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Why political parties use deliberation: A framework for analysis

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Abstract: The development of deliberative procedures raises a series of challenges for political parties. Despite the recent development of fruitful theoretical insights and empirical research, to date the analytical dimensions have not been put together to facilitate the study of the interaction between parties and deliberation. This paper seeks to address this gap in the literature and proposes a framework that can explain why parties use deliberation. It connects three bodies of literature: intra-party democracy, parliamentary activity, and connection with the citizenry. The article proposes an analytical framework that differentiates between issues (people and policies) and the goals (strategic objectives and normative goals). This framework brings relevant theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to the broader field of study.

Keywords: political parties, deliberation, issues, goals, framework

Introduction

Many deliberative procedures are organised in contemporary representative democracies. They consist in forums in which lay citizens – rather than experts or individuals representing particular groups or interests – engage in discussions about public problems and make a series of recommendations (Fung, 2006; Smith, 2009). This spread of deliberative procedures echoes a shift in citizens' attitudes towards politics. The rise of education levels and the development of postmodern values lead to situations in which citizens increasingly reject traditional form of participation characterised by hierarchical and top-down approaches (Dalton, 2008; Inglehart & Norris, 2017; Norris, 1999).

Deliberative procedures may provide an appropriate route to satisfy the people's demands and willingness to engage in decision-making beyond the traditional modes of participation. Although previous research covers the potential virtues of deliberative procedures (Curato, Dryzek, Ercan, Hendriks, & Niemeyer, 2017), the link between these and the broader political system remains underexplored (Bächtiger, Setälä, & Grönlund, 2014). More precisely, we know little about how political parties position themselves towards the development of deliberative procedures. Parties are key political actors in representative democracies for more than one century through their general function as transmission belts between the state and society. Their specific functions of political parties include the aggregation and representation of citizens' interests, the simplification of choices, the making and implementation of policies (including activity in the legislative and government), and the structuring of electoral competition through candidate recruitment and the promotion of a particular ideology or set of ideas (Schattschneider, 1942; Sartori, 1976; Gunther and Diamond, 2003; Scarrow, Webb and Poguntke, 2017). Under these circumstances, political parties are traditionally conceived as the users of an adversarial model of democracy in which leaders of different groups compete to advance a specific vision of society and / or a predetermined interest (Mansbridge, 1980; Sartori, 1976). At a glance, deliberative procedures appear contradictory to the competitive logic since they entail collaborative argumentation among diversified participants in the search of the common goods (Chambers, 2003).

Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows that an increasing number of contemporary political parties set up deliberative procedures. They do this both internally to give lay members a new role in the structure and externally when they call for the creation of participatory budgeting processes or citizens assemblies (Gherghina, Soare and Jacquet, 2020). What remains unclear is why political parties use deliberative procedures if they go against their logic of functioning (Hendriks & Lees-Marshment, 2019).

For long, deliberative procedures and political parties were two separate fields of inquiry in social and political science. The major problem behind this lack of communication is the absence of a common ground to analyze the phenomena at the intersection of the two fields. Specialists of deliberation have devoted important effort to assess lay citizens' capacities to take part in such procedures and their internal dynamics (Bächtiger & Parkinson, 2019; Jacquet & van der Does, 2021). A dialogue between the two strands of literature is likely

to close this gap. In this sense, three recent directions of research contribute to bring the two notions together: intra-party democracy, parliamentary activity and the use of deliberation to foster links with the citizenry. The intra-party democracy focuses on preference formation inside the party organisation outlining the possibilities of political engagement by the party members (Gherghina, Soare, & Jacquet, 2020; Wolkenstein, 2018). The strand dealing with parliamentary activities assess the quality of deliberation in legislators' speeches and the contribution made for the broader idea of representation (Bächtiger, 2014). The research on deliberation meant to enhance parties' links with the citizenry includes a broad array of issues such as changing preferences, electoral reform, participatory budgeting or constitution making (Fournier, van de Kolk, Carty, Blais, & Rose, 2011; Jacquet & van der Does, 2021; Reuchamps & Suiter, 2016). While these strands provide very useful insights into specific areas, they do not talk to each other to inform a broader perspective on how parties interact towards deliberative procedures. Little attention has been paid to unify these directions for research in a way that could impact further research.

