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Plural Policing in Crisis: Inclusive security provision in violent and unequal societies

Abstract

There is a growing acceptance that attaining the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 of 'peaceful and inclusive' societies in the Global South is contingent on recognizing and harnessing the plurality of security provision. Yet, comparatively speaking, there still remains a deficit in knowledge on plural policing in the face of complexity, deficit, and crisis. There remains a gap too between the normative ideal of inclusive plural security formations and the operational realities of achieving this. This chapter will reflect on the impact of crises on plural policing provision through considering the context of the Western Cape Province, South Africa from 2011 to 2020, a period characterized by a poly-crisis. Through focusing on state attempts to deliberately craft and promote plurality, it will reflect on crises not as the backdrop to plurality but as a formative component of it and the difficulties of constructing and operationalizing democratic and effective plural policing in the Global South.

Key words: plural policing; Global South; South Africa; Sustainable Development Goals

Introduction

The term 'plural policing' references the diversity of state and non-state entities involved in providing security and policing. Much of the literature on plural policing – which incorporates a wide range of (Global North and South) jurisdictions and contexts – has focused on the empirical, analytical, and theoretical task of mapping security nodes and the nature of relationships between those nodes involved in plural policing relationships and networks (see Abrahamsen & Williams, 2009; Baker, 2008; Berndtsson & Stern, 2011; Brodeur, 2010;

Crawford & Lister, 2004; Crawford, Lister, Blackburn & Burnett, 2005; Dupont, 2004, 2006; Fleming & Wood, 2006; Nøkleberg, 2020). There has also been much focus on the related issues of accountability, regulation, and governance opportunities and challenges associated with plurality (Berg & Shearing, 2020a; Lister & Jones, 2016; Loader, 2000; Ruteere, Shearing & Stenning, 2016; Sheptycki, 2002; Stenning, 2009; Stenning & Shearing, 2018).

Furthermore, there is a comparative literature of plurality cross-nationally and cross-regionally (Jones & Newburn, 2006; Jones, van Steden & Boutellier, 2009; Leloup & White, 2021; O'Neill & Fyfe, 2017; van Stokkom & Terpstra, 2018). Yet, there is a tendency in this burgeoning literature to predominantly focus on stable and resource-rich contexts, and/or contexts of strong state governance in both Global North (and South) contexts. In other words, most analyses of plural policing have been in contexts of stability, relative equality, and relatively good resources. However, there is a need to engage more fully with the contextual factors that impact on how plural policing manifests in the spaces where this is not the case – especially contexts characterized by what we call normalized crises. Although there has been a focus on the politics of plurality (Albrecht & Kyed, 2015; Diphoorn & Grassiani, 2019; White, 2010) as well as plurality in sites of conflict (Volinz, 2018), insecurity, violence and crime (Diphoorn & Kyed, 2016; Kyed, 2018; Müller, 2010), and economic austerity (O'Neill, 2014; White, 2014), it is worth expanding on this focus and specifically foregrounding a focus on the impacts of manifold crises on plural policing developments. In other words, it is worth explicitly exploring contexts characterized by a "poly-crisis" (Morin & Kern, 1999, p. 73) with respect to public governance and policing deficits, high crime and violence, and pervasive underdevelopment and inequality.

This chapter will therefore focus on plural policing in times of crises, through exploring the policing of crime and violence in a complex, unequal society where challenges to policing and

safety and security are significant. In this way the article will explore how crises impacts both on the development and erosion of plural policing plans and arrangements. By doing so the paper will draw attention to the disjuncture between the normative ideals of attaining 'peaceful and inclusive societies' as characterized by SDG 16 and the realities of plural policing in the Global South. The chapter thereby aims to address the question: How do crises impact on the operationalisation of plural policing in Global South contexts and what does this mean for attaining inclusive and effective security provision? Many of these crises to be discussed, as mentioned, may be experienced to a greater or lesser extent in other Global South contexts and it is therefore pertinent to reflect on the South African context – although unique in many respects – a useful case study to engage with the realities of everyday plural policing in times of crises representing other contexts 'in crisis'. In light of this, what follows is an overview of the South African case study in question, in terms of outlining the crises as well as the various government attempts at crafting a plural policing system in the Western Cape Province of South Africa both exploring the crises as a driver and a mitigator of these attempts.

