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1 **Assessing potential routes of *Streptococcus agalactiae* transmission between dairy herds**
2 **using national surveillance, animal movement and molecular typing data**

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6 Mikhail Churakov^{a,1}, Jørgen Katholm^b, Simon Rogers^c, Rowland R. Kao^{a,d}, Ruth N. Zadoks^{a,e,f,*}

7 ^a Institute of Biodiversity, Animal Health and Comparative Medicine, University of Glasgow,
8 G61 1QH, Glasgow, UK

9 ^b DNA Diagnostic A/S, Voldbjergvej 14, DK-8240 Risskov, Denmark

10 ^c School of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK

11 ^d Royal (Dick) School of Veterinary Studies and Roslin Institute, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh,
12 EH25 9RG, UK

13 ^e Moredun Research Institute, Pentland Science Park, Penicuik, EH26 0PZ, UK

14 ^f Sydney School of Veterinary Science, Faculty of Science, University of Sydney, Camden NSW 2570,
15 Australia

16

¹ Present address: Department of Animal Nutrition and Management, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU), Box 7024, SE-750 07 Uppsala, Sweden

* Corresponding author. Email address: ruth.zadoks@sydney.edu.au (R. N. Zadoks).

17 **Abstract**

18 *Streptococcus agalactiae*, also known as group B Streptococcus (GBS), is a pathogen of humans and
19 animals. It is an important cause of mastitis in dairy cattle, causing decreased milk quality and quantity.
20 Denmark is the only country to have implemented a national surveillance and control campaign for
21 GBS in dairy cattle. After a significant decline in the 20th century, prevalence has increased in the 21st
22 century. Using a unique combination of national surveillance, cattle movement and molecular typing
23 data, we tested the hypothesis that transmission mechanisms differ between GBS strains that are almost
24 exclusive to cattle and those that affect humans as well as cattle, which would have implications for
25 control recommendations. Three types of *S. agalactiae*, sequence type (ST) 1, ST23 and ST103 were
26 consistently the most frequent strains among isolates obtained through the national surveillance
27 programme from 2009 to 2011. Herds infected with ST103, which is common in cattle but rarely found
28 in people in Europe, were spatially clustered throughout the study period and across spatial scales. By
29 contrast, strains that are also commonly found in humans, ST1 and ST23, showed no spatial clustering
30 in most or any years of the study, respectively. Introduction of cattle from a positive herd was associated
31 with increased risk of infection by *S. agalactiae* in the next year (risk ratio of 2.9 and 4.7 for 2009–
32 2010 and 2010–2011, respectively). Moreover, mean exposure to infection was significantly higher for
33 newly infected herds and significantly lower for persistently susceptible herds, as compared to random
34 simulated networks with the same properties, which suggests strong association between the cattle
35 movement network and new infections. At strain-level, new infections with ST1 between 2009 and
36 2010 were significantly associated with cattle movements, while other strains showed only some degree
37 of association. Sharing of veterinary services, which may serve as proxy for local or regional contacts
38 at a range of scales, was not significantly associated with increased risk of introduction of *S. agalactiae*
39 or one of the three predominant strains on a farm. Our findings support the reinstatement of restrictions
40 on cattle movements from *S. agalactiae* positive herds, which came into effect in 2018, but provide
41 insufficient evidence to support strain-specific control recommendations.

42 **Keywords:** Mastitis, Multilocus sequence typing, Network analysis, Disease transmission, Spatial
43 clustering

44 **Introduction**

45 *Streptococcus agalactiae* is an important pathogen of humans, fishes, and dairy cattle. In people, *S.*
46 *agalactiae*, better known as group B *Streptococcus* (GBS), is a major cause of neonatal infectious
47 disease in the Western world and an emerging invasive pathogen in adults worldwide (Skoff et al.,
48 2009). Most recently, it has been recognized as a cause of foodborne disease in Southeast Asia
49 associated with consumption of raw fish (Barkham et al., 2019). The organism is carried
50 asymptotically by a large proportion of the adult population, both males and females, primarily in
51 the gastro-intestinal and urogenital tract but also in the oropharynx and on the skin (Bliss et al., 2002;
52 Cobo-Ángel et al., 2019; Van Der Mee-Marquet et al., 2008). In dairy cattle, *S. agalactiae* is known as
53 a cause of intramammary infection, resulting in decreased milk quality and quantity, whence it derives
54 its name. *Streptococcus agalactiae* is often described as an “obligate intramammary pathogen” in the
55 mastitis literature (Mweu et al., 2012a). This characterisation is inaccurate because *S. agalactiae* is also
56 present in other host species, including dogs and cats, and people on dairy farms (Cobo-Ángel et al.,
57 2019; Lämmle et al., 1998; Sørensen et al., 2019). Moreover, it has been detected in bovine faeces in
58 studies in North America (Manning et al., 2010), South America (Cobo-Ángel et al., 2018) and Europe
59 (Jørgensen et al. 2016); in extramammary body sites of cattle such as the throat or vagina (Jørgensen et
60 al. 2016); and in the dairy farm environment (Jørgensen et al. 2016; Cobo-Ángel et al., 2018), showing
61 that mammary, extramammary and environmental sources of *S. agalactiae* may co-exist.