This article aims to fill that gap in the literature and proposes a framework to disentangle why parties use deliberative procedures in various contexts. This framework has theoretical, methodological and empirical implications for the study of political parties and deliberative procedures. It distinguishes between the issues of deliberation and the goals for which deliberation is initiated. This topic is essential to understand the current evolution of democracy. Representative regimes are under pressure and deliberative procedures are often presented as an antidote to cure this malaise (Geissel & Newton, 2012). In order to analyse this transformation, we need to understand why the main players of representative democracy use such alternatives.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the three strands of literature outlined above and makes a case for the necessity to unify them. The third section presents the framework and reflects on its applicability. The last section discusses the important implications of our endeavour and opens avenues for further research.

Why Political Parties use Deliberation

We identified in the literature three major ways in which political parties are linked with deliberation: intra-party democracy, parliamentary activity, and connection with the

citizenry. In the following sub-sections, we discuss how parties use deliberation for each of these.

Intra-party democracy

There are far more theoretical arguments about why deliberation should be used than empirical evidence regarding the use of deliberation in intra-party democracy. The theoretical arguments have their origin in the models of democracy and in the corresponding interaction orientations, which define the ways in which actors perceive their relationship with other actors. There is a dichotomy between competitive and cooperative interactions (Scharpf, 2018) with the former inhibiting deliberation and the latter enhancing it. The competitive interactions match the normative ideas behind the model of competitive democracy (Dahl, 1956; Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1987; Schumpeter, 1942), which altogether rejects intra-party democracy for two reasons: inefficiency and inequality of interest representation. First, by making decision-making more inclusive the intra-party democracy threatens the efficiency of the party organisation, limits the policy formulation, constrains coalition bargaining and increases the risk of internal defection. Second, responsiveness towards party members could result in an unequal treatment of citizens' interests especially for those outside the party. One critique brought to the competitive model of democracy is that it assumes that citizens have preferences pre-politically established and exogenous to the political process. Instead, if we consider democracy as the rational formation of preferences through public discussion and debate, the formation of preferences is endogenous to politics (Teorell, 1999).

The cooperative interactions promote the idea of opening channels of communication within institutions, alternative to what provided by competitive democracy. Regarding intra-party democracy, this could allow for participation, which could be associated with self-government (Barber, 1984) and with having an effective voice inside the party organisation. Deliberative procedures within the party could facilitate the exchange of arguments between party leaders and members (Teorell, 1999). This exchange would be beneficial both for leadership legitimacy within the party and for enhanced values of citizenship outside the party. In other words, deliberation on policy issues would allow party members to see how the policy agenda set by parties for the broader society reflect their voices. At the same time, deliberation could achieve a structural objective by better integrating the ancillary organisations (e.g. youth party organisation) or by getting closer to community-oriented

organisations. The latter are relevant because as research has shown (Putnam, 1993) people are active in several organisations at the same time and they may feel attracted by the idea of a party organisation if it provides openness and possibility for deliberation. In brief, the proponents of deliberation place the communicative process of preference formation at the centre of democracy, which opposes the logic centered on competition, bargaining and aggregation.

One could ask why deliberation is appropriate for intra-party democracy since political parties have already experimented several methods to communicate with members. One example is the democratisation of candidate and leadership selection through the increase of decentralisation and inclusiveness (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Pilet & Cross, 2014; Sandri, Seddone, & Venturino, 2015). In theory, processes like primaries ensure that the most representative party members reach public office or the highest position in the party. However, this does not work in practice because earlier research showed that incumbents either win or have a stronger say about renomination and re-election, which diminishes the value of party primaries (Alford & Brady, 1993; Gastil, 2000). In other cases, the party leadership overrules the results of the primaries if they do not correspond to their initial calculations (Gherghina, 2013). Another example is that of membership ballots that are increasingly used by political parties in the last two decades (Scarrow, 2014). These ballots include policy or personal questions on which party members must take a direct decision. The problem with these ballots is the same with the primaries: they are usually pre-selected by the party leadership and thus unlikely to represent other views. All these indicate that such processes often reinforce the preferences of the party elite rather than bringing benefits to ordinary members (Wolkenstein, 2016).

