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Digging Jung: analytical psychology and philosophical archaeology

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ABSTRACT

Taking as its starting-point the interest in archaeological metaphors evinced by Freud and by Jung, this paper considers the project of analytical psychology under the rubric of the recently discussed term, 'philosophical archaeology'. Noting the shared methodological assumptions and procedures between these two areas, the paper goes on to examine the extent to which Jung's project can legitimately be considered as an archaeological pursuit in respect of two key aspects: its humanism, and its hermeneutics. In this second case, the paper concludes, we can learn much from Jung's recently published *Red Book*, sections of which may be profitably read through the lens of his seminal paper, 'The Aims of Psychotherapy'. What emerges from this discussion is a clearer appreciation of the role of the archaic in Jung's thought, an insight into the analytic consulting-room (as a place of the archetypal) as a third instance of the site of philosophical archaeology in addition to the archive (as a place of statement or *l'énoncé*) and the museum (as a place of expression), and a confirmation of Heidegger's assertion that 'the authenticity and greatness of historical knowledge reside in an understanding of the mysterious character of the beginning'.

KEYWORDS

Philosophical archaeology; analytical psychology; psychoanalysis; the archaic

In the spring of 2015 an unusual tale began to be reported across the world's press, including the *New York Times*. Under the headline 'Centuries of Italian History of Unearthed in Quest to Fix Toilet', the *NYT* reported how Luciano Faggiano, who had planned to open a trattoria in Lecce, had discovered a problem with sewage backing up in a toilet in the building he had purchased.¹ When his search for the sewage pipe began in 2000, he had little idea that he was about to discover, in the words of the *NYT*, 'a subterranean world tracing back before the birth of Jesus': including a tomb from Messapian times, a Roman granary, a Franciscan chapel, and etchings by the Knights Templar. The more Signor Faggiano and his family dug, the more they found; confirming the words attributed to Severo Martini, a member of the City Council in Lecce, 'Whenever you dig a hole, centuries of history come out'.²

Introduction

This episode appears to confirm an intuition held both by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and by C.G. Jung (1875-1961). In a famous passage in his *Civilisation and its Discontents* (1930), Freud compared the psyche to Rome. He pointed out that 'these remains of ancient Rome are found dovetailed

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into the jumble of the great metropolis which has grown up in the last few centuries since the Renaissance', argued that 'there is certainly not a little that is ancient still buried in the soil of the city or beneath its modern buildings', and he concluded that 'this is the manner in which the past is preserved in historical sites like Rome' – and, by extension, in the psyche as well.³ Much earlier, however, Jung had (in the opening paragraph of *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*) compared the notion of the Oedipus complex in Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* to 'that wholly peculiar feeling which arises in us if, for example, in the noise and tumult of a modern street we should come across an ancient relic – the Corinthian capital of a walled-in column, or a fragment of inscription'. For, he observed, in the middle of 'the noisy, ephemeral life of the present' there appears 'something very far away and strange', turning our attention 'to things of a higher order' and offering us 'a glimpse away from the incoherent multiplicity of the present to a higher coherence in history'.⁴ And Jung's dream of descending down the various levels and into the cellar of a multi-storeyed house plays a prominent role in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*;⁵ over recent years, this dream has attracted a good deal of critical discussion.⁶

In some ways the use made by Jung and Freud of motifs from archaeology is not surprising; after all, the late nineteenth century was *the* great age of archaeology. In the 1870s and 1880s, August Pitt Rivers had worked on excavations of Roman and Saxon sites, William Flinders Petrie had investigated the Great Pyramid in Gaza, Heinrich Schliemann had undertaken the excavation of Troy, and Sir Arthur Evans had discovered the Minoan civilisation on Crete. And in other respects, the nineteenth century was a great age in the 'archaeology of ideas' as well, as various thinkers proposed different models of what reality is 'really' like or what lies 'behind' it. (For Nietzsche, everything is about will and about power, or in other words about the 'will-to-power'; for Marx, everything is about economics and class; while for Freud, everything is about sexuality and desire.) Indeed, Nietzsche regarded the condition of modernity precisely in historical, even archaeological terms: 'An ability to feel his way back and sense how things were, to detect traces almost extinguished, to read the past quickly and correctly no matter how intricate its palimpsest may be – these are [the antiquarian individual's] talents and virtues'.⁷

As well as using metaphors from archaeology,⁸ Freud maintained a deep interest in it as a discipline or an activity in its own right.⁹ In this respect, Freud's interest in archaeology was matched by no one, except perhaps for Jung. On 14 October 1909 he told Freud, 'archaeology or rather mythology has got me in its grip, it's a mine of marvellous material' (251-252); on 8 November 1909 he wrote about his reading in 'the history of symbols, i.e. in mythology and archaeology' (including Herodotus, Friedrich Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker* (1810-1823), and Richard Payne Knight) and about how all his 'delight in archaeology (buried for years) has sprung into life again' (258); while on 25 December 1909 he confirmed his 'passionate interest' in archaeology and philology: having 'the most marvellous visions, glimpses of far-ranging interconnections', it had now become clear to him that 'we shall not solve the ultimate secrets of neurosis and psychosis without mythology and the history of civilization'.¹⁰

These and other comments would seem to confirm the thesis put forward by Sonu Shamdasani that Jung derived his ideas about the collective unconscious from his library.¹¹ Equally, however, this thesis does not refute Jung's ideas about the collective unconscious, rather it modifies our understanding of the transmission of those ideas, perhaps helping us change our idea of the collective unconscious from something *metaphysical* to something *cultural*, albeit no less *real*. In his letter of 8 November 1909, Jung told Freud: 'Rich lodes open up for the phylogenetic basis of the theory of neurosis. Later I want to use some of it for the *Jahrbuch*', i.e. the *Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und psychopathologische Forschungen*.¹² As we know, Jung did put this material to good use, for he drew on it in *Transformations and Symbols of the Libido*, first published in the *Jahrbuch* in 1911 and 1912.

In an interview given to Ira Progoff in 1952, Jung is recorded having had 'a gleam in his eye' when he was speaking of his early interest in palaeontology; and in his famous BBC 'Face to Face' interview in 1959, Jung told John Freeman that he had originally wanted to be an archaeologist (but that the course had been too expensive), explaining to Georg Gerster in an interview for

Swiss Radio in 1960 (on the occasion of his eighty-fifth birthday) that he had decided to switch from archaeology and history to science after a couple of vivid dreams.¹³ (According to the autobiographical work *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, the two dreams that decided Jung to switch from the humanities to the sciences involved digging up some bones of prehistoric animals and coming across a circular pool containing a giant radiolarian; by contrast, however, it was that famous dream related in his 1925 seminars of the multi-storeyed house with an uninhabited ground floor in mediaeval style, a Roman cellar, and a prehistoric cave that is said to have revived his interest in archaeology and led him to discover Creuzer's *Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker* at precisely the time when he was beginning to formulate his own theory of the psyche vis-à-vis Freud.)¹⁴

In a letter published in the inaugural issue of *The Psychoanalytic Review* in the autumn of 1913, Jung called on archaeologists (as well as philologists, historians, mythologists, etc.) to join in the work of medical psychologists that would be published in the new journal; discussing editorial plans for a new journal in a letter to Jolande Jacobi of 23 December 1932, Jung expressed his openness to contributions on a whole range of subjects, including archaeology; while in a letter to Benjamin Nelson of 17 June 1956 Jung expressed his sense of disappointment that medical psychotherapists have little knowledge of archaeology (as well as history, philology, philosophy, theology, etc.)¹⁵

So there is clearly an important rhetoric of archaeology in psychoanalysis and analytical psychology, but is it anything more than rhetoric? In this article, I wish to argue that psychoanalysis in general and analytical psychology in particular are ripe for consideration in relation to the notion of 'philosophical archaeology'. For one, because at a time when cross-disciplinary research is often frustrated at an institutional level by academic and administrative structures that foster a silo mentality, the topic of philosophical archaeology is arguably as timely as never before. And for another, because the way in which Jung's name is 'strangely missing' from recent literature on the topic of philosophical or psychological archaeology has recently been noted by Peter Kingsley in one of the most important studies of Jung to have appeared in recent years, *Catafalque* (2018). Jung's fascination with archaeology links directly into Kingsley's core thesis that Cary Baynes was right when she only half-jokingly suggested that any study of Jung's life would have to be a work of volcanology and that our understanding hitherto of Jung's entire work derives from a misinterpretation based on a mistranslation of a misedited passage: namely, that where in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* Jung is presented as saying of his 'confrontation with the unconscious' and the experiences that led to the *Red Book*, 'I hit upon this stream of lava and the heat of its fires reshaped my life' (*ich stieß auf diesen Lavastrom, und die Leidenschaft, die in seinem Feuer lag, hat mein Leben umgeformt und angeordnet*), he had in fact written, 'It was the passion and intensity inside this fire, it was the stream of lava itself which is the force that compelled whatever happened to happen, and so, completely naturally, everything fell into its own proper place and order' (*das ist die Leidenschaft, die in diesem Feuer lag, dieser Lavastrom, der hat's erzwungen und alles hat sich dann ganz natürlicherweise eingeordnet*).¹⁶ In particular, I wish to argue that (a) common to both philosophical archaeology and analytical psychology is the question of how meaning is constituted; and (b) the notion of philosophical archaeology can help clarify the status of the tricky concept of the archaic in Jung's thought.