The South African case

The case study presented is derived from author observations and work with the South African government from 2011 to 2020 in the Western Cape Province of the country. The Western Cape Province is one of nine Provinces in South Africa and is located in the southwest of the country incorporating Cape Town as the legislative capital of South Africa. South Africa is comprised of three tiers of government – local, provincial, and national. The focus of this chapter is on local and provincial government systems comprising the City of Cape Town as the municipal governing authority at the local level and the provincial government of the Western Cape as the provincial governing authority for the Province as a whole, most notably

the Department of Community Safety. The time period chosen reflects both a period during which time the country as a whole was experiencing a range of crises but also a time when both the local and provincial governments of the Western Cape were seeking innovative and responsive systems to engage with the safety and security challenges faced in the province.

The provincial government, in particular, was involved in reimagining and crafting a whole-of-society governance approach to achieving safety in the province, of which harnessing a plural policing response was a component of that. What stimulated this initial focus on a whole-of-society or plural approach was, amongst other things, a research project, in which one of the authors was involved, from 2010 to 2011 commissioned by the provincial government entitled *A Whole-of-Society Approach to Safety in the Western Cape, 2010-2011*. The research project culminated in a report in 2011 presenting a number of design principles for developing a whole-of-society approach to safety and from there a number of initiatives, engagements, and further projects developed over the years between one or both of the authors and the local and provincial governments. This chapter reflects on some of the state-initiated attempts to operationalise a whole-of-society and plural policing approach in the face of a range of national and local crises. In the next section we reflect on the nature of these crises.

The nature of the poly-crises

South Africa has been beset by a range of crises in governance and safety, some of which – we argue in light of the statistics below – have been felt more acutely in the Western Cape Province. For instance, relative to other African countries, South Africa has some of the highest recorded violent crime rates on the continent. The national murder rate has increased from 29 per 100,000 in 2011/12 to 36 per 100,000 in 2018/19 (a 24% increase). Cape Town has the highest murder rate of all the major cities in South Africa, which has experienced a 64%

increase in the murder rate between 2011/12 and 2018/19, increasing from 44 per 100,000 (2011/12) to 72 per 100,000 (2018/19) (SAPS, 2019). This is in stark contrast with most other South African cities, which have experienced a less significant increase and/or stabilisation in their respective murder rates, with Cape Town's murder rate being more than 70% higher than the average of major cities in South Africa (South African Cities Network, 2020).

Similar trends have been observable in relation to other categories of violent crime, such as attempted murder, common robbery, robbery with aggravating circumstances, illegal possession of firearms, violence in the minibus taxi industry (an informal system of public transportation relied upon by a large portion of South Africa's citizens) and gang violence. Such violence is the outcome of a complex interplay of historical and contemporary risk factors (Lamb & Warton, 2016). Violent crime has also been exacerbated by excessive alcohol consumption, the availability of firearms, and drug use throughout South Africa, including Cape Town (Seedat, Van Niekerk, Jewkes, Suffla & Ratele, 2009). South Africa also has high levels of structural and income inequality, poverty and unemployment, which is particularly acute in Cape Town (City of Cape Town, 2017a).

