Gordon, E. C. (2022) When monitoring facilitates trust. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 25(4), pp. 557-571. (doi: 10.1007/s10677-022-10286-9)
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Abstract
It is often taken for granted that monitoring stands in some kind of tension with trusting (e.g., Hieronymi 2008; Wanderer and Townsend 2013; Nguyen forthcoming; McMyler 2011, Castelfranchi and Falcone 2000; Frey 1993; Dasgupta 1988, Litzky et al. 2006) — especially three-place trust (i.e., A trusts B to X), but sometimes also two-place trust (i.e., A trusts B, see, e.g., Baier 1986). Using a case study involving relationship breakdown, repair, and formation, I will argue there are some ways in which monitoring can be conducive to two-place trust, and to instances of three-place trust that are likely to be repeated over time—especially when previously established two-place trust has broken down. The result, I hope, is not any kind of abandoning of the important idea that monitoring can undermine trust, but an appreciation of where the conflict between monitoring and trust doesn’t lie – one from which future work will hopefully be better positioned to illuminate where exactly the conflict is.
Item Type: | Articles |
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Status: | Published |
Refereed: | Yes |
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID: | Gordon, Dr Emma |
Authors: | Gordon, E. C. |
Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
College/School: | College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
Journal Name: | Ethical Theory and Moral Practice |
Publisher: | Springer |
ISSN: | 1386-2820 |
ISSN (Online): | 1572-8447 |
Published Online: | 07 May 2022 |
Copyright Holders: | Copyright © 2022 The Author |
First Published: | First published in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25(4): 557-571 |
Publisher Policy: | Reproduced under a Creative Commons License |
Related URLs: |
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