Now the term 'philosophical archaeology' has been used by a number of thinkers. For instance, Stephen T. Asma has used it in the context of the interface between science and philosophy.¹⁷ In a variant of the expression, the term 'archaeology of the soul' has been used by a variety of writers, including the American classicist and philosopher Seth Bernadete (1930-2001),¹⁸ Antero Ali,¹⁹ and Robert L. Hall.²⁰ Yet the term is most closely associated with the work of the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (b. 1942), a chapter of whose *Signatura rerum: Sul metodo* (2008), translated in English as *The Signature of All Things* (2009), was published separately in English as a paper in *Law and Critique*.²¹ As a subject of a paper and of a chapter, Agamben's concept of 'philosophical archaeology' has been discussed by several critics, including Colin McQuillan,²² William Watkin,²³

and Leonard Lawlor.²⁴ (And, most recently, Philip Tonner has drawn on recent developments in the field of the archaeology of mortuary practice to delineate a fresh approach to the insight of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) that our awareness of our own mortality marks out a distinctly human way of ‘being-in-the-world’.)²⁵

Philosophical archaeology and the archaic

What does philosophy have to do with archaeology? In the sense that the term is used by Agamben, their common features are techniques of interpretation and the question of meaning; the recovery and/or repression of the past; and the problematic concept of ‘origin’. In addition, both disciplines are concerned with the archaic: conceived by Agamben not so much as a point in the past but as an historical force (see below). As Agamben makes clear, his notion of philosophical archaeology draws on a number of sources, including Kant and Foucault, but also the German Protestant theologian Franz Overbeck (1837-1905), the French comparative philologist Georges Dumézil (1898-1986), and the Italian philosopher Enzo Melandri (1926-1993).

In an early paper (written for a prize competition held in 1791) known as ‘What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany?’ but never completed and never submitted, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) explores the idea of a ‘philosophizing history of philosophy’ and introduces the notion of philosophical archaeology:

A philosophical history of philosophy is itself possible, not historically or empirically, but rationally, i.e. *a priori*. For although it establishes facts of reason, it does not borrow them from historical narrative, but draws them from the nature of human reason, as philosophical archaeology. What have the thinkers among human beings been able to reason out concerning the origin, the goal, and the end of things in the world? Was it the purposiveness in the world, or merely the chain of causes and effects, or was it the purpose of humankind from which they began?²⁶

As Agamben explicates this passage, philosophical archaeology presents itself ‘as a “history” and, as such, cannot avoid interrogating itself about its own origin’, and yet ‘since its object coincides with the end of humanity, thus with the development and exercise of reason, the *arché*, which it strives for, can never be identified with a chronological date, and therefore, never be “archaic”’.²⁷

In this way, Agamben draws attention to something peculiar about the Kantian notion of the archaic. First, as Kant claims in his *Lectures on Logic* (Jäsche Logic; 1800), ‘every philosophical thinker builds his own work, so to speak, on someone else’s ruins’, and hence ‘one cannot learn philosophy, then, just because it is *not yet given*’.²⁸ If this means, Agamben wonders, that philosophy is a ‘science of ruins’ or a ‘ruinology’, what does this say about its object of interest, the *arkhai*? These have, Agamben suggests, drawing on a term found in Kant’s lectures under the title of *Philosophical Encyclopedia* (c. 1778), the status of *Urbilder*, i.e. primordial images or archetypes, for ‘an archetype remains what it is only if it cannot be retrieved’ and ‘its use is only that of a plumb line’.²⁹ (As Lawlor points out, Kant talks in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* and in the *Critique of Judgement* about the possibility of an ‘archaeology of nature’, in the context of a natural history concerned with signs, traces, and remains).³⁰

Second, Agamben draws on the related notion of ‘archaeology of knowledge’, as reflected in the work of Michel Foucault (1926-1984), especially the title of his 1969 book, *L’archéologie du savoir*, translated as *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1970), and the subtitle of his 1974 book, *Les Mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines*, translated as *The Order of Things* (1974).³¹ Agamben notes that in these works, as well as in his 1971 essay ‘Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire’, Foucault follows Nietzsche in distinguishing between, on the one hand, *Ursprung* (translated into French as *l’origine*), and, on the other, *Herkunft* (i.e. provenance) and *Entstehung* (i.e. emergence).³² In his preface to *Les mots et les choses*, Foucault introduces the term ‘archaeology’ in relation to a puzzling notion, the dimension of a ‘historical a priori’ described as the dimension of the *episteme*.³³ As Agamben points out, this term ‘historical a priori’ is an oxymoron, but he emphasizes that it is

not 'a meta-historical origin, or a kind of original donation which founds and determines knowledge'.³⁴ According to Agamben, the notion of an 'historical a priori' derives, not from Kant, but from Marcel Mauss (1872-1950) who, expounding the notion of *mana* found in the practice of magic, defines *mana* as 'given a priori, preliminary to all experience' or as 'an unconscious category of the intellect'.³⁵

As well as to Kant and Foucault, Agamben turns to Freud to gain a clearer understanding of the archaic, an aspect of Freud's thinking highlighted by Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005).³⁶ On Agamben's account, philosophical archaeology takes us on a path of regression to a point where consciousness and the unconscious, historiography and history, split: and we arrive at the idea that 'the present presents itself in the form of a constitutive impossibility-of-experience'.³⁷ Agamben links this idea to Freud's conceptions of trauma and repression, and this aspect of Agamben's work has subsequently been developed by Lawlor. As he explains, 'the most important characteristics of the philosophical concept of archaeology comes from psychoanalysis', and he goes on to say:

Because psychoanalysis is concerned with curing the hysteric, its archaeology is always interested; it is *not* an investigation of the past for its own sake. By means of an investigation of the past, archaeology concerns itself with the transformation of the present; indeed, and perhaps paradoxically, archaeology is really concerned with the future.³⁸

From this interest and concern for the future, Lawlor derives two other characteristics of philosophical archaeology. First, the past to which one returns, while 'preserved', is 'always incomplete'.³⁹ Lawlor sees this principle exemplified in the case at the centre of Freud's *Fragments of a Case of Hysteria* (1905), known as the case of 'Little Dora', in which, 'since the past is always incomplete, the solution to the hysterical symptom is always incomplete'.⁴⁰ In his prefatory remarks to his case study of 'Little Dora', Freud made a virtue of the incompleteness of his analysis – after Ida Bauer (1882-1945) broke off her therapy – by comparing himself to 'those discoverers whose good fortune it is to bring to the light of day after their long burial the priceless though mutilated relics of antiquity'. Indeed, here Freud suggested that dealing with incompleteness was part and parcel of the analytic and the archaeological task alike, claiming: 'I have restored what is missing, taking the best models known to me from other analyses', but – 'like a conscientious archaeologist' – 'I have not omitted to mention in each case where the authentic parts end and my constructions begin'.⁴¹ Consequently, Lawlor concludes, 'the future cure is based on a past that is incomplete – it is past and no longer there – and a reconstruction that is inventive'.⁴²

Second, however, and 'for a future cure to be found', it must be the case that 'the past is conserved' – in fact, 'the past must be simultaneous with the present; it must therefore not be past, but rather still be present'.⁴³ To illustrate this point, Lawlor cites the famous passage from *Civilisation and its Discontents* cited above. Third, in order to recover this past, we have to be committed to 'an absolute memory, a memory not relative to an individual's ability to remember, that is, a memory not relative to consciousness'. Fourth, and concomitantly, this characteristic of absolute memory implies 'the displacement of the conscious subject',⁴⁴ a characteristic exemplified by a passage in 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' (1896), where Freud compares the analyst to an explorer who 'arrives in a little-known region where his interest is aroused by an expanse of ruins, with remains of walls, fragments of columns, and tablets with half-effaced and unreadable inscriptions'.⁴⁵

Freud's 'constructions in analysis'

