democracy and sustain intercultural dialogue for a sustainable peace.

In his work on dialogue Martin Buber, the philosopher, identified an ineffability, called "das Zwischenmenschliche" (Buber, 1986) – or in English – the 'quick of relationships' that could be part of producing sufficient threads in an encounter with which to weave something sustainable. The image is helpful, but not easily quantifiable. It doesn't 'line out' on charts or proceed steadily but it comes in fits and starts, or pulses, confounding the systems which privilege milestones. That *Freedom of Expression and Leadership and Organisation* might be the two areas where the enabling environments and domains show little correlation is illuminated by attention to the arts and cultural pathways.

What is clear is that for ICD to be sustainable within arts and cultural pathways it needs a diversity of forms and each system will be context specific. Where *Leadership and Organisation* is poor but *Freedom of Expression* strong the arts and culture produced to sustain ICD will look very different to the forms produced under a strong, possibly stubborn, maybe charismatic, risk-taking leader with an inclusive outlook, with what may even seem a reckless belief and ability to work with symbols when history requires their presence.

In short, within arts and culture, in order to sustain a multiplicity of forms for engagement within public space, attentiveness to diversity is a prerequisite.

BOX 4.4.8

Principles for arts and cultural pathways in ICD for sustainable peace

1. A diversity of forms of leadership, organisation and expression are required
2. Artistic and Cultural work will require context specific analysis and response
3. Analysis must be iterative and respond to often rapidly shifting contextual situations
4. The presence of a connection to ancient cultural practices of hospitality, fostership and the weaving together of different, often diverse pathways are important markers indicating the presence of ICD for sustainable peace.
5. Attention to the many different ways in which ICD is 'language'd – the indigenous concepts and modes of protocol and expression of leadership and freedom is critical
6. Where leadership is poor or curtailed or interrupted by conflict, collective cultural work of solidarity is a manifestation which promotes peace building and operates through ICD
7. Where freedom of expression is poor or cultural rights are curtailed, collective or individual leadership can index change towards intercultural responsibility and cultural movements.
8. Collective artistic and cultural work is a key factor in enabling ICD. Whilst individual arts may articulate a critical failure of ICD with clarity cultural change is not possible without collective work amplifying and trans-creating the work expressed.

9. Women play a distinctive role as cultural tradition bearers and preservers enabling ICD through imparting knowledge and sharing knowledge of languages and the arts of hospitality and fostership.
10. Creativity in conceptualization and in offering hospitality is often present in work for ICD. It is not directly measurable but is a sign of the processes of ICD being underway.

4.5 The Pathway of Urban Planning and Cityscapes

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Throughout its long semantic career, the concept of dialogue has befuddled more than philosophers, politicians and priests. This vestige of classical Greek philosophy (“dia” meaning ‘across’ and “logos” meaning ‘discourse’ or ‘talk’) has stood the test of time as a tool for arriving at some common view of what we mean as human beings when we reflect upon the idea of “the good life”. Over time it has evolved into a broad field of humanist-inspired research on social dynamics, geopolitics and policy design. But it has also been used as a way of trying to imagine concrete lasting solutions to ongoing conflict and inter-group warfare.¹⁶ The general idea of dialogue—simply put, the exchange of ideas from different points of view—is not unique to Western traditions of thought, but as it becomes increasingly operationalised across borders and domains, its potential as a concept that is good to think with has become increasingly clear.

Enter UNESCO, ostensibly the organisation that has done more for intercultural dialogue than any other organisation on the global stage. Following the horrors of World War II and in the interest of rehabilitating economies, but also healing social wounds, UNESCO set out to develop a series of reconstructive logics that would eventually put intercultural dialogue at the centre of debates in academic and public policy circles on an international scale.¹⁷ While UNESCO and other UN organisations have been criticized for the eurocentrism implicit in their mission and vision, the impact of programmes that set out to promote the principles of intercultural dialogue would be felt far beyond the limits of Europe (Anctil 2014). In the research programme set out in this project, UNESCO (2021) takes on dialogue from

¹⁶ In this report, UNESCO defines intercultural dialogue as: “...a process undertaken to realize transformative communication that requires space or opportunities for engagement and a diverse group of participants committed to values such as mutual respect, empathy and a willingness to consider different perspectives”.

a different angle than has generally been the case in the past, ostensibly asking the question: how do we know if dialogue works?

For decades, the question of evaluating the impact of intercultural dialogue has been a nagging concern for researchers and policymakers, but very little research has been done to develop a systematic approach or framework for the comparative analysis of intercultural dialogue in cities. Phil Wood and Charles Landry (2008), in a groundbreaking monograph on intercultural practice and policy in cities explain how the intercultural paradigm requires cities to go beyond conventional wisdom about “diversity” by focusing on the ways that cities facilitate meaningful interactions between citizens. Indeed, much work needs to be done to determine exactly what we mean by the intercultural cities paradigm and how cities can make sense of what the Council of Europe refers to as the “intercultural lens” (COE 2008). Contributors to a recent volume on intercultural cities have explored how intercultural policy and practice in cities can help us better understand social cohesion (White 2018), especially by examining how policy frameworks are created and implemented. Taking inspiration from the Council of Europe’s Intercultural Cities program, this research sets out to understand how municipal administrations in various parts of the world use the principles of interculturalism as a way of making cities more inclusive. It also shows why cities are uniquely positioned to promote social cohesion through the principles of intercultural dialogue.

4.5.1 Methodological considerations

In response to its commitment to mobilizing knowledge on intercultural dialogue (ICD), the research proposed by UNESCO attempts to help policymakers understand what measures are effective in terms of supporting an environment conducive to ICD, but also to develop measures for understanding the impact of these measures. Going beyond the statement of general ideals or principles, the UNESCO project proposes a data-driven framework that sets out to understand the relationship between ICD and the overarching goals that comprise UNESCO’s global mission: the protection of human rights, the prevention of conflict and reduction of fragility, and the promotion of peace.

One of the strengths of this proposed framework is its grounding in systemic theory.¹⁸ The methodology of the UNESCO study, which looks at different levels of analysis, but also the interactions between levels, sets out to understand what factors enable or inhibit change, often considered a hallmark of systemic theory. The framework proposed in this study reflects several important aspects of systemic thinking. **First**, there is a recognition of the fact

that public institutions (a particular type of social structure) are not likely to change rapidly. Systemic change occurs at different levels, either by surprising large-scale events that destabilize pre-existing patterns of equilibrium (such as the death of George Floyd) or by small incremental changes (for example the implementation of Equity, Diversity and Inclusion programmes) in response to this crisis. **Second**—and this is extremely important for policymakers—proposed modifications to systems can be introduced from multiple points of entry and different points in time, considering available resources, expertise and stated objectives. This principle of systemic thinking means that the sequencing of policies and programmes may be less rigid than previously believed, an observation which comes out clearly in the study conducted by UNESCO.

It is also important to remember that comparative analysis comes with certain challenges, beginning with the question of comparative equivalency. Data from certain national or regional contexts could not be included in this analysis, not only because some countries are not covered in the secondary data sets used, but also because of the conceptual challenges in finding equivalency in the different domains. Thus, the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue developed from the framework is just that, a framework that makes it possible to explore relationships between domains at the largest level of analysis possible. While this summary table may lead to more questions about local context and regional or national specificities, systemic thinking requires us to compare levels of analysis that are functionally equivalent, accepting that *internal variation and local context must be studied using different tools*. In other words, the questions we ask and the tools we use to answer those questions depend on the level of analysis and the object of study (Genest 2017).

4.5.2 Intercultural practice and policy in cities

By focusing on various aspects of intercultural policy at the municipal level (for example how cities create intercultural policy frameworks or how they strike a balance between different pluralist orientations), it is possible to make some initial observations, even though from a comparative perspective these results are somewhat limited.

While research on interculturalism in cities is still relatively new, there have been some interesting developments in recent years, not only in terms of multi-level governance and what is referred to as the “local turn” (Zapata et al 2017), but also in terms of policy design and implementation (White 2018). At least three important ideas have resulted from this research. **First**, it is easier to create a sense of belonging to a city than it is to a country.

¹⁷ In this text I will not take on specifically the question of how to define the “intercultural” in intercultural dialogue (Emongo and White 2014). For the purposes of this analysis, it is probably sufficient to say that “intercultural” refers to contact between people or groups of diverse origins and that this qualifier may or may not refer to the phenomenon of inter-ethnic relations.

