One-system integrity and the legal domain of morality

Crummey, C. (2022) One-system integrity and the legal domain of morality. Legal Theory, 28(4), pp. 269-297. (doi: 10.1017/S1352325222000155)

Abstract

According to contemporary nonpositivist theories, legal obligations are a subset of our genuine moral obligations. Debates within nonpositivism then turn on how we delimit the legal “domain” of morality. Recently, nonpositivist theories have come under criticism on two grounds. First, that they are underinclusive, because they cannot explain why paradigmatically “legal” obligations are such. Second, that they are overinclusive, because they count as “legal” certain moral obligations that are plainly nonlegal. This paper undertakes both a ground-clearing exercise for and a defense of nonpositivism. It argues, in particular, that Dworkin's claims about the legal domain of morality in his later work are often mischaracterized by critics, because these critics fail to read these claims in light of his earlier theory of “Law as Integrity.” A nonpositivist theory that unifies Dworkin's earlier and later work, I argue, deals with the criticisms leveled at nonpositivist theories better than other nonpositivist competitors.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Published
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Crummey, Mr Conor
• Authors: Crummey, C.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > School of Law
• Journal Name: Legal Theory
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• ISSN: 1352-3252
• ISSN (Online): 1469-8048
• Published Online: 05 October 2022
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2022 The Author
• First Published: First published in Legal Theory 28(4): 269-297
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License