Discipline and Repress: The Hybrid Governance of Homelessness Through Housing First

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Abstract: Housing First is a popular model of homeless services that has transformed urban governance across the globe. Homeless scholars have praised Housing First as voluntary care that helps the poor or criticized it as a disciplinary intervention that enriches private landlords. Both perspectives offer a unidimensional account of Housing First case management. I address this shortcoming with interview-based research that conceptualizes U.S. Housing First as a hybrid form of homeless governance that facilitates economic growth through private rental markets. Federal policymakers contract Housing First providers to reduce public expenditures by rehousing homeless individuals who overconsume emergency services. Institutional incentives motivate case managers to make disciplinary interventions until the behavior of Housing First tenants puts them at-risk of eviction. At that point, Housing First providers use "inclusionary repression" to sustain market exchanges while rendering tenants pliable to discipline. This observation advances scholarship by showing how, as a publicly subsidized property management service, U.S. Housing First buttresses urban political economies through discipline and repression.

Keywords: Urban Poverty, Homelessness, Governance, Housing First, Neoliberalism

Introduction

Homelessness is an enduring characteristic of neoliberal urbanism. In the late-20th century, macroeconomic changes drained cities throughout the Global North of investment by decreasing the place dependency of capital (Harvey 1989). Mounting competition for investment goaded local government to create "business friendly" environments and gentrify poor neighborhoods to lure middle-class households (Logan and Molotch 1987). Low-skilled workers struggle in this context to secure employment that affords rent inflated by urban revitalization. Housing insecurity has consequently become a defining feature of neoliberal cities (Desmond 2012). In large U.S. cities, more than 9.4 out of every 1,000 residents suffered homelessness during 2019 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2020). Although the U.S. is more tolerant of poverty than other advanced industrialized countries, scholars have also observed spikes in homelessness throughout Europe (FEANTSA 2021).

Homeless governance has been an object of theoretical debate since the 1990s (Stuart 2015). City governments have experimented with different techniques of homeless governance: repression, in/voluntary care, and discipline (Grainger 2021a). Each tactic varies by the means and ends used to control homeless bodies. Repression reproduces institutions through the forceful exclusion of homeless bodies from public space (Herring 2019a). Involuntary care is beneficent coercion that entices the homeless to accept rehabilitative services (Stuart 2016). Voluntary care is an altruistic intervention that enables the homeless to survive a traumatic life experience by distributing unconditional aid (Cloke, May, and Johnsen 2011). Discipline is an act of production that stabilizes capitalism by transforming the poor into autonomous market participants (Hennigan 2017). Recent studies show local governing coalitions manage homelessness by coordinating techniques (Hennigan and Speer 2019; Herring 2019b). In this

regard, coalition members share a logic of governance—governmentality—that defines the ends pursued through different means of homeless control.

Urban scholars have published little about the governance of homelessness through Housing First (Grainger 2021a). Housing First is a governmentality that defines housing as a human right to be honored without preconditions so the homeless can be made self-sufficient (Tsemberis 2010). This constructs homeless service recipients as competent adults who deserve public assistance and access to preferred housing outside institutional settings. It is argued that Housing First rejects paternalistic case management, which uses coercion to advance the interests of institutional elites, in favor of client-centered interventions that achieve goals freely selected by service recipients (Parsell and Marston 2016). In this regard, Housing First advocates harm reduction to prevent displacement by clients who reject treatment. Reliance on harm reduction means some Housing First tenants require prolonged assistance. This governmentality therefore separates housing from clinical services and provides long-term case management so service recipients can recover at their own pace.

Housing First is praised as a progressive alternative to coercive forms of homeless governance. Parsell and Marston (2016) conceptualize Housing First in Australia as voluntary care because it advances the goals of homeless service recipients while meeting a basic need. Critical scholars have challenged this claim by nesting Housing First in political economic institutions. Hennigan (2017) conceptualizes U.S. Housing First as discipline because case managers grow landlord profits by transforming the homeless into obedient tenants. To this end, case managers use client-centered techniques to gently correct deviant housekeeping without undermining rapport (see Juhila et al. 2021). Hansen Löfstrand and Juhila (2012) expand Hennigan's critique by defining Housing First as hybrid governance that uses discipline and

coercion to control the homeless. In recent years, the cost-effectiveness of Housing First has motivated U.S. policymakers to promote economic growth by using this governmentality to reduce expenditures on emergency services (Baker, Evans, and Hennigan 2020). These studies indicate that, although the voluntary sector is too diverse to be generalized as a shadow state (DeVerteuil, Power, and Trudeau 2020), the dependency of U.S. Housing First providers on federal grants renders them subservient to institutional elites and therefore agents of social reproduction whose case management stabilizes urban political economies. This debate lacks a model that conceptualizes the logic(s) that U.S. Housing First providers use to select interventions. This limits critical scholarship on Housing First implementation.

