The epistemic normativity of conjecture

Simion, M. (2022) The epistemic normativity of conjecture. Philosophical Studies, 179(11), pp. 3447-3471. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01829-y)

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This paper has two aims: (1) it develops and defends a fully-fledged account of the epistemic normativity of conjecture (2) it goes sharply against orthodoxy, in arguing that conjecture is epistemically more demanding than assertion. According to the view defended here, one’s conjecture that p is permissible only if one knows that one has warrant, but not sufficient warrant to believe that p. I argue for my account on three independent grounds: (1) the Bach and Harnish account of the nature of communicative speech acts, (2) the plausible normative relation between assertion and other constatives, and (3) the normativity of belief in conjunction with constatives’ epistemic function.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona
Authors: Simion, M.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Studies
ISSN (Online):1573-0883
Published Online:13 July 2022
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2022 The Author
First Published:First published in Philosophical Studies 179(11): 3447-3471
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons licence

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
309239Knowledge-First Social EpistemologyMona SimionEuropean Research Council (ERC)948356Arts - Philosophy