In this paper, the analyst/explorer sets about excavating these ruins, and 'if his work is crowned with success, the discoveries are self-explanatory'; while 'when they have been deciphered and translated, [they] yield undreamed-of information about the events of the remote past, to commemorate which the monuments were built' or, as Freud triumphantly concludes, *saxa loquuntur!* – 'stones talk!'. Hence the final characteristic of philosophical archaeology, as described by Lawlor: 'the non-living or dead monument that nevertheless speaks'.⁴⁶ Yet Freud's point about the relation between where

the 'authentic parts' end and his 'constructions' begin continued to concern him, and he returned to this question – and to the comparison with archaeology – in over a quarter of a decade later in his paper entitled 'Constructions in Analysis' (1937).⁴⁷ The starting-point of this paper is the response of 'a certain well-known man of science' – according to Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen and Sonu Shamdasani, he means Adolf Wohlgemuth (1868-1942) – ⁴⁸ to the slippery principle, exemplified by Freud in his case-study of little Dora⁴⁹ and enunciated in his paper on 'Negation' (1925), that in analysis 'No' means 'Yes'.⁵⁰

Their dreams, the ideas achieved in 'free association', and their actions all offer ways, Freud begins, of 'recovering the lost memories' of the analysand.⁵¹ Yet he goes to argue that while the analysand's task is to try and *remember*, the *analyst's* task is to *construct* (*konstruieren*). In relation to this task of construction or reconstruction (*Konstruktion, Rekonstruktion*) Freud points to the similarities between the analyst and the archaeologist:

Just as the archaeologist builds up the walls of the building from the foundations that have remained standing, determines the number and position of the columns from depressions in the floor and reconstructs the mural decorations and paintings from the remains found in the débris, so does the analyst proceed when he draws his inferences from the fragments of memories, from the associations and from the behaviour of the subject of the analysis.⁵²

For Freud, the task of analyst and archaeologist alike share similar rights and risks: both have 'an undisputed right to reconstruct by means of supplementing and combining the surviving remains', he claims, yet both face 'many of the same difficulties and sources of error', especially determining the 'relative age' of their finds.⁵³ On the one hand, Freud argues, the task of the analyst is easier than that of the archaeologist, for the archaeologist is dealing with artefacts that have faced a considerable degree of destruction, whereas the analyst is working in a situation whose circumstances are comparable to those of Pompeii or the tomb of Tut'ankhamun. On the other, the task of the analyst is more difficult: first, because 'psychical objects are incomparably more complicated than the excavator's material ones'; and second, because 'we have insufficient knowledge of what we may expect to find, since their finer structure contains so much that is still mysterious [*so viel Geheimnisvolles*]'.⁵⁴

Significantly, Freud is at pains to describe the methods of analytical technique as 'constructions' (*Konstruktionen*) rather than 'interpretations' (*Deutungen*). In so doing, Freud sidesteps the question of whether the psychoanalytic interpretation or rather construction is correct or not. In fact, error comes to be no longer an issue, for 'no damage is done if, for once in a way, we make a mistake and offer the patient a wrong construction as the probable historical truth'. In such cases, he or she responds neither with a yes or no, and so the analysis simply moves on: 'The false construction drops out, as if it had never been made; and, indeed, we often get an impression as though, to borrow the words of Polonius, our bait of falsehood had taken a carp of truth'.⁵⁵ Indeed, for Freud it turns out to be no problem if 'the path that starts from the analyst's construction [and] ought to end in the patient's recollection [...] does not always lead so far' and the analyst does not succeed in bringing the patient 'to recollect what has been repressed'. For a successful analysis can replace the recollection with the reconstruction and produce '*an assured conviction of the truth of the construction which achieves the same therapeutic result as a recaptured memory*'.⁵⁶ This experience, as startling as it is, leads Freud to the conclusion that 'there is not only *method* in madness, as the poet has already perceived, but also a fragment of *historical truth* [*ein Stück historischer Wahrheit*]' and, rather than undertaking the 'vain effort [...] of convincing the patient of the error of his delusion', therapy should instead concentrate 'on liberating the fragment of historical truth [*das Stück historischer Wahrheit*] from its distortions and in leading it back to the point in the past to which it belongs'.⁵⁷ And in the final paragraph of his paper Freud extends this principle beyond the individual analysand to humankind as a whole: do our 'delusions' owe their 'extraordinary power' to 'the element of *historical truth* [*historische Wahrheit*] which they have brought up from the repression of the forgotten and primaeval past [*die Verdrängung vergessener Urzeiten*]'?⁵⁸

As we shall see, some of these themes in Freud's paper – especially the notion of a primordial *Urzeit* – are taken up and developed by C.G. Jung; indeed, on closer inspection, the principles of philosophical archaeology as advanced by Agamben and subsequently developed by Lawlor are exemplified even more clearly by Jung in his work. Yet although analytical psychology – or 'complex psychology' (*komplexe Psychologie*), used here to refer to the school of Jungian analysis (or the 'Zurich school') as opposed to Freudian psychoanalysis – ⁵⁹ has been undergoing a gradual rehabilitation, in general continental theorists and the subsequent literary theorists have rarely referred to Jung (with the significant exception, of course, of Gilles Deleuze [1925-1995]). ⁶⁰ By reading Jung in the light of Agamben's notion of philosophical archaeology, we can gain an important entry into the work of a relatively neglected thinker (at least, in academic circles), as well as a better understanding of what is at stake in Agamben's conception.

Archaeology and analogy in Jung

After all, one of Jung's earliest case-studies involved J., an archaeologist, ⁶¹ in his lecture on 'The Significance of the Unconscious in Individual Education' (1928) Jung described the analyst's approach to the unconscious as 'scarcely in keeping with any known scientific method of calculation and measurement' and as 'more like that of an archaeologist deciphering an unknown script' (CW 17 §262); ⁶² and in one of his most programmatic papers, 'The Aims of Psychotherapy', originally delivered as a lecture on 12 April 1929 at the 4th General Medical Congress for Psychotherapy in Bad Nauheim and published in the *Bericht* of that congress before being republished in *Seelenprobleme der Gegenwart* (1931), ⁶³ Jung explicitly uses the notion of archaeology in relation to his project of analytical psychology. At one point in his paper, Jung discusses the idea that some dreams contain something like an 'unconscious metaphysics' (*unbewusste Metaphysik*) (CW 16 §90). What does Jung mean by 'unconscious metaphysics'? He says that unconscious metaphysics means 'mythological thinking in analogies' (*mythologisches Analogiedenken*), which can give rise to dreaming in 'incredibly bizarre forms that can be surprising' (CW 16 §90, trans. modified). But how can Jung know that dreams contain anything like an unconscious metaphysics? He tells us, with refreshing honesty, that really he doesn't: 'I know far too little about dreams for that. I see only the effect on the patient [...]' (CW 16 §91).

To illustrate this point Jung refers to one of his clients who has a dream about the illness of his sister's child (see CW 16 §93). According to his client, in this dream the child 'evidently' represents the dreamer's interest in the psyche – an interpretation which, Jung remarks, he (Jung) himself should never have arrived at of his own accord: 'Seen purely theoretically, this dream image can mean anything or nothing. For that matter, does a thing or fact ever mean anything in itself? The only certainty is that it is always the human being who interprets, who assigns meaning. And that is the grist of the matter for psychology' (CW 16 §93, trans. modified). Accordingly, Jung goes on to argue that not only does he give his clients an opportunity to 'find associations' to their dreams, but he gives himself 'the same opportunity' (CW 16 §95), and he even goes so far as to say that, when he presents his clients with his 'ideas and opinions', he 'open[s] the door to "suggestion" [*suggestive Wirkungen*]', adding that he sees this as 'no occasion for regret', for 'it is well known that we are susceptible only to those suggestions with which we already secretly in accord' (CW 16 §95). In so writing, Jung restates St Augustine's famous dictum about God which also inspired Pascal, 'you would not have sought me unless you had already found me'; ⁶⁴ but does it also open up Jung to the sceptic's accusation of being a relativist, a postmodernist, a proponent of the view that 'anything goes'? How does Jung solve what one might call the problem of verifiability?