Further to this, the (violent) crime crisis has been accompanied by policing crisis, which has entailed consistently low levels of public trust in South Africa's centralised and national public police – the South African Police Service (SAPS) – and frequent incidents of police use of excessive force. Such police violence has been observable during incidents of public disorder, as well as during day-to-day policing. The most prominent case has been the 2012 Marikana massacre when police killed 34 striking mineworkers. The policing crisis has been exacerbated by endemic and systemic corruption (Faull, 2007; Kutnjak Ivković & Sauerman, 2015; Newham, 2002; Newham & Faull, 2011). Furthermore, the upper echelons of the SAPS leadership have also been embroiled in a series of corruption scandals, with four SAPS

National Commissioners and various provincial commissioners having been removed from public office due to alleged corrupt and improper behaviour since 2008.[1] Police officials at various levels have also been implicated in illegally selling large quantities of firearms to criminal gangs (Lamb, 2020). In 2018, Robert McBride, the head of the South African police watchdog, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID), stated in a verbal report to South Africa's Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Police that the SAPS were being governed by a "matrix of corruption", which had become the "biggest threat to national security", as it had drastically eroded the ability of the police "to contain serious and violent crime" (McBride, 2018).

Further to this, the upper echelons of South Africa's leadership – including at the centre of the this, the former President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma – has been embroiled in what has been called a case of state capture. This has involved the long-term and systemic collusion of private individuals and high-level public sector actors in the commandeering of state resources and institutions for private gain and has resulted in the systematic influencing and undermining of many of South Africa's key institutions, including for instance, the police, intelligence services, prosecution authority, judiciary, treasury, tax authority and parliament (Gevisser, 2019). After an investigation by the Public Protector in 2016 (Public Protector South Africa, 2016), a *Judicial Commission of Inquiry to Inquire into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and*

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[1] In 2017 Khomotso Phahlane (who served from 2015-2017), due to reports of widespread corruption relating to procurement processes and being complicit in terms of criminality within SAPS Crime Intelligence was eventually dismissed in 2020. Jackie Selebi (2000-07) was found guilty on charges of corruption as a result of receiving bribes from a self-confessed drug kingpin. Bheki Cele (2009-12) was dismissed due to allegations of corruption concerning his role in the SAPS' leasing of a building from one of Cele's business associates. Riah Phiyega (2012-15) was dismissed following an inquiry that found that she had committed perjury and had intentionally erased key information in a report to the President concerning SAPS actions during the 2012 Marikana massacre. Furthermore, Arno Lamoer, the former SAPS Western Cape Provincial Commissioner (2010-15) was sentenced to six years imprisonment in 2018 for receiving bribes. In November 2018, Deliwe de Lange and Mmamonnye Ngobeni the SAPS provincial commissioners for Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal respectively retired in the wake of corruption scandals. The current National SAPS Commissioner Khela Sitole, was at the time of writing, implicated in a corruption scandal.

Fraud in the Public Sector Including Organs of State, also known as the Zondo Commission, was set up in 2018 and has, since then, shed light on the extent of the damage of state capture specifically during Zuma's presidency from 2009 to 2018. This crisis of state governance has also had a profound impact on local and provincial developments in light of the undermining of key state institutions involved in safety and security.

Crisis as a driver of innovation

There are perhaps two particular developments which have occurred that have inspired the most innovation as a response to the poly-crises – one is the political motivation which has led local and provincial governments to seek innovative solutions and the other is linked explicitly to a lack of operational control over, as mentioned, a public police itself in crisis.

Political motivation

The Western Cape province is politically unique in South Africa as both the main city, Cape Town, and the province is entirely controlled by an opposition (minority) political party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). The DA, which has had ambitions to expand its electoral support base throughout South Africa, has intentionally sought to promote good governance and economic development and safety in both the City of Cape Town and the Western Cape Province in an attempt to demonstrate that it has ability to provide effective public services, governance and safety outcomes (Democratic Alliance, 2018). In other words, being the main opposition party holding power in the Western Cape Province and having to retain electoral

votes, making people safe became the fundamental hearts and minds driver to keep this power, in light of the high rates of crime and violence and the public policing crisis.

