Collin, J. H. (2022) The reverse ontological argument. Analysis, 82(3), pp. 410-416. (doi: 10.1093/analys/anab077)
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Abstract
Modal ontological arguments argue from the possible existence of a perfect being to the actual (necessary) existence of a perfect being. But modal ontological arguments have a problem of symmetry; they can be run in both directions. Reverse ontological arguments argue from the possible nonexistence of a perfect being to the actual (necessary) nonexistence of a perfect being. Some familiar points about the necessary a posteriori, however, show that the symmetry can be broken in favour of the ontological argument.
| Item Type: | Articles |
|---|---|
| Status: | Published |
| Refereed: | Yes |
| Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Collin, Dr James |
| Authors: | Collin, J. H. |
| College/School: | College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Journal Name: | Analysis |
| Publisher: | Oxford University Press |
| ISSN: | 0003-2638 |
| ISSN (Online): | 1467-8284 |
| Published Online: | 23 April 2022 |
| Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2022 The Author |
| First Published: | First published in Analysis 82(3): 410-416 |
| Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons licence |
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