Jung does so (at least, in part) when he goes on to say that 'no harm is done is if now and then one goes astray in this riddle-reading: sooner or later the psyche will reject the mistake, much as the organism rejects a foreign body', and he goes on to declare that he does not need to prove that his interpretation of the dream is right – 'a pretty hopeless undertaking anyway', he adds! – but rather

he ‘must simply try to discover, with the patient, what *acts* for them – I am almost tempted to say, what is actual’, or in the original German: *ich muss bloß mit dem Patienten zusammen das Wirksame suchen – beinahe wäre ich versucht zu sagen, das Wirkliche*’ (CW 16 §95; trans. modified). Again, the sceptical reader might ask: does this principle amount to anything more than saying ‘whatever works for you’? Again, this interpretation has to be rejected, in view of the overtones of Jung’s famous dictum, *wirklich ist, was wirkt*, or ‘whatever works is real’.⁶⁵ Because the crucial word here is the verb *wirken*, meaning ‘to have an effect’ but also ‘to construct’; and it is a verb with distinctly Goethean overtones as well. (For instance, when in the ‘Night’ scene of *Faust*, Part One, Faust contemplates the sign of the macrocosm, he observes, ‘How all one common weft contrives, / Each in the other works and thrives’ (*Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt, / Eins in dem andern wirkt und lebt!*); and then, on catching sight of the sign of the Earth Spirit, he declares, ‘Not so this sign affects my soul, not so!’ (*Wie anders wirkt dies Zeichen auf mich ein!*).⁶⁶ Etymologically the verb *wirken* is related both to *Wirkung* (‘effect’), *Wirklichkeit* (‘reality’), and *Werk* (‘work’), and all three senses are in play in Goethe as in Jung.

In order to find an interpretative guideline or rule-of-thumb, Jung turns to other disciplines, including primitive psychology, mythology, and comparative religion, but also archaeology, because these fields offer him ‘invaluable analogies’ with which he can enrich the associations of his clients and so both together can ‘find meaning in apparent irrelevancies’ (*das scheinbar Belanglose in die Nachbarschaft des Bedeutungsreichen rücken*) and thus ‘vastly increase the effectiveness of the dream’ (*die Möglichkeit der Wirkung erheblich erhöhen*) (CW 16 §96). We should note how, time and again in this paper, Jung attaches importance to the mechanism of analogy as an interpretational tool, hinting at an underlying affinity between analytical psychology and Platonism⁶⁷ or Neoplatonism.⁶⁸

For instance, in his work on Aristotle’s *Categories*, Dexippus (a commentator reliant on Porphyry) expresses the following view: ‘Since (intelligibles) are ineffable, [Aristotle] uses the name “substance” [or “being”, *ousia*] metaphorically (of them), making them knowable through things sensible and perceived by us’, for ‘sensible substance [or being] will be homonymous with intelligible substance [or being], representing it only by analogy, but it will be synonymous with physical substance [or being], representing it by its very composition’.⁶⁹ One can note here, as Robert M. van den Berg does, the distinction found in Porphyry between ‘homonymy by chance’ and ‘homonymy from analogy’. For instance, it is a matter of chance that the name ‘Paris’ applies to the son of Priam and to the capital of France alike. On the other hand, Porphyry gives as an example of homonymy from analogy (*kat’ analogian*) the word *archē* (‘source’), for one can say that unit is the source of number, that a point as the source of a line, or that a spring is the source of a river. And one can do so because although a unit, a point, and a spring are not identical, a unit is to a number as a point is to a line, and as a spring is to a river, and so the application of the word ‘source’ is not a coincidence, because there is a relationship of analogy between them.⁷⁰ Although Dexippus and others refer to homonymy by analogy as a metaphor, Porphyry does not follow them in doing so: and in some respects his understanding of analogy is symbolic, in the sense that Goethe later uses the term (as meaning ‘the thing, and not the thing, and yet the thing’).⁷¹ As van den Berg points out, the same kind of question arises in analogy as it did in the case of Jung’s dream interpretation, viz., how do we know that ‘being’ somehow metaphorically ‘grasps’ the right intelligible entity? For Porphyry, the answer lies in the authority of Aristotle; for Iamblichus, we need the notion of ‘intellective interpretation’ (*noera theōria*); and for Jung, as we have seen, there is something pragmatically corroborative involved.

In other words, Jung is concerned to develop an approach which proposes a model of understanding based on analogy. Could this model be valid for philosophical archaeology and for analytical psychology alike? In ‘The Aims of Psychotherapy’, Jung emphasises the importance of finding a right kind of meaning (*Sinn*) in dreams:

For the lay person who has done their utmost in the personal and rational sphere of life and yet has found no meaning and no satisfaction there, it is enormously important to be able to enter a sphere of irrational experience. In this way, too, the habitual and the commonplace come to wear an altered countenance, and can even acquire a new glamour. For it all depends on how we look at things [*wie wir die Dinge betrachten*],⁷² and not on how they are in themselves. The least of all things with a meaning is always worth more in life than the greatest of things without it. (CW 16 §96, trans. modified)

Jung anticipates an objection to this procedure: 'I do not think I underestimate the risk of this undertaking. It is as if one began to build a bridge out into space. Indeed, the ironist might even allege – and has often done so – that in following this procedure both doctor and patient are indulging in mere fantasy-spinning [= *phantasieren*]' (CW 16 §97). So he engages directly with this counterargument, tackling it head-on and making an unabashed *plaidoyer* for fantasy (in the precise sense of *Phantasie*):

It is the maternally creative side of the masculine mind [...] We can never rise above fantasy [...] All the works of humankind have their origin in creative imagination. [...] In the normal course of things, fantasy does not easily go astray; it is too deep for that, and too closely bound up with the tap-root of human and animal instinct. It has a surprising way of coming out right in the end. The creative activity of imagination frees the human being from their bondage to the "nothing but" and raises them to the status of someone who plays. As Schiller says, human beings are completely human only when they are at play. (CW 16 §98, trans. modified)⁷³

Jung goes on to elucidate the principles of his technique, describing its aim in processual (Goethean) terms as being 'to bring about a psychic state in which my patient begins to experiment with his own nature [*mit seinem Wesen zu experimentieren*] – a state of fluidity, change, and growth where nothing is eternally fixed and hopelessly petrified' (CW 16 §99) – or as the simpler original German puts it, *ein Zustand der Flüssigkeit, der Veränderung und des Werdens*. As this formulation shows, there is something paradoxical at work here, and by speaking about a *state of change*, Jung is recognising he is up against the limitations of language.

With regard to actual therapeutic procedure, Jung goes on to describe his technique in the following terms: 'In handling a dream or fantasy I make it a rule never to go beyond the meaning which is effective for the patient [*nie über den im wirkungsvollen Moment liegenden Sinn hinauszugehen*]; I merely try to make them as fully conscious of this meaning as possible, so that they shall also become aware of its supra-personal connections [*dessen überpersönliche Beziehung*]' (CW 16 §99, trans. modified). For Jung, this suprapersonal element involved in understanding the dream is crucial; in fact, he describes its significance in terms of an awareness of historical continuity:

For, when something happens to a person and they suppose it to be personal only to themselves, whereas in reality it is a quite universal experience, then this attitude is obviously wrong, that is, too personal, and it tends to exclude them from human society. By the same token we need to have not only a personal, contemporary consciousness, but also a supra-personal consciousness with a sense of historical continuity [*ein überpersönliches Bewusstsein, dessen Geist historische Kontinuität fühlt*]. (CW 16 §99, trans. modified)

This sense of historical continuity is, Jung believes, particularly important for understanding people's own 'religious promptings', something which compromises what he provocatively describes as 'a childish passion for rational enlightenment', and he argues that 'it is precisely for the religious function that the sense of historical continuity is indispensable' (CW 16 §99).

In other words, the project of analytical psychology has two important aspects. First, it espouses a humanist outlook, as the famous remark attributed to Jung in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* makes clear: 'Later I consciously linked my work to what Faust had passed over: respect for the eternal rights of humankind, recognition of "the ancient", and the continuity of culture and intellectual history' (*die Respektierung der ewigen Menschenrechte, die Anerkennung des Alten und die Kontinuität der Kultur und der Geistesgeschichte*).⁷⁴ Second, it involves a hermeneutic endeavour, for the

problem of meaning and the act of interpretation are central to its activity. And precisely this aspect of its work is thrown into relief and brought into focus by approaching it through the notion of philosophical archaeology. For, at its core, philosophical archaeology is concerned with the question of how meaning is constituted.

The Red Book and the recovery of the past

Now how did this constitution of meaning work in Jung's own case? Since the publication in 2009 of Jung's *Red Book*, in which he elaborated between 1915 and 1930 experiences envisioned between 1913 and 1916, we can begin to answer this question. Although this work is imaginative, even artistic (although not, Jung insisted, aesthetic)⁷⁵ in nature, rather than propositional in tone, and hence it should be used with some care, it can contribute much to our understanding of Jung's intellectual (as well as his psychological) development. As Konrad Paul Liessmann has noted in his recent extended commentary on the 'Midnight-Song' in Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, archaeology knows that 'anyone who begins to dig [...] invariably comes across the dead and their testimony: skeletons, bones, skulls, official graves, mass graves, weapons, remains of all kinds, sunk things, fallen things'.⁷⁶ If, in this sense, Zarathustra's cry, 'The world is deep', testifies to the radical verticality of Nietzsche's thought, then the *Red Book* bears witness to a similar verticality in analytical psychology.

