Miglo, A. (2011) Can corporate taxation be explained by limited liability? In: Morland, R. B. and Gagglione, A. J. (eds.) Business and Finance: Performance and Management. Nova Science Publishers: New York, pp. 185-190. ISBN 9781611229363
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Abstract
We consider a model where wealth-constrained entrepreneurs have private information about the qualities of available investment projects. We show that some "high risk-high return" projects will receive external financing even if they are not socially profitable. Some "low risk-low return" projects will not be funded even if they are socially profitable. Government interventions can improve equilibrium. Optimal government policy may include corporate taxation subsidies or other instruments. A universal tax on all entrepreneurs with limited liability is not optimal.
Item Type: | Book Sections |
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Status: | Published |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Miglo, Dr Anton |
Authors: | Miglo, A. |
College/School: | College of Social Sciences > Adam Smith Business School > Accounting and Finance |
Publisher: | Nova Science Publishers |
ISBN: | 9781611229363 |
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