¹⁸ Beginning with the early work by Gregory Bateson (1972) and the Palo Alto School in the 1950s, systemic thinking has evolved considerably and has proven to be useful in a wide variety of academic and applied fields, including but not limited to psychology, design, planning, health sciences, philosophy, environmental studies, and more recently intercultural relations.

In the case of cities, the barriers to entry are relatively low and in general belonging is defined by residency. In the case of countries, belonging can be dependent on ancestry, ethnicity and legal status, and thus represents more obstacles. **Second**, while intercultural cities may have certain commonalities with cities that promote the ideals of multiculturalism, they also display certain differences, namely that intercultural cities place greater emphasis on meaningful interactions. **Finally**, municipal inclusion policies must be attentive to three underlying principles of pluralism: 1) recognition of diversity, 2) fight against discrimination and 3) rapprochement through dialogue.¹⁹ This model has been applied as a preliminary framework for policy analysis in community organizations and municipalities throughout Québec and internationally, with promising results for policymakers and for locally based citizens' groups.²⁰

When municipal governments commit to making their city more inclusive, they make decisions based on the existing models at their disposal, taking into consideration the local landscape of intercultural dynamics but also institutional objectives which can sometimes represent competing interests. With the explosion in municipal integration networks in the last ten years (Lacroix 2021), cities have multiple options in terms of how to orient municipal programmes and policy. Participation in these networks is a good example of how supporting domains may contribute to structural change, as discussed in this UNESCO report. Cities that are active in national and international networks leverage influence from this participation both locally and globally, and in many cases this influence has led to changes in regional or national policy frameworks, what may be referred to as “trickle-up” intercultural policy (White 2021):

- The city of Barcelona’s intercultural plan has been a source of inspiration for policy initiatives and programmes at regional level, making Catalonia one of the first intercultural regions to be recognized by the Council of Europe.
- The City of Mexico, which has a particular status in relation to the states that make up the country of Mexico, enacted intercultural legislation which has been picked up by regional and national authorities in the defence of migrants and indigenous communities, but also to reassert mobility as a basic human right.
- Local initiatives promoting intercultural cities in Japan have led to nation-wide programmes targeting the recognition of migrant communities and the provision of services pertaining to education and second language learning, especially use of “plain Japanese”.

Below are some of the most well-known city-based

inclusion networks that compete for the attention and participation of cities:

- Welcoming America: promoting openness to newcomers and settlement services
- Integrating Cities: improving economic and political integration of migrants
- Cities of Migration: making cities more inclusive for immigrants and minorities
- International Coalition of Inclusive and Sustainable Cities: assisting local governments in the fight against racism and discrimination
- Intercultural Cities: promoting social cohesion through the principles of intercultural integration

Some networks focus more on elected officials and others on civil servants or municipal employees. Some are more generalist in nature and others are focused on specific groups or issues. While all the networks listed above are committed to the pluralist principles of recognizing diversity and fighting against discrimination, the same cannot be said with regards to the principle of dialogue. Except for the Intercultural Cities (ICC) programme, these city-based inclusion networks tend to focus primarily on the situation of migrants and refugees, and not on the dynamics between host societies and newcomers. ICC, which is the only city-based network to focus specifically on intercultural principles and practice, looks at cities as places where diversity is an intrinsic part of communities and as units of government that must focus on how to create the conditions for meaningful, positive interactions between communities. In this sense, the ICC network is a good example of how to nurture a culture of dialogue in cities and neighbourhoods.

This image of the city as the local face of government (what is referred to in French as “la gouvernance de proximité”, Leblanc 2019) is significant in terms of how local communities perceive their relationship to the state, but also with regards to how they think about and manage their relationships to each other. Obviously, cities are not only public institutions that provide services, but they also play a significant role as employers. Thus, cities and city-based networks are increasingly investing in the development of training programs aimed at improving intercultural competencies. In some cases, these approaches are drawing from relatively well-established models based on equity, diversity and inclusion (EDI), but increasingly cities are attempting to integrate critical approaches to training, such as anti-racism and de-colonialism.

¹⁹ This model is very similar to the “policy triangle” proposed by the Council of Europe which refers to diversity, equality and interactions: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/about>.

²⁰ For a detailed explanation of this methodology, see the 2019 UNESCO report in collaboration with the International Coalition of Inclusive and Sustainable Cities and the International Observatory of Mayors on Living Together: *City Policies on Living Together*.

With regards to this UNESCO study, which is focused on how to evaluate the impact of a culture of dialogue on local policy, two aspects stand out in particular. First it is striking how little attention has been paid to the question of local governance and how cities play a role in promoting intercultural dialogue and social cohesion. Second, and of even greater relevance for our purposes here, is the fact that research in the social sciences is behind in terms of defining ICD or evaluating its impact in terms of local governance. In the following section I will discuss some of the specific findings from the UNESCO study in order to explore its potential for contributing to intercultural policy and practice in cities.

4.5.3 Discussion of preliminary findings

Given that the UNESCO study presents a new methodology, and especially since it sets out to compare different contexts using domains that are both systemic and transversal, it is somewhat difficult to compare the findings of the study with the academic literature on ICD in cities. This can be considered a weakness since the UNESCO study does not engage directly with debates in the academic literature. But we can also consider this as a strength, as the methodology proposed by UNESCO would seem to be the first to provide concrete analysis of ICD from a policy perspective.

To begin with, UNESCO argues rather convincingly that we may need to question the commonly held assumption that structural domains precede or take precedence over supporting domains, an idea that is very common in the existing literature on the subject. Structural and supporting domains are interrelated, but the exact nature of this relationship is not pre-determined. The UNESCO study also suggests that certain domains are more likely to have an impact on the promotion of ICD than others, an observation that may have influence significantly the way that we evaluate public policy in cities. While public policy is often designed without reliable data and public resources are allocated on this basis, the framework proposed in this project has the potential to help policymakers make more well-informed decisions about 1) what type of policies to implement and where, 2) how to compare their progress in relation to themselves and to organizations elsewhere, and 3) how to evaluate their progress over time.

The UNESCO study shows that ICD has strong systemic qualities—a striking observation that has rarely been discussed in the voluminous literature on intercultural dialogue and one that merits more attention. This observation is especially significant given that the notion of dialogue is most often associated with inter-personal or inter-group dynamics at the local level. By talking about ICD from a systemic point of view, and not just as a series

of micro-level interactions, the analysis of dialogue can make it possible to see links between the structures and processes that inhibit or enable positive change. The analysis of ICD cannot be reduced to interpersonal communication, but it also cannot ignore the importance of patterns in interactions. The UNESCO study shows that *certain correlations are stronger and presumably more significant than others*. This is an important observation, and if valid it may help local governments decide how and where to invest valuable public resources in their efforts to create the conditions for more inclusive institutions and communities.

The results from the study make it possible to explore these linkages at various levels. To begin with, the analysis of the enabling environment shows strong correlations between the domain of *Governance and Citizenship* and several other domains. The two highest correlations in the framework are both associated with this domain—*Horizontal Equality* (.876) and *Stability and Non-Violence* (.835), a correlation which is perhaps not surprising given what we know about the relationship between inequality and stability. There is also a strong correlation between *Governance and Citizenship* and two other domains: 1) *Skills and Values* (.777), which reflects the recent trend to increase investments in the development of professional and organizational competencies, and 2) *Inclusion and Representation* (.750), an area of increasing interest to municipal administrations who are increasingly under pressure to maintain a municipal work force that is representative of diversity in the local community. It is important to focus on correlations that touch on governance, not only because the correlations associated with this domain are strong, but also because the literature on social cohesion in cities has increasingly been interested with municipal policy and multi-level analysis (White 2021).

The significant correlation between *Horizontal Equality* and *Skills and Values* (.792) would seem to support the idea that the elimination of structural inequality—probably the most often-cited obstacle to social cohesion—is a strong enabler for the development of intercultural values and competencies. Indeed, critiques of ICD often argue that the focus on dialogue obscures larger structural issues, such as economic inequality and systemic racism.²¹ Several important developments have begun to occur in terms of how cities view the relationship between inequality and intercultural competencies.

- First, many cities have begun to go beyond the first level of “cultural competency” or awareness raising that has become commonplace in the North American context.