This essentially created the space for innovation, such as a shift from conventional *whole-of-government* approaches to a *whole-of-society* approach through harnessing and embracing the plurality (both state and non-state) characteristic of much of South Africa and particularly in the Western Cape. The culmination of this has been the Western Cape Provincial Government's Safety Plan (Western Cape Government, 2019), which, at the time of writing, will be implemented in partnership with the City of Cape Town and other relevant stakeholders. The aim of the Plan is to increase and enhance the policing of the most unsafe areas in the City of Cape Town, as well as address the determinants of violent crime. A whole-of-society approach is a key implementation principal of the Plan. However, such a state of affairs has, at times, also contributed to acute tensions between national government (led by the African National Congress) and the city authorities in relation to resource allocation and policy priorities.

Policing without the public police

Another fundamental driver of innovation is directly related to the inability of the DA as a minority opposition party in power to politically or operationally control the public police, the SAPS. Furthermore, the impact of state capture on public police governance and as mentioned, the various high level cases of corruption and abuse of power, has all fed into a broader legitimacy crisis of public policing in South Africa (Lamb, 2021). In other words, besides a mandated police oversight role held by the provincial government, both the local and provincial governments in the Western Cape have sought to innovate and operate in a space of creating safety *without* overt reliance on the SAPS.

This has been a blessing in disguise as there have been reforms and innovations initiated by the Western Cape government and the City of Cape Town within the safety and security sector in Cape Town due to the significant safety deficit; the often strained relationship between the local and provincial government and the SAPS; and the DA's aspiration to increasingly indicate that it has the capacity to effectively govern South Africa at a national level. Generally speaking, the City of Cape Town has sought to innovate with respect to its own local level security and policing personnel including the Metropolitan (or Metro) Police, Law Enforcement department and others, while the provincial government has sought innovative ways to capacitate the non-state, amongst other things. These reforms will be discussed in more detail below.

Technological solutions for improved safety and security

In recent years, the City of Cape Town has placed a strong emphasis on the use of technology as key means to enhance its responses to safety and security challenges. Technology here can be seen as another actant or player within plural policing arrangements, but also as driving plural engagement on the ground amongst various policing entities. The flagship technological interventions have been: CCTV; the Emergency and Policing Incident Control (EPIC) system; and ShotSpotter. The City of Cape Town has also been exploring the use of drone surveillance technology in emergency and traffic incidents, protest action, policing operations and land invasions (Lewis, 2015).

CCTV has been a key policing tool for the City of Cape Town since the late-1990s, which has also provided surveillance of crime hotspots. In 2010 the City of Cape Town's Metro Police reported that it had access to a network of 442 CCTV cameras. At the time the Metro Police boasted that it was the largest area surveillance agency in Africa (Cape Town Metropolitan

Police Department, 2010). Between 2010 and 2018, the CCTV network has more than tripled. That is, as of April 2018 the City of Cape Town reported that it had access to a total of 1,544 cameras, as well as access to 513 privately registered CCTV cameras (Cape Argus, 2018). There is a dedicated Camera Response Unit that has been created to respond to actual and potential safety, security and emergency incidents (City of Cape Town, 2017a).

EPIC, which was initiated in 2016, is an integrated and coordinated electronic management communication tool for emergency and policing incidents. All response units are provided with tablets that are connected to a central command centre, as well as to relevant traffic authority and SAPS databases, including the Central Firearm Registry. EPIC also allows for real-time crime mapping and analysis. It is currently being used by a range of city-level departments, including the Metro Police, Law Enforcement, Traffic Services, Emergency Services, Fire and Rescue, Disaster Management, and Social Development Services amongst others (Buckle, 2017). The system also allows for the inclusion of neighbourhood watch structures and Community Police Forums[2] (City of Cape Town, 2017a).