62 For control of pathogen transmission, it is important to understand the sources and pathways that
63 contribute to dissemination of the organism. In veterinary medicine, the prevailing paradigm guiding
64 GBS control is that it is a contagious pathogen, transmitted from infected individuals to susceptible
65 individuals, whereby the individual can be an animal (within-herd transmission) or a herd (between-
66 herd transmission). Within herds, transmission to susceptible individuals happens as a result of indirect
67 contact during the milking process, e.g., via the milking machine, milkers’ hands, or towels used to
68 clean the teats of multiple animals. The risk of transmission can be reduced through use of sanitizer,
69 gloves, and single use towels during milking, as well as post-milking disinfection of teats to kill bacteria
70 left on teat skin (Schukken et al., 2013). In addition, infected cows can be detected and removed through

71 antimicrobial treatment or culling (Edmondson, 1989; Erskine and Eberhart, 1990; Loeffler et al., 1995;
72 Neave et al., 1969). Antibacterial treatment of GBS mastitis is highly efficacious, with cure reported in
73 more than 96% of affected cows both in lactation (Erskine et al. 1996) and during the dry period (Sol
74 & Melenhorst, 1990; Timone et al., 2018). In Denmark, where selective rather than blanket dry cow
75 treatment with antimicrobials is the standard, the proportion of dry cow treatments is not associated
76 with the likelihood of herd-level recovery from GBS mastitis (Skarbye et al., 2021). Poor control of
77 animal-to-animal transmission within herds leads to greater numbers of infected cows, which increases
78 the risk of transmission between herds, as well as the probability of subsequent animal-to-animal
79 transmission in the recipient herd. In many countries, control of *S. agalactiae* mastitis based on the
80 principles of preventing within- and between-herd transmission has been highly successful (Bauman et
81 al., 2018; Jørgensen et al., 2016; Sampimon et al., 2009).

82 In Denmark, an initial sharp reduction in herd-level prevalence of *S. agalactiae* from approximately
83 40% in the beginning of the program in 1960s to 1% in 1989 was followed by an increase in prevalence
84 to almost 5% (Mweu et al., 2012a), and similar trends have been noted in other northern European
85 countries (Jørgensen et al., 2016; Katholm et al., 2012). The gradual increase in prevalence could be
86 associated with a range of causes, including changes in host susceptibility, herd management or
87 pathogen characteristics. Management changes have occurred in association with increasing herd sizes,
88 increased used of automated milking systems, and increased pressure to limit the use of antimicrobials,
89 all of which may contribute to increased opportunities for within-cow and within-herd persistence of *S.*
90 *agalactiae* infections (Mweu et al., 2012a). Another possible explanation for the limited success of
91 control efforts would be that they are premised on incorrect assumptions with regards to infection
92 epidemiology. Analysis of annual surveillance data for *S. agalactiae* and animal movement records
93 from Denmark showed that the risk of new infection was higher in the period 2005 to 2009 than in the
94 period from 2000 to 2004 but this was not linked to annual movement-related risks, which were the
95 same across both periods (Mweu et al., 2013). This implies that animal movements are not the only
96 route of introduction of *S. agalactiae* infections into previously *S. agalactiae*-free herds and raises the
97 question whether other sources, notably humans, could play a role in introduction of the organism in

98 susceptible herds. Indeed, there is growing evidence that transmission between people and cattle may
99 occur (Cobo-Ángel et al., 2019; Dogan et al., 2005; Sørensen et al., 2019). A similar phenomenon has
100 been described for *Staphylococcus aureus*, which is also a commensal and pathogen of people and
101 animals, including dairy cattle. For *S. aureus*, both cattle movements and contacts via farm visitors were
102 shown to play a role in its spread between farms (García Álvarez et al., 2011).

103 Within multi-host pathogens like *S. aureus* and *S. agalactiae*, specialist and generalist strains may exist,
104 i.e., strains adapted to a single host species and those that are commonly found in multiple host species,
105 respectively (Richards et al., 2019; Richardson et al., 2018). For example, studies based on multi-locus
106 sequence typing (MLST) have identified *S. aureus* sequence type (ST)151 and ST425 and *S. agalactiae*
107 ST67 and ST103 as primarily cattle-associated, whereas *S. aureus* ST389 and *S. agalactiae* ST23 are
108 generalist strains that can be found in humans, cattle and other host species (Delannoy et al., 2013;
109 Richardson et al., 2018; Zadoks et al., 2011). It seems reasonable to postulate that transmission patterns
110 differ between specialist and generalist strains, whereby cattle-adapted strains would depend on cattle
111 contacts for transmission whereas generalist strains could be introduced from other sources.
112 Introduction of human strains of *S. agalactiae* into dairy herds may explain its presence in the absence
113 of animal-movement related risks (Dogan et al., 2005; Jensen, 1980). In Denmark, 71% of *S. agalactiae*
114 found in bulk tank milk belonged to ST1, ST23 or ST103 (Zadoks et al., 2011). ST1 and ST23 are host
115 generalists that are also commonly found in people and, in the case of ST23, in a range of terrestrial
116 mammals, aquatic mammals, and cold-blooded species, whereas ST103 is primarily found in bovine
117 milk (Lyhs et al., 2016; Richards et al., 2019; Yang et al., 2013).

118 The aim of this study was to use the unique combination of annual national surveillance data for *S.*
119 *agalactiae* and detailed animal movement records as available in Denmark to determine whether spatial
120 distribution and network measures differed between dominant strains of *S. agalactiae*. The underlying
121 biological hypothesis was that the distribution of the specialist strain ST103 would be driven by animal
122 movements, whilst the distribution of generalist strains ST1 and ST23 would be less dependent on
123 animal movements with other plausible routes of transmission being potentially of more importance.
124 Such knowledge could be used to inform *S. agalactiae* control policies in Denmark and other countries.