²¹ In recent research, we have begun to explore the intersections between interculturalism and anti-racism, two well-established fields of research and practice that are often at odds with each other with regards to how to explain and respond to the question of systemic discrimination. For more information on this project, visit this link: <http://labrri.net/dialogues-sur-la-discrimination/>

- Second, there is increasing attention to the importance of developing organizational, and not just individual, competencies.
- Third, municipal organizations are searching for more effective means of evaluating the long-term impact of training programmes.
- Finally, there are interesting developments around internal organizational change. For example, many cities in North America have created full-time permanent positions for experts who can advise the organization on how to promote inclusion in the workplace. In some cases, cities have created committees or task forces to serve as a source of expertise, but also to facilitate the circulation of information among employees and their different services.

It is difficult to imagine how the promotion of ICD can have an impact on structural forms of inequality (horizontal or vertical), such as wealth differentials or access to quality healthcare. There are, however, examples of how local governments and community-based organizations have used the principles of ICD as a way of responding to various forms of structural inequality. In each of the cases discussed below, we can see how the use of what ICC calls “intercultural integration” policy at the municipal level attempts to address structural forms of inequality:

- Recent research from Québec has shown how **municipal leisure programmes** that use an intercultural approach can have a significant impact on the social and economic integration of migrants, especially with regards to employment (Roult et al, 2021). This research is interesting because it goes against conventional wisdom about how full-time employment is necessary for the integration of immigrants and newcomers. In this research, participation in leisure programmes and different types of volunteer work makes it easier to find gainful long-term employment because newcomers can use these experiences for networking and to better understand the codes and norms of their new host society.
- The Intercultural Cities (ICC) programme launched a series of videos and tools to show how the promotion of **entrepreneurship** among migrant communities can contribute to economic development at the local and national levels. Programmes of this type have become very popular in cities, in part because they also facilitate the economic and social integration of migrants, who very often have personal experience with small and medium-sized businesses.

- One of the most interesting developments in urban integration policy has to do with the provision of municipal services. Undocumented migrants and other marginalized groups are not always aware of the availability of basic services. In some cases, they are reluctant to seek services out of fear for being jailed or deported (which explains the emergence of the sanctuary cities movement in the United States). To respond to this situation, many cities have developed **municipal ID cards** which can facilitate access to libraries, hospitals, and public transport. The cities of New Haven, Connecticut and New York City have been leaders in this area.

These findings seem to be consistent with UNESCO’s observation that leadership supportive of ICD can flourish even in sub-optimal economic conditions, perhaps because the values and principles of ICD have been shown to contribute to perceptions about dynamics between communities and about the policy orientations of local governments (for more on this see the recent report by the International Association of Francophone Mayors, reprinted by UNESCO 2019).

4.5.4 Lessons for municipal policy and practice

Recent research in social sciences has shown that municipal governments are playing an increasingly important role in making communities more inclusive. If these observations are true, then the framework and findings presented in this study should be of interest to professionals and policymakers, especially in cities. As local governments attempt to make sense of the rapidly diversifying urban environment, especially with regards to how they view their role in the process, how can these findings support or be supported by local municipal practice?

First and foremost, municipal administrations are inextricably linked to other levels of government, not only in terms of governance and accountability, but also in terms of funding. This relationship to regional and national governments requires cities to invest energy and resources into the justification of policy decisions and orientations. Thus, for local governments that decide to invest in ICD as a means of making cities more inclusive, there is an urgent need to evaluate the efficacy and the impact of these public policy interventions, especially in fields such as ICD which is often associated with indicators that are difficult to measure. City officials that are designing and implementing intercultural policy are deeply concerned with their ability to show why ICD matters and how it can not only improve the lives of everyday citizens, but also public institutions. Unfortunately, they do not have very many tools at their disposal. There have been a number of

initiatives that attempt to address this gap in intercultural policy and practice:

- The ICC Index (the primary tool used by the Council of Europe’s intercultural cities’ program) is a good example of the use of indicators based on intercultural principles. While the Index is based primarily on policy outputs and is not designed to measure the impact of these outputs, a study produced by the Migration Policy Group provides good evidence that cities with intercultural policies create a stronger sense of security and belonging among residents (Migration Policy Group). Cities of Migration has developed an auto-diagnostic tool which enables cities to evaluate the degree to which their cities are inclusive. One possible avenue of future research and policy design is to explore how the UNESCO project can contribute to these attempts to measure impact at the local level, or even how the UNESCO project can work in tandem with these initiatives and strengthen them.
- Cities are increasingly becoming active in terms of producing data about diversity and inclusion. The City of Montreal designed and administered a comprehensive citizen-based survey to collect data about the experience and perceptions of immigrants and visible minorities. This survey involved the participation of several municipal services and a team of experts from universities and surveying firms. The *Écho-Baromètre* project provides detailed information about specific neighbourhoods and sectors, and it also compares data from immigrant and non-immigrant communities. It might be worthwhile to seek institutional linkages or bridges between municipal policy mechanisms such as this one and the model being developed in the context of the UNESCO project.
- Cities are also becoming active in developing tools that make it possible to measure abstract or subjective features of ICD, which may suggest some correlations with the variables identified in the context of the UNESCO project. For example, Québec City developed a series of objective indicators that will make it possible to evaluate the characteristics and quality of cohabitation in the city (*vivre-ensemble*). In Sweden, the City of Botkyrka (with support from the Council of Europe) has been working with independent researchers from Canada to develop a “social trust barometer” that will enable cities to evaluate levels of trust and perceptions of belonging in increasingly diverse ethnic settings.

The notion of dialogue is generally upheld as a utopian ideal in most liberal democracies, but there is very little consensus about how to define it and even less consensus with regards to how to evaluate it or measure its impact. While the idea of measuring ICD may seem counter-

intuitive, if done in a way that responds to the needs of local communities and government, this process could have a significant impact on diversity and inclusion policy in the future. Not only do policymakers and city officials have a limited understanding of ICD, but also academics. Without a clear vision of what ICD entails and why it is important, local actors and institutions are very likely to ask: Why measure dialogue? What are we setting out to measure? To what end? These are all legitimate questions, and the UNESCO project may provide some initial answers.

The UNESCO study does not set out to measure dialogue per se, but more so the environment or domains that facilitate dialogue, presumably because of its potential to have a positive impact on larger structures and processes. From this point of view, what is needed is a “culture of dialogue”, not just at the individual or even the organizational level, but through the support of systems and networks at the societal level. Since public institutions are often charged with the mission of social transformation, local governments have a great deal to gain from investing resources in this area.

- One of the most innovative programmes in municipal integration policy comes out of Spain, where the municipal administration worked with local and international experts to develop a large-scale campaign to fight against the stereotypes and prejudice that contribute to hostility in the public sphere. The *Anti-Rumours Strategy* goes beyond the logic of communications campaigns to build local action networks that are supported by municipal governments and whose primary goal is to train and support the work of anti-rumours agents or multipliers.

4.5.5 Suggestions for future research and policy design

The methodological and conceptual framework set out in the UNESCO project raises important issues that should be taken into consideration when trying to explain the relationship between intercultural dialogue and municipal policy. Below is a series of pointers or tips that decision makers and policymakers may want to keep in mind:

- **Frameworks matter:** Organisations and institutions invest a great deal of energy into developing policy frameworks that enable them to set goals and achieve aspirations. This principle should also apply to ICD, especially given the way that the notion of dialogue is instrumentalized for political or ideological purposes. Organisations need a clear set of criteria for promoting and evaluating dialogue and they need to ensure that this model is understood internally as well as communicated to partners and citizens.