The possibility for discussion and debate could make intra-party democracy meaningful by empowering the members (Wolkenstein, 2016). Through deliberation they can engage in reasoned arguments with the elite, challenge the status quo and understand or devise policies. Moreover, deliberation can help articulating the idea of common good departing from individual preferences because “it provides a mechanism for individuals to jointly define and sharpen their political views through a process of reciprocal exchange with each other, out of which there can emerge a political platform they can all stand for” (Invernizzi-Accetti & Wolkenstein, 2017, p. 102). For these reasons, recent research promotes the creation of deliberative models of intra-party democracy with emphasis on the processes

of preference-formation at the level of local party branches, connect deliberations to decisions and make use of new technologies (Invernizzi-Accetti & Wolkenstein, 2017; Wolkenstein, 2016).

Earlier studies present several empirical applications of intra-party deliberation. In Greece, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) used deliberative polling to select its candidate for mayor of a large municipality in the Athens Metropolitan area in the 2004 local elections. The experiment aimed at accommodating political equality and deliberation, and ended up constituting the final decision although it was initially intended only as a consultation (Fishkin, Luskin, Panaretos, Siu, & Xekalaki, 2008). The deliberative polling led to a situation in which informed preferences together with candidate traits influenced the candidate choice. The extension of the polling to voting and further to constituting the formal selectorate of the party illustrates the applicability and relevant consequences of deliberation for intra-party democracy. In Romania, Demos used online and offline deliberation to select its candidates for the 2019 European elections. This process weakened intra-party cohesion because it gave voice to competing interests and conflicts went out of control (Gherghina & Stoiciu, 2020).

Other studies reflect how intra-party democracy can produce effects for inter-party competition. For example, in the case of Alternativet in Denmark, intra-party democracy provided transparency about salient issues but made the party vulnerable on the political scene. The opponents either undermined or “hijacked” its policy proposals before they were presented to the broader public (Gad, 2020). Other empirical evidence illustrates how intra-party deliberation can bring benefits for inter-party communication when it comes to coalition formation (Vodová & Voda, 2020).

Parliamentary activity

One of the three faces of a political party (Katz & Mair, 1990) is the party in public office, namely its representatives in the legislature. The plenary debates in Parliament are the most common and visible form of parliamentary activity (Proksch & Slapin 2012). A recent conceptualisation of parliamentary debates identifies three components. The first is a strategic and partisan rhetoric according to which the legislative speech has no impact on policy, and it is used for electoral purposes. The second is the discourse approach with a focus on the constitutive norms and conventions. The third is the deliberative approach that aims

to identify the conditions under which the parliamentary debates are reasoned, respectful, informed and oriented toward agreement (Bächtiger, 2014, pp. 145-146). Evidence from the legislatures in Germany, Switzerland and the US reveals important differences in terms of the causes, quality, content and orientation of deliberation (Bächtiger 2014).

The quality of deliberation in the parliamentary discourses and its causes has been covered by several studies. At national level, the analysis of accuracy and realism of US Congress members' claims about the effects of policies concludes that less than a quarter of the debates are good or very good (Mucciaroni & Quirk, 2006). Their findings indicate that salient issues have higher informational quality (relative to accuracy) compared to issues that receive less attention. Equally important, the debates covering issues that cut across party lines had higher quality of deliberation compared to those where differences between the two major parties were large. A similar conclusion is reached by another study that investigates the quality of deliberation in the Congress hearing on the Medicare program. There is more quality of deliberation when there is moderate disagreement between the participants in the meetings compared to the situations of extreme disagreement (Esterling, 2011). A similar pattern can be observed in Germany where the quality of parliamentary discourse is negatively influenced by the disagreement rooted in the government – opposition setting (Bächtiger, Hangartner, Hess, & Fraefel, 2008). However, the German case provides mixed evidence because another study on the plenary parliamentary debates on the import of embryonic stem cells shows that it is not deliberative and not oriented toward policy-making (Landwehr & Holzinger, 2010). At supranational level, a study seeking to explain the drivers for high quality deliberation in the European Parliament found that these consist of institutional issues and the personal characteristics of legislators (Lord & Tamvaki, 2013).

Another line of enquiry showed the potential effects of deliberation in Parliament over representation. A study of the plenary debates in the Welsh Parliament shows that women legislators use political discourse to advance the substantive representation of women. Compared to male legislators, female representatives have a higher likelihood to initiate and engage in political debates referring to women's issues. Overall, women parliamentarians have a positive effect in the quality of debates and link them closely to real life issues (Chaney, 2006). An analysis of the Scottish Parliament indicates the institutionalisation of a deliberative system comprising a range of discursive spheres of varying complexity. The legislators engage in several deliberative events that allow for direct interaction with stakeholders and citizens

(Davidson & Stark, 2011). This approach could help narrow the gap that is sometimes created in systems of representative democracy between citizens and elected elites.

Connection with the citizenry

Political parties used to be the transmission belt between the state and society for several decades (Richard S. Katz & Mair, 1995; Lawson & Merkl, 2014; Sartori, 1976). Parties' increasing orientation towards state resources and gradual distancing from society attracted a large amount of criticism. According to some democratic theorists, deliberation is one way to narrow the gap between the citizenry and the decision making (Dryzek et al., 2019). The consequences of deliberation for society are diverse and range from changes in communication with institutions, voting intentions or electoral reforms to deciding the budget or shaping a new constitution. To begin with the communication dimension, two studies illustrate contrasting effects of deliberation. On the one hand, Demos in Romania improved its communication with voters by adopting deliberative procedures (Gherghina & Stoiciu, 2020; Stoiciu & Gherghina, 2020). On the other hand, Alternativet in Denmark had poorer communication with the broad citizenry as a result of their deliberation (Gad, 2020). In other cases, the deliberation had no effect on the relation with citizenry. For example, the use of deliberation by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) did not help reconnecting with voters, and thus did not improve its electoral support (Barberà & Rodríguez-Teruel, 2020).

The change of voting intentions has been documented especially in relation to deliberative polling. In the 1997 British General Election a deliberative polling involved balanced briefing materials, the opinions of experts and the possibility to ask the candidates for prime minister belonging to the three most prominent parties in the country. The changes in voting intentions involved roughly one fifth of the electorate that shifted preferences from the two major competitors to the third one during deliberation (Fishkin, 2009).

The electoral reform through deliberation has been possible at the initiative of political parties. In Canada, the Liberals established the Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform to deal with a system that malfunctioned in British Columbia both in the 1996 and 2001 elections. The deliberative assembly reflected on the principles of an electoral system and tried to assess which one is the most suitable for the province (Flinders & Curry, 2008; Warren & Pearse, 2008). After almost half a year of deliberation, the assembly made a

recommendation in the form of a tailored electoral system that was subjected to a referendum several months later. In the Netherlands, a junior partner of the government coalition (D66) aimed to reform the country's electoral system in 2005 (Fournier et al., 2011). The country uses a party-list proportional representation system in which a party requires less than 1% of the votes to gain parliamentary seats, which leads to a fragmented legislature. A citizens' assembly was established to recommend a new electoral system and after nine months of deliberation in 2006 it suggested a version that altered the seat allocation formula and the individual threshold (Flinders & Curry, 2008). The recommendation had no policy outcome because the new cabinet emerged after the elections in November 2006 did not include D66 and the other parties showed no real interest in taking the reform further.

Participatory budgeting combines deliberation with representation and aims to empower citizens relative to policy implementation in their community. In its simplest form, this form of deliberation allows citizens to decide how a share of the local budget is spent. This type of deliberation includes the disadvantaged groups in society that are otherwise excluded from participation. It involves politicians and had a series of positive outcomes for communities ranging from democratisation and social justice to political emancipation and a stronger sense of community (Baiocchi & Ganuza, 2014; Sintomer, Röcke, & Herzberg, 2016; Wampler, 2008). The deliberation aimed at discussing the role of citizens in the country's democratic setting or at constitution change has gained momentum in Europe in the last decade. Government parties in several countries established mini-publics that could inform the reform of country's constitution. These deliberative assemblies provided citizens the opportunity to express an informed opinion, carry out a reasoned dialogue and leave a mark on the constitution. These processes have attracted a lot of interest and were characterised by high degrees of legitimacy, irrespective of their outcome (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2018; Gherghina & Miscoiu, 2016; Reuchamps & Suiter, 2016).


A framework for analysis

The review of these three strands of research indicates a case of diversity in unity. The analyses focus on three different arenas (intra-party, parliamentary and the connection with the citizenry), but it is also possible to identify common stakes. Accordingly, we propose to develop a general framework that gauges the reasons for which political parties use deliberative procedures in contemporary representative democracies. The framework has

broad applicability and is not restricted to specific deliberative procedures. The latter can be organised either by the political parties (e.g., a forum with party members to discuss the election manifesto) or by other institutions, most notably the public authorities (e.g., the initiative of a ministry to organise a climate citizens’ assembly at the national level). Based on concepts and typologies developed in the party politics and the deliberations fields, the framework allows locating different research inquiry and offers a common ground to develop discussion across settings. We focus on political parties because they are present in almost all political settings, which increases the applicability of the framework. Unlike political parties that have the ability to use deliberation since they make their own rules in line with the general laws of the country, the ability of public authorities to initiate deliberation differs across countries.

Figure 1 summarizes the components of the framework. The broad distinction of the framework is based on the two main ways to conceive the “why” in the empirical scholarship on deliberative procedures (Fung, 2006; Gourgues, 2013). The first branch refers to a descriptive research objective, i.e. which task is attributed to the deliberative procedures. We refer to it as the issue of the deliberative procedures. The second branch is analytical and asks what motivates political actors to support (or not) deliberative procedure. We refer to it as the “goal” of the deliberative procedures. The following paragraphs describe the two branches of the framework.

Figure 1: The Framework for Analysis



The issue of deliberation

The first branch concerns the issue of deliberation. It shows that internal and external procedures can tackle similar problems: (1) the selection of people and (2) the content of particular policies. First, the issue of the deliberation can be the selection of people for a particular office. Regarding internal procedures, this can concern deliberation about the selection of candidates for election, leaders in the organization and even partner for a coalition (Ebeling & Wolkenstein, 2018; Fishkin et al., 2008; Pilet & Cross, 2014). The idea is to have a meaningful dialogue about the merits of different candidates before selecting them for a particular function. Externally, deliberative procedures on the selection of people for public office is less common. This is the case of the few American citizens' juries on candidates (Crosby & Nethercut, 2005), or the proposal by Ackerman and Fishkin (2004) to organize small group of discussion among citizens one week before each national election. The underlying rationale is to make elections more informed based on careful considered judgement.

The second type of issues for deliberative procedures are policies. Inside political parties, various deliberative fora can be established to discuss manifestos before electoral campaigns or to collect the inputs on policies from the members during a legislature (Wolkenstein, 2016). This the case of a number of new 'deliberative' parties that rely on internal deliberation to determine their positions (Gherghina et al., 2020).

Externally, public authorities establish many deliberative procedures that convene a group of citizens to discuss a salient public problem. In line with their traditional functions to run in elections and make policies, political parties can use deliberation during electoral campaigns and also when they are in office. One of the most discussed procedures are deliberative mini-publics (Grönlund, Bächtiger, & Setälä, 2014; Jacquet & van der Does, 2021). These forums gather randomly selected lay citizens such as deliberative polls, consensus conferences and citizens' juries (Setälä & Smith, 2018). Mini-publics are not the only form of procedures that seek to embody the ideal of deliberation. Deliberation can indeed take place in various places such as in open online forums, participatory budgeting processes and citizens' initiative reviews (Gastil & Knobloch, 2020; Geissel & Newton, 2012; Sintomer et al., 2016; Smith, 2009).