125 **Materials and methods**

126 *Surveillance data*

127 Annual routine surveillance for *S. agalactiae* in the Danish dairy industry has been in place since 1995.
128 Bulk tank milk (BTM) samples from each dairy cattle herd are collected once each year during the
129 period from September to December (inclusive). Samples included in the current study were those from
130 the annual collection periods in 2009, 2010 and 2011 (Additional information S.1; Figure S.1). Some
131 follow-up sampling for 2011 was conducted in 2012, not to determine herd infection status (which was
132 defined by the annual surveillance results) but to obtain bacterial isolates for molecular typing
133 (Additional information S.1; Figure S.2).

134 During the collection of milk from the bulk tank, the first 30 litres of milk are routinely flushed through
135 the milk hose and pipes in order to avoid false positive test results for *S. agalactiae* due to potential
136 contamination by milk residues from previously visited herds (Andersen et al., 2003). Then, 60 ml of
137 milk was extracted and stored in plastic test tubes that were immediately stored on ice. In the next 24
138 hours the samples were delivered to Steins Laboratory A/S (Hjalttesvej 8, 7500 Holstebro, Denmark)
139 for examination.

140 Until the end of 2009, surveillance in Denmark was based on bacteriological culture, using standard
141 methodology for BTM testing (Mweu et al., 2012b). In addition, real-time PCR (PathoProof Mastitis
142 PCR, Finnzymes, Oy, Espoo, Finland) started to be used for BTM screening in 2009. PCR became the
143 standard surveillance method in September 2010. Based on latent class analysis, real-time PCR has
144 higher sensitivity but lower specificity than bacteriological culture, whereby high sensitivity is desirable
145 during an eradication program aimed at detection of every positive herd. However, confirmation by
146 bacteriological culture was considered advisable for herds with high Ct values (Mweu et al., 2012b).

147 Cases were defined as herds that were GBS positive by PCR, bacterial culture, or both during the annual
148 surveillance period, regardless of the availability of a cultured isolate for molecular characterization.
149 Potential false-positive results due to carry-over between farms (Andersen et al., 2003) were identified
150 using data on the milk collection route and the following criteria: (1) The same ST was identified in the

151 suspected source herd and the potential recipient of a carry-over event; (2) The pathogen load was
152 lower, i.e. the Ct value was higher, for the suspected recipient than for the suspected source of a carry-
153 over event; and (3) The source herd was persistently infected (GBS positive in multiple years), whereas
154 the recipient herd was not persistently infected (only GBS positive on a single occasion). Herds
155 identified as false positives (n = 14, 6 and 22 for 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively) were excluded
156 from subsequent analysis (Additional information S.2; Figure S.3).

157 Attempts to determine MLST profiles using DNA extracted from BTM were not successful (data not
158 shown). Isolates of *S. agalactiae* obtained through bacterial culture were sent to the Moredun Research
159 Institute, where conventional MLST was performed (Jones et al., 2003) or material was prepared for
160 high-throughput MLST (HiMLST) at Streeklab Haarlem, The Netherlands (Boers et al., 2012). Within
161 dairy herds in northern Europe, a single ST of *S. agalactiae* dominates, with occasional occurrence of
162 a single locus variant of the dominant ST. This has been demonstrated in cross-sectional and
163 longitudinal studies in Denmark (Mahmmod et al., 2015), Finland (Lyhs et al., 2016) and Norway
164 (Jørgensen et al., 2016) and is also supported by high resolution typing using whole genome sequencing
165 (Sørensen et al., 2019). Therefore, a single isolate per year was used to determine each herd's ST.
166 Results from the current study confirm this pattern, as the same ST was identified on two or more
167 occasions within a herd for 21 of 22 herds where multiple isolates were evaluated within a single year
168 (Additional information S.3). Likewise, when looking at ST results from consecutive surveillance
169 rounds, results were generally consistent across year. On this basis, missing ST data for PCR-positive,
170 culture-negative BTM samples from annual surveillance rounds were inferred from available ST data
171 from the same herd. In rare cases, assigning STs for confirmed infected herds was not straightforward
172 and the detailed procedures are described in the Supplementary Material (Additional information S.3,
173 Table S.1).

174 *Farm location, animal movement and veterinary practice data*

175 Herd-level data were extracted from the Danish Cattle Database, which allowed us to determine spatial
176 locations of positive and negative herds in 2009, 2010 and 2011, the three years for which molecular
177 typing data were generated. Cattle movement data from 2009 through 2011 were obtained from the

178 Central Herd Register (Danish Veterinary and Food Administration, Glostrup, Denmark) that captures
179 all livestock movements within Denmark on a daily basis. We excluded cattle movements to abattoirs
180 because they were assumed to pose no risk of onward transmission, while movements to and from other
181 agricultural holdings were kept, including movements of young animals that do not produce milk but
182 may carry *S. agalactiae* ((Jørgensen et al., 2016)).

183 We also retrieved a list of registered veterinary practices for each herd and corresponding start and end
184 dates of herd registration with each practice. Data on veterinary practices were used to construct a
185 contact network where a link connects two nodes if the corresponding herds shared the same veterinary
186 practice during the time period of interest. We primarily consider the veterinary contact network as a
187 marker for broader types of professional connections such as sharing of farming equipment, pastures,
188 relief workers, milk or cattle hauliers (García Álvarez et al., 2011), although such connections may exist
189 at a range of spatial scales that differ from those of veterinary contact networks, as shown in Sweden
190 (Olofsson et al., 2014).

