The structure of defeat

Graham, P. J. and Lyons, J. C. (2021) The structure of defeat. In: Brown, J. and Simion, M. (eds.) Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press, pp. 39-68. ISBN 9780198847205 (doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198847205.003.0003)

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Epistemic defeat is standardly understood in either evidentialist or responsibilist terms. The seminal treatment of defeat is an evidentialist one, due to John Pollock, who famously distinguishes between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. More recently, an orthogonal distinction due to Jennifer Lackey has become widely endorsed, between so-called doxastic (or psychological) and normative defeaters. We think that neither doxastic nor normative defeaters, as Lackey understands them, exist. Both of Lackey’s categories of defeat derive from implausible assumptions about epistemic responsibility. Although Pollock’s evidentialist view is superior, the evidentialism per se can be purged from it, leaving a general structure of defeat that can be incorporated in a reliabilist theory that is neither evidentialist nor responsibilist in any way.

Item Type:Book Sections
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Lyons, Professor Jack and Graham, Professor Peter
Authors: Graham, P. J., and Lyons, J. C.
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher:Oxford University Press
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