The metaphysical case for luck egalitarianism

Knight, C. (2006) The metaphysical case for luck egalitarianism. Social Theory and Practice, 32(2), pp. 173-188. (doi: 10.5840/soctheorpract200632212)

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The article defends the concept of luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism states that social and economic inequality is justifiable only if the person concerned is responsible for their position. If birth, circumstance or disability results in inequality, then the person is entitled to compensation. Metaphysical arguments are often used to dispute luck egalitarianism. Arguments have been made that given metaphysical libertarianism, i.e. people have free will, those who are inherently lazy or reckless are just as deserving of compensation as the disabled. The article argues that luck egalitarianism can respond to metaphysical concerns by its superior accounting of the role of responsibility, which can be judged by an educated guess.

Item Type:Articles
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Knight, Dr Carl
Authors: Knight, C.
College/School:College of Social Sciences > School of Social and Political Sciences > Politics
Journal Name:Social Theory and Practice
Publisher:Philosophy Documentation Center
ISSN (Online):2154-123X
Copyright Holders:Copyright © 2006 Social Theory and Practice
First Published:First published in Social Theory and Practice 32(2): 173-188
Publisher Policy:Reproduced in accordance with the publisher copyright policy

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