191 *Spatial clustering analysis*

192 In order to assess spatial distributions of *S. agalactiae* positive herds and individual STs, we tested for
193 their spatial clustering using Ripley's K function (Ripley, 1981). The function counts the number of
194 cases within a given distance and compares it to the expected number of cases based on a spatially
195 random point pattern. If the number of cases within a given distance of each individual case is greater
196 than that for a random distribution, the distribution is considered clustered. If the number is smaller, the
197 cases are dispersed. Otherwise, if there is no significant difference from the random distribution, the
198 cases are randomly distributed. Ripley's K function is generally calculated at multiple distances to
199 highlight changes in point pattern distributions with spatial scale, e.g., at small distances points could
200 be clustered, while they could be dispersed at a larger scale.

201 The difference between K functions for cases (positive herds regardless of ST or, for ST-specific
202 analysis, herds infected with a particular ST) and controls (all other herds, including *S. agalactiae*
203 negative herds) was used here to account for the heterogeneous underlying population at risk. We also

204 generated 1000 random ST distributions for fixed herd locations, maintaining the proportion of herds
205 per ST as observed in the dataset. Then we compared the test statistic (difference of K functions)
206 between the observed and simulated ST distributions. Significant clustering of cases is detected if the
207 test statistic for the observed data is higher than for the majority (95% in this case) of randomly
208 generated data. The analysis was performed in R (R Core Team, 2019) using smacpod (French, 2018)
209 and spatstat (Baddeley and Turner, 2005) packages.

210 *Network analysis*

211 The role of particular contacts between dairy herds in pathogen transmission can be assessed using
212 network analysis. In this paper, we considered two types of networks corresponding to cattle movements
213 and shared veterinary services, respectively. The sharing of veterinary services was used as a proxy for
214 other service provider contacts and do not necessarily imply the veterinary visits as the mode of
215 transmission.

216 *Movement network construction*

217 From detailed records of cattle relocation, we derived the number of cows that were in herd A and then
218 appeared in herd B (via direct movement or an intermediate dairy/non-dairy farm, market, etc.) within
219 a pre-defined time period. Dates of first BTM milk samples of national surveillance in each year (19
220 October 2009, 18 October 2010, and 30 August 2011) determined the two time periods used for the
221 construction of movement networks. The networks for 2009–2010 and 2010–2011 were defined by the
222 following rule: we add an edge to the network if during the considered period there are records that a
223 cow left herd A, entered another herd B, and these events are ordered chronologically. Thus, we capture
224 potential transfer of bacteria from one herd to another, including via cows that could have visited
225 intermediate agricultural premises. The constructed networks assumed that the chance of getting
226 infected with *S. agalactiae* while in transit between herds (e.g., at a market or on communal pasture) is
227 negligible due to a relatively short time and limited number of such movements.

228 *Veterinary network construction*

229 Veterinary networks were based on shared veterinary services, with time periods and nodes defined as
230 described for movement networks. Links connected each pair of herds that shared a veterinary practice
231 at some point during the specified period, thus, these networks were bidirectional as opposed to the
232 movement networks. Also, the constructed veterinary networks were denser than the movement
233 networks, i.e., had more connections on average.

234 *Risk ratio analysis*

235 The risk of becoming infected after having contact with another infected farm can be assessed using the
236 contingency table (Table 1) that summarises possible outcomes for a previously negative farm.

237 **Table 1.** Contingency table for risk analysis. We considered the number of newly infected herds (or
238 absence thereof) given absence/presence of incoming links from previously infected herds.

	Event (infection of previously negative farm)	No event (farm stays negative)
Treatment (link from infected farm)	<i>a</i>	<i>b</i>
Control (no links from infected farms)	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>

239

240 We calculated the risk ratio (RR) to assess the increase of probability of infection in herds due to an
241 incoming link from an infected herd, i.e., a cattle movement (unidirectional) or the presence of a shared
242 veterinary service (bidirectional). The calculations were performed using the epitools R package
243 (Aragon, 2017). The risk ratios were estimated using unconditional maximum likelihood and the
244 confidence intervals were estimated using a normal approximation. In terms of the contingency table
245 from Table 1,

$$RR = \frac{\text{risk of event in trt}}{\text{risk of event in ctrl}} = \frac{\text{prob of infection given link}}{\text{prob of infection with no link}} = \frac{a/(a + b)}{c/(c + d)}$$

247 *Mean exposure analysis*

248 Animal movement and other contact networks, such as those based on shared service providers, have
 249 been previously considered in relation to pathogen transmission between dairy cattle herds (García
 250 Álvarez et al., 2011; Rossi et al., 2017). We developed a similar approach to compare mean exposure
 251 E via links from infectious herds between t_1 (e.g., herd survey in 2009) and t_2 (e.g., herd survey in 2010)
 252 for newly infected (NI: negative at t_1 and positive at t_2) and persistently susceptible (PS: negative at
 253 both t_1 and t_2) herds:

$$254 \quad E(NI) = \frac{\text{number of links from infected herds at } t_1 \text{ to NI herds at } t_2}{\text{number of NI herds at } t_2} = \frac{a}{a + c}$$

$$255 \quad E(PS) = \frac{\text{number of links from infected herds at } t_1 \text{ to PS herds at } t_2}{\text{number of PS herds at } t_2} = \frac{b}{b + d}$$

256 In the original paper (García Álvarez et al., 2011), the authors generated randomly simulated networks
 257 to assess whether the observed network was significantly different from them in terms of transmission
 258 potential. Here, we generated 20,000 random networks by permuted nodes instead, which is effectively
 259 equivalent to permuting links and also allowed us to preserve all network properties of simulated
 260 networks.