- **Get behind systemic thinking:** Thinking about complex systems requires complex tools. Given their knowledge of local dynamics and infrastructure, cities have the know-how to seek solutions to local problems using the tools and concepts of systemic thinking (multi-level analysis, feedback patterns, modelling etc.). Several findings from this study show that ICD has strong systemic qualities and can have an impact on the structures and processes that facilitate inclusion in increasingly diverse urban environments.
- **Rethink conventional wisdom about change:** The analysis presented in this study supports many of the findings in the literature on municipal integration policy. Not only are cities often at the forefront of innovation in terms of promoting inclusion through dialogue, but they are also aware that urban systems are only as strong as the relationship between their parts. This means that change may come from above or from below and that paying attention to processes as well as structures can have a positive impact on change over time.
- **Support the work of connectors:** ICD asks fundamental questions about how to capture and support the work of mediators, connectors and bridge builders. The preliminary results from this study suggest that supporting the work of connectors (not only individuals, but also organisations and networks) may in fact be a weak link in the promotion of peace and stability. The work of connecting requires resources, expertise and political commitment and cities have been skilled at mobilising in this domain.
- **Understand intercultural dynamics at the local level:** While the comparison of trends at the national and international level can provide insight about problems looming on the horizon, it is important to understand how local histories and dynamics influence outcomes and underlying assumptions. In order to develop policies and programmes that respond to local needs, city governments need to document the situations that characterise intercultural dynamics at the local level and use this information as a regular feature of consultation and policy design.
- **Go beyond dialogue as a moral imperative:** Intercultural dialogue is not just an abstract philosophical concept or a political tool. It is also a worldview and a methodology that has systemic qualities with real implications for the development of policy. To make the most of ICD as a source of social transformation, we need to think about dialogue not just as a talking point, but as a framework or a point of leverage for making societies more just and more inclusive. By creating and promoting a culture of dialogue, local governments can have an impact on the structures and processes that lead to lasting peace and prosperity.

4.6 The Pathway of Political Negotiation

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4.6.1 Introduction

The world is witnessing a reversal of some of the democratic gains that were achieved in the 1990's and 2000's, with an alarming rise authoritarian tendencies and the undermining of the rule of law, both of which are drivers of violent conflict across all continents. The prevalence of transnational violent extremism, for example in the form of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has now spread to North Africa and the Lake Chad Basin, is a persistent threat to the future of global peace and security. The tensions within nation-states have also contributed towards exacerbating xenophobia, sectarian violence and gender-based violence, which undermines regional integration and international cooperation, and has provided some governments with the rationale to impose security measures which threaten democratic consolidation around the world. The need for effective political negotiation processes, which can accommodate cultural differences, is now more urgent than ever.

Examining the insights and perspectives contained within the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue, as developed by UNESCO and IEP, this piece will assess the prospects for integrating intercultural dialogue (ICD) into political negotiation processes, in order to address the prevalence of growing intolerance, discrimination and social polarization. The analysis will contextualise the nexus between the domains of ICD and the elements of political negotiation. To provide an evidentiary basis to assess how ICD can contribute towards enhancing political negotiation, the piece will undertake an assessment of case studies relating to South Africa and Northern Ireland. It will also analyse how the key findings can provide insights to policymakers to enable them to strengthen the enabling environment for intercultural dialogue to enhance political negotiation processes.

The UNESCO-IEP initiative developed a working definition of ICD to mean “a process undertaken to realize transformative communication that requires space or opportunities for engagement and a diverse group of participants committed to values such as mutual respect, empathy and a willingness to consider different perspectives” (UNESCO-IEP, 2020). This piece argues that in order to enrich efforts to pursue political negotiation,

the utility of ICD can contribute towards re-thinking:

- i. the transactional nature of political negotiation processes, and;
- ii. how the low-context and high-context communication approaches to negotiation can be anchored through an intercultural dialogue framework.

The UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue findings will be utilised to illustrate key insights that can enhance efforts to pursue political negotiation. In particular, the analysis will re-think how the transactional nature of political negotiation, which also assumes a universal paradigm of communication approaches, can be challenged and transformed by nurturing and transmitting ICD capacities among the negotiating actors. The analysis will argue that the presumption of a mono-cultural approach to political negotiation undermines the possibility of ICD. Furthermore, it will illustrate that the low-context and high-context communication approaches to political negotiation can be more appropriately understood, and engaged with, by adopting a culturally sensitive frame of reference. Ultimately, these insights can contribute towards rendering political negotiation more effective and in developing and producing more durable peace agreements for stabilize societies. The piece will conclude by outlining some key recommendations for informing policy development and improving negotiation practice.

4.6.2 Contextualising the nexus between intercultural dialogue and political negotiation

Contextualizing political negotiation

Article 33 of Chapter VI of the UN Charter of 1945 states that: “the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement.” Negotiation is defined as a process that seeks to enable two or more parties, with divergent views, to come together and reach an agreement on a contested issue (Cohen, 1991). The key elements of political negotiation include relationship building, issue identification, option deliberation and terms agreement. Mediation, also known as assisted negotiation, is a form of third-party intervention that facilitates a process where two or more disputing parties find a mutually acceptable agreement. In the political context, negotiation and mediation processes strive to pursue an agreement on issues relating to governance, constitutionalism, the rule of law, distribution of resources and the management of power. In this regard, political negotiation is therefore a complex process that involves the use of communication to persuade the other party to reach an agreement on a particular set of interests.

The UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue identifies “a collection of forces that create the potential for intercultural dialogue to work effectively in contributing to positive outcomes such as conflict prevention, promoting peace and the protection of human rights” (UNESCO-IEP, 2020). Furthermore, the Framework results illustrate that there is a strong correlation between the macro-structural domain of Stability and Non-Violence, which is partly achieved through political negotiation, and three supporting domains, notably *Governance and Citizenship* (0.835), *Horizontal Equality* (0.713); and *Social Cohesion* (0.652). This suggests that creating an enabling environment for enhancing ICD capacities to pursue effective political negotiation, which strengthens the *Stability and Non-Violence* domain is likely to have a cascading effect on strengthening other domains. In addition, the Framework results also illustrate that there is a strong correlation between the domain of *Stability and Non-Violence* and the three proxy outcome measures for conflict prevention, human rights protection and peacefulness: Fragile States Index (-0.836); Political Terror (-0.742) and Global Peace Index Internal Peace (-0.919). This indicates that strengthening the enabling environment for ICD, within the context of political negotiation, can lead also to a strengthening of conflict prevention, peacefulness and human rights protection.

The transactional nature of political negotiation

Despite the objective of pursuing an agreement, contemporary political negotiation persists in being primarily transactional and adversarial in nature in terms of the use of demands, threats and bluffs (Fisher and Ury, 1991, p.xviii). Regrettably, this form of negotiation is informed by the tenets of political realism, which have dominated politics, and driven primarily by the pursuit of national self-interest (Binnendijk, 1987). In adopting such an approach, the negotiator “sees any situation as a contest of will in which the side that takes the more extreme positions and holds out longer fares better” (Fisher and Ury, 1991, p.xviii). This casts the political negotiation process in a very narrow frame of reference and can, in effect, undermine efforts to pursue a mutually acceptable outcome and agreement, which is necessary in order to maintain the relationship between the negotiating parties. As Fisher and Ury note in this form of negotiation, “the task of jointly devising an acceptable solution tends to become a battle” and “each side tries through sheer will power to force the other to change its position” (Fisher and Ury, 1991, p.6). A transactional and adversarial approach to political negotiation renders one side the effective winner and fails to address the concerns of the other party. Subsequently, “anger and resentment often result as one side sees itself bending to the rigid will of the other while its own legitimate concerns go unaddressed” (Fisher and Ury, 1991, p.6). This is a myopic view of the objective of the negotiation process which results in an outcome that is exclusionary and one that undermines the

trust and relationship between the parties. In addition, this transactional and adversarial approach, which still permeates the majority of political processes, results in one side feeling threatened by the process, which undermines any efforts to address the deep rooted and even cultural dimensions of a particular conflict. In effect, negotiating teams may not respond constructively to the power asymmetries that permeate the transactional political negotiation processes.

Low-context and high-context negotiation processes

An additional challenge that confronts political negotiation is the unspoken “the assumption that there is a single, universal paradigm of negotiation” (Cohen, 1991, p.153). In particular, the universal paradigm of negotiation which emerged from Western and Euro-centric assumptions about the nature of communication “is associated with the predominantly verbal and explicit, or low-context, communicatory style” (Cohen, 1991, p.153). According to Hall (1976) “a high-context communication is one in which most of the information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person, which very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message” (Hall, 1976, p.91). By contrast, “a low-context communication is just the opposite...the mass of the information is vested in the explicit code” (Hall, 1976, p.91). The presumed universal paradigm of negotiation which is drawn from an internalization of low-context communication “is infused with the can-do, problem-solving spirit, assumes a process of give-and-take, and is strongly influenced by Anglo-Saxon legal habit” (Cohen, 1991, p.154). Cohen observes that:

“when theorists posit a universal paradigm of negotiation (usually involving such features as the ‘joint search for a solution’, ‘isolating the people from the problem’, and the ‘maximization of joint gains’) they are in effect proposing an idealized version of the low-context, problem-solving model” (Cohen, 1991, p.154).

