How to be an infallibilist

Kelp, C. , Carter, A. and Simion, M. (2022) How to be an infallibilist. Philosophical Studies, 179(8), pp. 2675-2682. (doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7)

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While fallibilism has been the dominant view in epistemology in recent times, the field has witnessed the rise of a new form of infallibilism. In a recent book, Jessica Brown has taken on the task of mounting a systematic defence of fallibilism against this new infallibilism. She argues that new infallibilism incurs several problematic commitments that fallibilism can avoid. In addition, the key data points that infallibilists have adduced in support of their view can be accommodated by fallibilism, giving fallibilism the upper hand. This paper develops a rejoinder on behalf of new infallibilism. It explores ways in which new infallibilists can avoid the problematic commitments Brown identifies and provides reason to think that some of the data points supporting new infallibilism cannot be as readily handled by fallibilism as Brown would have us think.

Item Type:Articles
Additional Information:The authors would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust (#RPG-2019-302), the European Research Council (#948356), and the Swiss National Science Foundation (#100012M_200737/1) for supporting this research.
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Simion, Professor Mona and Kelp, Professor Christoph and Carter, Professor J Adam
Authors: Kelp, C., Carter, A., and Simion, M.
Subjects:B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
College/School:College of Arts & Humanities > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Philosophical Studies
ISSN (Online):1573-0883
Published Online:30 January 2022
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2022 The Authors
First Published:First published in Philosophical Studies 179(8): 2675-2682
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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Project CodeAward NoProject NamePrincipal InvestigatorFunder's NameFunder RefLead Dept
306621A Virtue Epistemology of TrustJoseph CarterLeverhulme Trust (LEVERHUL)RPG-2019-302Arts - Philosophy
309239Knowledge-First Social EpistemologyMona SimionEuropean Research Council (ERC)948356Arts - Philosophy