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Humanitarianism, Egalitarianism, and Support for Political Compromise

ABSTRACT: Democratic policymaking requires compromise, but public support for it varies substantially. Scholars know relatively little about the psychology of such public attitudes. In this investigation, we consider the predictive capacities of humanitarianism (a commitment to helping those who are suffering) and egalitarianism (a commitment to equal treatment). Such altruistic values, we argue, foster concern for the common good and a cooperative vision of democratic policymaking — which, in turn, engender support for compromise. Moreover, we suggest that partisan differences in such values (with Democrats being more likely to prioritize them, on average, than Republicans are), help explain Democrats' disproportionate support for compromise. Data from two nationally representative studies are consistent with this theoretical perspective, offering novel insights into the roots of political compromise, the reach of core values as political determinants, and the dynamics of partisan asymmetry.

Key Words: compromise, core values, humanitarianism, egalitarianism, cooperative visions of democratic policymaking, partisan asymmetry

Political compromise enhances democratic efficacy (Crick, 2005 [1962]; Gutmann and Thompson 2012), but many citizens are unwilling to support it — at least when it comes to how they want their *own* representatives to behave (e.g., Hibbing, Theiss-Morse, and Whitaker 2009, Wolak 2020).¹ Such public resistance incentivizes obstinacy on the part of those lawmakers (e.g., Barker and Carman 2012, Kamarck and Wallner 2018, Anderson, Butler and Harbridge 2020).² Thus, as a burgeoning literature reflects, it is important to understand the variance in public attitudes toward political compromise (e.g., Hibbing, Theiss-Morse and Whitaker 2009; Mackuen et al. 2010; Harbridge and Malhotra 2011, Wolf, Strachan and Shea 2012; Harbridge, Malhotra and Harrison 2014; Haas 2016, Bauer, Harbridge and Krupnikov 2017; Kirkland and Harden 2018; Wolak 2020).³

Some prominent explanations for why many people oppose political compromise point to moral, ideological, and religious commitments (Barker and Carman 2012, Ryan 2017, Delton, DeScioli and Ryan 2019, Grossmann and Hopkins 2016), which can make compromise feel like “selling out” or “dancing with the devil” (e.g., Grossmann and Hopkins 2016, Lelkes and Sniderman 2016, Schufeldt 2018, Ryan 2017, Delton, DeScioli and Ryan, 2019; also see Ginges et al. 2007; Skitka 2010). An easy inference to draw from these studies is that the psychology of compromise is

¹ Compromise is related to, but distinct from, bipartisanship; the former remains relatively common in Congress, but actual compromise — conceding something significant to political adversaries in order to gain passage of an important and visible bill (Lepora 2012)—is increasingly rare (e.g., Sparks and Conover 2020).

² Of course, public demands are only one of many factors that influence legislative decision-making and the tendency toward gridlock (e.g., Binder 2003, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006, Theriault 2008, Barber and McCarty 2015, Lee 2016).

³ Public attitudes toward compromise are one category of political *process attitudes*, which affect democratic outcomes in a variety of important ways (e.g., Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, Hibbing, Theiss-Morse and Whitaker 2009; Doherty 2015, Reeves and Rogowski 2016, 2018).

one of moderation, perfidy, and/or weakness — that people support compromise when they lack either the principles or the guts to demand what they really want (also see Berelson 1952).⁴

We suggest, by contrast, that *some* moral commitments can actually motivate support for compromise. Specifically, we reason that altruistic values such as humanitarianism (a commitment to helping those who are suffering) and egalitarianism (a commitment to equal treatment) nurture concern for the common good and a conceptualization of democratic policymaking that emphasizes cooperation over competition. As such, we argue, it is easier for committed humanitarians and egalitarians to make concessions in service to a broader “deal” than it is for citizens whose values and orientations are weighted more toward individualism, competitiveness, and/or social dominance.⁵

Moreover, because Democrats are more likely than Republicans to prioritize humanitarian and egalitarian policy goals over individualistic and/or hierarchy-preserving ones (e.g., Barker and Tinnick 2006, McAdams et al. 2008, Piurko, Schwartz and Davidov 2011, Haidt 2012, Barker and Marietta 2020), we suggest that such asymmetrical partisan value dynamics help explain the well-established tendency of Democrats to support political compromise more readily than Republicans

⁴ Education, civic skills, and social capital appear to counteract the obstinacy-inducing influence of dogmatism (Wolak 2020), but they do not predict support for compromise on their own — at least not consistently across ideological groups (Glaser, Berry and Schildkraut 2019).

⁵ The role of egalitarianism as an attitudinal and ideological determinant enjoys a conspicuous scholarly lineage in political science (e.g., Feldman 1988, McClosky and Zaller 1984, Feldman and Steenbergen 2001). So does the role of humanitarianism (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; ak.a. “nurturance,” [Lakoff 1996], “care,” [Haidt 2012], or “benevolence” [e.g., Schwartz 1992]). Although humanitarianism and egalitarianism are distinct from each other, both conceptually and empirically (e.g., Feldman and Steenbergen 2001), they share an altruistic component, which is important for our argument.

do (Hibbing, Theiss-Morse and Whitaker 2009, Wolf, Strachan and Shea 2012, Grossmann and Hopkins 2016, Ryan 2017, Glaser and Berry 2018, Mason 2018, Wolak 2020, but see Davis 2019).⁶

Two nationally representative studies, undertaken during quite different political contexts and using different measures, offer robust empirical support for our theoretical argument. We suggest that these findings (a) offer new insight on the psychology of political compromise, (b) broaden the range of political attitudes for which scholars examine core values as potential determinants, and (c) heighten understanding of partisan asymmetry in political cognition. We hope that they will catalyze further investigations to strengthen causal inference. **Not comparing**

The Psychology of Attitudes toward Political Compromise

As with so many other political attitudes, citizens differ considerably when it comes to their views of political compromise. To provide just one example, in a 2019 poll by George Washington University, respondents split evenly between those who expressed a preference for politicians who “make compromises with people they disagree with” and those who preferred politicians who “stick to their positions” — with 64% of Democrats favoring the former statement and 66% of Republicans favoring the latter (Sides 2019).

Breaking such attitudes down further, citizens tend to support the abstract principle of compromise far more than they support compromises on the part of *their own* representatives (Wolak

⁶ As Haidt and colleagues have observed (e.g., Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009), “care” (i.e., humanitarianism) is relevant to the moral framework of both liberals and conservatives (and thus, to Democrats as well as Republicans), but liberals/Democrats are much more likely to prioritize it. Also, whereas “fairness” is important to both liberals/Democrats and conservatives/Republicans, the latter tend to define it less as egalitarianism than as rewards/punishments that comport with effort and conduct.

2020) — especially when it comes to highly salient and divisive issues (Blumenthal 2010; Doherty, Kiley and Johnson 2018, Sides 2019).

