Antitrust compliance: collusion

Paha, J. and Thepot, F. (2021) Antitrust compliance: collusion. In: van Rooij, B. and Sokol, D. D. (eds.) The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance. Cambridge University Press, pp. 868-880. ISBN 9781108759458 (doi: 10.1017/9781108759458.059)

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Abstract

Focusing on collusive behavior, this chapter outlines the complexity associated with both the ex ante design of antitrust compliance programs and the ex post assessment of their impact. Following an interdisciplinary review of relevant literature, the chapter provides a structured cost–benefit approach to compliance and challenges the idea that compliance cannot be rationalized. We recognize that measurement of compliance programs may be particularly difficult in light of the importance of less-tangible factors such as corporate culture. Yet, the chapter proposes that a principled approach to compliance would considerably support the work of practitioners. Future research should concentrate on studying the interaction effects of compliance mechanisms and corporate culture. Such large-scale empirical studies on individual and firm-specific factors of compliance might be promoted and coordinated by competition authorities.

Item Type:Book Sections
Status:Published
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Thepot, Dr Florence
Authors: Paha, J., and Thepot, F.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > School of Law
Publisher:Cambridge University Press
ISBN:9781108759458

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