This paradigm of political negotiation presumes that there is an underlying rationality that views people as part of the problem and not part of the solution, and in particular “goals are defined in terms of material, not psychic, satisfactions” (Cohen, 1991, p.154). According to Kimmel (2000, p.460) “the low-context approach is likely to be used in situations where social relationships are not so important.” This low-context approach to negotiation reveals a privileging of an individualistic ethos. By contrast, “high-context communication is often used in a situation in which social relations are important” (Kimmel, 2000, p.460). The high-context approach to negotiation is “associated with a non-verbal, implicit ... style of communication...” and it is more prevalent “in interdependent societies that display a collectivist, rather

than individualistic ethos” (Cohen, 1991, p.154). Specifically, “it declines to view the immediate issue in isolation; lays particular stress on long-term and affective aspects of the relationship between the parties” (Cohen, 1991, p.154).

The existence of these two paradigms of negotiation suggests that there is a need to find a way to bridge the “cultural dissonance” that could emerge between negotiators and mediators who are utilising either the low-context or high-context form of communication. For example, low-context communication “negotiators tend to be surprised by their interlocutors’ preoccupation with history and hierarchy, preference for principle over nitty-gritty detail, personalized and repetitive style of argument, lack of enthusiasm for explicit and formal agreement, and willingness to sacrifice substance to form” (Cohen, 1991, p.154). In response, high-context communication “negotiators tend to be surprised by their interlocutors’ ignorance of history, preoccupation with individual rights, obsession with the immediate problem while neglecting the overall relationship, excessive bluntness, impatience, disinterest in establishing a philosophical basis for agreement, extraordinary willingness to make soft concessions, constant generation of new proposals, and an inability to leave a problem pending” (Cohen, 1991, p.154). The encounter between the low-context/high-context communication negotiators is bound to generate cultural tension and ultimately contribute towards the failure of negotiations. As Cohen (1991, p.154) notes, “the most frequent consequence of intercultural misunderstanding...” is “...a spill over effect spreading beyond the immediate negotiation and causing a loss of credibility and damage to the wider relationship.” The failure to effectively understand one’s negotiating partners distorts “the ability of the parties to foresee future moves and hence to take the necessary preventive or remedial action” (Cohen, 1991, p.157).

The nexus between political negotiation and intercultural dialogue

The Framework results illustrate the importance of utilising the architecture of ICD to provide guidance for political negotiators. In particular, the analysis and results point to the causal links between the structural domains enabling ICD and effective political negotiation processes. Cohen (1991, p.157) observes that “if cross-cultural dissonance can harm a relationship, the converse should be equally true: that cross-cultural harmony, based on a careful attention to the other side’s psychological needs, should prove beneficial.” He further argues that “unless there are shared interests in an agreement, no amount of cross-cultural sensitivity will help” (Cohen, 1991, p.157).

As noted in the previously published Conceptual and Technical Framework, “ICD is a cross-cutting theme that

applies to all areas or domains that require reaching an agreement” (UNESCO, 2020, p.15). Political negotiation requires creating platforms for a culturally diverse range of participants to engage in transformative dialogue and communication to achieve shared and mutually agreed outcomes (UNESCO, 2020, p.15).

However, it is worthwhile to note that in the sphere of political negotiation, the utility of integrating ICD as a foundational aspect of the process remains a contested issue and a work-in-progress, due to the dominant transactional approach to negotiation, and universalising paradigm of low-context communication discussed above. This is evident in the absence of a deliberate framing of political negotiation as a variant of ICD. Therefore, it is necessary to assess how ICD can enhance political negotiation processes, prior to identifying and proposing key policy recommendations on how to strengthen the synergy in terms of reframing political negotiation as a variant of ICD.

ICD seeks to pursue transformative communication through the creation of spaces where diverse communities can interact and exchange on the basis of mutual respect, empathy and consideration of different perspectives. The structural and supporting domains of ICD are oriented towards creating an enabling environment for transformative communication which can contribute towards preventing conflict and promoting peacefulness. In this regard, Cohen notes that where “communication is easy and unencumbered, it may not be possible to brush aside unsurmountable differences but misunderstanding of the other’s intentions and gratuitous complications can be avoided” (1991, p.158). In addition, “without open channels of communication, opportunities to explore common interests may be missed” (Cohen, 1991, p.158).

There is an educational aspect to the conduct of political negotiation and mediation, in terms of providing all the parties with an understanding of the purpose and objectives of ICD. Furthermore, there are situations that arise in which the negotiating partners or mediators have to educate all of the parties involved as to how the interlocutors are communicating. For example, for the transactional and low-context negotiator “it seems natural for the parties to a negotiation to commence the contest by setting out their opening positions as clearly as possible...” which “...is rooted in the adversarial style” (Cohen, 1991, p.64). In contrast, the high-context negotiator “may prescribe a rather different procedure, namely, to postpone showing one’s hand for as long as possible” (Cohen, 1991, p.64). In such a context, the low-context negotiator would find themselves at a tactical disadvantage having already placed their cards on the table. If the negotiating partners or mediators have an awareness of these cultural practices, they would be more effectively prepared to engage with them and to also

manage expectations on all sides. In a historical study of American and Japanese negotiating styles, Leo Moser, a former diplomat, observed that:

“When the Americans state their position, the Japanese tendency is to listen quite carefully, to ask for additional details and to say nothing at all committal. This lack of response is likely to frustrate the American side, which wants a counterproposal put on the table ‘so that give-and-take can begin.’ To the Japanese, this approach may appear overly aggressive, embarrassing, even impolite. They may also consider it unwise to expect the two delegation leaders to make initial, clear statements of their negotiating position: would it not be wiser to let them speak only after the two sides had worked out a mutually acceptable position at the working level? To the American the Japanese response is liable to seem standoffish, dilatory, even inscrutable” (Moser, 1986, p.43).

In effect, political negotiation, in the majority of situations, requires cross-cultural accommodation in order to be effective in reaching an inclusive agreement. The intercultural negotiator must understand their partners’ culture and history, and also be able to develop a personal relationship.

In the following section, the examples of South African and Northern Ireland will be used to illustrate the potential for ICD to enhance political negotiation. The efforts to achieve a negotiated political solution in South Africa and in Northern Ireland required creating the conditions for the opposing negotiators to embrace a cross-cultural perspective which included an appreciation of each other’s history and identity. Each example has much to teach on the potential of ICD.

4.6.3 South Africa’s negotiated political settlement as a model for implementing intercultural dialogue

South Africa’s negotiated political settlement remains a model for adopting an intercultural approach and enshrining such an approach into constitution. The approach enabled the country to transition from an authoritarian civil war context towards governance based on inclusive constitutional democratic principles. The European settlements in what is today known as modern day South Africa, initiated a process that led to the gradual colonization of the territory by Dutch and British colonial interests. This process of land dispossession culminated in the 1913 Native Land Act, which prohibited Natives and Africans, in particular, from owning productive land that could be utilised to generate wealth. In 1948, the formal adoption of the system of apartheid created an order of institutionalized racism that privileged “white people” and excluded people of colour from accessing adequate

housing, health care, education and infrastructure through the creation of segregated communities and the forced removal of people of colour to socially devastating “townships” and “shanty towns” which continue to exist in contemporary South Africa.

Due to this increased disenfranchisement and discrimination, there were increased resistance movements both within and outside South Africa, which included the armed resistance militia groups activated by political formations. The increasing apartheid repression resulted in a catalogue of state-sanctioned murders, disappearances, torture, forced removals, racial terror and human rights violations, including the socio-economic deprivation of people of colour, and the denial of their access to adequate housing, healthcare, education and infrastructure. These issues would need to be addressed in any transition from apartheid to a more democratic order.

In the 1980’s and 1990’s internal and external pressure increased on the apartheid government to negotiate a political settlement to the South African conflict. In parallel, a range of confidence building measures and track-two behind the scenes negotiation processes were undertaken by the pro-democratic liberation movements as well as the apartheid state. In particular, in the mid-1980’s, Nelson Mandela began his secretive political negotiations with the apartheid South African state. He found his interlocutors to be highly transactional and adversarial in their low-context approach, in particular, the South African apartheid state “expected to be able to outsmart the African National Congress (ANC) in negotiations, and intimidate them with the power of the Afrikaner state” (Waldmeir, 1997, p.103). However, in adopting an ICD approach, Mandela disoriented his interlocutors who “were surprised to find that Mandela recognised the fears of white people ... and emphasised the importance of minority groups being given a real sense of security” (Waldmeir, 1997, p.97).

