The knowledge norm for enquiry

Willard-Kyle, C. (2023) The knowledge norm for enquiry. Journal of Philosophy, 120(11), pp. 615-640. (doi: 10.5840/jphil20231201134)

[img] Text
277561.pdf - Accepted Version
Restricted to Repository staff only until 1 November 2024.

490kB

Abstract

A growing number of epistemologists have endorsed the Ignorance Norm for Inquiry. Roughly, this norm says that one should not inquire into a question unless one is ignorant of its answer. I argue that, in addition to ignorance, proper inquiry requires a certain kind of knowledge. Roughly, one should not inquire into a question unless one knows it has a true answer. I call this the Knowledge Norm for Inquiry. Proper inquiry walks a fine line, holding knowledge that there is an answer in the left hand and ignorance of the answer in the right.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:Funding: I am also grateful to Therme Group for funding this project.
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Willard-Kyle, Dr Christopher
Authors: Willard-Kyle, C.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Journal of Philosophy
Publisher:Journal of Philosophy
ISSN:0022-362X
ISSN (Online):1939-8549
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2023 The Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
First Published:First published in 120(11):615-640
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

University Staff: Request a correction | Enlighten Editors: Update this record