P, but you don't know that p

Willard-Kyle, C. (2021) P, but you don't know that p. Synthese, 199, pp. 14667-14690. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03438-4)

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Abstract

Unlike first-person Moorean sentences, it’s not always awkward to assert, “p, but you don’t know that p.” This can seem puzzling: after all, one can never get one’s audience to know the asserted content by speaking thus. Nevertheless, such assertions can be conversationally useful, for instance, by helping speaker and addressee agree on where to disagree. I will argue that such assertions also make trouble for the growing family of views about the norm of assertion that what licenses proper assertion is not the initiating epistemic position of the speaker but the (potential) resulting epistemic position of the audience.

Item Type:Articles
Status:Published
Refereed:Yes
Glasgow Author(s) Enlighten ID:Willard-Kyle, Dr Christopher
Authors: Willard-Kyle, C.
College/School:College of Arts > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Journal Name:Synthese
Publisher:Springer
ISSN:0039-7857
ISSN (Online):1573-0964
Published Online:26 October 2021
Copyright Holders:Copyright © The Author(s) 2021
First Published:First published in Synthese 199: 14667-14690
Publisher Policy:Reproduced under a Creative Commons licence

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