What explains the variance in such attitudes? Some studies have pointed to differences in (1) anger (e.g., Mackuen et al. 2010), (2) psychological loss aversion (Glaser and Berry 2018), (3) anti-government sentiment (Glaser and Berry 2018, Glaser, Berry and Schildkraut 2019), (4) perceived threat (Maoz and McCauley 2009; Halperin, Porat and Wohl 2013, Haas 2016), and (5) social identity consciousness (Cohen et al. 2007, Mason 2018, Davis 2019).⁷

Perhaps the most prominent explanation, though, points to conviction — moral, ideological, and/or religious (e.g., Ryan 2017, Delton, DeScioli and Ryan 2019, Grossmann and Hopkins 2016). Such conviction, the argument goes, causes people to view compromise as a violation of something sacred rather than a transactional necessity in pluralistic communities (e.g., Tetlock 2003, Marietta 2012). The logic and evidence for this perspective are compelling, as a general rule, but we suggest that there are some important exceptions to that rule. That is, we argue that some core values actually engender *support*, not resistance, to compromise.⁸

⁷ Surely, strategic considerations are also very important: citizens, like negotiators themselves, are likely less willing to support “playing ball” with the other side when they know their side has bargaining leverage in the form of partisan majority status and general political capital (e.g., Schelling 1960, Dwyer and Walker 1981, Keohane 1984; Pinkley, Neale and Bennett 1994). However, such strategic considerations vary within individuals over time. We want to understand more deep-seated instincts that lead a person to be either more or less disposed toward supporting compromise, independent of strategic calculation.

⁸ These explanations are consistent with the vast literature core values (a.k.a. “moral foundations” [e.g., Haidt 2012] or “principles” [Peffley and Hurwitz 1985]), which can be defined as “abstract, cognitive representations of desirable, trans-situational goals (e.g., Rokeach 1973, Schwartz 1992) or “innate, universal psychological systems that are the ‘intuitive ethics’ from which culture then constructs virtues, narratives, and institutions” (e.g., Graham, Haidt and Nosek 2009). Core values are fundamental to personal identity (Lupton, Smallpage and Enders 2020) and the inherent conflict between them grounds political ideology to a significant degree (e.g., Kerlinger 1984, Jacoby 2006, Feldman 2013). Unlike specific policy preferences, which tend to be fairly capricious (e.g., Zaller

The specific values we have in mind are *humanitarianism* and *egalitarianism*. Though the former is rooted in emotional sympathy and the latter is rooted in a devotion to fairness (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001), the two values share an empathetic concern for others to whom one is not genetically or “tribally” related — especially for the underprivileged and downtrodden.⁹ It stands to reason, then, that such humanitarians and egalitarians (who are often, but not always, the same people) would also tend to feel positively disposed toward political processes that prioritize sociotropic bridging between groups. Compromise is one such political process, almost by definition. To compromise, after all, is to make some measure of parochial sacrifice in order to promote meaningful progress toward a collective agreement. Fittingly, in actual negotiation settings, compassion is associated with successful deal-making (e.g., Allred et al. 1997).¹⁰

More directly, such altruistic instincts may also inspire a conceptualization of democratic policymaking that pursues consensus through cooperation (e.g., Rousseau 1762, Mansbridge 1980, Habermas 1984, Fishkin 1991) — to which compromise is essential. The absence of such instincts, by contrast, may lead to a vision of democratic policymaking as a venue for tribal competition

1992), core values tend to be deeply rooted in cultural, religious, evolutionary, personality, and even genetic differences (e.g., Duckitt and Sibley 2010, Oxley et al. 2008, Smith et al. 2011, Alford et al. 2005). A dense literature documents the ways that such values structure specific policy attitudes (e.g., Rokeach 1973, Feldman 1988, Schwartz 1992, Feldman and Steenbergen 2001, Jacoby 2014, Levy and Wright 2020; but see Goren 2005, Connors 2019).

⁹ Egalitarianism is not a synonym for fairness concerns, writ large. Punitive attitudes are also rooted in conceptions of fairness (e.g., Haidt 2012).

¹⁰ None of this is to suggest that committed humanitarians/egalitarians are always willing to give up their preferred policy outcomes to salvage a deal. Undoubtedly, when policy disputes are about whether or how much to help the downtrodden, committed altruists often stick to their positions and refuse to compromise. We are merely suggesting that, on average, humanitarians and egalitarians are more likely to bend in the service of progress toward collective goals than are those who possess more individualistic or socially competitive worldviews.

(Sibley, Wilson and Duckitt 2007), to which compromise is anathema (see Allred et al. 1997; also see Glaser, Berry and Schildkraut 2019).¹¹ This logic is supported by historical analyses pointing to the socially Darwinistic roots of “adversarial” policymaking in the early Republic, as well as the altruistic underpinnings of its more cooperative alternatives (Mansbridge 1980). Likewise, Levine (1999) describes how pushing for cooperative models of democratic policymaking was central to Progressive era ambitions — the essence of which were altruistic commitments toward the needy and the oppressed.

Accordingly, we further suggest that humanitarian and egalitarian values account for some of the oft-noted partisan asymmetry in support for compromise (e.g., Grossmann and Hopkins, 2016, Ryan 2017, Davis 2019, Glaser and Berry 2018, Glaser, Berry and Schildkraut 2019). American liberals/progressives tend to define morality in humanitarian and egalitarian terms, after all, whereas ideological conservatives are more likely to prioritize competition, individualism, and punitive justice (e.g., Lakoff 1996, Barker and Tinnick 2006, Mcadams et al. 2008, Haidt 2012, Barker and Marietta 2020).¹² As such, given the parties’ contemporary ideological sorting (e.g., Levendusky 2009), we argue that Democrats are more likely than Republicans to view compromise as a tool for progress, whereas the latter are more likely to view it as selling out. Such commitments to altruistic values such as humanitarianism and egalitarianism, and thus (per our argument) to a vision of collective decisionmaking in which consensus is a goal, may help to account for Democrats’ relatively steadfast

¹¹ The pluralistic conceptualization of democratic policymaking is a common one, as reflected in Lasswell’s (1936) famous definition: “politics is who gets what, when and how.”

¹² American ideological progressivism also includes instinctive orientations toward “openness” (e.g., Johnston, Lavine and Federico 2017), reason (e.g., Oliver and Wood 2018), and some expressions of populism (e.g., Judis 2020), among other things. Therefore, differences in humanitarianism and egalitarianism are not just proxies for ideology, though they are important elements of it.

pursuit of compromise despite some evidence that the contemporary Republican Party does not always deliberate in good faith (e.g., Hacker and Pierson 2016, Mann and Ornstein 2016).

To summarize and state our hypotheses formally:

H₁: Humanitarianism is associated with support for political compromise

H₂: Egalitarianism is associated with support for political compromise

H₃: Humanitarianism and egalitarianism, account, in-part, for the disproportionate tendency of Democrats to express support for compromise, relative to Republicans

H₄: A conceptualization of democratic policymaking that emphasizes cooperation over group competition mediates the relationships between humanitarianism/egalitarianism and support for political compromise

In the remainder of this paper, we describe our empirical assessments.

Empirics

Below, we describe two studies that assess our hypotheses across different partisan configurations of governing authority. That is, Study 1 took place in 2017, when Republicans controlled the presidency and both houses of Congress, whereas Study 2 took place in 2021, when Democrats enjoyed such unified governing authority. Both studies evaluate Hypotheses 1-3, using slightly different measurement strategies to evaluate the robustness of the relationships. Because the survey instrument used in Study 1 did not include a measure of cooperative vs. competitive visions of democratic policymaking, we were only able to evaluate Hypothesis 4 in Study 2.

Study I: Humanitarianism, Egalitarianism, and Support for Political Compromise

Study 1 uses survey data collected through the 2017 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES; n=1000).¹³ To measure *Support for Compromise*, we put the following question to respondents:

Some people believe that Democrats and Republicans should compromise so that stuff can get done and everyone can get a little of what they want. Others believe that compromise is selling out and makes things worse. What about you? When it comes to the issues below, to what extent do you believe that members from your party [TO PURE INDEPENDENTS: “members who share your point of view”] should bargain and compromise with the other side? (0=strongly oppose; 3=strongly support)¹⁴

Issues: Gun control, Immigration, the Minimum Wage, Abortion

These four issues, the order of which we randomized to respondents, are highly salient and contentious, and they represent a range of different issue domains (criminal justice, racial, sexual/religious, and economic).

We used principal component analysis to create an index of support for compromise (Cronbach’s alpha=.82), and converted it to a 0-1 scale (eigenvalue=2.58). The weighted

¹³ For survey methodological details regarding this specific survey, see the CCES Guide 2017 at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu>. For details regarding Yougov’s sampling methodology more broadly, see Ansolabehere, Schaffner and Luks (2020). For a discussion of the CCES methods and matching procedures, see Ansolabehere and Rivers (2013).

¹⁴ The patterns we report here are highly consistent, both substantively and statistically, with those we have observed across seven additional surveys that we conducted between 2017-2021. In most of those other years, we also included a survey question about general support/opposition to compromise, without reference to a specific issue. Those analyses reveal that humanitarian and egalitarian values predict such abstract support for compromise equally well, or better, than they do support with respect to specific issues (see Study 2, below, for one example).

contributions of each item in the index are nearly identical (*Gun Control*: Loading=.50; *Immigration*: Loading=.51; *Minimum Wage*: Loading=.50; *Abortion*: Loading=.49), indicating that no single issue or combination of issues is dominating the index.

By measuring respondents' attitudes toward compromise in relation to specific (highly contentious) issues by lawmakers who share their partisan/ideological point of view, rather than toward compromise as a general principle, we aim to capture respondents' own vicarious willingness to compromise, instead of their disposition toward a concept that is positively loaded and which most Americans have been conditioned to support (Wolak 2020). Specifically, we hoped to mitigate the likelihood of respondents interpreting the question as being about whether they think *the other side* should move toward them — which people are typically happy to accept (Blumenthal 2010, Tyson 2019, Wolak 2020).

In-so-doing, we expected to find somewhat weaker levels of support for compromise than some other studies have observed. This expectation was borne out; whereas many surveys find that around 2/3 of Americans or more tend to support the *principal* of compromise (e.g., Wolak 2020), our index reveals evenly distributed support and opposition to compromise when specific issue domains are triggered. (mean=.51; standard deviation=.29). See Table A1 in the Appendix for the frequency distributions of support for compromise as they relate to each specific issue.¹⁵

To measure *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism*, we gauged levels of agreement-disagreement with the following statements (0-4; 4=strongly agree; rescaled to 0-1 for analysis):

¹⁵ As we expected, fewer respondents supported compromise on the issue of abortion (see Table 1 the Appendix). The abortion issue, unlike the others, is highly related to one's faith tradition and perspective as well as to ideas about motherhood and sexual behavior, which means it is more likely to be considered sacred (e.g., Luker 1984).

- *Humanitarianism*: “Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial moral virtue” (mean=.78; s.d.=.24)¹⁶
- *Egalitarianism*: “When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated equally” (mean=.82; s.d.=.24)¹⁷

As expected, these two items are significantly correlated (polychoric rho=.48; $p < .001$), which is consistent with our argument that although they are distinct, they share an underlying orientation toward altruism.

To test our our first hypothesis, we estimated ordinary least squares regression models regressing *Support for Political Compromise* on *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism*. In light of the substantial correlation between *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism* that we just referenced, we analyzed the explanatory purchase of each variable without taking the other into account (Section I of the Supplementary Materials online displays models that include both simultaneously, revealing essentially the same patterns that we report here).¹⁸

To mitigate omitted variable bias (e.g., King Keohane and Verba 1994), we added the following covariates to the regression models: *Gender*, *Race*, *Age*, *Education*, *Born-Again Christian Identity*, *Moralism*, *Ideological Commitment*, *Closed Personality*, *Authoritarianism*, *Social Identity Consciousness*, and *Liberal-Conservative ID* (see the Appendix for measurement details and descriptive statistics

¹⁶ Humanitarianism is the actionable manifestation of compassion. We borrowed this item from Graham, Haidt and Nosek’s (2009) measure of *Care*, which we consider to be essentially the same value and is, on its face, an expression of altruism.

¹⁷ We borrowed this item almost verbatim from Graham, Haidt, and Nosek’s (2009) measure of “Fairness,” replacing “fairly” with “equally.”

¹⁸ Because the amount of missing data is negligible, we deleted it using the listwise method in all models.

regarding these additional covariates).¹⁹ Including *Liberal-Conservative ID* as a covariate provides a highly stringent test of the predictive efficacy of *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism*, given that liberal-conservative ideology follows in part to a remarkable degree from differences in these values (e.g., Lakoff 1996, Schwartz 1992, Haidt 2012, Barker and Marietta 2020). Despite the potentially flattening effect it could have on the slope coefficients for our explanatory variables of primary interest, we included *Liberal-Conservative Identity* in the model because we worried that leaving it out could lead to spuriously attributing predictiveness to *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism* that is in fact a product of other aspects of ideological liberalism to which those altruistic values are correlated.

Results

As Table 1 shows, a minimum-to-maximum difference in *Humanitarianism* corresponds to an increase in *Support for Compromise* of 19 points on the 0-1 scale ($p < .001$), and a minimum-to-maximum difference in *Egalitarianism* corresponds to a boost of 14 points ($p < .001$; $p < .05$).²⁰

Models predicting support for compromise with respect to each of the four issues, individually, reveal highly similar patterns (see the Supplementary Materials online, pp. 3-6). It is worth noting that *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism* are stronger predictors of *Support for Compromise* as it pertains to the issue of immigration, and weaker predictors of it as it pertains to the issue of abortion.

¹⁹ In light of concerns regarding post-treatment bias (controlling for variables that are causally subsequent to explanatory variables of interest; see Acharya, Blackwell and Sen 2016), we also estimate simple models that control only for exogenous demographic characteristics. The patterns we observe in those models are highly similar to those we describe here (see page 2 of the Supplementary Materials online).

²⁰ The Pearson's correlation between *Humanitarianism* and *Support for Compromise* is .16 ($p < .001$) and the correlation between *Egalitarianism* and *Support for Compromise* is .17 ($p < .001$).

With respect to the other covariates, three findings stand out that may appear surprising to some readers. First, in partial contradiction to some other studies (Glaser, Berry and Schildkraut 2019, Wolak 2020), *Education* is negatively associated with *Support for Compromise*. This negative relationship is not an artefact of model specification (it holds in a bivariate specification as well). It is consistent with Barker, Marietta, and DeTamble's (2021) finding that intellectualism is associated with hubris, which is in-turn associated with obstinacy. Second, in what may appear to contradict Glaser and Berry's (2018) assertions regarding authoritarianism, *Respect for Authority* is positively related to *Support for Compromise*, holding everything else constant. However, we do not place too much stock in this pattern because the bivariate relationship is null. Third, *ceteris paribus*, we observe no statistically reliable relationship between *Moralism* and *Support for Compromise*. However, we do not think any conclusions should be drawn from this "null" effect, because (a) the measure is quite different from Ryan's (2017) measure of moral conviction (in Study 2, we correct for this), and (b) in this case, in simpler model specifications, *Moralism* is significantly predictive of opposition to compromise.

Table 1:

Humanitarianism, Egalitarianism, and Support for Political Compromise (2017)

	<i>b (s.e.)</i>	<i>b (s.e.)</i>
<i>Humanitarianism</i>	.19 (.04)	
<i>Egalitarianism</i>		.14 (.04)
<i>White</i>	-.07 (.02)	-.06 (.02)
<i>Female</i>	-.02 (.01)	-.01 (.02)
<i>Age</i>	.03 (.04)	.02 (.04)
<i>Income</i>	.03 (.05)	.02 (.05)
<i>Education</i>	-.07 (.02)	-.06 (.02)
<i>Born Again</i>	-.04 (.02)	-.03 (.02)
<i>Liberal-Conservative ID</i>	-.17 (.03)	-.18 (.03)
<i>Ideological Commitment</i>	-.37 (.04)	-.35 (.05)
<i>Moralism</i>	-.05 (.03)	-.04 (.03)
<i>Closed Personality</i>	-.09 (.04)	-.09 (.04)
<i>Respect for Authority</i>	.07 (.03)	.06 (.03)
<i>Social Identity Consciousness</i>	-.12 (.04)	-.13 (.04)
Constant	.82	.85
n	925	925

NOTE: Cell entries are differences in the predicted value of *Support for Compromise* that correspond to minimum-to-maximum differences in the explanatory variables, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant relationships ($p < .05$) are in **bold**.

Finally, to test H_3 , we estimated five models regressing *Support for Compromise* on *Party Identification* (five-point: 0=Democrats; .25= Independents who “lean” Democratic; .5=Pure Independents; .75 Independents who “lean” Republican; 1=Republicans; mean=.43; s.d.=.34).²¹ The first model is a bivariate estimation, to observe the overall relationship. The second adds *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism*, to observe the degree to which those values are able to account for the partisan asymmetry by themselves. The third and fourth models replace those two altruistic variables with the other covariates from Table 1, in order to provide a standard for comparison—

²¹ Other simple analyses reveal that the most humanitarian respondents in the sample are 57 percentage-points more likely to identify as Democrats than as Republicans, and the most egalitarian respondents are 78 percentage-points more likely to identify as Democrats than as Republicans.

that is, to see how *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism* stack up as accountants of the correspondence between *Party ID* and *Support for Compromise* correspondence in relation to all of those other well known predictors. The difference between Models 3 and 4 is the presence of *Liberal-Conservative ID*. Model 3 excludes it, in light of the afore-mentioned powerful relationships between such ideological identification and those altruistic values, whereas Model 4 includes it to see if *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism* can independently account for some of the *Party ID* effect even after much of their predictive power has been omitted due to those inter-correlations. Finally, Model 5 includes all of the predictors in the model.

Table 2 displays the results. As we expected, overall, Republicans tend to score about 20-points lower on the 0-1 *Support for Compromise* index than do Democrats ($p < .001$). That relationship drops to 16.5 points when *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism* are added to the model (accounting for about 17% of it [likelihood ratio $\chi^2 = 21.22$; $p < .001$]). By comparison, Model 3 shows that, absent *Liberal-Conservative ID* (which, again, is partially a byproduct of *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism*), including the rest of the predictors in the model only reduces the independent predictiveness of *Party ID* to 18.9 points on the 0-1 scale. However, as Model 4 shows, adding *Liberal-Conservative ID* to the model makes a big difference — reducing the independent effect of *Party ID* to about 13 points on the 0-1 scale. Finally, adding *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism* to this most fully specified model reduces the independent effect of *Party ID* by another 1.8 percentage-points (rounding makes it appear as though it is only one percentage point in the table), or 14%, and reduces the *Liberal-Conservative ID* coefficient by five-percentage-points which renders it statistically indistinguishable from zero in a two-tailed test (42%; likelihood ratio $\chi^2 = 26.82$; $p < .001$).²²

²² It is notable that, while no matter what other variables are in the model, a robust independent relationship between Democratic identification and *Support for Compromise* remains, meaning that there is much more theoretical work to be done to fully account for that partisan asymmetry.

Table 2:

Party Identification, Altruistic Values (Humanitarianism and Egalitarianism), and Support for Political Compromise (2017)

	<i>b (s.e.)</i>				
<i>Party ID</i>	-.20 (.03)	-.17 (.03)	-.19 (.03)	-.13 (.03)	-.12 (.03)
<i>(5-point; GOP High)</i>					
<i>Humanitarianism</i>		.10 (.04)			-.15 (.04)
<i>Egalitarianism</i>		.12 (.04)			-.08 (.04)
<i>White</i>			-.05 (.02)	-.06 (.02)	-.05 (.02)
<i>Female</i>			-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	-.02 (.02)
<i>Age</i>			.01 (.04)	.03 (.04)	.00 (.04)
<i>Household Income</i>			.03 (.05)	.03 (.05)	.04 (.05)
<i>Education</i>			-.07 (.03)	-.07 (.03)	-.06 (.03)
<i>Born Again</i>			-.05 (.02)	-.04 (.02)	-.04 (.02)
<i>Ideological Commitment</i>			-.32 (.04)	-.34 (.04)	-.36 (.04)
<i>Moralism</i>			-.04 (.03)	-.03 (.03)	-.04 (.02)
<i>Closed Personality</i>			-.10 (.05)	-.10 (.04)	-.08 (.04)
<i>Respect for Authority</i>			.06 (.03)	.08 (.03)	.08 (.03)
<i>Social ID Consciousness</i>			-.12 (.05)	-.11 (.04)	-.12 (.05)
<i>Liberal-Conservative</i>				-.12 (.04)	.07 (.04)
Constant	.60	.39	.96	.95	.77
n	1000	1000	925	925	925

NOTE: Cell entries are differences in the predicted value of *Support for Compromise* that correspond to minimum-to-maximum differences in the explanatory variables, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant relationships ($p < .05$) are in **bold**.

In sum, Study 1 provides observational evidence that *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism* predict public support for political compromise — even after accounting for the other predictors of *Support for Compromise* that the extant literature has identified — and that these values account for a significant but not huge proportion of the partisan asymmetry in *Support for Compromise*.²³

²³ It is reasonable to wonder whether the results we observe might be a byproduct of the specific issues we referenced, but evidence from the 2017 Cooperative Congressional Election Study suggests that, with respect to these four issues, egalitarians/humanitarians/liberals/Democrats tend to be either just as unified and intense in their stances as individualists/conservatives/Republicans (minimum wage, gun control), or more so (immigration, abortion). Moreover, as we will describe, Study 2 uses a much larger battery of issue contexts and observes nearly identical results.

Study 2: Humanitarianism and Egalitarianism, a Cooperative Vision of Democracy, and Support for Political Compromise

To reiterate, this study serves three purposes. First, it strengthens the measurement of our concepts across the board, and in-so-doing, also assesses the analytical robustness of the patterns we observed in Study 1. Second, it aims to assess the degree to which our hypotheses find empirical support in a context in which Democrats, not Republicans, enjoyed unified control of government (the presidency and both houses of Congress).²⁴ Third, and perhaps most importantly, it aims to examine the the degree to which the relationships between humanitarianism/egalitarianism and support for compromise are mediated by a vision of democratic policymaking that is cooperative and common-good focused rather than one that is competitive and group-centered (H_4), which Study 1 could not do. If we observe that (a) altruistic values are meaningfully predictive of a cooperative policymaking vision, (b) such a cooperative vision is meaningfully predictive of support for compromise (even after accounting for altruistic values), and (c) a cooperative vision of democracy accounts significantly for the relationship between altruistic values and support for compromise, this study will have augmented our theoretical argument.

We again collected data as part of the *Cooperative Election Study* (November 3rd-December 7th, 2021, n=1,000). Our measure of *Support for Compromise* was similar to that in Study 1, but first as applied to compromise in general:

Some people say that political compromise is necessary so the country can make progress on big problems. Others say that compromise is just selling out and giving in to one's opponents. What do you think? Should the politicians in Washington who share your views make compromises with the other side? Or should they stand firm no matter what?

²⁴ To be clear, we do not aim to make direct comparisons about the predictiveness of *Humanitarianism* and/or *Egalitarianism* over time; we merely seek to observe the degree to which their predictiveness holds up in different contexts and using different metrics.

0=Strongly support standing firm | 1=Support standing firm | 2=Don't know;
3=Support making compromises | 4=Strongly support making compromises

We then asked respondents to answer the same question as it pertains to nine, rather than four, specific policy issues (presented in randomized order: health-care, tax-rates, abortion regulation, education, immigration, gun control, crime, the environment, and foreign policy).

As was the case in the analysis of Study 1, we used principal-component analysis to create an index of the ten items (eigenvalue=6.09; Cronbach's alpha=.92) and rescaled it to 0-1 for analysis (mean=.47; s.d.=.24). As was also the case in Study 1, the weighted contributions of each item to the principal components index are highly similar: general=.29; health care=.33; taxes=.33; abortion=.27; education=.34; immigration=.33; gun control=.30; crime=.33; environment=.30; foreign policy=.33). Section III of the print appendix displays the frequency distributions regarding each issue.

Two things stand out about this index. First, as expected and as we alluded to earlier, support is strongest in the abstract, without reference to any specific issue (mean=2.21 on the original scale).²⁵ Second, the mean level of support for the three items that were included in both studies (abortion, immigration, and gun control) was lower in 2021 than it was in 2017 (.41 to .50). We must be cautious about comparing such distributions across cross-sectional surveys, but given that the data were collected by the same survey organization in both years using the same methods, this difference *suggests* that it is possible that the American public became a little less supportive of compromise during this time period.

²⁵ With respect to the specific issues, support is strongest as it pertains to foreign policy (mean=2.07) and weakest as it pertains to abortion (mean=1.53) and gun control (mean=1.57). Support in relation to the rest of the policy issues ranges from 1.81 (crime) to 1.97 (education).

As for our measures of *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism*, we again used single Likert-Style items (0=Strongly Disagree; 4=Strongly Agree, which we rescaled to 0-1 for analysis):

- *Humanitarianism*: “We should always help people who are suffering, no matter why they are suffering.” (mean=.69; s.d.=.23)
- *Egalitarianism*: “We should make sure that everyone has equal rights, equal opportunity, and equal power in society” (mean=.77; s.d.=.26)

These statements differ from those we used in Study 1, in light of our experience fielding several additional studies between 2018-2020. In making changes, we sought to (1) emphasize the public (and therefore more policy relevant) aspect of *Humanitarianism* (making it more consistent with our measure of *Egalitarianism*), and (2) to partially mitigate the inherent social desirability of both value statements, in order to capture more of the genuine variance in these values across citizens. In *Humanitarianism*, in particular, we added “no matter what the reason” to distinguish citizens who condition their degree of humanitarianism on “deservingness” from those who do not. This effort may have proven fruitful, as both variables (especially *Humanitarianism*) have greater variance than they had in Study 1. Despite the wording changes, the two variables remain strongly correlated (to almost the exact same degree as in Study 1; polychoric $\rho=.51$; $p<=.001$) which supports our contention that they share an underlying orientation toward public altruism.

Analytically, we began by estimating a series of ordinary least squares regression equations in the same way that we had in Study 1 — focusing again on the explanatory purchase of either *Humanitarianism* or *Egalitarianism* independently, not in concert (models including both altruistic variables appear in Section IV of the Supplementary Materials online).

Once more, to mitigate omitted variable bias (e.g., King Keohane and Verba 1994) and to account for as many of the competing causal explanations we referred to earlier as possible, we also included covariates for *Gender, Race, Age, Education, Born-Again Christian Identity, Moral Conviction,*

Ideological Commitment, Liberal-Conservative ID, Closed Personality, Authoritarianism, and Social Identity Consciousness. We modified the measures of *Moral Conviction, Authoritarianism, and Closed Personality* to align with the validated “industry standards” for each (specific question wording and descriptive statistics appear in the [in-print] Appendix).

As in Study 1, in light of concerns regarding post-treatment bias (controlling for variables that are causally subsequent to explanatory variables of interest; see Acharya, Blackwell and Sen 2016), we also estimate simple models that control only for exogenous demographic characteristics. Those results appear in the Supplementary Materials online, which also report models predicting *Support for Compromise* as it pertains to each issue separately, as opposed to the principle component index. The patterns we observe in all of those alternate model specifications are highly similar to those we describe here.

Results: Re-Testing Hypotheses 1-2

Table 3 displays the results. Looking first at *Humanitarianism*, we see that a minimum-to-maximum difference corresponds to a substantial 13-point boost in *Support for Compromise* on the 0-1 scale ($p < .001$). For what it is worth, in a model that only includes the basic demographics as covariates, the correspondence jumps only marginally, to 16 points ($p < .001$). As for *Egalitarianism*, a minimum-to-maximum difference corresponds to a 14-point increase in *Support for Compromise* on the 0-1 scale ($p < .001$). The correspondence jumps to 19 points in a model that only includes demographics in the list of covariates ($p < .001$). In short, Study II provides additional evidence in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2.

Table 3: Humanitarianism, Egalitarianism, and Support for Political Compromise (2021)

	<i>b</i> (<i>s.e.</i>)	<i>b</i> (<i>s.e.</i>)
<i>Humanitarianism</i>	.13 (.03)	
<i>Egalitarianism</i>		.14 (.03)
<i>White</i>	.00 (.02)	.01 (.02)
<i>Female</i>	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.02)
<i>Age</i>	.07 (.03)	.06 (.03)
<i>Household Income</i>	.05 (.04)	.05 (.04)
<i>Education</i>	.03 (.03)	.03 (.03)
<i>Born Again</i>	-.06 (.02)	-.04 (.02)
<i>Liberal-Conservative ID</i>	-.15 (.03)	-.14 (.03)
<i>Ideological Commitment</i>	-.17 (.02)	-.17 (.02)
<i>Moral Conviction</i>	-.09 (.03)	-.08 (.03)
<i>Closed Personality</i>	-.03 (.04)	-.03 (.03)
<i>Authoritarianism</i>	.00 (.02)	.01 (.02)
<i>Social Identity Consciousness</i>	.01 (.03)	.01 (.03)
Constant	.39	.54
n	909	909

NOTE: Cell entries are differences in the predicted value of *Support for Compromise* that correspond to minimum-to-maximum differences in the explanatory variables, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant relationships ($p < .05$, two-tailed) are in **bold**.

Results: Re-Testing Hypothesis 3 — Accounting for Partisan Asymmetry in Support for Compromise

Next, to test H_3 , we again estimated five models to show the overall predictive capacity of *Party ID* (0=Democrats; .25=Independents who “lean” Democratic; 2=Pure Independents; .5=Independents who “lean” Republican; .75=Republicans; mean=.43; s.d.=.56) and the degree to which such partisan asymmetry can be accounted for by *Humanitarianism*, *Egalitarianism*, and combinations of the other covariates.²⁶ The first model is a bivariate estimation predicting *Support for*

²⁶ Bivariate analyses reveal that the most humanitarian respondents in the sample are 41 percentage-points more likely to identify as Democrats than as Republicans, and the most egalitarian respondents are 66 percentage-points more likely to identify as Democrats than as Republicans.

Compromise with *Party ID*. The second adds *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism* to observe the degree to which such altruistic values may account for partisan asymmetry in *Support for Compromise* by themselves. Models 3 and 4 replace *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism* with all of the other covariates from Table 1 — excluding *Liberal-Conservative ID* in Model 3 (for the reasons described earlier) and including it in Model 4 — to observe how those variables stack up against the others in accounting for partisan asymmetry. Model 5 includes all the covariates, to provide the fullest picture.

Table 4 displays the results. First, in the bivariate model, Republicans tend to score about 20 points lower than Democrats on the 0-1 *Support for Compromise* index. However, as Column 2 shows, when *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism* are introduced to the model, the correspondence between *Party ID* and *Support for Compromise* drops to about 16 points on the 0-1 index. In other words, the pair of altruistic values accounts for about 20% of the relationship between *Party ID* and *Support for Compromise* (likelihood ratio $\chi^2=13.31$ [$p<.001$]). By comparison, as Column 3 shows, when the rest of the covariates except *Liberal-Conservative Identity* are introduced to the model instead, the relationship between *Party ID* and *Support for Compromise* falls to about 17 points on the 0-1 index (so those covariates account collectively for for 15% of the relationship). In other words, the two altruistic values account for a comparable proportion of the partisan asymmetry in *Support for Compromise* (perhaps a bit more) as do the eleven other covariates. As Column 4 shows, when *Liberal-Conservative Identity* is added, the model performs significantly better at accounting for partisan asymmetry — accounting for about 35% of it (reducing the independent *Party ID* effect to thirteen-points). Finally, as Column 5 shows, adding *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism* back to this fully specified model produces the best accounting of partisan asymmetry (50% of the overall effect), reducing the independent *Party ID* effect down to 10-points on the 0-1 scale (likelihood ratio $\chi^2=19.34$; $p<.001$) and again rendering the independent predictiveness of *Liberal-Conservative ID* insignificant.

Thus, to sum things up so far, Study 2 provides compelling evidence that across years, political contexts, and measures, the capacity of *Humanitarianism* and *Egalitarianism* to (a) predict *Support for Compromise* and (b) account for partisan asymmetry in such support is remarkably robust — much more so than many of the other known predictors that we have modeled.

Table 4:

Party Identification, Altruistic Values (Humanitarianism and Egalitarianism), and Support for Political Compromise (2021)

	<i>b (s.e.)</i>				
<i>Party ID</i>	-.20 (.02)	-.16 (.02)	-.17 (.02)	-.13 (.03)	-.10 (.03)
<i>(5-point; GOP High)</i>					
<i>Humanitarianism</i>		-.04 (.04)			-.07 (.03)
<i>Egalitarianism</i>		-.09 (.03)			-.10 (.03)
<i>White</i>			.01 (.02)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.02)
<i>Female</i>			-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.02)	-.01 (.01)
<i>Age</i>			.05 (.03)	.05 (.03)	.04 (.03)
<i>Household Income</i>			.06 (.04)	.06 (.04)	.06 (.04)
<i>Education</i>			.01 (.03)	.01 (.03)	.02 (.03)
<i>Born Again</i>			-.06 (.02)	-.05 (.02)	-.05 (.02)
<i>Ideological Commitment</i>			-.16 (.02)	-.16 (.02)	-.17 (.02)
<i>Moralism</i>			-.09 (.03)	-.09 (.03)	-.09 (.03)
<i>Closed Personality</i>			-.01 (.04)	-.01 (.04)	-.02 (.03)
<i>Authoritarianism</i>			.00 (.02)	.01 (.02)	.01 (.02)
<i>Social ID Consciousness</i>			.01 (.03)	.01 (.03)	.01 (.03)
<i>Liberal-Conservative ID</i>				-.07 (.04)	-.05 (.04)
Constant	.56	.44	.64	.65	.52
n	949	949	909	909	909

NOTE: Cell entries are differences in the predicted value of *Support for Compromise* that correspond to minimum-to-maximum differences in the explanatory variables, with standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant relationships ($p < .05$) are in **bold**.

Results: Testing Hypothesis 4 — The Mediating Role of Cooperative Democratic Vision

Finally, to test Hypothesis 4, we used Imai, Keele and Tingley’s (2010) method of calculating mediation effects within the context of a path analysis, in which a measure of *Cooperative Democratic*

Vision serves as the mediator. That is, the mediation analyses estimates two models simultaneously — the first predicting a *Cooperative Democratic Vision* and the second predicting *Support for Compromise*.

We measured *Cooperative Democratic Vision* with the following item:

Some people understand politics in a democracy as a competition between groups. Others see it as shared decision-making for the common good. What about you? If you imagine a scale where 1 means that you strongly agree that democratic politics is a competition between groups and 7 means that you strongly agree that democratic politics is shared decision-making for the common good, where would you place yourself?

(0=Strongly Support Vision as Competition between groups; 6=Strongly Support Vision as Shared Decision-Making for the Common Good; mean=3.95; s.d.=1.79)²⁷

We perform two mediation analyses: one that assesses *Cooperative Democratic Vision*'s mediating effect as it relates to *Humanitarianism* (Table 5), and another that assesses that mediating effect as it relates to *Egalitarianism* (Table 6). In both, in the second stage of the analyses (that estimating *Support for Compromise*) we include all the covariates described above. In the first stage (that estimating *Cooperative Democratic Vision*), in light of the lack of extant literature to draw upon, we trim the list of covariates to include only the demographic covariates (*White, Female, Age, Household Income, Education, Born Again Christian Identity*).

Looking at Table 5, the first results column reveals that the strongest humanitarians tend to score about 25 points higher on the 0-1 *Cooperative Democratic Vision* scale than do non-humanitarians ($p < .001$). And as the second results column reveals, those who score highest on the *Cooperative Democratic Vision* scale tend to score about ten points higher on the 0-1 *Support for Compromise* scale than do those who hold the most competitive democratic visions, even after accounting for the direct association with *Humanitarianism* and all of the other covariates ($p < .001$). As for that direct association, the strongest humanitarians tend to score about ten-points higher in *Support for*

²⁷ The correlation between abstract support for compromise (no issue referenced) and *Cooperative Democratic Vision* ($r = .20$) indicates that — as expected — the two are related but far from redundant.

Compromise on the 0-1 scale than do non-humanitarians ($p < .001$). Accordingly, the total relationship between *Humanitarianism* and *Support for Compromise* is .12 on the 0-1 scale, about 21 percent of which (.025) is mediated through a *Cooperative Democratic Vision* ($p < .05$).

