Project financing versus corporate financing under asymmetric information

Miglo, A. (2010) Project financing versus corporate financing under asymmetric information. Journal of Business and Economics Research, 8(8), pp. 27-42. (doi: 10.19030/jber.v8i8.749)

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In recent years, financing through the creation of an independent project company or financing by non-recourse debt has become an important part of corporate decisions. Shah and Thakor (JET, 1987) argue that project financing can be optimal when asymmetric information exists between firms’ insiders and market participants. In contrast to that paper, we provide an asymmetric information argument for project financing without relying on corporate taxes, costly information production or an assumption that firms have the same means of return. In addition, the model generates new predictions regarding asset securitization.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Miglo, Dr Anton
Authors: Miglo, A.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Accounting and Finance
Journal Name:Journal of Business and Economics Research
Publisher:Clute Institute
ISSN (Online):2157-8893

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