From the point of view of our discussion so far, one of the most relevant parts of the *Red Book* relates to experiences Jung recorded in his so-called *Black Books* on 22 January 1914.⁷⁷ On this occasion, described in the *Red Book* in the chapter entitled 'The Three Prophecies', Jung called to his soul – a frequent rhetorical device in this work – and asked her to 'dive down into the floods' whose 'distant roaring' he could hear.⁷⁸ 'And thus', we read, 'she plunged into the darkness like a shot, and from the depths she called out: "Will you accept what I bring?"', to which Jung replies: 'I will accept what you give. I do not have the right to judge or to reject'. So what does Jung's soul bring up from the depths? She brings up, first, 'old armor and the rusty gear of our fathers down here, murderous leather trappings hanging from them, worm-eaten lance shafts, twisted spear heads [...]'; second, 'painted stones, carved bones with magical signs, talismanic sayings on hanks of leather and small plates of lead, [...] fratricide, cowardly mortal blows, torture, child sacrifice, the annihilation of whole peoples, arson, betrayal, war, rebellion [...] epidemics, natural catastrophes, sunken ships, razed cities, frightful feral savagery, famines, human meanness, and fear, whole mountains of fear'; and third, 'the treasures of all past cultures, magnificent images of gods, spacious temples, paintings, papyrus rolls, sheets of parchment with the characters of bygone languages, books full of wisdom, hymns and chants of ancient priests, stories told down the ages through thousands of generations'.⁷⁹

What is the meaning of these objects, or what do they represent? According to the *Red Book* itself, 'from the flooding darkness the son of the earth has brought, my soul gave me ancient things that pointed to the future. She gave me three things: The misery of war, the darkness of magic, and the gift of religion'.⁸⁰ What is significant about these three things – in line with the argument proposed by Jung in his lecture on 'The Aims of Psychotherapy' – is the response they provoke in Jung as he beholds them. Just as Agamben turns to Mauss's work on *mana* in his investigation of the theory of magic to understand the notion of an historical *a priori*, so Jung conjures the notions of war, magic, and religion:

If you are clever, you will understand that these three things belong together. These three mean the unleashing of chaos and its power, just as they also mean the binding of chaos. War is obvious and everybody sees it. Magic is dark and no one sees it. Religion is still to come, but it will become evident. Did you think that the horrors of such atrocious warfare would come over us? Did you think that magic existed? Did you think about a new religion? I sat up for long nights and looked ahead at what was to come and I shuddered. Do you believe me? I am not too concerned. What should I believe? What should I disbelieve? I saw and I shuddered.⁸¹

Jung's response to these three things and his reflections on them are twofold. Both are consistent with later developments in the intellectual elaboration of this therapeutic practice. First, he engages on a programme of self-restriction:

I return to the small and the real, for this is the great way, the way of what is to come.^[82] I return to my simple reality, to my undeniable and most miniscule being. And I take a knife and hold court over everything that has grown without measure and goal. Forests have grown around me, winding plants have climbed up me, and I am completely covered by endless proliferation.⁸³

What is Jung imaginatively performing here? One might understand it as a kind of *exercice spirituel* involving self-reduction or self-abnegation, almost a sort of self-pruning (of the kind that Nietzsche, for instance, advocates in *Daybreak*, §560).⁸⁴ This procedure has its positive counterpart, embodied in a famous literary topos that constitutes his second response to the archaeological work of his soul:

JUNG: I must limit myself. Who could ever grasp such wealth?

SOUL: Be content and cultivate your garden with modesty.^[85]

JUNG: I will. I see that it is not worth conquering a larger piece of the immeasurable, but a smaller one instead. A well-tended small garden is better than an ill-tended large garden. Both gardens are equally small when faced with the immeasurable, but unequally cared for.

SOUL: Take shears and prune your trees.⁸⁶

As part of this second response Jung begins to develop a notion of the archaic.⁸⁷

Philosophical archaeology, the archaic, and art

About a decade-and-a-half later, in his paper on 'The Aims of Psychotherapy', Jung reflects in the following terms on what, in the course of analysis, the soul brings up from the depths, and he introduces one of his key ideas, the notion of the archaic.⁸⁸ And he does so in the context of discussing the pictures produced by his clients whom, when they had arrived 'at a certain stage in their development', he apparently encouraged to express themselves 'by means of brush, pencil, or pen' (CW 16 §105). (Oddly, Jung remarks that these pictures, although they are 'artistically beautiful' and 'might very well be shown in modern "art" exhibitions', are nevertheless to be regarded as 'completely worthless when judged by the canons of real art' [§104] ...⁸⁹ Indeed, Jung insists that it is 'essential' they should be considered 'worthless!')⁹⁰

In his paper Jung comments – and in some respects his remarks remind one of the extraordinary pictures contained in the *Red Book* – that 'a feature common to all these pictures is a primitive symbolism which is conspicuous both in the drawing and in the colouring. The colours are as a rule quite barbaric in their intensity. Often an unmistakable *archaic* quality is present' (CW 16 §111, my emphasis). What is the reason for this primitive, barbaric, archaic quality to these pictures (and, by extension, to the pictures in the *Red Book*)? Again, we find ourselves struggling to understand the mysterious presence of the *arkhai*, by definition belonging to the (historical) past, in the midst of our (imaginary) present: a challenge at the core of philosophical archaeology.

According to Jung, these archaic characteristics point to 'the nature of the underlying creative forces', to the 'irrational, symbolistic currents that run through the whole history of humankind, and are so archaic in character that it is not difficult to find their parallels in archaeology and comparative religion' (CW 16 §111; trans. modified). Thus in Jung's eyes what analytical psychology, comparative religion, and archaeology all uncover is what he terms the 'collective unconscious', defined as 'an unconscious psychic functioning common to all human beings, the source not only of our modern symbolical pictures but of all similar products in the past' (CW 16 §111; trans. modified). So perhaps the reason why Jung chooses to deny these pictures the status of art

is because they 'spring from, and satisfy, a natural need' – or, as he puts it, 'as if a part of the psyche that reaches far back into the primitive past were expressing itself in these pictures and finding it possible to function in harmony with our alien conscious mind' (CW 16 §111). This remark suggests that consciousness is something alien to us, and the unconscious is where we are truly at home. At this point, the vitalist roots of Jung's thinking become clearly visible.

Yet so do further parallels with philosophical archaeology. If we return for a moment to Lawlor's discussion of the philosophical concept of archaeology, which is focused on Freud rather than on Jung, we find comparable remarks about, for instance, the existence of 'an absolute memory, a memory not relative to an individual's ability to remember, that is, a memory not relative to consciousness' or about 'the displacement of the conscious subject'.⁹¹ In fact, it is highly instructive – and this is the thrust of my argument – to approach Jung's analytical psychology through the five key characteristics of philosophical archaeology as set out by Lawlor –⁹² both for what they have in common *and* for the respects in which they differ.

First, archaeology 'concerns signs, traces, or sedimentations of the past, in a word, mediation'; and analytical psychology is concerned with uncovering these traces, or the effects of these traces. Second, 'in the reading of signs, consciousness is displaced toward an unconscious that precedes it, that has been conserved and that is incomplete'; and analytical psychology shares this displacement of consciousness toward a preceding unconscious, albeit (in its view) one that is both preserved and complete. Third, archaeology investigates 'the space of the unconscious, that is, a spatial order or simultaneity that is prior to consciousness or empirical or psychological genesis'; and analytical psychology conducts just such an investigation, in the form of therapeutic analysis. Fourth, this order is not 'an abstract a priori' but 'an a priori for these singular historical facts or signs'; and analytical psychology bears out this point by treating the collective unconscious not simply (or not even?) as a fact, but as an actor in the process of psychological development, collectively and individually. And fifth, 'in the investigation of this historical a priori, archaeology overcomes a kind of forgetfulness, which implies that it consists in a kind of memory'; and analytical psychology commits itself to precisely this conception of memory, a memory that is 'not really a memory of the past, that is, it is not interested in the past for its own sake; its interest is the future'.