A common stake for these four types of deliberative procedures is the connection with the power to make authoritative decision, inside and outside to the party. For some procedures, the decision directly follows the deliberation. This is for instance the case when

party members select candidates after a discussion in a broad deliberative forum. This is also the project of those who want to establish new legislative assemblies composed of randomly selected citizens, a reform that has never been implemented (Gastil & Wright, 2019; Jacquet, Niessen, & Reuchamps, 2020). Nevertheless, the connection between deliberative procedures and decision can also be very thin. The output of deliberation is in many cases purely advisory, and decision makers are free to choose which recommendation they want to follow, a practice described as cherry-picking (Font, Smith, Galais, & Alarcon, 2018). There might be good normative reasons to not make binding the output of deliberation (see for instance the discussion by Lafont, 2019), but this usually creates a lot of frustration for party members and lay citizens (Fernández-Martínez, García-Espín, & Jiménez-Sánchez, 2020). The absence of consideration can give the impression that deliberative procedure is pointless and do to contribute to any empowerment.

The goals of deliberation

The second branch of the framework refers to the goals of the deliberative procedures. We distinguish between strategic motivations and normative objectives. Regarding the strategic motivations, we rely on the traditional model in the study of party politics: vote-seeking behaviour, office-seeking behaviour and policy-seeking behaviour (Strom, 1990). This analytical distinction can help to disentangle what does motivate political parties to establish deliberative procedures or do not promote them. These are closely linked to some of the findings we highlighted from the literature on legislative behavior. We argue that the creation of deliberative procedures can, as any other political activities, help political parties to achieve some strategic objectives. For instance, the Dutch and the Canadian citizens' assemblies on electoral reforms were advocates by opposition parties during the electoral campaigns. Fournier et al. (2011) note these parties mobilized this proposal to portray themselves as closer to the citizenry demands and supportive of a progressive agenda. A party can also support the establishment of deliberative procedures to advance a particular policy. For instance, green parties often argue to set-up citizens' assemblies on climate change (Pascolo, 2020). One possible explanation for this approach is their belief that the population may be in favour of pro-climate policies and thus reflect what the party has already advocated.

The second facet of the goal concerns the normative objectives attributed to the procedures. As argued by Mansbridge (1993) and Kingdon (1993), strategic motivations are

incomplete explanation of political actors' actions and the role idea is equally important. In this context, one can ask which normative justifications are provided by political parties when they promote deliberative procedures, both internally and externally. Based on the analyses various forms of public participation, we can identify three standard normative objectives: legitimacy, efficacy, and education (Fung, 2006; Sintomer et al., 2016). This constitutes a basis to analyse which parties use which rationale.

Decisions based on the deliberative procedures can be favored due to their legitimacy. This is connected to the criticism of the current representative system (Fishkin, 2009; Van Reybrouck, 2016). Some actors criticize the fact deliberation is limited to a small elite of professional politicians that is descriptively unrepresentative of the broader population or party members (gender, age, education level, social class). Developing deliberative procedures is way to deepen democracy by involving more people in the deliberation and decision about the public good.

Deliberative procedures can increase the efficacy of decision-making (Fung, 2006). From an epistemic point of view, the wider the diversity of perspectives and experiences taken into account, the better the quality of the decisions that follow (Landemore, 2013). As suggested by Fung (2006, 71), 'citizens may possess essential local knowledge that comes from close exposure to the context in which problems occur. In all these areas, public participants may be able to frame problems and priorities in ways that break from professional conceptions yet more closely match their values, needs, and preferences'. Deliberative procedures can accordingly be advocated for providing better public services based on a large variety of inputs. Much of this rhetoric is reflected in the literature on legislative speeches reviewed before. This justification is present in most participatory budgeting processes in Europe (Sintomer et al., 2016). The idea is to complement the knowledge provided by recognized experts and stakeholders' representatives by collecting the demands from all the inhabitants of the locality. Citizens can share their experiences as 'users' and help decision-makers to formulate better policies.