261 To compare results for different years and individual STs, we calculated the proportion P of simulated
 262 mean exposure values that were below the mean exposure for the observed data, both for NI and PS
 263 herds. We assumed a strong association between pathogen transmission and the network under
 264 consideration if $P(NI)$ was higher than 0.95 and $P(PS)$ was lower than 0.05, i.e., observed mean
 265 exposure was significantly higher for NI herds and significantly lower for PS herd compared to
 266 simulated data. Alternative outcomes including those with $P(NI) > 0.95$ but $P(PS) > 0.05$, and $P(NI) <$
 267 0.95 but $P(PS) < 0.05$ were assumed to be insufficient to conclude association of the modelled network
 268 structure with transmission.

269 **Results**

270 *Molecular characterization of isolates*

271 Population composition of *S. agalactiae* isolated from annual BTM samples was largely consistent
272 between years with three predominant strains ST1, ST23 and ST103 (Figure 1). MLST results were
273 available for 62% (195 of 316), 65% (185 of 284) and 73% (165 of 221) of positive herds in 2009, 2010
274 and 2011, respectively (with 4258, 4091, and 3918 tested, respectively).

275 *Spatial clustering of infected herds*

276 We tested for spatial clustering of positive herds among all registered dairy herds in Denmark. Our
277 results (Figure 2, upper graphs) suggest significant clustering in 2010, no significant clustering in 2011
278 and an intermediate result in 2009, when evidence for clustering was only seen at certain spatial scales.

279 For spatial clustering analysis of individual STs, we present results for the three predominant strains
280 ST1, ST23, ST103. Results for STs that had more than 10 cases over the three years (ST2, ST8, ST9,
281 ST19, ST88 and ST314) can be found in the Supplementary Material (Additional information S.4; Figure
282 S.4). STs that did not have enough cases for the analysis were not examined individually.

283 Results of K-function analysis (Figure 2, lower graphs) showed herds infected with ST103 were
284 spatially clustered in each year, whereas herds infected with ST23 were not spatially clustered in any
285 year. Herds with ST1, which is the most prevalent ST, showed variable levels of clustering, similar to
286 the overall results for *S. agalactiae* positive herds.

287 *Infection probabilities*

288 In Table 2, we present calculated probabilities of a farm to stay susceptible, become infected, clear
289 infection, etc. The probability of becoming positive was low and decreased from 3.1% in 2009–2010 to
290 2.1% in 2010–2011. Farms infected with *S. agalactiae* are almost equally likely to recover in the next
291 year (~45%) or stay infected (~50%), with around 4.5% of farms being de-registered from the official
292 database. Probability to stay infected with the same ST (calculated relative to the number of herds
293 infected with that ST rather than to the number of herds that stayed infected with GBS; Table 2) was

294 59% and 51% in 2009–2010 and 2010–2011, respectively. For major STs, this probability was even
 295 higher. Note that we did not account for positive herds with missing ST data, i.e., if a herd was first
 296 infected with ST103 and positive in the subsequent year but with no ST assigned, it will be counted as
 297 a herd that stayed infected but not with the same ST, so persistence at ST-level may have been
 298 underestimated. Infection and recovery rates were similar across years for ST1 and ST23, but differed
 299 between years for ST103, with higher risk of becoming infected and higher risk of staying infected in
 300 the second year of the study.

301 **Table 2.** Infection, recovery, and closure probabilities for Danish dairy herds relative to their
 302 *Streptococcus agalactiae* status during annual bulk milk surveillance. We calculated probabilities of
 303 changing a status (negative, positive, positive with known ST, positive with missing ST, infected with
 304 ST1, ST23, ST103, closure of farm) for 2009–2010 and 2010–2011.

Previous state	Probability	2009–2010	2010–2011
Negative	Stay susceptible	0.92	0.93
Negative	Become infected	0.031	0.021
Negative	Become infected with ST1	0.0025	0.0026
Negative	Become infected with ST23	0.0013	0.0011
Negative	Become infected with ST103	0.001	0.0021
Negative	Closure after being negative	0.046	0.049
Positive	Stay infected	0.51	0.5
Positive	Recover	0.45	0.46
Positive	Closure after being positive	0.041	0.042
Positive with ST	Stay infected with the same ST	0.59	0.51

Any	Closure (removed from the register)	0.045	0.046
ST1	Stay infected with ST1	0.66	0.59
ST1	Recover from infection with ST1	0.24	0.24
ST1	Closure after infection with ST1	0.04	0.061
ST1	Stay infected but with another ST	0.02	0.06
ST1	Stay infected but with unidentified ST	0.04	0.04
ST23	Stay infected with ST23	0.59	0.61
ST23	Recover from infection with ST23	0.23	0.22
ST23	Closure after infection with S23	0.023	0.028
ST23	Stay infected but with another ST	0.09	0.08
ST23	Stay infected but with unidentified ST	0.07	0.06
ST103	Stay infected with ST103	0.49	0.78
ST103	Recover from infection with ST103	0.43	0.087
ST103	Closure after infection with ST103	0.057	0.043
ST103	Stay infected but with another ST	0.03	0.087
ST103	Stay infected but with unidentified ST	0	0

305

306 *Analysis of cattle movements and shared veterinary services*

307 Risk ratios for *S. agalactiae* infection in Table 3 suggest that cattle movements played a role in the
308 overall pathogen spread in both time periods (risk ratios of 2.9 and 4.7, respectively; significant p-
309 values), while veterinary networks, although significant in 2009–2010, had risk ratios close to one (1.1
310 and 0.9), i.e., sharing of veterinary services increases risk of infection only marginally.

