Willard-Kyle, C. (2023) The knowledge norm for enquiry. Journal of Philosophy, 120(11), pp. 615-640. (doi: 10.5840/jphil20231201134)
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Abstract
A growing number of epistemologists have endorsed the Ignorance Norm for Inquiry. Roughly, this norm says that one should not inquire into a question unless one is ignorant of its answer. I argue that, in addition to ignorance, proper inquiry requires a certain kind of knowledge. Roughly, one should not inquire into a question unless one knows it has a true answer. I call this the Knowledge Norm for Inquiry. Proper inquiry walks a fine line, holding knowledge that there is an answer in the left hand and ignorance of the answer in the right.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Additional Information: | Funding: I am also grateful to Therme Group for funding this project. |
Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Willard-Kyle, Dr Christopher |
Authors: | Willard-Kyle, C. |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Journal of Philosophy |
Publisher: | Journal of Philosophy |
ISSN: | 0022-362X |
ISSN (Online): | 1939-8549 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2023 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc. |
First Published: | First published in 120(11):615-640 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy |
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