Deliberative procedures may be conceived as schools of democracy. This goes back to the participatory tradition and the idea that 'participation make better citizens' (Mansbridge, 1999). According to this perspective, the best way to teach citizens knowledge and skills needed to be active in the public sphere is to engage them in political deliberation. This theoretical intuition has inspired a couple researches on the impact of deliberation in small

groups on participants civic skills (Bächtiger & Parkinson, 2019). Relying on experiment or ethnographic observation, such studies have analysed induced individual transformations (Andersen & Hansen, 2007; Grönlund, Setälä, & Herne, 2010; Talpin, 2011). Evidence shows that deliberation can indeed affect citizens' willingness to take part political activities, knowledge about the discussed topic and perceptions of the democratic system. Nevertheless, the effects are often mixed, and questions remain about the longer-term impact of such deliberation on individuals (Jacquet & van der Does, 2021).

Implications of the framework

This section illustrates how the analytical framework makes contributions at theoretical, methodological and empirical levels. The theory of deliberation has recently known a systematic turn. Some scholars have criticised the overwhelming attention on micro-deliberative (ex: citizens assemblies) events and developed a perspective about deliberation at macro level (Dryzek, 2000; Hendriks, 2006; Owen & Smith, 2015; Parkinson & Mansbridge, 2012). Our framework contributes to this development by guiding empirical research in how one central actor in the political system such as parties use micro-site of deliberation. It argues that the procedures of deliberation may depend on the level at which they happen (internal vs. external) and on the content (people, policy or both). In this sense, it distinguishes between several elements that are often merged in the general discussion about how parties use deliberation.

The major question that follows is what the role of political parties in this system should be. Some defend that parties are essential to reduce and structure outcomes of deliberation (Manin, 1987). Parties face each other, and the process of argumentation is submitted to the arbitration of all. Others argue that such organisation are the key actors to exercise political justification (White & Ypi, 2011) and deliberative autonomy (Ebeling & Wolkenstein, 2018). Further theoretical considerations are needed to conceptualise the positive and negative contributions of political parties to micro- and macro-deliberation. Such considerations can be informed by the issues and goals, which can sometimes reinforce each other, but that are different in terms of drivers and manifestations. For example, a theoretical model aiming to understand how political parties approach deliberation in a specific context could use the distinction between strategic motivations and normative objectives. Equally important, a theoretical consideration could inform the linkage between the traditional

functions of political parties and the use of deliberative procedures. Many reasons presented in Figure 1 are a direct match to what political parties do. For example, the policy-related deliberation is in line with parties' function of simplifying choices (the manifesto component) or making policies (the mini-public component). However, others such as the efficacy objective is broader and feeds into several different functions.

From a methodological perspective, the framework suggests that intra- and extra-party deliberative procedures can be the subject of common research questions and stakes. In doing so, it seeks to match the lines of enquiry in the study of deliberation to what happens in party politics. The study of deliberative procedures is traditionally structured along three questions: who deliberates, how participants deliberate and why they deliberate (Caluwaerts & Reuchamps, 2018; Fung, 2006; Gourgues, 2013). Methodologies to answer these questions were applied to the study of mini-publics composed of lay citizens (Caluwaerts, 2012; Himmelroos, 2017). Such approaches exist in isolation from the study of political parties. One partial exception is the development of different measurements to assess the quality of deliberative quality in the parliamentary arena and deliberative mini-publics (Bächtiger & Parkinson, 2019; Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & Steiner, 2003).

Our framework implies that researchers could develop common research strategy to analyse how parties use deliberation. It includes specific elements, which can be observed empirically qualitatively or quantitatively. For example, studies aiming to grasp how deliberation leads to the adoption of internal policies can decide if they focus on the elaboration of manifestos (internal), the use of mini-publics (external) or both. Similarly, a study that wishes to outline the consequences of intra-party deliberation can distinguish between effects on people and those on policies. In brief, the framework clarifies the scope conditions for analysis and makes it easier for researchers to develop measurements for specific processes of deliberation rather than for a general and vague concept. Some elements included in Figure 1 have been measured by previous research on collateral topics (e.g. vote-seeking, efficacy).