For when *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* tells us that Jung 'consciously linked' his work to 'respect for the eternal rights of humankind, recognition of "the ancient", and the continuity of culture and intellectual history', the implication is that he did so out of a concern for *the future*. Correspondingly when Jung, in the *Red Book*, he calls and asks his soul to dive down into the dark depths, and she returns with 'three things', i.e. with 'the misery of war; the darkness of magic; and the gift of religion', she does so in order to enable him to prepare himself for the future, in the sense of 'the great way, the way of what is to come'. Just as, for Jung, the archaic reveals to us the past inasmuch as it exists in the present, so the future in the sense of the way of what is to come affects us *now*. (In the words of Agamben, 'the point of emergence, the *arché* of archaeology, is that which will happen, that which will become accessible and present only when the archaeological inquest will have fulfilled its operation', and 'it has therefore the form of a futural past, that is of a future perfect'.)⁹³ Or as Jung put it in the first chapter of *Liber primus*, entitled 'The Way of What is to Come': '*But the supreme meaning is the path, the way and the bridge to what is to come. That is the God yet to come. It is not the coming God himself, but his image which appears in the supreme meaning. God is an image, and those who worship him must worship him in the image of the supreme meaning*'.⁹⁴

At this point the path of analytical psychology diverges from the path of philosophical archaeology, as it is practised by Kant and Foucault (to say nothing of related, if distinct, concepts found in Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and in Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), whom Lawlor discusses). For these thinkers, there is no *Über-Sinn* (or, as translated above, 'supreme meaning'); for Jung, clearly, there *is*. So the notion of philosophical archaeology can be used to help clarify the status of the archaic in Jung's thought, as representing an alternative (and, to a certain extent, occluded) tradition in twentieth-century thought. For Agamben, the *arkhé* (ἀρχή) toward which

archaeology regresses ‘must not be understood in any way as an element that can be situated in chronology (not even one with a large grid, of the sort used in pre-history); it is, rather, a force that operates in history’; it is ‘not a *datum* or a substance’ but rather ‘a field of bipolar historical currents within the tension of anthropogenesis and history, between the point of emergence and becoming, between arch-past and present’.⁹⁵ (At this point, one recalls that for Jung the *Urbild* or the archetype is ‘bipolar’,⁹⁶ and can be interpreted as just such a structuring device; for instance, he compares the *form* of the archetype to ‘the axial system of a crystal, which, as it were, preforms the crystalline structure in the mother liquid, although it has no material existence of its own’).⁹⁷

Conclusion

Thus for Agamben the *arkhé* is ‘solely capable of guaranteeing the intelligibility of historical phenomena, of “saving” them archaeologically within a future perfect, yet not grasping its (in any case unverifiable) origin, but rather its history, at once finite and untotisable’ –⁹⁸ which brings us back to Jung’s emphasis on the importance of the dimension of meaningfulness, on the possibility of a ‘saving thought’,⁹⁹ and on the problem of verifiability. Clearly there remains a lot of work to be done in this area, but this article hopes to have established the viability of comparing the concept of philosophical archaeology and the project of analytical psychology: by pointing, as Agamben does, to the parallels between the way in which ‘the child in psychoanalysis expresses an active force in the psychic life of the adult’ and the *arkhé* in archaeology is apprehended as ‘a force that operates in history’; and, moreover, the way in which Jung conceives analysis a way of attuning oneself to the archaic dimension of life. So perhaps one could add to Lawlor’s taxonomical distinction between Foucault’s and Merleau-Ponty’s approaches to philosophical archaeology in terms of a difference between the archive (as a place of statement or *l’énoncé*) and the museum (as a place of expression)¹⁰⁰ a third location – the analytic consulting-room (as a place of the archetypal)? After all, all three bear witness to the truth of Heidegger’s assertion that ‘the authenticity and greatness of historical knowledge reside in an understanding of the mysterious character of the beginning’.¹⁰¹

Notes

1. Jim Yardley, ‘Centuries of Italian History of Unearthed in Quest to Fix Toilet’, *New York Times*, 14 April 2015.
2. An earlier version of this article was given as a paper at *Towards a New Worldview: Conversations with Analytical Psychology*, a symposium at the C.G. Jung Institute with Collegium Helveticum organised by Philip Kime and Harald Atmanspacher on 13–14 February 2016.
3. Freud, *Civilisation and its Discontents* [1930], in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, general eds James Strachey and Anna Freud, 24 vols (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), vol. 23, pp. 57–146 (pp. 68–69).
4. C.G. Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious: A Study of the Transformations and Symbolisms of the Libido: A Contribution to the History of Thought*, trans. Beatrice M. Hinkle, introd. William McGuire (London: Routledge, 1991), §1 (p. 5).
5. C.G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, ed. Aniela Jaffé, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (London: Collins; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 182–183. For an analysis of the genesis of this work, see Elena Fischli, ‘Historischer Kommentar’, in Aniela Jaffé, *Streiflichter zu Leben und Denken C.G. Jungs* (Einsiedeln: Daimon Verlag, 2021), pp. 223–410.
6. For further discussion, see Meredith Sabini, ‘The Bones in the Cave: Phylogenetic Foundations of Analytical Psychology’, *Journal of Jungian Theory and Practice* 2 (Fall 2000), 17–33; Raya A. Jones, ‘A Discovery of Meaning: The Case of C.G. Jung’s House Dream’, *Culture and Psychotherapy* 13, no. 2 (2007), 203–230; Steve Myers, ‘The cryptomnesic origin of Jung’s dream of the multi-storeyed house’, *Journal of Analytical Psychology* 54, no. 4 (September 2009), 513–531; Kevin Lu, ‘Jung, History and His Approach to the Psyche’, *Journal of Jungian Scholarly Studies* 8, no. 9 (2012), 1–24; and Lucy Huskinson, ‘Housing Complexes: Redesigning the house of the psyche in light of a curious mistranslation of C.G. Jung appropriated by Gaston Bachelard’, *International Journal of Jungian Studies* 5, no. 1 (2013), 64–80.
7. Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life’ [1874], §3, in *Untimely Meditations*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 73 (trans. modified).

8. See Julian Thomas, 'Sigmund Freud's Archaeological Metaphor and Archaeology's Self-understanding', in Cornelius Holtorf and Angela Piccini (eds), *Contemporary Archaeologies: Excavating Now* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 2009), pp. 33-45).
9. For further discussion, see Richard H. Armstrong, *A Compulsion for Antiquity: Freud and the Ancient World* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); and Janine Burke, *The Sphinx on the Table: Sigmund Freud's Art Collection and the Development of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Walker, 2006).
10. Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung, *The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C.G. Jung*, ed. William McGuire, trans. Ralph Manheim and R.F.C. Hull (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), pp. 252-253, 258, and 279.
11. See Sonu Shamdasani, *C.G. Jung: A Biography in Books* (New York and London: Norton, 2012). Shamdasani describes the collective unconscious as 'the library within' (p. 49) and observes in relation to an episode described in the Red Book: '[W]hile Jung's self-investigation marked a turn away from scholarship, his fantasies and his reflections were marked by and indebted to his extensive scholarly readings' and '[his] self-experimentation was largely undertaken while seated in his library' (p. 90).
12. Freud/Jung, *Letters*, p. 258.
13. William McGuire and R.F.C. Hull (eds), *C.G. Jung Speaking: Interviews and Encounters* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 209, 248, and 457.
14. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, ed. Jaffé, pp. 104-105 and 184-186.
15. C.G. Jung, *Letters*, ed. Gerhard Adler and Aniela Jaffé, trans R.F.C. Hull, 2 vols (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973-1975), vol. 1 (1906-1950), pp. 29-30 and 113; vol. 2 (1951-1961), p. 307.
16. Peter Kingsley, *Catafalque: Carl Jung and the End of Humanity*, 2 vols (London: Catafalque Press, 2018), p. 603 and pp. 82 and 516; cf. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, ed. Jaffé, p. 225. For further discussion of this passage and its misinterpretation, see *Catafalque*, pp. 82-83, 321-322, 326, 327-330, 516-517 and 602-604.
17. Stephen T. Asma, *Following Form and Function: A Philosophical Archaeology of Life Science* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996).
18. Seth Bernadete, *The Archaeology of the Soul: Platonic Readings in Ancient Poetry and Philosophy*, ed. Ronna Burger and Michael Davis (South Bend, IN: St Augustine Press, 2012).
19. Antero Ali et al., *Towards an Archaeology of the Soul: A Paratheatrical Workbook* (Berkeley, CA: Vertical Pool, 2003).
20. Robert L. Hall, *An Archaeology of the Soul: North American Indian Belief and Ritual* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1997).
21. Giorgio Agamben, 'Philosophical Archaeology', *Law and Critique* 20, no. 3 (November 2009), 211-231.
22. Colin McQuillan, 'Philosophical Archaeology in Kant, Foucault, and Agamben', *Parrhesia* 10 (2010), 39-49.
23. William Watkin, 'The Signature of All Things: Agamben's Philosophical Archaeology', *Modern Language Notes* 129, no. 1 (January 2014), 139-161.
24. Leonard Lawlor, *Thinking through French Philosophy: The Being of the Question* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), chapter 2, 'The Chiasm and the Fold: An Introduction to the Philosophical Concept of Archaeology', pp. 24-46.
25. Philip Tonner, *Dwelling: Heidegger, Archaeology, Mortality* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2018). I am grateful to Philip Tonner for drawing the work of Lawlor to my attention and for our conversations on the intersection of anthropology and philosophy.
26. Kant, 'What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?' (1793/1804), in *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781* [Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant], ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 337-424 (here: p. 417; trans. modified). See also 'Preisschrift über die Fortschritte der Metaphysik' and 'Lose Blätter zu den Fortschritten der Metaphysik', in *Gesammelte Schriften [Akademie-Ausgabe]*, ed. Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 20 = *Nachlaß*, vol. 7 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1942), pp. 253-332 and 333-351; and *Philosophische Enzyklopädie* [c. 1778], in *Gesammelte Schriften [AA]*, vol. 29.1/1 = *Vorlesungen*, vol. 6.1/1, *Kleinere Vorlesungen und Ergänzungen I* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1973), pp. 1-45.
27. Agamben, 'Philosophical Archaeology', p. 212.
28. Kant, *Lectures on Logic* [Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant], ed. and trans. J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 538; cf. 'Vienna Logic': 'Philosophy cannot be learned, because every philosopher erects his own building on the ruins of another' (p. 260). See Kant, *Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik, Teil 2* [Werkausgabe, vol. 6], ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), p. 448.
29. Kant, *Philosophische Enzyklopädie*, in *Gesammelte Schriften [AA]*, vol. 29.1/1 = *Vorlesungen*, vol. 6.1/1, *Kleinere Vorlesungen und Ergänzungen*, pp. 3-45: 'Ein Urbild bleibt nicht mehr Urbild, wenn es erreicht werden kann. Es soll bloß zur Richtschnur dienen' (p. 8).
30. See Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, book 1, §39: 'Tombs and mausoleums are signs of our remembering the dead. So too are pyramids, which are also imperishable mementoes of the great power a king once had. — Strata of seashells in regions far from the sea, holes of Pholades in the high Alps, or