Here, I present interview-based research that makes three contributions to address this shortcoming. First, I define "consumerisation" as the primary goal of Housing First. Unlike commodification, which disciplines the unemployed to be exploitable workers, consumerisation molds the homeless into transactionable renters. In the U.S., where I conducted this study, federal lawmakers contract nonprofit agencies to promote economic growth by consumerising the homeless through Housing First in segregated rental markets. This bolsters spatial inequities that contribute to homelessness. Second, I differentiate exclusionary from inclusionary repression to conceptualize "hard" interventions by Housing First providers. Exclusionary repression fortifies urban political economies by criminalizing and displacing the homeless from high streets. By contrast, inclusionary repression selectively denies in/formal rights to reintegrate the homeless into private markets. This distinction specifies the unique form and function of disenfranchisement that Housing First providers use to mediate rental market exchanges. Third, I show Housing First providers discipline service recipients until they become vulnerable to eviction, at which point, they inclusively repress delinquent tenants to make them pliable to

consumerisation. U.S. Housing First providers are therefore publicly subsidized property managers who govern homelessness by using hybrid interventions to fortify urban political economies.

Housing First as Hybrid Governance

Foucault (1995) differentiates ancient from modern society by the techniques institutional authorities use to exercise social control. Unlike the classical era, when sovereigns gained obedience by torturing the body of criminals in public, bourgeois authorities manage deviance by disciplining the mind of subordinates to voluntarily obey the rules of capitalism. To this end, social scientists invent psychological theories, evaluation tools, and clinical interventions for disciplinarians to create "modern" subjects (Rose 1999). Elites embraced discipline as an economic mode of social control that enhances compliance while decreasing enforcement costs. The production of docile bodies, whose manufactured will advances the interests of capital, are internally motivated to obey institutional norms. The stability of modern society is therefore rooted in the production of subjectivities that naturalize bourgeois conventions, legitimate social hierarchies, and goad conformity instead of revolution.

Critical theorists use this insight to conceptualize neoliberal discipline as "responsibilisation:" The production of subjectivities—knowledges, desires, and habits—that privatize the cause(s) of and solution(s) to social problems (Shamir 2008). The responsibilisation of public assistance recipients is a cornerstone of neoliberal social policies (Mead 1986). Unlike welfarism, which created social security through "passive" income transfers that fostered government dependency, neoliberalism uses "active" interventions to produce human capital by preparing service recipients to autonomously manage risk (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). The construction of neoliberal subjectivity, a responsibility generally delegated to nonprofit agencies

by policymakers in the neoliberal era (Wolch 1990), curtails expectation of public assistance by legitimizing inequality and stigmatizing need amongst the poor. In this regard, neoliberal political economies are in part (re)produced by social workers who create subjects that "choose" market participation over government dependency (see Bhattacharya 2017).

[Enter Table 1 Here]

Table 1 differentiates two kinds of responsibilisation. Workfare is a responsibility project that commodifies the unemployed. National governments across the Global North have transformed welfare from a passive to active policy that pushes service recipients into private labor markets (Schram 2006). To this end, workfare providers responsiblise the unemployed by individualizing the cause(s) of poverty (Collins and Mayer 2010), producing soft skills that enable the unemployed to meet the expectation(s) of low-wage employers (Peck 2001), motivating voluntary exploitation by legitimatizing capitalist class relations (Purser and Hennigan 2018), and stymieing class formation by pitting the unemployed against each other (Broughton 2001). Activation of workfare recipients bolsters global capitalism by transforming the unemployed into exploitable workers who accept economic precarity as a justified norm. This commodifies service recipients by developing basic capacities needed to voluntarily sell their labor in low-wage labor markets.

The neoliberal turn also involves the responsibilisation of consumption. Giesler and Veresiu (2014) theorize "consumer" as a constructed subjectivity that is produced through disciplinary interventions. Table 1 defines "consumerisation" as the production of subjectivity that directs consumption toward ends selected by institutional elites. Kipp and Hawkins (2019) trace the production of "development" consumers through cause-related marketing that individualizes the cause of and solution to uneven development in the world system. This act of

"ethopower" moralizes consumers by attaching values to impersonal market exchanges (Rose 2001). In doing so, cause-related marketers define laissez-faire capitalism as the answer to global inequality and stymie collective action by assigning responsibility for social change to individuals. This insight shows consumers, like workers (Bhattacharya 2017), are constructed gears of capital accumulation.

Critical scholars have applied this insight to neoliberal housing policy. The British Government, in its efforts to rebalance welfare rights with personal responsibilities, sold a large portion of its housing stock to nonprofit organizations. British lawmakers now contract social landlords to responsiblise tenants by requiring them to select advertised units, submit lease applications, and sign tenancy agreements (Flint 2004). Social landlords control delinquent tenants by signing Acceptable Behavior Contracts that list requirements to prevent eviction and creating Good Neighbor Agreements that outline contributions tenants should make to their community (Flint and Nixon 2006). The ends social landlords pursue vary across international contexts. Costarelli, Kleinhans, and Mugnano (2020) note social landlords in Holland discipline tenants to help the Dutch state assimilate refugees while those in Italy discipline tenants to maintain units. National governments have therefore used neoliberal logics to achieve different outcomes through housing policy.

