On some intracranialist dogmas in epistemology

Carter, J. A. (2022) On some intracranialist dogmas in epistemology. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 1(2), 44. (doi: 10.1007/s44204-022-00045-z)

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Abstract

Research questions in mainstream epistemology often take for granted a cognitive internalist picture of the mind. Perhaps this is unsurprising given the seemingly safe presumptions that (i) knowledge entails belief (viz. the entailment thesis) and that (ii) the kind of belief that knowledge entails supervenes exclusively on brainbound cognition. It will be argued here that (contra orthodoxy) the most plausible version of the entailment thesis holds just that knowledge entails dispositional belief. However, regardless of whether occurrent belief supervenes only as the cognitive internalist permits, we should reject the idea that dispositional belief supervenes only in cognitive internalist-friendly ways. These observations, taken together, reveal two things: first, that a cognitive internalist picture of the mind is much more dispensable in epistemology than has been assumed and, second, that pursuing questions in extended epistemology need not involve any radical departure from the commitments of more traditional epistemological projects.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Carter, Professor J Adam
Authors: Carter, J. A.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Asian Journal of Philosophy
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:2731-4642
ISSN (Online):2731-4642
Published Online:01 October 2022
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2022 The Author
First Published:First published in Asian Journal of Philosophy 1(2): 44
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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