The subsequent political negotiations between the apartheid Government of South Africa and the political formation made up of a diversity of organisations and led by the ANC drew upon the five structural domains of ICD, notably *Stability and Non-violence, Governance and Citizenship, Freedom of Expression, Horizontal Equality, and Social Cohesion*. The South African Constitution enshrines a continuous process of ICD, by privileging the protection and inclusion of the cultural rights of all groups within the state. Specifically, Article 185, of the South African Constitution mandates a Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities that seeks “to promote and develop peace, friendship, humanity, tolerance and national unity among cultural, religious and linguistic communities, on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and free association” (Republic of South

Africa, 1996, Article 185). In effect, South Africa has embedded an enabling environment for ICD within its constitutional and institutional provisions, which was achieved through political negotiation. This provision enables the country to continue to sustain a national inter-cultural dialogue process in order to address the persistent political divisions and tensions of the past, which regularly re-emerge and fuel instability, for example, the July 2021 social unrest, are addressed in an ongoing manner to prevent conflict, pursue peacefulness and protect human rights.

4.6.4 Shifting the cultural frame of reference to address conflict: the case of Northern Ireland

A key challenge that confronts political negotiation is how to enable the interlocutors to shift their cultural frame of reference or mind-set in order to appreciate and understand the position of their negotiating partners. Kimmel notes that “mutual problems faced by parties in international conflict and permanent negotiations are more amenable when seen from a wide perspective with many alternatives” (2000, p.467). In particular, “problem solving is facilitated if participants have the ability to intentionally shift the cultural frame of reference (mind-set)” through training in ICD which “enables them to understand each other and the issues more fully” (Kimmel, 2000, p.461). Furthermore, ICD “can avert and clarify cultural misunderstanding and misperception and ameliorate destructive conflict by creating new meanings and relationships” (Kimmel, 2000, p.467).

The case of the Northern Ireland crisis is instructive in this regard due to the underlying cultural dimension of the political conflict, which can be historically situated to the tensions that have existed on the island for the last three centuries (Bloomfield, 1997). The political negotiation between the British government and the political actors in Northern Ireland, following the tension and crisis that fuelled violence between 1969 and 1999, that led to the death of more than 3,500 people. The contemporary tensions in Northern Ireland have an extensive history as noted above, but its contemporary dynamics can be dated to 1921, following the division of Ireland, which unleashed a struggle between different cultures and identities on the island. Specifically, in the case of Northern Ireland, the competing cultural claims of the Catholics and Protestants in the province followed the path of a long and arduous journey of convening culturally sensitive and responsive negotiation processes, which was ultimately mediated by the former US Senator George Mitchell, and which led to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, on 10th April 1998. The demands by both the Catholic and Protestant communities to ensure that their own cultural practices and sensibilities were respected and honoured was at the core of the crisis in the province.

The Good Friday Agreement required the negotiators to shift their cultural frames of reference and mind-sets in order to appreciate and understand the position of their negotiating partners. The Agreement outlined a process “through which the people of Northern Ireland would decide the future of the region based on the principle of consent and the inclusive and equal participation of all parties and communities” (Murithi, 2009, p.174), which addressed any cultural misunderstandings and deliberately sought to create new meanings and relationships. In particular, a new framework of political governance, in the form of the Northern Ireland Assembly, constituted through an electoral system of proportional representation, was created, altering the nature of the relationship between the Catholic and Protestant communities. In addition, a British-Irish Council was established to assuage the concerns of the Protestant unionists. In effect, the new constitutional arrangement in Northern Ireland represented a reframing of the political and cultural identity of the people of the province as well as creating a new relationship with the British and Irish nation-states. As noted in my previous work “if this peacebuilding processes continues to prevail into the future, it will represent the emergence and consolidation of the belief among the parties affected that they can depend on the reconstituted entity of Northern Ireland to safeguard and respect the plurality of their socio-cultural traditions” (Murithi, 2009, p.174). This case highlights key insights on how an ICD process can inform political negotiations on challenging issues such as sovereignty, identity and belonging.

4.6.5 Enhancing the supporting domain of Skills and Values through training for intercultural negotiation and mediation

The UNESCO-IEP initiative highlights the importance of supporting domains which influence ICD structures and processes. These supporting domains are drawn from the principles, values and competencies that impact upon the actions, policies and activities of ICD. In the context of political negotiation, the supporting domain of *Skills and Values* stands out as an important element in enabling effective ICD and, in particular, in supporting the structural domain of *Stability and Non-Violence*. This does not preclude the influence of other supporting domains such as *Inclusion and Representation*, *Leadership and Organisation*, or *Linkages and Coherency*. Indeed, all structural and supporting domains impact each other and work together to enable effective ICD. For the purposes of this analysis, the supporting domain of *Skills and Values* provides an important entry point for enhancing political negotiation by integrating ICD into its processes.

There are a range of skills and values that underpin effective ICD. In particular, intercultural competences are integral to the range of skills that political negotiators need

to develop including principles, such as reciprocity, and abilities, such as perspective-taking and active listening, which are necessary for promoting and sustaining culturally transformative communication (UNESCO, 2020, p.23). Key elements of negotiation also include the ability to listen actively, to reframe issues and positions, and design a broad range of options which can be utilised to craft a mutually acceptable solution. In this regard, negotiation also requires a certain degree of perspective-taking, however, there are situations in which there is a lack of awareness about how any assumptions relating to the meaning of the message that is being communicated and how it is being communicated, notably through indirect formulations and non-verbal gestures.

The skills and values that inform effective political negotiation can be developed and enhanced through culturally informed capacity building and training programmes. In effect, there is an educational, skills, capacity building and values development dimension that interlocutors in political negotiation processes need to engage in, notably negotiators need to adopt perspectives that are reflexive and demonstrate an awareness of their own subjective cultural outlook in order to avoid misperception and misunderstanding (Kimmel, 2000, p.461). It is necessary to provide skills and values training to enable negotiators and mediators to understand and explicate their own positions, in order to engender a reciprocal understanding by their interlocutors who may not share a similar cultural approach to perceiving, reasoning and communicating (Kimmel, 2000, p.461). Concretely, capacity building and values training processes targeted at negotiators and mediators should encourage a disposition towards embracing cultural self-learning as the processes unfold (Kimmel, 2000, p.461). Through this introspective process of internalizing cultural self-learning negotiators and mediators can also acquire a much more nuanced understanding of how their own culture is perceived by their interlocutors (Stewart, 1995, p.56). This encourages the negotiating actors to adopt a principled and value-informed approach to their engagement which further reinforces the enabling environment that they create for effective ICD.

4.6.6 Analysing the interface between intercultural dialogue and political negotiation

There is a need to identify how to more effectively articulate and prioritize the interface between ICD and political negotiation. Negotiation and mediation processes are in effect seeking to transform and rebuild relationships and re-establish trust, as illustrated by the cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland, and therefore there is a natural synergy with ICD processes, in terms of their efforts to realize transformative communication. Therefore, there is a clear interface between ICD and

political negotiation, and it is necessary to inculcate the necessary skills and values for ICD among negotiators and mediators. This requires transforming negotiators and mediators into agents of ICD, and empowering them with a degree of intercultural competence, so that they can engage in culturally responsive transformative dialogue.

It is necessary for ICD to become an integral aspect of the way individuals, groups and institutions interact on a regular basis. In order to achieve this, policymaking processes need to prioritize promoting culturally informed interactions (UNESCO, 2020, p.12). In practical terms, this suggests that policymakers and practitioners should prioritize political negotiation as an entry point to advance action, given its ability to function as an amplifier of the strengthening of other domains. Concretely, this requires preparing negotiators and mediators for ICD through skills and values training interventions, so that they can conduct and participate in culturally responsive negotiation processes.