Recent studies suggest Housing First is a consumerisation project (Hennigan 2017). Policymakers created Housing First in the U.S. where citizenship is tied to market participation (Katz 2010). It is therefore not a coincidence that Housing First promotes social inclusion by defining service recipients as "consumers" and creating opportunities for them to develop "responsible" autonomy (Hansen Löfstrand and Juhila 2012). U.S. lawmakers embraced Housing First principles to reduce outlays on costly emergency services (Gent 2018). Homeless policies

now motivate case managers to prioritize elite interests while mediating rental market exchanges for Housing First recipients (Grainger 2021b). Unlike in Australia, where Housing First providers deliver voluntary care (Parsell and Marston 2016), U.S. Housing First disciplines the unhoused poor to accept macrostructures like residential segregation that contribute to urban homelessness (Willse 2015). In this regard, Housing First case managers consumerise the homeless by producing transactionable subjectivities so service recipients can reduce public expenditures and stimulate economic growth by independently participating in protracted rental market exchanges.

Hansen Löfstrand and Juhila (2012) describe Housing First as a hybrid mode of homeless governance. That discourse analysis shows Housing First architects intended to consumerise service recipients through disciplinary interventions. Although Housing First advocates discipline, Hansen Löfstrand and Juhila show it also endorses repressive interventions to manage disruptive tenants. This observation challenges unidimensional accounts of Housing First by depicting it as a hybrid form of governance that supplements discipline with repression if tenants habitually shirk contractual obligations. I build on this contribution by analyzing the institutional logics Housing First case managers use to choose interventions and the concrete interventions they employ to control service recipients. By more thoroughly theorizing the type of discipline that case managers practice, I seek to build knowledge about interactional mechanisms of contemporary homeless governance.

[Enter Figure 1 Here]

My research was designed to answer the following questions: How do case managers discipline Housing First tenants? How do Housing First case managers exercise repression? Why do Housing First case managers exercise repression? I conceptualize discipline in U.S. Housing

First as consumerisation that normalizes the homeless by producing basic competencies to participate in private rental markets. I show case managers surveil Housing First tenants to measure their conformity to rental market norms and select interventions. Case managers initially use discipline to internally motivate lease compliance. Chronic lease violations portend eviction(s) that increase the workload of case managers, add barriers that delay rehousing, and jeopardize competitive grant funding. These institutional factors motivate case managers to inclusively repress tenants at-risk of eviction. Unlike exclusionary repression, which governs homelessness through political economic marginalization (Smith 1996), inclusionary repression sustains market participation by selectively curtailing the liberty of delinquent tenants. Inclusive repression supplements discipline to reduce public expenditures by subduing disruptive clients to grow landlord profits and free up tax revenue to attract capital investment. U.S. Housing First is therefore a hybrid mode of homeless governance that relies on the pragmatic reinforcement of stratified urban political economies.

Data & Methods

I conducted this research in a large post-industrial county located in the Northern U.S.[2] Springfield County is a highly segregated metropolitan area whose housing market poorly accommodates its low-wage service economy. At the time of this study, less than 10% of the county's rental stock rented units below $500 (United States Census Bureau 2018). Roughly 65% of households earning 30% of area median income devoted 50% or more of their wages to rent (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2017b). The local housing authority offered meager assistance to reduce cost burden. Springfield County's public housing stock

[2] A spatial pseudonym is used to protect the identities of study participants.

decreased from 5,000 units in 2000 to 2,750 units in 2019 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2019a). Over the past ten years, average wait time for rental assistance varied between 20–25 months (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2019a). Consequently, 1 in 1,000 Springfield County residents experienced homelessness in 2018. Over 50% of Springfield County's homeless population identified as Black. Only 10% of this population qualified as chronically homeless (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2019b). Consequently, 90% of Springfield County's homeless population was ineligible for Housing First.

[Enter Table 2 Here]

I conducted 44 in-depth interviews and 5 focus groups with Housing First providers. Participants were recruited from a Housing First referral meeting that I had observed for 8 months and local community care providers whom the county government contracted to deliver Housing First case management. After approaching program supervisors, I got permission to recruit members of their case management team. Table 2 describes the demographic characteristics of my sample. I recorded interviews at a location selected by each respondent. Each interview and focus group ranged 30–90 minutes; however, most lasted approximately 1-hour. I sent recordings to a private transcription service. I anonymized the transcripts and analyzed the data using MAXQDA software. I open coded interview transcripts before using scholarly literature on homeless management to theorize the case study. After identifying discipline, responsibilisation, surveillance, motivation, embodiment, and disenfranchisement as emergent themes, I used governmentality theory to conceptualize discipline as "consumerisation," the repressive governance literature to conceptualize disenfranchisement as "inclusionary repression," and theorize the relationship between governing techniques.