311 We also present in Table 3 risk ratios of getting infected with one of the three predominant STs given
 312 that there had been a link (cattle movement or shared veterinary service) with a farm infected in the
 313 year before. Cattle movements seem to be significantly associated with increased probability of
 314 transmission of ST1 in 2009–2010, and of ST23 and ST103 in 2010–2011. For ST103 in 2009–2010,
 315 there were no NI herds that bought cattle from herds previously diagnosed with ST103, thus risk ratio
 316 could not be calculated. The veterinary network was significant for transmission of ST1 in 2009–2010
 317 and ST23 in 2010–2011, but not for ST103 in either period. Interestingly, absolute values of risk ratios
 318 for the movement network were noticeably higher than for the veterinary one.

319 **Table 3.** Risk ratios of getting an infection with *Streptococcus agalactiae* (SAG) or its sequence types
 320 (ST) in the presence of a link from an infectious farm for movement (MOV) and veterinary (VET)
 321 networks.

Network	MOV		VET	
Measure	Risk ratio (CI)	p-value	Risk ratio (CI)	p-value
SAG in 2009–2010	2.9 (1.8-4.7) *	p = 0.00025	1.1 (1.0-1.2) *	p = 0.017
SAG in 2010–2011	4.7 (2.6-8.7) *	p = 0.000086	0.99 (0.89-1.1)	p = 0.83
ST1 in 2009–2010	17 (4.5-66) *	p = 0.0067	1.7 (1.2-2.3) *	p = 0.029
ST1 in 2010–2011	12 (1.7-85)	p = 0.086	1.2 (0.69-2.1)	p = 0.55
ST23 in 2009–2010	11 (1.7-76)	p = 0.089	0.87 (0.41-1.9)	p = 0.72
ST23 in 2010–2011	21 (3.1-150) *	p = 0.05	1.8 (1.2-2.8) *	p = 0.039
ST103 in 2009–2010	No NI herds with links		1.5 (0.66-3.3)	p = 0.43
ST103 in 2010–2011	32 (8.3-130) *	p = 0.002	1.3 (0.7-2.3)	p = 0.47

322 * Significant association between the observed network and the disease distribution ($p < 0.05$).

323 Figure 3 shows results of network analysis for the movement and veterinary networks in 2009–2010
324 and 2010–2011. Potential association between the considered network and pathogen transmission is
325 measured by comparing mean exposure to infection (via direct or indirect links from infectious herds)
326 for NI and PS herds for the observed and random simulated networks. The network is associated with
327 disease spread if mean exposure of NI herds is significantly higher than that of simulated networks (i.e.,
328 $P(NI) > 0.95$) and the mean exposure of PS herds is significantly lower ($P(PS) < 0.05$).

329 The movement networks in both time periods showed significant differences from the simulated
330 networks with higher exposure for NI herds and lower for PS herds compared to random networks. The
331 observed veterinary networks also behaved dissimilarly to the simulated networks, in both time periods
332 mean exposure of NI herds was significantly higher than expected ($P(NI) = 1$), while PS herds also had
333 abnormally higher mean exposure ($P(PS) = 1$). This is suggesting that both NI and PS herds are
334 frequently connected with previously infected ones, which is expected given high density of the
335 veterinary networks. Therefore, we can conclude that the movement networks are associated with
336 increased *S. agalactiae* infection probability but not the veterinary networks.

337 ST-specific network exposure analysis (Table 4; individual figures can be found in Additional
338 information S.5; Figure S5) showed similar but less pronounced results as those for all *S. agalactiae*
339 types combined. Mean exposure of NI herds via the movement networks was above all simulated
340 networks for all STs and both time periods, with only exception of ST103 in 2009–2010. Although ST-
341 specific analysis generally showed lower mean exposure of PS herds than for simulated networks,
342 infection association criteria for PS herds were met only by ST1 in 2009–2010. The veterinary networks
343 showed extremely high mean exposure of PS herds across STs and time periods. As a consequence,
344 there was no association with ST transmission based on our criteria, not even for STs that also showed
345 higher mean exposure of NI herds.

346 **Table 4.** Percentage of exposure to infection with *Streptococcus agalactiae* (SAG) or its sequence types
347 (ST) for simulated random networks that are smaller than the observed exposure for movement (MOV)
348 or veterinary (VET) networks. If the value for NI is above 0.95 and below 0.05 for PS herds, association
349 between the observed network and the disease distribution was significant.

Network	MOV		VET	
Measure	P(NI)	P(PS)	P(NI)	P(PS)
SAG. in 2009–2010	1*	<0.001*	1*	1
SAG in 2010–2011	1*	<0.001*	0.93	1
ST1 in 2009–2010	1*	0.03*	1*	1
ST1 in 2010–2011	1*	0.14	0.88	1
ST23 in 2009–2010	1*	0.25	0.55	1
ST23 in 2010–2011	1*	0.83	1*	1
ST103 in 2009–2010	0.93	0.19	0.91	1
ST103 in 2010–2011	1*	0.16	0.9	1

350 * Significant association between the observed network and the disease distribution ($P(NI) > 0.95$ or
351 $P(PS) < 0.05$).

352 Based on both methods, i.e., risk ratios and mean exposure, cattle movements were associated with
353 increased risk of overall *S. agalactiae* transmission in both time periods and were the likely transmission
354 route for new cases of ST1 between 2010 and 2011. Other STs also showed signs of association with
355 cattle movements but did not meet some of our criteria for significance.

356 While risk ratios of shared veterinary services for all *S. agalactiae* and ST1 in 2009–2010, and ST23 in
357 2010–2011 were significant, their absolute values were much smaller and closer to one than risk ratios
358 of movements. Moreover, network exposure analysis revealed that veterinary networks increased mean
359 exposure of PS herds to a higher extent than for NI herds, suggesting that shared veterinary practices
360 are unlikely to be associated with infection between herds or that transmission risk is low despite the
361 possibility of such transmission pathways.