ShotSpotter is an acoustic technology that was originally developed for law enforcement purposes in the US. The system draws on a series of specialised sensors in order to pinpoint the location of gunshot incidents and then relays this information to law enforcement officials in terms of a mapping interface (ShotSpotter, 2018). The ShotSpotter project in Cape Town, which is the only one outside of the US, currently covers an area of seven square kilometres in Hanover Park and Manenberg, which are gang violence hotspots. It has recently been linked to

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[2] A Community Police Forum is a legally constituted mechanism that, since 1995, has been, by and large, established in police station districts for the purposes of building good relations between the police and community, drawing in non-state resources and also to promote police legitimacy (Du Plessis & Louw, 2005). Normatively speaking, Community Police Forums meet on a regular basis and these meetings are administered by SAPS, however, this depends on the functionality of the Forum.

the CCTV camera network in an attempt to identify those responsible for discharging firearms and other firearm-related crime. The effectiveness of this technology is highly dependent on the support of the SAPS, but in April 2018 the City of Cape Town reported: "While there is certainly support for the ShotSpotter concept, the limited SAPS resources and response to alerts remains a challenge" (Ndlendle, 2018). By March 2018, more than 2,200 gunshots had been detected.

Neighbourhood Safety Officers and Neighbourhood Safety Teams

The City of Cape Town has also been experimenting with the deployment of Neighbourhood Safety Officers (NSOs) and the creation of Neighbourhood Safety Teams (NSTs). NSOs and NSTs are based on the local application of the problem-oriented approach to policing within a whole-of-society framing. Problem-oriented policing seeks to identify and analyse varieties and clusters of problems within a community that may ultimately result in criminality and disorder (Goldstein, 1990; Hinkle, Weisburd, Telep & Petersen, 2020). An NSO is typically a specially trained Metro Police official that is deployed in a specific neighbourhood to identify safety problems and coordinate the solving thereof with relevant community and local government stakeholders. As of April 2018, there were 16 NSOs that were deployed to 17 areas, most of which have high levels of crime (City of Cape Town, 2018).

NSTs, at the time of writing, was still in the early stages of being rolled out, with a pilot project currently being pursued in the suburb of Delft (Fisher, 2017). NSTs will draw members from relevant city entities, community organisations, such as Community Police Forums and neighbourhood watch structures, in order to provide a more comprehensive problem-solving approach to safety and security problems. The Delft NST, given the intensity of gang violence

in the area, includes members of the Metro Police's Stabilisation Unit and Gang and Drug Task Team (City of Cape Town, 2017a).

Rent-a-Cop, volunteers and cadets

In 2008 the City of Cape Town established the Rent-a-cop programme. This programme entails the private sector sponsoring half of the costs of a junior Law Enforcement officer. These officers are then deployed in specific areas at specific times to provide for improved visible policing and the issuing of fines for traffic and by-law violations. This initiative has mostly been used by business associations, ward counsellors and Business Improvement Districts (Mccain, 2016; Western Cape Government, 2009). For example, in the 2017/18 financial year, the South African Breweries contributed close to ZAR4 million towards this initiative (City of Cape Town, 2017b).

Since 2013 the City of Cape Town has maintained the Volunteer Auxiliary Law Enforcement Service, which draws on volunteers to support neighbourhood safety interventions throughout the city, particularly in relation to neighbourhood watch structures. The City of Cape Town also introduced a Volunteer Cadet Youth programme in 2013 in an effort to expand its law enforcement and visible policing capacity, but also to contribute to active citizen and social responsiveness amongst youth in Cape Town. Between 2013 and 2017 there has been the participation of approximately 2,000 cadets. Graduates from the programme wear a uniform and can be deployed to assist more experienced Metro Police and Law Enforcement officials (People's Post, 2018).

Furthermore, both local and provincial governments have focused on capacitating neighbourhood watches through training, resourcing, licencing and accreditation. In particular

the Department of Community Safety, Western Cape Government runs a Neighbourhood Watch Accreditation and Support Programme, in support of the neighbourhood watch model, which itself describes as "a whole-of-society approach to prevent crime and violence" (Western Cape Government, 2021). This is particularly pertinent given the multiple roles being allocated to neighbourhood watch members, for instance, the recruitment of accredited neighbourhood watch members as Disaster Risk Management volunteers to assist during Covid-19 and in partnership with the City of Cape Town, with the enforcement of social distancing at key sites of public interaction – such as transport hubs, hospitals and shops. (Francke, 2020).