From an empirical point of view, the framework opens the door to several avenues of research. It allows to formulate concrete and feasible research questions about new empirical phenomena. For example, one neglected topic refers to the reasons for which political parties promote (or not) deliberative procedures. Scholars and political actors exchanged arguments about the pros- and cons- of deliberation in political parties and in the society (Cohen, 1989;

Wolkenstein, 2016). In the framework we refer to three standard justifications (legitimacy, efficacy and education). However, these arguments are constructed theoretically and require empirical evidence to substantiate them. Consequently, the reasons for which parties encourage or discourage such procedures still need to be investigated.

At the same time, the classification that we make between issues and goals, accompanied by the further distinctions between internal vs. external and strategy vs. normativity, help connecting this topic with broader research questions. For example, empirical research could investigate whether some parties are more deliberative than others and what are the features of those deliberations. On a note that is loosely related to traditional approaches in party politics, one could enquire whether ideologies or specific political behaviour can explain differences between parties in adopting deliberation. Another potential avenue for empirical research can analyse the development of deliberative procedures by parties in office and with what consequences (e.g. internal, external, people-oriented, policy-oriented).

A more general view could look at the ways in which contextual factors such as the type of political regime, the participatory tradition and the popular demand for deliberation could influence parties' decisions to adopt or oppose them, i.e. as normative objectives. Finally, the framework can outline a series of motivational factors that could encourage parties differentiates between the issues (people and policies) and the goals (strategic objectives and normative goals) to favour deliberative procedures such as electoral gains or alliance formation. An analysis can enquire how these are driven by strategic motivations and related more to normative objectives.

Conclusion

This article proposes a framework that seeks to explain why parties use deliberative procedures. For long, deliberation and political parties were two separate fields of inquiry in social and political science. This can be explained by the fact that they were initially conceived as two opposed notions. Deliberation focus on cooperative communication and preference formation whereas party democracy is centred on competition, aggregation and bargaining (Johnson, 2006). Deliberation is increasingly used in different areas of decision-making with the desire to complement representative democracy (Bedock & Pilet, 2020; Gherghina & Geissel, 2020). Political parties, as key institutions of representation in contemporary

democracies, cannot stay away from it in practice. As such, the last two decades have nevertheless seen the development of fruitful theoretical insights and empirical research that bring the two notions together. We reconcile three strands of literature that analyse the link between political parties and deliberation and provide a framework that differentiates between the issues (people and policies) and the goals (strategic objectives and normative goals).

The framework has broad applicability and can bring important contributions to the two bodies of literature that we bridge. The literature on party politics can benefit from this framework in two ways. First, it provides the possibility to empirically investigate topics that have been presented so far more along theoretical arguments. For example, the normative principles for deliberation within parties made the subject of earlier studies. Now further research can match those with evidence or explain how things differ in practice. Second, the framework connects deliberation with party activities and uses the language of parties' regular behaviour to investigate their approaches towards deliberation. The latter has gained traction across many democratic societies in the last two decades. Parties' attempt to keep up with developments in society make it difficult to escape deliberation to complement or partially replace existing mechanisms of decision-making.

The model also allows understanding which parties use deliberation for strategic reasons and which aim to respond to members' demands for deliberation. The reasons behind the use of deliberation can be identified by applying the model to several parties – an empirical issue (Adria Pomon Ruiz, Valencia).

Use also the arena where deliberation occurs – Wolkenstein refers to small scale deliberation and we could differentiate between local or central level, congress etc. Maybe deliberation is possible only at small scale.

For the literature on deliberation, this framework can contribute to 'repoliticize' the study of deliberative procedures (Bächtiger & Parkinson, 2019). The field has generated many insights into the functioning and impact of small-scale procedures, both inside and outside political parties. However, their interactions with the main actors and institutions of representative democracies remains understudied. After so many experiences of deliberative procedures, we need now to scrutinize how they are shaped by the environments, and if they succeed to transform it. This essential to assess if deliberative procedures remain interesting but negligible experiments, or if they percolate in the centre of the political system.

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