Three limitations of this study should be noted. First, I did not directly observe actions described by case managers. Although each theme was triangulated by multiple participants, this analysis is weakened by my inability to specify conditions under which each strategy was used. Second, this paper relies on data collected from a post-industrial city whose housing market was loose enough to rely on private rental vouchers. This weakness limits the transferability of my findings to different economic contexts where Housing Fist providers depend on public housing, social landlords, or master leases to govern homelessness. Third, I recruited participants from 6 of 15 agencies that provided Housing First case management. Agencies that did not contribute to the study employed program supervisors who ignored my request to conduct a recruitment presentation with their case management team or case managers who refused participation. I cannot be uncertain if characteristics of these agencies differentiate them from participants. This nonresponse reduces the richness of my data analysis.

[Enter Table 3 Here]

Techniques of Hybrid Governance

Housing First providers thought "good" tenants embodied dispositions that differentiated the housed from unhoused. Case managers believed Housing First tenants were steeped in a culture of poverty that made them indistinguishable from people suffering homelessness even after getting rehoused:

> They don't know how to care for an apartment. You're so used to living on the streets that your apartment starts to become the streets enclosed. I have a guy. He has a bed in there but won't sleep in it. He has newspapers all over the floor too like how he lived when he was homeless. [Alex]

Case managers viewed themselves as disciplinarians who transformed the homeless into responsible tenants:

> They've learned behaviors and ways to react to things from living on the street. So, I just help them reframe it, "That used to work for you, but now you're a different person. You're in a different situation. Those things don't work as well." [Chris]

Housing First providers used three governing techniques to control tenants. Table 3 indicates case managers monitored tenants to measure the normalization of tenants and select interventions that preserve rental market exchanges. Housing First providers used that information to discipline tenants. If discipline failed to produce voluntary lease compliance, then case managers used inclusive repression to make clients transactionable through disenfranchisement. In this regard, Housing First providers delivered a property management service that used hybrid governance to stabilize rental market exchanges.

Surveillance

Modern institutions secure obedience through decentralized surveillance apparatuses that authorities use to make observations, produce knowledge, choose interventions, and motivate self-government (Foucault 1995). Surveillance is therefore a cornerstone of modern government that enables authorities to transform the mind of subordinates (Dean 1999). This insight directs inquiry to how disciplinarians "see" their subjects across institutional settings (Rose 1999). Housing scholars have applied this insight to homeless governance. Unlike emergency shelters, where service providers can conduct 24-hour surveillance (Evans 2011), Housing First providers monitor the poor in private dwellings that limit surveillance:

> It's important to meet people out in their homes to make sure everything's alright. We've got some guys who have poor hygiene. And, so, we do try and get out to see people in their homes, just to make sure we're not going to get a five-day [eviction] notice because there's garbage everywhere. [William]

Most Housing First programs in Springfield County mandated home visits. The surveillance conducted during home visits was guided by the logic(s) of private rental markets. In this regard, case managers used their knowledge of rental markets to measure the normalization of tenants. William used his knowledge of landlord expectations to evaluate his clients. He intervened to prevent eviction if observation revealed a skill deficit. The U.S. Government funded William's position through Medicaid to yield return on Housing First. William therefore provided a publicly subsidized property management service that monitored lease compliance by Housing First tenants.

Housing First providers used various methods to collect information while producing informal measurements. Housing First reintegrates the homeless by placing them in scattered-site housing in private rental markets. This hindered case managers from directly monitoring clients and conducting timely interventions. Case managers used local proxies to overcome this barrier. Jeremy, for example, relied on neighbors to notify him if a client became disruptive:

> We have one unit, I think there's 17 in one building. And we'll have developed relationships with their case managers and will say, "Hey, rumor has it around," the client will tell the case manager, "You see a lot of people coming in and out of there and some people think that there's something going on." So, a lot of our clients will inform on the other clients.

In addition, Lana used landlords and colleagues to inform on her clients:

> A landlord has emailed saying that sometimes he has a lot of trinkets outside on the ledge. Apparently, he was throwing things over the railing. I did address it the one time we got an email, "I just wanted to touch base because your landlord had contacted Michelle and he'd appreciate it if you could maybe clean some of this up out here."

Proxies allowed case managers to collect information unobservable during home visits. In addition to neighbors and landlords, case managers obtained information from police officers, family members, and electronic public records. Hence, Housing First providers were one node in a large surveillance apparatus that they created to govern homelessness.

Housing First providers used different methods to collect information during home visits. Case managers documented observations in their clients' file that was discussed at weekly staff meetings. Evidence in each file reflected partial information that case managers obtained from clients who varied in transparency. To maintain rapport, case managers strategically collected data while measuring normalization. Patrick collected ocular and auditory data once he entered his clients' home:

> We could look for whether meds are laying around, if the apartment is more disorganized than normal, or if there's evidence of a lot of substance use. If it's disorganized just because they just took a break from keeping the place straight or it's more of a negative symptom-type issue or they don't have the motivation to clean up versus, "Whoa, this person looks nothing like, their normal baseline," or they have more energy or they're thoughts are disorganized.

Nona also collected olfactory data:

> We have to do house visits every week. As the people who are also paying the rent, we need to make sure that everything is okay because that's also on us. I come in, "It looks like you didn't clean up this week." We also know that if they normally keep their place tidy, and then suddenly, it's not when you come, then we have concern about, like, potentially mental health. . . If it does smell like marijuana, that would be a conversation of, "Do you feel stressed out?"

Case managers entered their observation(s) into a clinical file that documented normalization over time. Housing First providers used this information to choose interventions during weekly staff meetings.

Facts do not speak for themselves. Housing First providers interpret observations before they select an intervention. Limited information available during home visits impeded measurements. The appearance of "disorder" tricked them into making internal rather than external attributions for "problematic" behavior:

> I've met with him maybe six times now and his cot is always in a different spot. I was like, "Hey man, what's going on?" And he was like, "I put it in the bedroom at first and then I put it up against the window and then it got hot and I brought it to the other side." After a while, I realized he was moving it because he doesn't have any other furniture. I realized he's improvising. I had to make sure I wasn't interpreting like he has a mental health symptom. [Katrina]

Home visits overwhelmed case managers with information that they had to quickly interpret. Most participants were professional social workers who were trained to interpret clients through psychiatric discourse. Katrina initially conceptualized her ocular data as mental illness. After

collecting auditory data, Katrina externalized her tenant's behavior to poverty. This allowed Katrina to diagnose her client's behavior and select an intervention.

Lastly, case managers adjusted the frequency of surveillance to their clients' normalization. Participants reduced home visits once a tenant became normalized and vice versa. Patricia, for example, described the way she adapted surveillance for a client with schizophrenia who damaged property after refusing medication:

> Increase our visits. Then, we can get them in to see the doctor and see if maybe there's some med change that can happen too.

Pearl varied the timing of surveillance to observe clients who habitually violated lease obligations:

> I have another client. She has moved this guy in. I've been explaining, "He can't be here." A lot of times I pop up on her. And she hates it. I told her this Wednesday, "I pop up on you because this is the type of stuff I want to see. You tell me that things are different, but there's an apartment full of people."

Each excerpt shows Housing First providers adjusted surveillance to the normalization of each client. The above examples show surveillance is an active rather than passive component of Housing First that case managers strategically adapt to circumstances so they can guarantee lease compliance for private landlords.

Discipline

As observed by Hennigan (2017), case managers in this study used surveillance data to discipline Housing First tenants. The architects of Housing First advocate client-centered case management—a strengths-based method of social service provision designed to cultivate rapport and independence through coordinated pursuit of personal goals—to discipline the homeless

(Lydahl and Hansen Löfstrand 2020). Case managers used client-centered techniques to internally motivate lease compliance. To this end, service providers made suggestions that linked obedience to personal objectives, embodied transactionable norms to produce confidence, and/or tolerated lease violations to let market discipline influence clients. These interventions constructed lease compliance as a personal choice rather than authoritative fiat.

To illustrate, case managers used *suggestion* while helping tenants adjust to permanent housing. The previous section shows Housing First providers possessed a shared understanding of normal tenancy that they used to conduct home visits. This discourse assumed housed individuals have certain amenities in their unit. Housing First providers believed their clients lacked this understanding of tenancy and thus used suggestion to internally motivate "proper" consumption:

> We have a client. Someone went to his house last week. He didn't have a plate, a fork, a spoon. He didn't even have a towel. He didn't have a bed. I think that is part of it is from his residual homelessness. Now, he's got a roof over his head. "I'm good. My money is for other things." I was like, "Come on. You deserve that kind of stuff. Those are just natural things. You deserve to have a pillow and a blanket and a towel." [Farrah]

Farrah echoed her colleagues' concern that Housing First tenants imported a culture of poverty into their unit. A home visit revealed one of her clients lacked "basic" kitchenware, bathware, and furniture that Americans assume normal people have in their home. To Farrah, this meant her client had accepted a standard of living on the street that contradicted being housed. Farrah used suggestion to normalize tenants by essentializing her definition on tenancy, redefining the meaning of "need," and challenging the sense of worthlessness imposed on U.S. public

assistance recipients. This internally motivated Farrah's client to align their apartment with the image of normal tenancy in her mind.

In addition, case managers used suggestion to help Housing First tenants adjust to living alone. Although homelessness is a traumatic life experience, the unhoused poor create survival networks that provide companionship that gets lost once they are rehoused:

> When you're on the street, you latch on to people who are either staying with you in the camp or at the library or the meal site. And you have these other outreach teams who check on you daily. When you move into a unit, oftentimes folks experience a form of disconnection. You're often sitting there with no one to talk to for a week or two at a time. [Mike]

Transition to permanent housing allowed symptoms of post-traumatic stress to manifest as lease violations:

> Many have been on the streets for over a year. And they've just been focusing on surviving. I noticed that once they get into housing, they find they have to confront a lot more trauma. One of my clients has severe social anxiety and depression. He just sits a lot in his house dealing with that kind of past trauma. Then, he went to smoking weed to kind of self-medicate. [Eva]

This impeded adjustment to permanent accommodation. Case managers said service recipients frequently used illegal drugs to control panic attacks. Most private landlords prohibited illegal drug use to prevent crime, property damage, and nuisance fines. To thwart eviction, case managers used their clients' personal goals to create new habits:

> I had a [client] who we moved in on a Friday evening. I was like, "I'm going to leave my work phone on. So, if you need anything over the weekend." They did

> call me over the weekend, “Hey, it’s so quiet in here.” And we just had conversations about, “What could you do if you wanted to? How do you problem solve rather than just feeling all of their feelings?” [Nona]

Nona circumvented landlord-tenant conflicts by helping clients invent new ways of being alone that honored lease obligations. Probing individual interests internally motivated tenants to adopt new coping strategies that curbed loneliness without violating the lease. In this regard, case managers minimized transaction costs for private landlords by making suggestions that helped tenants adjust to permanent accommodation without taxing profits.

Lastly, Housing First providers used suggestion to internally motivate unit gatekeeping. Private landlords prohibit extended guests to reduce crime, utility costs, nuisance complaints, and municipal fines. Housing First tenants felt obligated to help homeless friends and family. Case managers normalized tenants by coaching them to assuage guilt with utilitarian reasoning:

> We talk about it, “If you move somebody else in, you’re both going to lose this.” And they’re like, “This person helped me when I was outside. And I remember being out there and nobody would help me. So, I want to help them.” “I get that, but you can’t because then neither one of you will have a place to go.” [Rebecca]

Rebecca made interest-based suggestions that motivated clients to independently regulate unit access. Alternatively, Stacy cited meritocracy and property rights while making value-based suggestions:

> We talk about how hard you had to work to get this place, and that you’re not helping anyone by doing their work for them. If I had done the work for you, do you think we would’ve gotten this far? No, because you work for yourself. You

> learn to appreciate it. This is your sanctuary. Your place. You choose who comes here.

Housing First tenants often mistrusted the welfare system, doubted the longevity of their rental assistance, and viewed their survival network as an indispensable resource. As a result, tenants often let homeless friends and family stay in their apartment. This generated landlord-tenant conflicts that portended eviction. Rebecca and Stacy thwarted displacement by appealing to the self-interest and personal values of Housing First tenants. This legitimated abandonment by creating knowledges that Housing First tenants used to manage guilt while denying significant others respite from the street.

Second, case managers motivated Housing First tenants by *embodying* rental market norms. Housing First providers demonstrated "good" tenancy during home visits. This created self-efficacy that motivated Housing First tenants to honor lease obligations. For example, case managers embodied effective housekeeping to reduce property damage:

> There's a lot of teaching that has to go into activities with living. We strategize what can be most beneficial for that person. We'll help people with grocery shopping. Our mental health tech [will] help people with cleaning, developing cooking skills, those types of things to help them maintain their housing. [Sandy]

Private landlords reduce profit loss by evicting tenants who damage property. A recent eviction hindered Housing First tenants, who already encountered source of income discrimination, from getting rehoused. This burdened case managers who invested more time securing another lease. Some Housing First tenants lacked housekeeping skills and therefore damaged their unit beyond normal wear-and-tear. To prevent eviction, case managers demonstrated proper housekeeping so clients could imitate their behavior and develop transactionable habits.

Respondents also embodied effective communication. The lease is a protracted exchange that requires communication to make rent payments, address maintenance problems, and flip the unit. Poor communication creates stress that landlords avoid. Housing First tenants risked eviction because they struggled to communicate with landlords. Case managers normalized tenants by demonstrating "appropriate" communication:

> My client, who ended up moving into that horrible apartment, none of the doorbells worked. Then, communicating with the landlord that the doorbell was broken. He was in the office all the time and just gets pissed at them because he has no idea how to ask for things in the right way. I have him just watch me and how I handle things and just stay calm. [Heather]

Case managers interpreted combative speech as a survival tactic. The importation of this communication style, they argued, generated landlord-tenant conflicts. Heather thwarted displacement by role modeling "appropriate" speech. This minimized transaction costs for an absentee landlord by training her client to be less confrontational and reveals a moral dilemma of Housing First case management: disciplining clients may avoid eviction by making it easier for slumlords to grow profit. Dependency on a small pool of landlords meant case managers lacked leverage to challenge slumlords and thus disciplined clients to accommodate market inequities.

Third, case managers exercised tolerance by setting boundaries with service-resistant clients. Housing First tenants sometimes became non-transactionable after ignoring suggestions or refusing to imitate embodiments. Non-transactionable renters committed lease violations that risked eviction and limited housing choice. Case managers tolerated noncompliance to exploit consequences as motivational opportunities:

> I've had clients, if they were to relapse or stop taking their medications, and they stop paying rent. That's when I just monitor to make sure that they're not a danger. I've also tried to convince clients to go inpatient. It's their choice. Sometimes, it's like, learn the hard way. I have a client right now. He's like, "I want to stay under the bridge." I will meet you there, then. [Lucy]

Lucy conceptualized Housing First tenants as rational actors. Exposing clients to market discipline gave Lucy an opportunity to produce transactionable subjectivity. Lucy preferred to hospitalize unmedicated tenants; however, strict laws barred involuntary commitment unless somebody was an imminent danger to themselves or others. Rendered powerless by the court system, Housing First case managers used client-centered discourse to blame unstable clients who reentered homelessness.