All of these strategies have aimed at enhancing plurality through multiplying those involved in safety provision, besides only the SAPS.

Gang violence reduction

Through the financial support of the City of Cape Town, the Ceasefire/Cure Violence gang interruption model has been used by a community organisation (First Community Resource Centre) in two high violence areas, Hanover Park and Manenberg. In essence the approach involves the deployment of violence 'interrupters' who use mediation techniques in an attempt to defuse tensions between individual gang members. It also seeks to promote non-violence problem-solving norms in focal communities. The model was initially developed and refined in Chicago (US), and studies have shown that it has the potential to reduce firearm-related violence between alleged gang members (Ransford, Kane & Slutkin, 2013).

Both the City of Cape Town and the First Community Resource Centre have publicly stated that the programme has been a success. However, the SAPS have been unsupportive; and the approach has been undermined by the increased proliferation of illegal firearms and an

intensification of gang violence through the city in recent years. In May 2018, the City of Cape Town announced that it would no longer continue to fund the Ceasefire interventions, but announced that it would review this decision after there was public criticism of their initial decision (Booysen, 2018).

There are many more examples besides the ones highlighted here, such as the collaboration of the City of Cape Town and provincial government with an organisation known as Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU). This organisation has used environmental design and social crime prevention methods in high crime, high violence areas in Cape Town. There has also been a focus on harnessing the capacity of private security where the Western Cape Safety Plan of the provincial government, recognises the need to incorporate the private security industry within a whole-of-society model of safety (Western Cape Government, 2019). Considering that the private security outnumbers the SAPS by approximately 3:1 in South Africa it has a substantial contribution to make towards a plural model of safety provision – and in some spaces it is already doing so, for better or for worse (Berg & Howell, 2017, also see Diphoorn & Berg, 2014).

However, the motivating potential of the poly-crises is a double-edged sword and what follows is a reflection on the ways that crisis may undermine plurality.

Crises as undermining innovation

High violence contexts
One of the biggest obstacles to innovation and the development of whole-of-society and plural responses to safety is the impact of high levels of violence as itself an obstacle to practices on

the ground. For instance, in research involving both authors conducted for the provincial government in 2015/2016, it was found that neighbourhood watches in areas known for gang violence were unable to perform even the basic function of patrolling, as doing so would mean that members would cross over gang boundaries and so put themselves in danger (Safety and Violence Initiative & Centre of Criminology, 2016). Furthermore because of the high rates of gang homicides, the military has, in the past, been sent into these areas to halt shootings, however, this also tends to drive out any other type of response and may feed into heavy handed and militaristic strategies to deal with violence which may crowd out other options (Lamb, 2018).

Paramilitarism and militarisation

Related to the previous point, the crafting of inclusive plural policing arrangements/models have been fundamentally undermined by militaristic strategies and/or tendencies in nearly all forms of policing in South Africa to a greater or lesser extent – such as the public police and private security, as well as community organisations (such as neighbourhood watches) influenced by the practices of public policing entities as well as responding to the contextual dynamics of high crime and violence in their areas (Berg, 2010; Lamb, 2021). Much of this has to do with the urgency of halting the violence, as mentioned, but also related to the desire for short-term solutions and political wins.

Shifting mentalities and quick (political) wins

In the face of crises, what has been apparent is a constant political attraction to predominantly, what could be called, traditional law enforcement mentalities and approaches, or a 'governing-through-crime' approach primarily focused on arrests and punishment and characterised by police raids and crackdowns, increases in police numbers as well as the measurement of

progress towards safety in terms of numbers of arrests (Simon, 2013). This is not altogether problematic if its included within a broader whole-of-society framing in which a range of governing-through-harm and -crime responses take place to deal with complex safety problems. However, a governing-thorough-crime approach may end up crowding out other responses and may end up being more harmful to communities as well as shifting the problem (Berg & Shearing, 2018).

