On the virtue of epistemic justice and the vice of epistemic injustice

Kotsonis, A. (2022) On the virtue of epistemic justice and the vice of epistemic injustice. Episteme, (doi: 10.1017/epi.2022.32) (Early Online Publication)

Abstract

In this paper, I develop an account of epistemic justice as a character-based intellectual virtue that a truth-desiring agent would want to possess. The agent who possesses this virtue is just towards other knowers in matters pertaining to epistemic goods and this involves a regard for agents as knowers. Notably, the virtue of epistemic justice has a unique position among virtues: epistemic justice is presupposed by every other intellectual virtue, while remaining a standalone virtue itself. Correspondingly, I also offer an account of the vice of epistemic injustice as an epistemically dis-valuable trait of character. The agent who possesses this trait is unjust towards other knowers in matters pertaining to epistemic goods and this involves a disregard for agents as knowers. Most importantly, I highlight that the vice of epistemic injustice is entailed by every other epistemic vice, though it remains a distinct vice.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Early Online Publication
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Kotsonis, Dr Alkis
• Authors: Kotsonis, A.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > School of Education
• Journal Name: Episteme
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• ISSN: 1742-3600
• ISSN (Online): 1750-0117
• Published Online: 27 September 2022
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2022 The Author
• First Published: First published in Episteme 2022
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy