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Knowledge, individualised evidence and luck

Mortini, D. (2022) Knowledge, individualised evidence and luck. Philosophical Studies, 179(12), pp. 3791-3815. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01861-y)

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Abstract

The notion of individualised evidence holds the key to solve the puzzle of statistical evidence, but there’s still no consensus on how exactly to define it. To make progress on the problem, epistemologists have proposed various accounts of individualised evidence in terms of causal or modal anti-luck conditions on knowledge like appropriate causation (Thomson 1986), sensitivity (Enoch et al. 2012) and safety (Pritchard 2018). In this paper, I show that each of these fails as satisfactory anti-luck condition, and that such failure lends abductive support to the following conclusion: once the familiar anti-luck intuition on knowledge is extended to individualised evidence, no single causal or modal anti-luck condition on knowledge can succeed as the right anti-luck condition on individualised evidence. This conclusion casts serious doubts on the fruitfulness of the move from anti-luck conditions on knowledge to anti-luck conditions on individualised evidence. I expand on these doubts and point out further aspects where epistemology and the law come apart: epistemic anti- luck conditions on knowledge do not adequately characterise the legal notion of individualised evidence.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:This work received generous funding from a Royal Institute of Philosophy Jacobsen scholarship.
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Mortini, Mr Dario
Authors: Mortini, D.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Studies
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0031-8116
ISSN (Online):1573-0883
Published Online:25 August 2022
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2022 The Author
First Published:First published in Philosophical Studies 179(12): 3791-3815
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons License

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