Why empathy is an intellectual virtue

Kotsonis, A. and Dunne, G. (2022) Why empathy is an intellectual virtue. Philosophical Psychology, (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2100753) (Early Online Publication)

Abstract

Our aim in this paper is to argue that empathy is an intellectual virtue. Empathy enables agents to gain insight into other people’s emotions and beliefs. The agent who possesses this trait is: (i) driven to engage in acts of empathy by her epistemic desires; (ii) takes pleasure in doing so; (iii) is competent at the activity characteristic of empathy; and, (iv) has good judgment as to when it is epistemically appropriate to engage in empathy. After establishing that empathy meets all the necessary conditions to be classified as an intellectual virtue, we proceed to discuss Battaly’s argument according to which empathy is a skill rather than a virtue. We contend, contra Battaly, that the agent who possesses the virtue of empathy: (a) sometimes foregoes opportunities to engage in the activity characteristic of empathy because it is the virtuous thing to do, (b) does not make deliberate errors, and (c) her actions are always ultimately aiming at epistemic goods.

• Item Type: Articles
• Status: Early Online Publication
• Refereed: Yes
• Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: Kotsonis, Dr Alkis
• Authors: Kotsonis, A., and Dunne, G.
• College/School: College of Social Sciences > School of Education
• Journal Name: Philosophical Psychology
• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• ISSN: 0951-5089
• ISSN (Online): 1465-394X
• Published Online: 26 July 2022
• Copyright Holders: Copyright © 2022 The Authors
• First Published: First published in Philosophical Psychology 2022
• Publisher Policy: Reproduced under a Creative Commons License