volcanic residue where no fire now erupts from the earth signify to us the ancient state of the world and establish an *archaeology* of nature. [...] The ruins of Palmyra, Baalbek and Persepolis are eloquent reminders of the artistic level of *ancient states*, and melancholy indications of the way *all things change*' (Immanuel Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), p. 66); and *Critique of Judgment*, part 2, §82, footnote: 'If the name of *natural history* [...] is to be continued to be used for the description of nature, we may give the name of *archaeology of nature*, as contrasted with art, to [...] an account of the bygone or *ancient* state of the earth [...]. Fossil remains would be objects for the archaeology of nature, just as rudely cut stones, and things of that kind, would be for the archaeology of art' (Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), Part II, p. 90); cf. Lawlor, 'The Chiasm and the Fold', p. 30. As Ernst Cassirer points out, the passages from the third *Critique* seem to have been written with reference to the *Natural History* of Buffon (see Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, trans. Fritz C.A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 79-80). For further discussion, see Phillip R. Sloan, 'Kant on the history of nature: The ambiguous heritage of the critical philosophy for natural history', *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences* 37 (2006), 627-648.

31. See Michel Foucault, *L'archéologie du savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969); trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith as *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1970); and Foucault, *Les Mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966); trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith as *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1974). For an archaeology of Foucauldian archaeology, see Heinz-Peter Preußner, 'Epochenkonstruktion und Gegenrede: Zur Archäologie Michel Foucaults', in *Pathische Ästhetik: Ludwig Klages und die Urgeschichte der Postmoderne* (Heidelberg: Winter, 2015), pp. 29-48.
32. See 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' in Paul Rabinow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), pp. 76-100.
33. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, p. xxiii: 'Archaeology, addressing itself to the general space of knowledge, to its configurations, and to the mode of being of the things that appear in it, defines systems of simultaneity, as well as the series of mutations necessary and sufficient to circumscribe the threshold of a new positivity'. For further discussion, see David Webb, *Foucault's Archaeology: Science and Transformation* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013).
34. Agamben, 'Philosophical Archaeology', pp. 219-220.
35. Marcel Mauss, 'Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la magie' [1902/1903], in *Sociologie et anthropologie* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1950), pp. 1-141 (p. 111): 'elle est donnée *a priori*, préalablement à toute expérience', 'ce rôle [...] de catégorie inconsciente de l'entendement'. The concept of magic plays an important rôle in Jung's *Red Book* (see below) as does the concept of *mana* in *The Relations between the Ego and the Unconscious* (1928) see *Collected Works*, ed. Sir Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, Gerhard Adler, and William McGuire, 20 vols (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953-1983), vol. 7, *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953), §202-§406 (here: part 2, chapter 4, 'The Mana-Personality', §374-§406, pp. 225-239).
36. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 445-446. Ricoeur explicitly states that he regards Freudianism as 'a revelation of the archaic, a manifestation of the ever prior' and thus as having roots in 'the Romantic philosophy of life and the unconscious' (p. 440). For Ricoeur's discussion of 'the concept of archaeology' and 'archaeology and reflective philosophy' in Freud, see pp. 439-457.
37. Agamben, 'Philosophical Archaeology', pp. 223-224.
38. On this point, compare with Jung's famous remarks about the *prospective* approach offered by analytical psychology in contrast to Freud's *retrospective* approach; see his lecture 'On Psychological Understanding' (1914), published as a supplement to the second edition of *The Content of the Psychoses* (1908; 2nd edn, 1914), in *The Content of the Psychoses*, in *The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease* [*Collected Works*, vol. 3], trans. R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960), §363-§384 (here: §341-§353, pp. 165-170).
39. Lawlor, 'The Chiasm and the Fold', p. 26.
40. Ibid.
41. Freud, 'Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria', *Standard Edition*, vol. 7, pp. 3-123 (p. 12). See the discussion of this episode in Karin Sanders, *Bodies in the Bog and the Archaeological Imagination* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2009), pp. 47-60.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Lawlor, 'The Chiasm and the Fold', p. 27.
45. Freud, 'The Aetiology of Hysteria' (1896), *Standard Edition*, vol. 3, pp. 189-223 (p. 192).
46. Lawlor, 'The Chiasm and the Fold', p. 28.