362 Discussion

363 Making use of Denmark's uniquely detailed data on herd infection status with *S. agalactiae* and animal
364 movements, we show that the risk of herds becoming infected with *S. agalactiae* is significantly
365 associated with movement of animals from positive herds. In addition, we demonstrate strong spatial
366 clustering of ST103 (the third most common ST in Denmark) but not of ST23 (the second most common
367 ST in Denmark), with variable results for ST1 (the most common ST in the country; Zadoks et al.,
368 2011). This analysis extends previous work from Denmark (Mweu et al., 2012a, 2014) in several
369 respects by considering additional years (2009–2011 vs 2000–2009), more detailed movement data, and
370 strain-specific patterns for the three STs that make up ca. 70% of the bovine *S. agalactiae* population
371 in the country. It also differs from prior studies in that herd-level prevalence data up to and including
372 2009 were based on bacterial culture whereas our data on herd status for 2010 and 2011 were based on
373 PCR. The sensitivity of PCR-based *S. agalactiae* detection in bulk tank milk is considerably higher than
374 for culture, with minimal sacrifice of specificity, whereby point estimates for sensitivity and specificity
375 are 95.2% and 98.8%, respectively, for PCR compared to 68.0% and 99.7% for culture (Mweu et al.,
376 2012b). The incidence of new infections (3.1% of susceptible herds) in 2010 is relatively high compared
377 to the incidence in the preceding years (<2.3%) (Mweu et al., 2012a) and the subsequent year (2.1% in
378 this study), which may reflect the transition from culture-based screening to PCR-based screening with
379 higher sensitivity. Because of the inability to conduct MLST without positive culture results, it is not
380 known whether an association exists between ST and the probability of obtaining culture-negative,
381 PCR-positive results. The lack of ST data could be differential (linked to a specific ST) or non-
382 differential (not ST-specific). Data from a limited number of farms suggests that the average bacterial
383 load in cows infected with ST23 (three farms studied) is lower than for cows infected with ST1 (two
384 farms studied), whereas no data are available for ST103 (Mahmmod et al., 2015). No such results are
385 available at BTM level. The prevalence ratio (within-herd prevalence based on PCR relative to within-
386 herd prevalence based on culture), however, was similar for ST1 and ST23. Thus, culture negative
387 results from PCR positive samples were no more likely for ST23 than for ST1, implying non-differential
388 lack of ST data.

389 Since 2005, there has been an increase in prevalence of *S. agalactiae* positive herds in Denmark (Mweu
390 et al., 2012a, 2014). The infected bovine mammary gland is a major source of the pathogen and often
391 considered the main or even sole driver of transmission of infections. For that reason, there was a
392 prohibition in Denmark to sell cows and pregnant heifers from herds declared to be infected. This ban
393 was lifted in 2005, albeit with the obligation for farmers with infected herds to disclose their herd status
394 (Mweu et al., 2012a). Logically, it was postulated that lifting of the movement restrictions might
395 contribute to the increased herd-level incidence that was subsequently observed. Preliminary analysis
396 of the association between animal movements and herd infection status did not confirm such a link
397 (Mweu et al., 2014), a finding that is contradicted by our analysis. One possible explanation for this
398 discrepancy is the fact that we considered all individual animal movements rather than just the presence
399 or absence of any animal movements. Moreover, infection status of the source herd was taken into
400 account in our analysis, which clearly identified animal movements from infected herds as a risk factor.
401 Thus, our results support reinstatement of movement restrictions of animals from *S. agalactiae* positive
402 herds in the Danish policy. Such measures were effectively implemented in 2018 by registering as
403 infected all milk delivering herds that buy live animals from already registered infected herds.

404 ST103 is among the common STs in areas as far apart as northern Europe (Jørgensen et al., 2016; Lyhs
405 et al., 2016; Zadoks et al., 2011), China (Yang et al., 2013) and Colombia (Cobo-Ángel et al., 2019;
406 Reyes et al., 2017) but it is rarely reported in humans outside Asia. By contrast, ST1 and 23, are
407 common human carriage strains in Europe and North America (Lyhs et al., 2016; Manning et al., 2009).
408 This led us to hypothesize that transmission of ST103, but not ST1 or ST23, would be driven primarily
409 by animal movements, and that different control strategies might be required for different ST in
410 Denmark and other countries where ST103 is prevalent. The concept of strain-specific transmission
411 patterns that inform infection prevention and control measures has relevance well beyond the study
412 setting. For example, methicillin resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) ST398 is 72% less
413 transmissible than other MRSA and does not require the same infection prevention and control measures
414 in hospitals (e.g., patient isolation) as other strains (Wassenberg et al., 2011). Where livestock-
415 associated MRSA ST398 is common compared to other types of MRSA, less stringent control measures