4.6.7 Key policy recommendations and conclusion

The analysis above suggests that policy initiatives can be designed to strengthen the integration of ICD into political negotiation processes. The presuppositions of mainstream political negotiation approaches are ill-defined to address the myriad of challenges that confront our globalized world. The need to infuse a culturally informed dimension to political negotiation processes cannot be understated. This would require problematizing and jettisoning an over-emphasis on a transactional approach to negotiation which is predicated on a presumed universalist paradigm to negotiation, and inculcating a *cultural turn* among practitioners, premised on an acknowledge of the extensive diversity of societies around the world.

If the efficacy of political negotiation is to contribute towards forging and crafting more peaceful and sustainable societies, then the urgency of internalising this cultural turn is of utmost importance. The Framework is instructive on the utility and effectiveness of integrating ICD into political negotiation processes in a key enabler in enhancing the likelihood of the durability and sustainability of peace agreements. Integrating ICD into the policies and practices of negotiators and mediators around the world can be leveraged upon and instrumentalized through the vehicle of knowledge and skills transfer processes. On this basis, policy makers can incorporate the requirements of ICD in political negotiation directly into legislative frameworks that activate peace-making interventions, which will provide guidelines to ensure the systemic inculcation of culturally informed into mainstream practice.

Policymakers should make targeted investments to

support the integration of ICD into political negotiation processes, due to their ability to amplify their impact upon the majority of structural domains. To inform practical interventions relating to the utilization of ICD to enhance processes of political negotiation, policymakers and practitioners should:

- Prioritize resources to actively integrate ICD principles in political negotiation and mediation processes;
- Provide skills and values training to negotiators and mediators, to empower them with intercultural competencies;
- Ensure that governmental and inter-governmental policy frameworks that guide political negotiation are anchored and informed by the utility of ICD.

Policymakers and practitioners should prioritize resources to actively integrate ICD principles into governmental and intergovernmental policy frameworks in order to provide guidance to political negotiation and mediation processes. More specifically, governments and regional organisations should proactively engage in professionalising their negotiation and mediation capacities utilising a cultural lens. In addition, governments and regional organisations can provide access to knowledge transfer as well as skills and values training to negotiators and mediators, to empower them with intercultural competencies. Concretely, capacity building interventions can be carefully designed and targeted to enhance the cultural proficiency of governmental and intergovernmental negotiators and mediators.

Ultimately, given the culturally diverse settings that accompany most political negotiation processes, ICD is not only an optional add-on, but a key and foundational aspect that needs to be internalised by negotiators and mediators.

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SECTION 4

Education

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Annex

Annex 1: UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue – Methodology

Domains and Indicators

The conceptual framework for the data presented in this report was developed through extensive expert consultation and review. As a first step, the Institute for Economics and Peace produced a scoping study, exploring key concepts, data availability and reliability, and developing a draft indicator framework. This scoping study was the focus of an expert meeting bringing together experts from different fields – including peace and security, intercultural communication, education, culture, and development – and institutions – including the World Bank, the OECD, UNDP, the Council of Europe, the Nordic Cultural Fund, Global Affairs Canada, the Institute of Economics and Peace, the CELL Foundation (The Netherlands), City University (UK), Durham University (UK), Deakin University (Australia) and Pontificia Universidade Catolica de Sao Paulo (Brazil), as well as representatives from all UNESCO sectors and the UNESCO Institute of Statistics.

This expert meeting produced a number of recommendations, which were further consulted on through a survey and a series of dialogues with selected experts. An expert consultant was hired to consolidate all of the insights gained from this extensive research and consultation process, and *Measuring Intercultural Dialogue: A conceptual and technical framework* was produced as a result, detailing the conceptual and technical rationale and architecture for the project.

The UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue contained in this report has been developed on the basis of this prior work. Table 1 shows the five structural domains of the Framework and the indicators selected to capture these domains. Similarly, Table 2 provides an overview of the four supporting domains.

Since its inception, the Framework has intended to be an informative benchmarking exercise. Its aims are at building greater consistency around the use of the term ICD and enhancing understanding of factors that are important to its effective implementation. As such, the indicators were selected through an internationally consultative process, and they have been collated and analysed to provide a tool for Member States in understanding their own strengths and weaknesses in enabling ICD. Explicitly, the purpose of the exercise has never been to “name and shame” Member States through comparing their performance against other countries. As such, no overall score is calculated for the Framework and no country ranking table, or global performance map, is presented. UNESCO’s approach rather contextualises Member State indicator performance to global and regional averages, and the case studies have been written to focus on what is working rather than what is not.

TABLE 1

UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue - Structural Domains and Indicators

Indicator	Domain	Description	Source	Number of Countries	Latest Year
Freedom of Expression	Press freedom	The World Press Freedom Index is composite measure of freedom available to journalists and with quantitative data on abuses and acts of violence against journalists.	The World Bank	138	2019
Freedom of Expression	Religious restrictions	The Government Restrictions Index measures government laws, policies and actions that restrict religious beliefs and practices. This includes efforts by governments to ban particular faiths, prohibit conversion, limit preaching or give preferential treatment to one or more religious groups.	PEW Research Center	198	2016
Governance and Citizenship	Factionalised elites	Measures the fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines. A component of the Fragile States Index.	Fund for Peace	178	2020
Governance and Citizenship	Control of corruption	Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests. A Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI).	The World Bank	206	2019
Government and Citizenship	Government effectiveness	Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. A Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI).	The World Bank	191	2020

Government and Citizenship	Political stability and absence of violence	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism. A Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI).	The World Bank	208	2019
Government and Citizenship	Regulatory quality	Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. A Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI).	The World Bank	206	2019
Governance and Citizenship	Rule of law	Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. A Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI).	The World Bank	208	2019
Governance and Citizenship	Voice and accountability	Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. A Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI).	The World Bank	208	2019
Governance and Citizenship	GINI	Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.	The World Bank	165	2018
Horizontal Equality	Group grievances	The Group Grievance Indicator focuses on divisions and schisms between different groups in society – particularly divisions based on social or political characteristics – and their role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process. A component of the Fragile States Index.	Fund for Peace	175	2017
Horizontal Equality	Horizontal accountability	The Accountability Index measures to what extent the ideal of government accountability is achieved. Accountability is defined as constraints on the government's use of political power, e.g. through elections, checks and balances between institutions, and by civil society organisations and media activity.	V-Dem Institute	183	2019
Social Cohesion	Intergroup cohesion	Intergroup cohesion measures inter-group disparities, perceptions of being discriminated against, and feelings of distrust against members of other groups.	International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam	208	2015
Stability and Non-violence	Internal conflict	This Global Peace Index's (GPI) Internal Conflicts Fought indicator measures the number and duration of conflicts that occur within a specific country's legal boundaries. Information for this indicator is sourced from three datasets from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP): the Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset. The score for a country is determined by adding the scores for all individual conflicts which have occurred within that country's legal boundaries over the last five years.	Institute for Economics and Peace	163	2020
Stability and Non-violence	Potitical instability	Assessment of political instability ranked from 0 to 100 (very low to very high instability) by the EIU's Country Analysis team, based on five questions. This indicator aggregates five other questions on social unrest, orderly transfers, opposition stance, excessive executive authority and an international tension sub-index.	Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU)	163	2020
Stability and Non-violence	Feeling safe	Proportion of people feeling safe walking alone at night where they live. Affirmative answers are used.	Gallup World Poll	164	2018
Stability and Non-violence	Likelihood of violent demonstrations	Assessment of the likelihood of violent demonstrations ranked from 1-5 (very low to very high) by the EIU's Country Analysis team, based on the question, "Are violent demonstrations or violent civil/labour unrest likely to pose a threat to property or the conduct of business over the next two years?"	Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU)	163	2020

TABLE 2

UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue - Supporting Domains and Indicators

Indicator	Domain	Description	Source	Number of Countries	Latest Year
Inclusion and Representation	Inclusion of Minorities	Inclusion of Minorities measures levels of discrimination against vulnerable groups such as indigenous peoples, migrants, refugees, or lower caste groups. This measure focuses upon whether there is systemic bias among managers, administrators, and members of the community in the allocation of jobs, benefits, and other social and economic resources regarding particular social groups.	International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam	208	2015
Leadership and Organisation	Leadership Approval	Proportion of people who approve of the country's leadership. Affirmative answers are used.	Gallup World Poll	154	2018
Linkages and Coherency	Group Acceptance	Average score of four Gallup questions: 1) Is the city or area where you live a good place or not a good place to live from Gay or Lesbian people? 2) Is the city or area where you live a good place or not a good place to live for immigrant from other countries? 3) Is the city or area where you live a good place or not a good place to live for a racial and ethnic minority? 4) Is the city or area where you live a good place or not a good place to live for religious minorities?	Gallup World Poll	151	2015-2018
Skills and Values	Education	UNDP's education index is an average of mean years of schooling (of adults) and expected years of schooling (of children), both expressed as an index obtained by scaling with the corresponding maxima.	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	190	2018

BOX 1

Evolution of the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue.