Conclusion: Plural policing and the SDGs

What we have hoped to do in this chapter is to place crises at the forefront of engagement with the SDGs, as both a driver and mitigator of innovations in safety governance – particularly attempts at crafting plural or whole-of-society systems of dealing with crime and violence. In fact, both the local and provincial governments have embraced the SDGs and used them to frame their integrated planning framework documents as a means to communicate and demonstrate a commitment to governance and safety that is not only relevant to the South African context, but also has global resonance. Yet, there is a need to engage more fully with the impact of these crises in terms of achieving the goals of the SDGs – particularly SDG 16. These types of crises are often pitched in a unidimensional way as perpetuating inequalities and vulnerabilities – and rightly so – but here we have shown that crises could and perhaps should be considered as an actant in shaping safety innovation not simply as a backdrop to this.

This has certainly been demonstrated by Covid-19 as significantly shaping governance practices all across the world. Drawing on the work of Bruno Latour, a prominent sociologist advocating for the non-human to be considered as 'actants', the pandemic has indeed been described as a "nonhuman actant" as well as an "innovation catalyst" (Hanson, 2020; El Hilali, 2020). In this chapter we want to expand this framing of crises as actants, to these normalised

crisis apparent in Global South contexts as well as the "North's Souths" – spaces in the Global North characterised by similar crises (Blaustein, Fitz-Gibbon, Pino & White, 2020, p. 5). This is in light of the fact that much of the focus of implementing the SDGs – particularly from the perspective of global bodies like the United Nations – has been on improving governance systems globally and locally (such as criminal justice systems) as well as the rule of law to deal with crises (Blaustein, Fitz-Gibbon, Pino & White, 2020). In other words,

> "Instead of focussing on practices on the ground, there is a tendency to start off with a normative descriptor (e.g., 'the rule of law') by which we attempt to define what is happening on the ground. This normative descriptor may work in some contexts, but it may be inadequate in others." (Berg & Shearing, 2020b, p. 168)

Here we have shown the real effects of crises directly impacting on these normative aspirations of good governance systems and rule of law (given the extent of state capture for instance) and inspiring innovation outside of conventional 'rule of law' approaches and 'crime prevention' strategies and ways of thinking. By initiating a normative framing without consideration of the impacts of crises as 'actants' of change we miss the potential for enhancing local level innovation.

Furthermore, in this chapter we have also demonstrated that innovation may rise in the face of policing deficits, whereas often these are pitched as the problem rather than, ironically, the inspiration for a solution. In this vein, much attention has been aimed at reforming public policing, mostly informed by Western and Global North narratives (Ellison & Pino, 2012). Yet our South African example speaks to broader issues associated with the defund the police

movement which may involve diverting funding from public policing entities to fund more social services, or it can entail abolishing the police altogether:

> "Abolition … is about dismantling oppressive structures, including policing, whilst simultaneously building new ways of responding to harm and inequality and enacting new forms of justice." (Joseph-Salisbury, Connelly & Wangari-Jones, 2021).

Here we have presented a real-world instance of a defund-the-police-type situation where local and provincial government have had to either work with their own, limited, policing entities (such as the Metro police) in novel ways and/or draw on technology and the non-state more broadly in innovative, 'new ways' to address complex crime and violence problems.

Ultimately, what our chapter has sought to show is that any broadscale normative attempts such as the SDGs – especially aimed in similar contexts of crises – need to factor into account not only the situational and contextual vagaries of unsafety but also the real impact of crises as drivers and mitigators, so as to begin to close the gap between normative aspiration and real local-level attainment of sustainable and inclusive safety governance.

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