47. 'Constructions in Analysis', in Freud, *Standard Edition*, vol. 23, pp. 256-269. For further discussion, see Sergio Lewkowicz and Thierry Bolkanowski with Georges Pragier (eds), *On Freud's "Constructions in Analysis"* (London: Karnac, 2011).
48. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen and Sonu Shamdasani, *The Freud Files: An Inquiry into the History of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 332, n. 152.
49. See *Fragment of a Case of Hysteria*, in *Standard Edition*, vol. 3, pp. 44-45.
50. Freud, 'Negation', in *Standard Edition*, vol. 19, pp. 235-239.
51. Freud, 'Constructions in Analysis', p. 258.
52. Freud, 'Constructions in Analysis', p. 259. For further discussion, see Cathy Gere, *Knossos and the Prophets of Modernism* (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2009), pp. 153-160.
53. Freud, 'Constructions in Analysis', p. 259.
54. Freud, 'Constructions in Analysis', p. 260.
55. Freud, 'Constructions in Analysis', pp. 261-262.
56. Freud, 'Constructions in Analysis', pp. 265-266; my emphasis.
57. Freud, 'Constructions in Analysis', p. 268.
58. Freud, 'Constructions in Analysis', p. 269.
59. On these terms, see Sonu Shamdasani, *Jung and the Making of Modern Psychology: The Dream of a Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 13-18 and 66-68.
60. See Christian Kerslake, 'Rebirth through incest: On Deleuze's Early Jungianism', *Angelaki* 9, no. 1 (2004), 135-157; Christian Kerslake, *Deleuze and the Unconscious* (London and New York: Continuum, 2007); and Inna Semetsky and Joshua A. Delpuch-Ramey, 'Jung's Psychology and Deleuze's Philosophy: The unconscious in learning', *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 44, no. 1 (2012), 69-81.
61. Jung, 'The Content of the Psychoses', in *The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease [Collected Works, vol. 3]*, §363-§384 (here: §341-§353, pp. 165-170).
62. Jung, 'The Significance of the Unconscious in Individual Education', in *The Development of Personality [Collected Works, vol. 17]*, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), §253-§283, pp. 149-164 (here: §262, p. 154).
63. See Jung, 'The Aims of Psychotherapy', in *The Practice of Therapy: Essays on the Psychology of the Transference and other subjects [Collected Works, vol. 16]*, trans. R.F.C. Hull, 2nd edn (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), §66-§113, pp. 36-52. The original text is included in C.G. Jung, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, ed. Verena Kast and Ingrid Riedel (Ostfildern: Patmos, 2011), pp. 295-313.
64. See Pascal, *Pensées*, §553 (ed. Brunschvicg), 'You would not seek me if you had not already found me'; and Augustine, *Confessions*, book 10, chapter 27, 'You were with me, and I was not with you'. For the suggestion that behind such statements lies a passage found in Plotinus (*Enneads*, 6 Ennead, treatise 5, §12, 13-29), see Pierre Hadot, *Plotinus or the Simplicity of Vision* [1989], trans. Michael Chase (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1993), p. 47).
65. For one of the many occasions when Jung uses this phrase, see 'The Aims of Psychotherapy' (CW 16 §111).
66. Goethe, *Faust I*, ll. 447-448 and 460; see Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust: A Tragedy*, trans. Walter Arndt, ed. Cyrus Hamlin (New York and London: Norton, 2001), p. 14; *Faust*, ed. Erich Trunz (Munich: Beck, 1972), p. 22.
67. On the form of the Good as compared with the sun, the divided line, and the allegory of the cave, see Robert J. Fogelin, 'Three Platonic Analogies', *The Philosophical Review* 80, no. 3 (July 1971), 371-383.
68. Cf. John Dillon, 'Image, Symbol and Analogy: Three Basic Concepts of Neoplatonic Allegorical Exegesis', in R. Baine Harris (ed.), *The Significance of Neoplatonism* [Studies in Neoplatonism: Ancient and Modern, vol. 1] (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1976) pp. 247-262.
69. Dexippus, in *Cat.*, 41.25-30, in Dexippus, *On Aristotle Categories*, trans. John Dillon (London: Bloomsbury, 1990), p. 76. Cf. Robert M. van den Berg, 'The gift of Hermes: The Neoplatonists on language and philosophy', in Pauliina Remes and Svetla Slaveva-Griffin, *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 251-265 (esp. p. 256).
70. Porphyry, in *Cat.* 66.29-67.26, in Porphyry, *On Aristotle Categories*, trans. Steven K. Strange (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), pp. 76-77.
71. Goethe, *Werke: Weimarer Ausgabe* (Weimar: Böhlau, 1887-1919), Abteilung I, vol. 49/i, p. 142: '[E]in Symbol [...] ist die Sache, ohne die Sache zu sein, und doch die Sache'. For further discussion, see Paul Bishop, 'Das Goethe'sche Symbol als Instrument der morphologischen Wandlung in Philosophie und Psychologie: Cassirer, Jung und Klages', in Jonas Maatsch (ed.), *Morphologie und Moderne: Goethes »anschauliches« Denken in den Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften seit 1800* (Berlin and Boston: de Gruyter, 2014), pp. 157-175.
72. Cf. 'Psychotherapy Today' (1941; 1945): 'That individuals' philosophy of life is directly connected with the well-being of the psyche can be seen from the fact that their mental attitude, their way of looking at things, is of enormous importance to them and their mental health — so much so that we could almost say that things are less what they are than how we see them' (CW 16 §218, trans. modified). For a discussion of the Goethean

echo in this formulation, see Paul Bishop, *Analytical Psychology and German Classical Aesthetics: Goethe, Schiller, and Jung*, vol. 1, *The Development of the Personality* (Hove: Routledge, 2008), p. 32.

73. For the source of the reference to Schiller, see Friedrich Schiller, Letter 15, §9, in *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*, ed. and trans. Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 107.
74. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 262 (trans. modified).
75. In *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* Jung described the *Red Book* as an 'aesthetic elaboration' of his fantasies, but rejected the view that it was art' (pp. 213 and 210).
76. Konrad Paul Liessmann, *Alle Lust will Ewigkeit: Mitternächliche Versuchungen* (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2021), p. 143. I am grateful to Christiana Ludwig for kindly sending me this work.
77. C.G. Jung, *The Black Books, 1913-1932: Notebooks of Transformation*, ed. Sonu Shamdasani, trans. Martin Liebscher, John Peck, and Sonu Shamdasani, 7 vols (New York and London: Norton, 2020), vol. 4, pp. 220-222.
78. Jung, *The Red Book: Liber novus*, ed. Sonu Shamdasani, trans. Mark Kyburz, John Peck, and Sonu Shamdasani (New York and London: Norton, 2009), p. 305.
79. Jung, *Red Book*, p. 305.
80. Jung, *Red Book*, p. 306.
81. Ibid.
82. Cf. the opening chapter of the *Red Book*, 'The Way of What Is to Come' (*Red Book*, pp. 229-231).
83. Jung, *Red Book*, p. 306. Can one read this remark about 'endless proliferation' as a reference to the process of creating the *Red Book* itself ... ?
84. 'One can dispose of one's drives like a gardener and, though few know it, cultivate the shoots of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity as productively and profitably as a beautiful fruit tree on a trellis [...]' (Friedrich Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), §560, 'What we are at liberty to do', p. 225). For a critique of this and other passages about the 'drives' in Nietzsche's writings, see Tom Stern, 'Against Nietzsche's "Theory" of the Drives', *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2015), 121-140.
85. Cf. the famous conclusion reached in Voltaire's *Candide*. This prompts the question: of this injunction is offered as a satirical proposal in Voltaire's novel, is its intention in Jung's *Red Book* satirical, too ... ?
86. Jung, *Red Book*, p. 306.
87. For further discussion, see Paul Bishop, *The Archaic: The Past in the Present* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012).
88. Cf. Heidegger's remark in his discussion of Sophocles's *Antigone* in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*: 'The authenticity and greatness of historical knowledge reside in an understanding of the mysterious character of this beginning. The knowledge of primordial history is not a ferreting out of primitive lore or a collecting of bones' — i.e., it is not simply archaeology, 'ethnology and psychological anthropology' — for 'it is neither half nor whole natural science but, if it is anything at all, mythology' (Martin Heidegger, 'The Ode on Man in Sophocles' *Antigone*', in Thomas Woodward (ed.), *Sophocles: A Collection of Critical Essays* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1966), pp. 86-100 [p. 93]).
89. Compare with the debates surrounding the works displayed in the famous collection established by Hans Prinzhorn (1886-1933) in Heidelberg. For further discussion, see Inge Jádi, Bettina Brand-Claussen and Caroline Douglas, *Beyond Reason: Art and Psychosis: Works from the Prinzhorn Collection* (London: Hayward Gallery, 1996); and for Jung's own art, see *The Art of C.G. Jung*, ed. Foundation of the Works of C.G. Jung (New York and London: Norton, 2018).
90. Cf. Jung's argument at this point: 'It is not a question of art at all — or rather, it should not be a question of art — but of something more and other than mere art, namely the living effect upon the patient himself or herself. The meaning of individual life, whose importance from the social standpoint is negligible, stands here at its highest, and for its sake the patient struggles to give form, however crude and childish, to the inexpressible' (CW 16 §104, trans. modified).
91. Lawlor, 'The Chiasm and the Fold', p. 27.
92. See Lawlor, 'The Chiasm and the Fold', p. 31.
93. Agamben, 'Philosophical Archaeology', p. 227.
94. Jung, *The Red Book*, p. 229 (text italicised in the original). For further discussion, see Wolfgang Giegerich, 'Liber Novus, that is, The New Bible: A First Analysis of C.G. Jung's *Red Book*', *Spring: A Journal of Archetype and Culture* 83 (Spring 2010), 361-411; republished in *The Flight into The Unconscious [An Analysis of C.G. Jung's Psychology Project]*, vol. 5] (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2020).
95. Agamben, 'Philosophical Archaeology', p. 230.
96. Jolande Jacobi, *The Psychology of C.G. Jung: An Introduction with Illustrations* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1942), p. 42.

97. Jung, 'Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype' (1938/1954), in *The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious* [Collected Works, vol. 9/i], trans. R.F.C. Hull (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), \$148-\$198 (here: \$155, p. 155).
98. Agamben, 'Philosophical Archaeology', p. 230.
99. See Jung, *Psychology of the Unconscious*, \$614 (p. 364).
100. Lawlor, 'The Chiasm and the Fold', p. 37.
101. Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 155.

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