In the initial publication, *Measuring Intercultural Dialogue: A conceptual and technical framework*, a series of indicators were proposed for the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue. In this report, a number of data changes were found to be more practical in implementing the initial vision. Namely:

- The initial World Values Survey indicators were dropped in favour of comparable Gallup World Poll questions. This was due to wider country coverage and more consistent and comparable polling.
- The GINI coefficient was included in the *Horizontal Equality* domain.
- The PEW Social Hostilities Index in *Freedom of Expression* was replaced by the Government Restriction Index (GRI) from the same source. In implementation, it was decided this was a more relevant measure. The GRI was originally proposed to be included in the *Governance and Citizenship* domain.
- Trust in Public Institutions in the *Skills and Values* domain was replaced by average mean years of schooling from UNDP as a proxy measure. This was a difficult domain to find data on and represents an area from development in future iterations of the Framework.

Data availability and imputation

The methodology developed has been designed to be in line with other prominent global measurement tools, and substantial effort has been made to populate the Framework with the best existing country information. However, the major challenge to developing a harmonised composite measure is in attempting to overcome the paucity of consistent and comprehensive data across very diverse countries around the world. They vary significantly not just in terms of demographic and geographic characteristics, but also in terms of socio-economic characteristics which often impact data collection and quality.

The issue of data gaps is a common challenge in the process of establishing multi-dimensional measurement tools. The OECD Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators recommends a number of statistical techniques for dealing with data imputation to fill in data gaps, and table 3 lists the methods used in the Framework.²² Using the combination of these techniques, the Framework represents the use of the best possible data without an overly complex methodology.

Countries with less than 70 per cent data availability of the indicators in the Framework were dropped from the analysis. This threshold allowed the Framework to include 160 countries.

Domain Calculations – Banding

This section illustrates how each indicator, and hence each domain is treated. Constructing the domains has two primary stages 1) data collection and 2) imputation and banding.

Banding data in the case of the Framework is a way of dealing with comparing otherwise incongruous information. It takes each indicator and scales them to a score between 0 and 1, relative to the whole data set. To do this, appropriate minimum and maximum values for the data set are decided such that anything below the minimum is assigned zero, and anything above the maximum is assigned 1, and everything else is scaled between

²² <https://www.oecd.org/els/soc/handbookonconstructingcompositeindicatorsmethodologyanduserguide.htm>

TABLE 3

Data imputation methods

Method	Description	Application in the UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue
Cold Deck Imputation	Replacing the missing value with a value from another source.	The Framework uses this either when it uses the most recent data point in a series as the current data point, or uses additional country statistics to fill in gaps.
Hot Deck Imputation	Replacing the missing value with a KNN imputation. KNN is an algorithm that is useful for matching a point with its closest k neighbours in a multi-dimensional space. It can be used for data that are continuous, discrete, ordinal and categorical which makes it particularly useful for dealing with missing data. The Framework fills in data gaps using the 5 most similar countries to impute a value.	The Framework uses hot deck imputation for data that is not available for all countries.

the two. Therefore, in year y , after data imputation, the banded score is calculated for indicator i by Equation 1.

Equation 1: Banding Equation

$$\text{Banded}_i = \frac{\text{CountryIndicatorValue } \in \text{Year}_y - \text{minimumcutoff}_i}{\text{maximumcutoff}_i - \text{minimumcutoff}_i}$$

Banding this way indicates the implicit assumption that higher levels of the indicator are better. However, higher levels of some indicators, such as the political instability indicator, represent a less desirable case for countries. In such cases, the banded score is reversed and is calculated by Equation 2.

Equation 2: Reverse banding equation

$$\text{ReverseBanded}_i = 1 - \frac{\text{CountryIndicatorValue } \in \text{Year}_y - \text{minimumcutoff}_i}{\text{maximumcutoff}_i - \text{minimumcutoff}_i}$$

An integral part of the banding process is to set appropriate minimum and maximum cut off values for the banded scores. There are empirical and normative methods available for doing this. While some data may be distributed normally and, therefore, lend itself well to standard mathematical techniques, such as defining outliers as those greater than three standard deviations from the mean, other data sets do not follow well-behaved trends. The choice of which technique to use depends on a number of considerations: the nature of the data, the distribution, the purpose of the index, what information is being conveyed, etc. Upon investigation of the global datasets used in the Framework, very few of the distributions can be classified as normal. The presence of outliers affects not only the average, but the variance, skewing both the min and max.

To account for this, IEP have, in some instances, set statistically derived minimums and maximums to ensure results are not too heavily influenced by outliers. In cases with extreme outliers, the lower bound is set as the lowest data point that is within 1.5 times the interquartile range below the first quartile (where the interquartile range is defined as the distance between the first and third quartiles). Similarly, the upper bound is set as the largest data point that is within 1.5 times the interquartile range above the third quartile.

Weighting the Indicators

As the purpose of the Framework has not been to rank countries, but rather have a standardised score across all domains, equal weighting was used for each indicator in each domain. For example, there are seven indicators in the

Governance and Citizenship domain, so each are weighted at $1/7 = 0.143$ when aggregated to a domain score. Similarly, the *Freedom of Expression* domain has two indicators weighted at 0.5. As there was not the intention of combining these separate domains into one aggregate score, equal weighting in the case of the Framework was seen as a justifiable approach. Not aggregating into one overall composite measure avoids inadvertently weighting some indicators more heavily simply because they form part of a domain with less indicators.

Selecting the Case Studies

To select the case studies, a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was conducted using all the indicators in the Framework. PCA is a quantitative technique that reduces the 21 indicators in the Framework to a set of statistical principal components. It is a useful tool to create statistically derived metrics that separate countries as much as they can be on a standard measure given the input information. Further information can be found in the OECD Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators.²³

The countries that received the highest score in their region in the first principal component was selected as a case study.

Once identified, the following steps were taken to agree to the case studies:

- 1) Selecting one case study from each of UNESCO's five regions;²⁴
- 2) Only selecting countries from those contexts which have strong enabling environments for ICD, confirmed by undertaking a principal components analysis;
- 3) Selecting the countries on the basis of existing case studies developed in the relevant literature (to be identified by using our existing research and the results of a systematic literature search, looking for relevant qualitative research which explores the connection between the enabling/supportive environment for ICD and specific dialogue processes);
- 4) Approval from the concerned delegations on the basis of the selection made via the above mentioned criteria.

Points to consider in selection

Whilst justifiable, it's worth recalling the methodological limitations of the approach taken: 1) the pool of literature used wasn't selected through systematic criteria (it is the literature reviewed for the scoping study for the project) and therefore could inadvertently represent the biases of the researchers; 2) the tallying of the frequency of how often each country is mentioned doesn't allow for an understanding of what is being discussed in the literature, positive or negative.

²³ Further information can be found in the OECD Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators. <https://www.oecd.org/els/soc/handbookonconstructingcompositeindicatorsmethodologyanduserguide.htm>

²⁴ The five UNESCO regions were defined in: the 2022 edition of the UNESCO Basic Texts (p141 - 143)



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We Need to Talk: Measuring intercultural dialogue for peace and inclusion

An analysis into the power of intercultural dialogue and the new *UNESCO Framework for Enabling Intercultural Dialogue, We Need to Talk* presents the first evidence of the link between intercultural dialogue and peace, conflict prevention and non-fragility, and human rights. Using data covering over 160 countries in all regions, the report presents a framework of the structures, processes and values needed to support intercultural dialogue, examining the dynamics and interlinkages between them to reveal substantial policy opportunities with broad spanning benefits. Providing policy support and guidance, the report also includes information on regional trends as well as deep diving case studies.

The data, case studies, and think pieces contained in this report highlight key policy and intervention opportunities for intercultural dialogue as an instrument for inclusion, peace and wider societal benefits. Policy makers, development workers, peace and security actors, academics and more are invited to leverage the analysis in this report and findings of the *Framework* to strengthen intercultural dialogue around the world.