Table 5:
Humanitarianism, Cooperative Democratic Vision, and Support for Compromise (2021)

	<i>Cooperative Vision</i>	<i>Support for Compromise</i>
	<i>b (s.e.)</i>	<i>b (s.e.)</i>
<i>Humanitarianism</i>	.25 (.04)	.09 (.03)
<i>Cooperative Democratic Vision</i>		.10 (.03)
<i>White</i>	-.03 (.02)	.01 (.02)
<i>Female</i>	.02 (.02)	-.01 (.01)
<i>Age</i>	.18 (.04)	.04 (.03)
<i>Household Income</i>	-.05 (.05)	.07 (.04)
<i>Education</i>	.11 (.04)	.01 (.03)
<i>Born Again Christian</i>	-.11 (.02)	-.05 (.02)
<i>Liberal-Conservative Identity</i>		-.07 (.04)
<i>Ideological Commitment</i>		-.17 (.02)
<i>Moral Conviction</i>		-.09 (.03)
<i>Closed Personality</i>		.02 (.04)
<i>Authoritarianism</i>		.01 (.02)
<i>Social Identity Consciousness</i>		.01 (.03)
Constant	.43	.49
n	903	903
Total Effect of <i>Humanitarianism</i>		.12 (.05)
% of <i>Humanitarianism</i> Effect Mediated through <i>Cooperative Democratic Vision</i>		21

NOTE: Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients (*b*) of differences in the predicted value of *Cooperative Vision* or *Support for Compromise* that correspond to minimum-to-maximum differences in the explanatory variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistically significant relationships ($p < .05$, two-tailed) are in **bold**.

Looking next at *Cooperative Democratic Vision's* mediating role in relation to *Egalitarianism's* capacity to predict *Support for Compromise* (Table 6), we see a very similar story. The strongest egalitarians in the sample tend to score about 31 points higher on the 0-1 *Cooperative Democratic Vision* scale than do non-egalitarians, and (again) those with the most cooperative democratic visions tend

to score about ten points higher on the 0-1 *Support for Compromise* scale than do those with the most competitive visions — after also taking into account the direct relationship between *Egalitarianism* and *Support for Compromise* (which amounts to about ten points on the 0-1 scale). All told, the relationship between *Egalitarianism* and *Support for Compromise* is .13 on the 0-1 scale, about 22% of which (.03) is mediated through *Cooperative Democratic Vision*.

Table 6:
Egalitarianism, Cooperative Democratic Vision, and Support for Compromise (2021)

	<i>Cooperative Vision</i>	<i>Support for Compromise</i>
	<i>b (s.e.)</i>	<i>b (s.e.)</i>
<i>Egalitarianism</i>	.31 (.04)	.10 (.03)
<i>Cooperative Democratic Vision</i>		.10 (.03)
<i>White</i>	-.02 (.02)	.01 (.02)
<i>Female</i>	.01 (.02)	-.01 (.01)
<i>Age</i>	.17 (.04)	.03 (.03)
<i>Household Income</i>	-.06 (.05)	.06 (.04)
<i>Education</i>	.10 (.03)	.01 (.03)
<i>Born Again Christian</i>	-.08 (.02)	-.04 (.02)
<i>Liberal-Conservative Identity</i>		.06 (.04)
<i>Ideological Commitment</i>		-.17 (.02)
<i>Moral Conviction</i>		-.08 (.03)
<i>Closed Personality</i>		.02 (.04)
<i>Authoritarianism</i>		.01 (.02)
<i>Social Identity Consciousness</i>		.01 (.03)
Constant	.36	.48
n	903	903
Total Effect of <i>Egalitarianism</i>		.13 (.04)
% of <i>Egalitarianism</i> Effect Mediated through <i>Cooperative Democratic Vision</i>		22

NOTE: Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients (*b*) of differences in the predicted value of *Cooperative Vision* or *Support for Compromise* that correspond to minimum-to-maximum differences in the explanatory variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistically significant relationships ($p < .05$, two-tailed) are in **bold**.

These results offer novel evidence in support of Hypothesis 4 that the relationships between (1) *Humanitarianism* and *Support for Compromise* and (2) *Egalitarianism* and *Support for Compromise* are both partially mediated through *Cooperative Democratic Visions*.

Discussion and Conclusion

In two studies we find that altruistic values such as humanitarianism and egalitarianism are associated with support for compromise, which accounts for a significant portion of the well-known partisan asymmetry in support for compromise. The evidence is also consistent with our theory that cooperative rather than competitive visions of democratic policymaking mediate that relationship to some extent — though we find that the values exert independent predictive capacity as well.

Moreover, because the studies were conducted four years apart, they provide evidence that the patterns we observe are robust to changes in partisan leadership (the Republicans controlled the presidency and both legislative branches at the time of our 2017 data collection, whereas the Democrats controlled all three at the time of our data collection in 2021).

So what? These findings contribute to empirical democratic theory by identifying new ingredients of democratic efficiency — humanitarianism and egalitarianism — and they contribute to the study of political psychology by expanding scholarly understanding of political “process” attitudes. They also expand the explanatory reach of core value conflict (generally) — and humanitarianism and egalitarianism, specifically — with respect to political attitudes and partisan asymmetry. What is more, these findings offer support for the idea that, though distinct, humanitarianism and egalitarianism do share an underlying commitment to public altruism, which means they may work in concert to structure some types of political cognition. Finally, these results add nuance to the conventional scholarly wisdom that normative commitments necessarily weaken

support for compromise; when it comes to a normative commitment to altruistic values, at least, the reverse appears to be true.

Of course, there is much work left to be done. First, our studies are observational, meaning we cannot draw strict causal inferences from them. That is, though it stands to reason that core values such as humanitarianism and egalitarianism—and the underlying altruism they reflect—are more deeply seated than are specific attitudes about a political process such as compromise, we cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that causality runs the opposite direction. Thus, future investigations should randomly prime egalitarianism and humanitarianism to the top of respondents' heads (independently and in concert) to see if doing so results in higher levels of support for compromise.

Second, researchers can only learn so much from survey data; behavioral measures of compromise behavior via simulated negotiations or deliberations would be helpful (e.g., Neblo, Esterling and Lazer 2018). Such negotiations could also provide behavioral indicators of sociotropic values, as gleaned from the arguments that participants make during the negotiations.

Third, while this study (and most others in the extant literature) focus on the psychological mechanisms underlying attitudes toward compromise, other potential factors to consider include strategic calculations as well as institutional and contextual differences (perhaps especially cross-national ones).

Finally, if humanitarianism and egalitarianism are associated with support for compromise among citizens, it stands to reason that such value-based psychology might also apply to policymakers themselves as they negotiate and/or consider whether to support particular pieces of legislation. We encourage other political scientists to explore strategies to measure the variance in such values among legislators, staffers, and executive branch officials, and the degree to which they correspond to different negotiating styles and voting patterns.

Appendix

I. Table A1: Study I Frequency Distributions of Support for Political Compromise, by Issue

	Minimum Wage (%)	Guns (%)	Immigration (%)	Abortion (%)
Strongly prefer compromise	26	27	24	19
Somewhat prefer compromise	36	29	34	24
Somewhat oppose compromise	20	22	21	22
Strongly oppose compromise	19	23	21	36

II. Study I Supplement: Measurement of Potentially Confounding Covariates

A. *Demographics*:

- *Female*: 1=Yes (59%)
- *White*: 1=Yes (65%)
- *Age*: 18-91, rescaled to 0-1; mean=.42; s.d.=.24)
- *Household Income*: 0-12; 0=<\$10,000; 12=>\$200,000; rescaled to 0-1; mean=.32; s.d.=.22)
- *Education*: 0-5; 0=<high school degree; 5=post-graduate degree; rescaled to 0-1; mean=.51; s.d.=.29)

B. *Born-Again Christian Identity* (CCES Measure): “Do you consider yourself a Born-Again Christian? 1=Yes (28%)

C. *Liberal-Conservative Identity* (CCES measure): “Politically speaking, to what extent do you consider yourself very liberal, liberal, moderate or middle of the road, conservative, or very conservative?”(0-4; 4= “very conservative”; rescaled to 0-1; mean=.50; s.d.=.30).²⁸

D. *Moralism*: Two-item standardized index (rescaled to 0-1) of Moral Absolutism and Moral Clarity, borrowing the well-worn dichotomous measures from the American National Election Studies (polychoric correlation=.40; mean=.57; s.d.=.37)²⁹

- Moral Absolutism: “Thinking about morality now, would you say “doing the right thing” changes with the times?” (No=43%)
- Moral Clarity: “Still thinking about morality, would you say “doing the right thing” is usually pretty straightforward, or is it often complicated?” (Straightforward=71%)

E. *Ideological Commitment*: Two-item standardized index (rescaled to 0-1) of Ideological Strength and Ideological Constraint (mean=.52; standard deviation=.38)

- Ideological Strength: Folded measure of *Liberal-Conservative Identity*: mean=.52 standard deviation=.38)

²⁸ In alternative model specifications, we replaced this measure with a much more complicated index of policy preferences (the unfolded version of the Ideological Constraint index described above). The relationship between *Sociotropic Values* and *Support for Compromise* is not materially affected.

²⁹ Ideally, we would have liked to incorporate Skitka and colleagues’ moral conviction scale (e.g., Skitka 2010, Ryan 2017), which is conceptually related to *Moralism* but is also distinct from it.

- Ideological Constraint: Summed index of four dichotomous items, folded and rescaled to 0-1: mean=.61; standard deviation=.25
 - Do you support or oppose always allowing a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice 1=SUPPORT
 - If you were in Congress, would you vote to repeal the Affordable Care Act (also known as Obamacare)? 1=NO
 - Do you support or oppose giving the Environmental Protection Agency power to regulate Carbon Dioxide emissions? 1=SUPPORT
 - Do you support or oppose granting legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes? 1=SUPPORT
 - On the issue of gun regulation, do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Make it easier for people to obtain concealed-carry permit .1=OPPOSE
 - Do you support or oppose negotiating an agreement with North Korea to stop the development of nuclear weapons and to allow inspectors to check for such weapons? 1=SUPPORT

F. *Closed Personality*: Four-point agreement-disagreement: “I like to try out new activities” (rescaled to 0-1; strongly agree=0; strongly disagree=1; mean=.64; standard deviation=.23)

G. *Authoritarianism*: Four-point agreement-disagreement: “People don’t have enough respect for authority anymore” (rescaled to 0-1; strongly disagree=0; agree=1; mean=.68; standard deviation=.31)

H. *Social Identity Consciousness*: Two-item standardized index of Overlapping Socio-Partisan Identities and Group Pride (rescaled to 0-1; mean=.59; standard deviation=.19):

- Overlapping Socio-Partisan Identities: Summed index of gender, race (white/non-white), and religious identity (“Born Again” Christian vs. other), folded and converted to a 0-1 scale (1=white evangelical male or non-white non-evangelical female); mean=.35; standard deviation=.33)
- In-Group Pride: Summed index of racial, gender, religious, and partisan pride: “When you think of people who share your racial or ethnic (gender, religious, partisan) identity, to what degree do you feel proud or embarrassed?” (4-point scale from “very

embarrassed to “very proud” for each, resulting in a 16-point index that we converted to 0-1 scale; mean=.70; standard deviation=.19)

III. Table A2: Study II Frequency Distributions of Support for Political Compromise, by Issue

Issue	% Strongly Oppose	% Somewhat Oppose	% Somewhat Support	% Strongly Support
General	12	18	40	10
Health Care	16	26	34	6
Tax Rates	15	20	39	6
Abortion	26	26	22	5
Education	16	22	37	6
Immigration	21	19	34	6
Gun Control	27	24	26	5
Crime	18	26	32	5
Environment	19	24	31	7
Foreign Policy	12	20	38	6

IV. Study II Supplement: Measurement of Potentially Confounding Covariates

A. *Demographics*:

- *Female*: 1=Yes (54%)
- *White*: 1=Yes (72%)
- *Age*: 18-90, rescaled to 0-1; (mean=.45; s.d.=.24)
- *Household Income*: 0-15; 0=<\$10k; 14=>\$250k, rescaled to 0-1 (mean=.34; s.d.=.24)
- *Education*: 0-5; 0=< high school graduate; 4=postgraduate degree, rescaled to 0-1 (mean=.52; s.d.=.30)

B. *Born-Again Christian Identity* (CCES Measure): “Do you consider yourself a Born-Again Christian? 1=Yes (30%)

C. *Liberal-Conservative Identity* (CCES Measure): “Politically speaking, to what extent do you consider yourself very liberal, liberal, moderate or middle of the road, conservative, or very conservative?” (0-4; 4= “very conservative,” rescaled to 0-1; mean=.48; s.e.=.29)

D. *Ideological Commitment*: Folded measure of *Liberal-Conservative Identity*: “ (0=Moderate/Middle of the Road; .5=liberal/conservative; 1=Very Liberal/Conservative”; mean=.43 standard deviation=.40)

E. *Moral Conviction*: Conventional measure (e.g., Skitka et al. 2005, Ryan 2017), which first asks respondents to indicate “What do you think the most important problem facing the country today?”, and then “How much are your feelings about that issue connected to your core moral beliefs or convictions?” (Not At All | Slightly | Moderately | Very Much). Rescaled to 0-1 (mean=.74; s.d.=.30).

F. *Closed Personality*: Two Likert-item summed scale, taken from conventional Big-5 (OCEAN) inventory (e.g., Rammstedt and John (2007), rescaled to 0-1 (mean=.40; s.d.=.20)

- “I am someone who has an active imagination”: 0-4, **reverse coded** such that 4=strongly disagree; rescaled to 0-1 [mean=.30; s.d.=.24])
- “I am someone who has few artistic interests”; 0-4; 4=strongly agree, rescaled to 0-1 (mean=.51; s.d.=.30)

G. *Authoritarianism*: Principal component index (one principal component extracted; eigenvalue=1.70) of three items (e.g., Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Weiler 2009): “There are a number of qualities that are important for children to have, but people disagree about which

ones are most important. If you had to choose, would you say it is more important for children to learn . . .”

- Independence or Respect for Elders? (Respect=66%; principal component loading=.60)
- Self-Reliance or Obedience? (Obedience=28%; principal component loading=.53)
- Curiosity or Good Manners? (Good Manners=59%; principal component loading=.60)

Rescaled to 0-1; mean=.52; s.d.=.36)

H. *Social Identity Consciousness*: Principal component index (one principal component extracted; eigenvalue=2.49): “When you think about your identity or “who you are,” how important are each of the following characteristics to you? 0=not at all important to who I am; 6=extremely important to who I am; all rescaled to 0-1)

- My sense of belonging to my own racial or ethnic group(s) (mean=.44; s.d.=.35; principal component loading=.53)
- My sense of belonging to my own gender group (mean=.51; s.d.=.35; principal component loading=.53)
- My sense of belonging to my own religious group (mean=.42; s.d.=.37; principal component loading=.50)
- My political party identification (mean=.44; s.d.=.32; principal component loading=.44)

Rescaled to 0-1; mean=.46; s.d.=.27)

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