416 for ST398 MRSA carriers could result in significant cost savings in the health care sector (Bootsma et
417 al., 2011). Conversely, where standard infection prevention and control measures are insufficient to
418 contain spread of a particular strain, additional or alternative control measures may be needed, as
419 illustrated by the emergence of the Delta strain of SARS-CoV-2 (Alizon et al., 2021; Hetemäkiet al.,
420 2021). Although the evidence for movement effect in our study (expressed as risk ratio) was strongest
421 for ST103 (higher effect estimate and lower p-value than ST1 or ST23), it was not convincingly
422 different from estimates for ST1 or ST23. ST103 did differ from ST23, and to a lesser extent from ST1,
423 in that it showed strong spatial clustering. Looking at *S. agalactiae* as a species, evidence of spatial
424 clustering was only observed in one of three years (2010) in the current study, which is consistent with
425 previous observations on lack of spatial clustering at species-level (Mweu et al., 2014). At species-
426 level, the spatial signal from ST103 would be masked by the more common types, ST1 and ST23. *S.*
427 *agalactiae*, like *S. aureus* and *Streptococcus uberis*, seems to be a more heterogeneous species than
428 previously thought, with different strains showing different transmission patterns (Zadoks et al., 2011).
429 The mechanism underpinning the observed spatial clustering is not clear. There is some suggestion that
430 ST103 may survive in the bovine gastrointestinal tract, with fecal shedding documented in Norway and
431 Colombia, even in cows without *S. agalactiae* mastitis (Cobo-Ángel et al., 2019; Jørgensen et al., 2016).
432 This could potentially indicate an environmental route of transmission for ST103, with manure of
433 carrier animals or farm run-off contributing to spread within or between farms (Jørgensen et al., 2016).
434 Despite the popular misconception that *S. agalactiae* is an obligate intramammary pathogen in the
435 context of dairy farms, the organism can survive in wastewater and aquatic environments for several
436 weeks (Jensen and Berg, 1982), theoretically creating the possibility of local dissemination. All studies
437 that identified ST103 in dairy populations were conducted with isolates collected after 2005, which is
438 due to developments in cost and availability of MLST methodology. Uniquely, archived isolates of *S.*
439 *agalactiae* are available for a period spanning more than six decades in Sweden. In this collection,
440 ST103 was first detected in 2005, despite testing of 46 isolates obtained from 1952 to 2004 (Crestani et
441 al., 2021). The origin, transmission mechanisms and evolutionary drivers behind the emergence of
442 ST103 are currently unknown. We can however hypothesize that ST103 is a newly emerged strain of
443 *S. agalactiae* with different ecology and transmission than other strains, which may explain its

444 expansion in the face of current control measures in Denmark. Without full understanding of sources
445 and transmission routes, elimination of *S. agalactiae* from the Danish dairy cattle population is likely
446 to remain an elusive goal.

447 There were slight discrepancies in ST-specific results between risk ratios and network exposure
448 analysis. Both methods assess potential association of the considered networks with disease distribution,
449 but they are fundamentally different. Risk ratio indicates differences in frequencies of infections in the
450 presence/absence of infection links for an “average individual”, while network exposure analysis aims
451 to compare the observed network with simulated random networks (with the same properties, i.e., that
452 are structurally similar) in terms of mean exposure to infection of NI and PS herds. Therefore, it is
453 possible to observe conflicting results of the two methods.

454 Sharing of veterinary services was not significantly associated with strain-specific and overall spread
455 of *S. agalactiae*. However, the transmission potential via veterinary practices and other between-herd
456 connections needs further analysis, as it could be associated with a variety of other contact types,
457 including but not limited to pasture sharing, haulier routes, or other professional networks (Oloffson et
458 al., 2014). Alternative sources of detailed contact data between dairy herds will be essential to further
459 clarify transmission routes of bovine *S. agalactiae*.

460 **Conclusions**

461 In summary, we demonstrate that strain-level analysis of spatial distributions and contact networks
462 provides enhanced insight into pathogen epidemiology and opportunities for control. Specifically, we
463 demonstrate that the spatial distribution of bovine-associated *S. agalactiae* ST103 is distinct from the
464 spatial distribution of the multi-host strain ST23, and that cattle movements are strongly associated with
465 increased risk of *S. agalactiae* transmission, especially for ST103. This study supports the reinstatement
466 of movement restrictions for live cattle from *S. agalactiae* positive dairy herds in Denmark but provides
467 insufficient evidence to make movement restrictions strain-specific. Further work would be needed to
468 understand the cause of spatial clustering of ST103, and its potential relevance to mastitis control.

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645 **Captions for Figures**

646 **Figure 1.** Sequence type (ST) distribution of *Streptococcus agalactiae* isolates collected through annual
647 bulk tank milk surveillance of all dairy herds in Denmark in 2009, 2010 ad 2011. Throughout the study
648 period, ST1, ST23 and ST103 were the most prevalent strains.

649 **Figure 2.** Spatial clustering of herds with *Streptococcus agalactiae* (top row) or its predominant
650 sequence types (ST1, ST23 and ST103; lower rows) among all registered dairy herds in Denmark using
651 K-function and annual bulk tank milk surveillance data from 2009, 2010 and 2011. Clustering is
652 detected when the K-function difference estimate for the observed distribution (red line) is significantly
653 higher than those for randomly generated distributions (shown in light grey, 90% confidence intervals
654 are in dark grey). Light red vertical lines or regions (where line density is high) indicate distances at
655 which spatial clustering is detected.

656 **Figure 3.** Summary of the exposure analysis for the movement ntework (MOV) and veterinary
657 networks (VET) during the year between annual bulk tank surveillance rounds (2009-2010, 2010-2011).
658 Mean exposure to infection (via links from infectious herds) for herds newly infected (NI) with or
659 persistently susceptible (PS) to *Streptococcus agalactiae* is compared between the observed (red dot)
660 and random simulated networks (grey dots). Mean of the simulated values is represented by a black dot.
661 Darker grey regions indicate 0.05 and 0.95 quantiles, and light grey regions indicate ranges of simulated
662 mean exposure values for NI and PS herds. Dashed black line indicates equal mean exposure for NI and
663 PS herds. Proportion P of simulated mean exposure values that were below the mean exposure for the
664 observed data are shown on the corresponding axes: NI on x, PS on y.