Inclusive Repression

Housing First tenants occasionally resisted disciplinary intervention(s). If service-resistance begot egregious lease violations, then Housing First tenants confronted eviction and possibly homelessness:

> We work with a lady. One week, her mattress was on the floor covered in cigarette butts. [The landlord] was saying, "This is a fire hazard. This can't continue." And her response was, "Get out." Had those symptoms persisted, I think there's a good chance that she'd be homeless. [Richard]

Evictions burdened case managers who had to rehouse clients:

> There's a strategy in how we help these people maintain housing because, at the end of the day, we want them to stay stable in their housing. It's a lot more work

> for us to find new housing than it is helping them with maintaining that housing. [Sandy]

Eviction(s) hindered Housing First providers from fulfilling their contractual obligation to the U.S. Government by soiling the program's reputation among private landlords:

> Keeping [landlords] is hard, but finding them is even harder… And if there's ever been a case manager that didn't come and see their people, or if it's the private program and not a government funded voucher, and they didn't get their payments in time. And once they're done, they won't work with it anymore. [Casey]

The inability to recruit and maintain landlord participation thwarted case managers from yielding immediate return on Housing First for federal lawmakers. This put both their agency's funding and personal job at risk because policymakers financed Housing First through a competitive block grant. Hence, while some case managers felt concerned about their clients, the political economy of Housing First created personal interests that motivated repressive interventions if discipline failed to generate lease compliance.

Figure 1 shows that case managers used inclusive repression if service-resistant tenants became vulnerable to eviction. Unlike discipline, which garnered lease compliance through internal motivation, inclusive repression used external motivation to sustain rental market exchanges. Inclusive repression restricted positive liberties to render Housing First tenant pliable to normalization. Case managers perform multiple functions over which they have discretion. An important component of their role is providing housing search assistance. Housing First recipients submit a lease application that violates at least one screening criteria of prospective landlords. During lease negotiations, case managers thwart discrimination by strategically

framing their clients' rental history, criminal background, and household income. Case managers threatened to withhold advocacy for service-resistant tenants who habitually violated their lease:

> I'll tell [landlords], "Yeah, he's working on it." But we had to give [one tenant] a reality check, "You will be on the street if you don't take the proper steps." And it's like, "Well, I'm trying to find me a place." "Bring back information. We are fine to help you, but we're not going to be actively meeting with landlords and, 'Yeah he's a great guy.'" [William]

Federal lawmakers allocated meager rent subsidies that limited housing options for Housing First recipients. Access shrank if Housing First tenants reported recent evictions on their lease application. Housing First providers minimized this barrier by deflecting blame for past eviction(s). This service gave case managers leverage that they used to externally motivate disobedient tenants. For example, after discipline proved ineffective, William painted a distressing picture by threatening abandonment and allowing relegation to unsuitable accommodation. Refusing a client's right to advocacy externally motivated lease compliance while protecting the reputation of Housing First providers among private landlords. This enabled case managers to defend their interests by sustaining access to an essential resource needed to satisfy their grant requirements.

In addition, Housing First providers restricted the negative liberty of service-resistant tenants. A lot of Housing First tenants received Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). The Social Security Administration appoints a representative payee to control the income of SSDI recipients who have been deemed "incompetent" by a psychiatrist. Housing First tenants who suffered addiction risked eviction if their condition impeded rent payment. Case managers used representative payeeship to prevent addicted tenants from getting evicted:

> Their behaviors play a big part in their staying stable in housing, because they can act out, and then the landlord wants them out. We've got tenants who are their own payee. They might go smoke up they money and then they'll get evicted. So, in those instances, we seek to take their funds from them, and become their payees. [Tina]

Rose used this role to prevent eviction by distributing her client's income throughout the month:

> Our guy we just moved from the smaller landlord. We're his payee. Once the rent is paid, we don't have to give them everything on the first. We can say, "Alright, you're getting $75 a week. We can go to the bank together and then to the grocery store."

Housing First providers initially suggested clients release control of personal finances if their substance abuse caused lease violations. If suggestion failed, then case managers contacted a psychiatrist to become representative payee. Representative payeeship enabled case managers to prevent eviction by reducing transaction costs for private landlords. This accommodated non-transactionable tenants by making the case manager a landlord surrogate. Tolerating addiction delayed consumerisation to accommodate the willingness of tenants to change, sustained the clinical relationship so case managers could discipline tenants during subsequent crisis moments, and reduced public expenditures on emergency services by sustaining the rental market exchange.

Case managers also curtailed negative liberty through involuntary hospitalization. Housing First recipients had a legal right to refuse treatment unless they posed an imminent threat to themselves or others. Medication noncompliance often begat psychosis, lease violations, and eviction. Case managers initially encouraged voluntary hospitalization. If suggestion failed

to gain medication compliance, then case managers waited for a crisis to involuntary hospitalize their client:

> I have a client that has a delusional disorder, and he hasn't been medicated. He has a delusion right now that these people are trapping these women upstairs, so he's been pounding on their door. The landlord has had it because he hasn't paid rent on time. He won't answer the door if the landlord is knocking. He won't return phone calls. He pushed the maintenance guy. We tried to do a [court petition] because we really felt he was a danger to himself and to others. [Taylor]

An involuntary commitment involved a medication order. This produced mental clarity that made it possible for case managers to normalize tenants upon release. Housing First providers coupled involuntary commitment with representative payeeship:

> I had a guy who was refusing meds. He wasn't paying rent. He ended up having to go inpatient. The landlord continued to work with him because he knew we were involved. He got to a point, 'If this man doesn't have a payee, I'm not going to rent to him any longer.' So, while he was at the hospital the psychiatrist put in for him to have a payee. We got approved. Since we are able to pay his rent, the landlord continues to work with him. [Christie]

Housing First providers used involuntary hospitalization as a last resort. Upon release, state authorities mandated medication compliance. If a tenant refused medication, then their case manager contacted the county sheriff who immediately returned them to the psychiatric hospital. Unlike representative payeeship, which accommodated service-resistant tenants, involuntary hospitalization rendered non-transactionable clients pliable to discipline by forcefully changing

their consciousness. In this regard, inclusive repression supplemented discipline by curtailing negative liberty to create subjectivities that could be normalized.

Conclusion

Recent scholarship shows urban governing coalitions pragmatically control homeless bodies (Grainger 2021a). That research has focused on the coordination of repressive and supportive interventions. For example, Stuart (2016) observed law enforcement officers use repressive tactics to steer the homeless toward rehabilitative services. Hennigan and Speer (2019) found emergency shelter providers evict homeless encampments. Both studies show governing coalitions exercise agency by using different interventions to advance jointly defined ends. This paper extends that insight by examining hybrid governance by Housing First providers. Housing First is a governmentality that defines the ends and means of homeless management. I showed, like the emergency shelter providers described in Hennigan and Speer (2019), Housing First providers use multiple techniques to control homeless service recipients. I advance Hennigan and Speer (2019) by showing homeless service providers use discipline and repression to grow private landlord profit and manage their caseload.

Furthermore, this paper extends critical research on Housing First. Parsell and Marston (2016) define Australian Housing First as "justified paternalism" because it centers the goals of service recipients. Hennigan (2017) challenges the relevance of that claim to U.S. Housing First by showing case managers use client-centered interventions to establish trust that is exploited to discipline tenants for private landlords. Hansen Löfstrand and Juhila (2012) extend Hennigan's analysis by showing Housing First advocates repressive and disciplinary interventions. I advance Hansen Löfstrand and Juhila's insight with a theoretical model that nests Housing First case management in urban political economy and by presenting interview data that details various

techniques that case managers use to govern homelessness. My analysis shows that, although case managers help clients recover from a life-threatening trauma, the political economy of U.S. Housing First problematizes its definition as voluntary care. For this reason, I extend Wolch (1990) by reconceptualizing U.S. Housing First as a publicly subsidized property management service whose practitioners are funded by the neoliberal state to pragmatically buttress urban political economies.

Lastly, I advanced scholarship on repressive governance by identifying inclusive functions of force. U.S. scholars have documented the use of exclusionary repression to bolster urban political economies by banishing the homeless from prime spaces (Davis 1990; Mitchell 2003; Smith 1996). This disenfranchises the homeless by denying their right to occupy public space(s). My findings show Housing First providers disenfranchise service recipients to prevent reentry to homelessness by sustaining rental market exchanges. Critics may equate inclusive repression to coercive care. Although inclusive repression and coercive care share a similar form, they differ in function: coercive care sustains the homeless by forcing them to accept rehabilitative services (Stuart 2016) while inclusive repression buttresses urban political economies by curtailing the liberty of service recipients. In this regard, inclusionary repression serves explicit institutional functions that coercive care does not.

My findings suggest three directions for future research. I conducted this study in the U.S. where policymakers adopted Housing First to promote economic growth through public expenditure reduction. This begets austere homeless policies that constrain Housing First providers and direct case management practices. A dearth of research has examined Housing First both within and across welfare regimes to understand the impact macropolitical constraints on case management (Johnson, Parkinson, and Parsell 2012; Lancione, Stefanizzi, and Gaboardi

2018). Future research could close this knowledge gap comparative case studies. In addition, I conducted this research in a loose rental market where case managers could rely on rental vouchers to rehouse service recipients and therefore had flexibility to initially pursue disciplinary interventions. This field site differs from those where supply constraints force Housing First providers to use alternative means to rehouse the homeless (Anderson-Baron and Collins 2019; Johnson, Parkinson, and Parsell 2012); however, the paucity of research on this topic means housing scholars lack knowledge about the range of tactics that case managers use to accommodate or challenge supply-side constraints. Future research could examine Housing First case management in tight rental markets to determine if macroeconomic constraints produce different techniques of governance. Third, I neglected the experience of Housing First tenants in this paper. This leaves unanswered questions regarding how service recipients interpret and respond to U.S. Housing First case management. Future research could examine the techniques that Housing First recipients use to accommodate or resist disciplinary interventions across international settings.

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